In the News
The U.S.-China-Taiwan Triangle: Towards
Equilibrium
by Donald S. Zagoria
Although the Taiwan Strait remains a potential flashpoint in U.S.-China
relations, the findings of a National Committee on American Foreign
Policy (NCAFP) study group on a recent trip to China and Taiwan
suggest that a tentative equilibrium among the three key players
- the U.S., China and Taiwan - may now be within sight.
The first step toward such equilibrium would be for China and
Taiwan to reach an Interim Agreement on preserving the status quo.
The basic idea behind such an agreement, long discussed in American
think tanks, is that China and Taiwan should each agree to abandon
their bottom lines - for China, the use of force; for Taiwan, a
formal declaration of independence. For a variety of reasons, largely
having to do with domestic politics, it is unlikely that Beijing
and Taipei will formally agree on this subject. But both sides now
seem to be moving towards a de facto interim agreement.
China (the PRC) will not formally renounce the option of using
force against Taiwan because it wants to maintain the threat of
military action against Taiwan in case it declares independence.
But the Chinese increasingly emphasize their desire for "peaceful"
reunification, and they increasingly rely on the economic and cultural
card - "soft" power - to win the "hearts and minds"
of the Taiwanese people. In the past year or two, Beijing has developed
a very sophisticated strategy of targeting separate constituencies
in Taiwan - businessmen, doctors, farmers, students and the opposition
Kuomintang - by reducing tariffs for Taiwan farmers, announcing
scholarships for Taiwan students, and encouraging direct party to
party contacts between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist
Kuomintang Party in Taiwan. In sum, Beijing has not abandoned "sticks"
but feels time is on its side and is increasingly using "carrots"
in its Taiwan policy. The doctrinal basis for this policy was laid
down by Hu Jintao himself with his "four nevers," the
most important of which is "never abandon faith in the Taiwan
people." And on our recent trip, PRC officials insisted that
Beijing is mainly concerned with preventing Taiwan's de jure independence,
not with pushing for immediate reunification.
In Taiwan, neither the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
nor the main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), will formally
renounce the independence option. This would be political suicide
for any Taiwanese political party. But the DPP and the KMT are closer
on the sovereignty issue than is generally recognized. The common
denominator is the belief that the 23 million people of Taiwan should
decide Taiwan's future status. Also, both major parties in Taiwan
agree on the "four no's," a pledge first made by President
Chen in 2000 not to seek to change Taiwan's name or flag or to declare
independence. Although Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian has in
the past flirted with changing the Taiwan Constitution and moving
towards de jure independence, the defeat of the DPP in the legislative
elections of December 2004, the weakening of Chen's position as
a result of corruption scandals, and American pressure have moved
Chen back closer to the center on the sovereignty issue. The centrist
position is to support neither independence nor reunification but
to accept the status quo - a position supported by the vast majority
of the Taiwan people. In our meetings in Taiwan, Chen's advisers
kept assuring us that he stands by the "four no's."
The United States, for its part, is now adeptly combining a policy
of deterrence and reassurance for both China and Taiwan. Vis-à-vis
China, the United States has convinced Beijing by a variety of actions
and policies that it will not allow it to take Taiwan by force.
Thus, the deterrence side of U.S. policy is working. At the same
time, the Bush Administration - the most pro-Taiwan administration
in recent decades - has reassured the PRC that it does not support
Taiwan independence. Indeed, this has now become part of the official
American mantra and was reiterated by President Bush in his recent
meeting with President Hu Jintao in Washington.
Vis-à-vis Taiwan, the Bush Administration, after a recent
spat over President Chen's abolition of the largely symbolic National
Unification Council, got Chen to agree to the position that the
Council was not being abolished but was simply ceasing to function.
Moreover, the United States has now gone a long way towards convincing
President Chen that it is not in the U.S.'s or Taiwan's interests
for Chen to gratuitously provoke the PRC by making statements or
adopting policies that would unilaterally alter the status quo.
So, here, too, deterrence is working. At the same time, the Bush
Administration is successfully reassuring President Chen and the
Taiwan people that it will not sacrifice Taiwan's interests in its
dealings with the mainland and that its commitments to Taiwan's
security remain intact. A new U.S. representative in Taiwan has
already played an important role in this effort.
In sum, the conditions for equilibrium in the Taiwan Strait are
now at least visible. It is possible but unlikely that President
Chen, in his remaining two years in office, can or will challenge
this equilibrium. He cannot revise the Constitution without a three-quarters
vote in the legislature; and the legislature is now controlled by
the KMT, which opposes any more constitutional changes. Also, Chen
has assured the U.S. government that in the remaining two years
of his presidency, there will be no more "surprises."
Indeed, in his most recent speeches, he has played the "democracy"
rather than the "secessionist" card against Beijing. Meanwhile,
the DPP itself is moving towards the center so as to accommodate
growing public pressure on the government to forge closer economic
links with the mainland in order to accelerate economic growth.
Taiwan's premier, Su Tseng-chang, one of the most likely DPP candidates
for president in 2008, has recently said that he may go along with
some of the decisions for economic exchange with the PRC that the
Kuomintang reached with the Chinese Communist Party. Frank Hsieh,
the former premier and another important DPP leader, has said recently
that he may decide to visit Beijing at an appropriate time.
If, as present polls suggest, the Kuomintang returns to power in
2008, this should also promote stability in the Taiwan Strait. For,
the KMT leader, Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, has already indicated
that the party will work towards improving relations with the PRC
while remaining firm on the sovereignty issue.
China, for its part, is unlikely in the short run to abandon its
"hearts and minds" strategy and will probably resume an
official dialogue with whichever party wins the Taiwan presidency
in 2008. The United States will, most certainly, continue its policy
of opposing any unilateral move by either the PRC or Taiwan to change
the status quo, as this has been the policy of seven U.S. Presidents.
This optimistic scenario does not mean that we can be complacent.
Two things could go wrong, one in the short term and a second over
the longer term. In the remaining two years of President Chen's
term, he might, out of frustration with Beijing's continuing efforts
to isolate him and China's continuing missile buildup, go back on
the "four no's" and seek to revise the Taiwan Constitution.
Such a move could produce a crisis in his relations with both the
PRC and the United States. To head off such a development, Beijing
- in its own interests - needs to enter into a dialogue with President
Chen and the DPP and start reducing the number of its missiles facing
Taiwan. The United States needs to play a more active role in bringing
about such a dialogue.
Over the longer run, Beijing could become impatient with progress
on reunification and return to a policy of threat and intimidation.
In this respect, much will depend on the political evolution of
the mainland.
Still, the prospect for greater equilibrium is there. If this
potential is translated into practice, it will go a long way towards
helping to develop a framework for a stable and cooperative U.S.-China
relationship.
__________
Donald S. Zagoria is a trustee of the NCAFP, a private American
think tank dedicated to resolving conflicts that threaten U.S. national
interests.
Nepal in Crisis
Why Americans Should Care
By Leon J. Weil
For the past several weeks the media has been transfixed by scenes
of Nepali citizens agitating for democracy. Almost daily there are
news reports of mass protests, rioting, and shootings of demonstrators
by security forces. Shocking pictures of these events have hit the
front pages of leading newspapers throughout the Country.
Why should we care so much about the fate of this poor land located
half way around the world with apparently little strategic or commercial
importance to the United States?
Well, there are two primary reasons why we should care about Nepal.
The first is they are our long time friends, and year after year
tens of thousands of Americans have enjoyed the hospitality of the
welcoming and kindly Himalayan people.
Nepal and the United States have had over a half century of extremely
cordial and friendly diplomatic relations. We were among the earliest
countries to recognize Nepal and among the earliest to have a resident
ambassador in Katmandu. Our two counties have had consistent and
parallel views on important world issues, such as maintaining the
independence of small nations threatened by aggressive neighbors,
as with Afghanistan during the Soviet attempt to crush it in the
1980's.
For over forty years Nepal steadfastly maintained full diplomatic
relations with Israel, even at a time when every other country in
South Asia not only refused to do so, but also voted with the communist
block year after year to deny Israel's credentials at the United
Nations.
Let's not forget the famous Nepalese Gurkha troops who fought courageously
side by side with the Allied forces in two world wars.
The second reason why we should care is that we have a vital interest
in seeing that Nepal does not become a helpless unstable state and
a haven for communist terrorist activity that has already spread
to areas of South Asia. It is no secret that these hostile groups
have for years been a major problem in parts of India, especially
in regions that border on Nepal.
What happened to bring this sorry situation about?
In 1990, in response to a period of popular agitation, the late
King Birendra agreed to create a new constitution and appointed
a committee of scholars to recommend reforms. The new constitution
was subsequently approved, establishing a constitutional monarchy
with political parties and a parliament elected by popular vote.
The King remained head of state, but the prime minister was head
of government. The country was jubilant and celebrated the arrival
of democracy.
Sadly, the anticipated benefits did not fully materialize, especially
for the rural communities in the western part of the country, where
the people were ignored by their government and remained mired in
illiteracy, ethnic and caste discrimination, and poverty while political
parties bickered, and their leaders constantly maneuvered for power.
These were some of the conditions that in 1996 fostered the Maoist
guerilla-based insurgency. Maoist tactics included unbelievable
cruelties-murder, rape, kidnappings, forced servitude, and extortion-
all designed to create a climate of fear and instability.
Then, in 2001, suddenly and tragically King Birendra and virtually
the entire royal family were murdered by the drug and alcohol crazed
Crown Prince, son of the monarch. Gyanendra, the sole surviving
brother of the dead king, inherited his reign under the most difficult
and trying circumstances.
Thus began a downward spiral. The parties squabbled amongst themselves,
as well as internally, splitting into factions. The Maoists took
advantage of the situation, and, feeling emboldened, spread chaos
in ever widening areas. Unable to provide effective government,
the prime minister finally went to the King and requested that the
parliament be dissolved. The King did so and charged him with the
tasks of holding new elections and solving the Maoist problem. Unfortunately,
the Prime minister, unable to accomplish either of these tasks,
was subsequently dismissed. Then followed a series of ineffective
governments leading to the notorious royal take over of February
2005 in which the King declared a state of emergency, fired the
government, and assumed direct control. For weeks, phone and internet
lines were blocked, independent news organizations were shut down,
right of assembly was suspended, and political leaders were placed
under house arrest.
Friendly governments such as the United States, India, the U. K.,
and human rights organizations were outraged. They called for the
immediate restoration of democracy, and military assistance was
suspended.
After a brief period of on and off control, the political parties
were allowed to resurface and eventually formed a seven party alliance
to provide a common voice against direct royal rule. The King remained
obstinate. The parties, despite deep misgivings about working with
the Maoists, eventually reached a tenuous agreement with them on
a twelve point program for a future government.
The seven parties then began a series of protests which have escalated
into the riots and chaos which today are tearing the country apart.
In the meantime the Maoists are biding their time, and, as many
suspect, pulling the strings.
In the last few days the King has announced major concessions and
has offered to transfer executive power to Nepal's political parties.
The proposal, although vague, is a welcome first step toward diffusing
the political crisis. Unfortunately, the parties dismissed the offer
out of hand, describing it as insufficient.
While the parties are correct to demand clarity on important details
before dropping their pressure, they should realize and accept that
a smooth transition of power will have to follow a process, and
not be simply an instantaneous event.
With that in mind, the U. S. and friendly governments should urge
the parties to respond favorably to the King's address by forming
a Cabinet-in-waiting with the mandate to immediately negotiate the
details of the transfer of power
Nepal's security forces must realize that they have a role to play
in democratic Nepal as protectors of the people and be managed by
a civilian government.
The political parties must show that they have learned from their
earlier mistakes, by not allowing personal rivalries to split the
political arena into so many pieces that effective governance becomes
impossible and credibility is lost.
The King must accept that the active role he pursued for the last
fifteen months does not fit 21st century Nepal. His transfer of
sovereignty to the people should be complete and he should focus
his attention on renewing support for the monarchy, as even a ceremonial
institution, in order to provide a climate of unity for all citizens.
Insurgency, autocracy, and poverty have brought Nepal to the brink,
but the strong spirit of its people in the struggle for democracy
shows that its future can still be bright, but only if the good
of the country is the strongest motivation of all Nepalese.
Leon J. Weil
U. S. Ambassador to Nepal (1984-87)
April 22, 2006
The Honorable Leon J. Weil is a Trustee and Executive Committee
Member of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. The
Wall Street Journal published an edited version of this essay which
was titled, "Nepal Matters," on April 24, 2006, page A14.
Echo Profile: In like Flynn
Bill Flynn's peace policy pays off
August 3, 2005
When William J. Flynn first became involved in the search for
a peaceful settlement in Northern Ireland the place looked like
the political equivalent of Florida after Hurricane Andrew. If he
had applied his industry's actuarial techniques at the time, Flynn
would have quickly concluded that becoming involved in the North's
daily strife would be a high risk, low return venture.
He jumped in anyway.
And now, close to twenty years later, Flynn is drawing a well-earned
dividend in the form of the IRA's withdrawal from war. Flynn has
dedicated his business life to turning profits and boosting shares.
Much of his own time has been dedicated to turning swords into plowshares.
At his core, Flynn is a businessman and realist more than he
is a theorist and dreamer.
And yet, his pursuit of peace brought with it the kind of risk that
only comes with chasing a dream.
Wading into the morass that is the history of Ireland and its larger
neighbor to the east was always going to result in surprises.
Last week's IRA order to dump arms was, for sure, one of the
better ones. And Flynn was ready for it.
Flynn's resume runs a long arm's length.
But to most he is known as former CEO and chairman of the Park-Avenue
based Mutual of America insurance company, and as the still active
chairman of the National Committee on America Foreign Policy, a
think-tank with far flung reach and high-placed influence.
Over the years, Flynn combined his roles in both organizations
into what became a most unusual stratagem.
He used his numerous economic, political and diplomatic connections
to engage with and hold the attention of the warring groups in Northern
Ireland and, additionally, the governments in Dublin, London and
Washington.
On a more practical level, he literally threw open the doors of
a Manhattan corporate tower to a most unusual assemblage of guests.
It was at 320 Park Avenue, Mutual's spire-topped headquarters,
that Irish president Mary Robinson shook hands with, of all people,
the hard-edged leaders of Ulster Loyalist paramilitarism. It was
as odd an encounter as it was once unimaginable.
But that meeting -- as would innumerable other events and encounters
at 320 Park -- would be simply another piece in the jigsaw assembled,
painstakingly, by Flynn and others of Irish America who passionately
believed that the United States, its prestige, and ultimately its
president, could make a real difference in Ireland.
Flynn's involvement in the quest for normality took form in
the 1980s when he offered his assistance to the Peace People group
led by Nobel Peace Prize winners Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan.
Flynn was sympathetic towards the group, but soon concluded
that more would be needed to take the cause of peace to the ultimate
level.
In the years that followed, Flynn and his colleagues at the
National Committee worked out a ten-point peace plan for the North.
It was a simple, clear and unambiguous formula. But what chance
for even a sensible plan if dropped into a boiling cauldron?
A better one if the plan for peace was delivered in person.
In Sept. of 1993, Flynn traveled to Belfast with an Irish American
delegation.
The mission would ultimately pave the way for President Bill Clinton,
but, in the shorter term, it would be seen as having a real effect
on the lives of people in the six counties.
"The IRA decided to call a ceasefire while we were there.
That sure impressed the hell out of me," Flynn said.
The positive response would lead to more visits, both for the group
and for Flynn himself.
And as political leaders argued back and forth, won office and left
office, Flynn, selling peace as he might a sound insurance policy,
emerged as a constant.
He hosted and cajoled, shook hands and scolded. Most importantly,
perhaps, he developed a reputation for a salty honesty. He had seen
enough, heard enough and wasn't afraid to speak his own mind.
"Bill has been quite unique in his willingness to use his
well earned status as an establishment figure to take a lot of risks
and be very persistent in his pursuit of a dream, the dream that
is peace," said former congressman Bruce Morrison, a member
of Flynn's peace delegation.
"In the early 1990s, his willingness to play that leading
role made a huge difference. Many would not have taken that kind
of risk at that time," Morrison said.
Flynn, for sure, brought his business edge and personal toughness
to the table.
But ultimate control would always rest in the hands of those who
were the targets of Flynn's rather singular powers of persuasion,
the IRA among them.
"These people have now had the courage to put down their arms
even though the policing problem remains unsolved," said Flynn.
Not for the first time, Flynn has been impressed by people who have
been dismissed repeatedly as being beyond the bounds of politic
reason.
But though he found himself pleasantly surprised by the content
and scope of the IRA statement, Flynn was not completely taken aback
by its naissance.
"We provided money and facilities, no matter the ups or downs,"
said Flynn of his friends, colleagues and associates.
"And we stuck with it. The secret of success is sticking with
it and never being forced to say something that you're actually
against. We Irish are splitters but the key to this was that we
did not split."
Flynn has his political expectations for the coming months. And
he also harbors a wish. He would like to be an eyewitness when the
IRA blows its arms up.
In the meantime, with the IRA's words echoing through the headlines
late last week, Bill Flynn prepared himself for a lunch.
The guest of honor would be Sinn Féin's Martin McGuinness,
but also around the table would be longtime friends, Henry Kissinger
and Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman.
"They had the greatest doubts about all this you know,"
said Flynn of his peace missions.
"Now they're coming to say we're sorry for doubting you."
Source: O'Hanlon, Ray. "Echo profile: In like Flynn."
Irish Echo, August 3, 2005.
For Full Text: www.irishecho.com.
I.R.A. Pledge Seen as Potential Model for Other Conflicts
July 30, 2005
"At a Celebratory lunch yesterday in New York, one eminent
speaker after another, from an archbishop to a former secretary
of state, rose to rejoice in the news that the Irish Republican
Army had abandoned violence and suggest that Northern Ireland could
prove an example to the world."
"[The] gathering was organized by a private foreign policy
study group, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy,
which has played an influential role in the Irish peace process
since the early 1990's."
"The main speaker at the lunch, Martin McGuinness, a former
I.R.A. commander and the chief negotiator for Sinn Fein, the political
party aligned with the I.R.A., said it was clear that democratic
institutions, created by negotiations and ratified by voters across
Ireland, could replace the armed struggle."
"The chairman of the foreign policy group, William J. Flynn,
said that people in Northern Ireland had slipped from the grip of
history not with the single declaration from the I.R.A. this week
but through a long, tedious process of replacing physical force
with democratic institutions. He and others noted that conflict
in Northern Ireland had its origins in institutional discrimination
that began almost as soon as it was split from the rest of the island
by the British in 1921."
Source: Dwyer, Jim. "I.R.A. pledge seen as potential model
for other conflicts." The New York Times. July 30, 2005,
sec A3.
UK army pulls down N. Irish watchposts to aid peace
July 29, 2005
Pulling down eight hill-top watchtowers along the Irish border
is one of the actions long demanded by Irish nationalists to normalize
life in a province slowly emerging from a 30-year conflict in which
3,600 people were killed.
"In light of yesterday's developments, the Chief Constable
and I have decided that a further reduction in (our) security profile
is possible," General Commanding Officer Reddy Watt said.
The move put pressure on the IRA to fulfill its side of the
deal by dumping the huge arsenal of guns and explosives that sustained
its fight for a united Ireland until a 1997 ceasefire.
Martin McGuinness, chief negotiator for the province's main
Catholic party, welcomed the dismantling of the watchtowers.
"(It) keeps the momentum of this going and clearly shows
that people are prepared to make a very determined effort,"
he told a National Committee on American Foreign Policy lunch in
New York.
Souce: Ginsberg, Jodie. "UK army pulls down N. Irish watchposts
to aid." Reuters, July 29, 2005.
Optimism raised on N. Korea talks, no date fixed
July 1, 2005
Informal discussions on the North Korean nuclear crisis ended
on Friday with participants optimistic that Pyongyang would return
to six-country negotiation, but no date was fixed.
The two-day closed academic conference gave the United States
and North Korea a rare opportunity to talk directly and later the
State Department said "the atmosphere was constructive."
Source: Reuters, "Optimism raised on N. Korea talks,
no date fixed." July 1, 2005.
US Department of State Daily Press Briefing
July 1, 2005
The U.S. Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani and
our Korean Affairs Director Jim Foster are attending the conference
in New York. Today is the last day of the conference; it began yesterday.
It's being hosted by the National Committee on American Foreign
Policy on issues relating to the Korean Peninsula.
We are -- all the members of the six-party talks are still waiting
to hear from North Korea, a date when they will return to the six-party
talks and engage in those talks in a constructive manner. At these
sorts of conferences, which are organized independently, there is
a natural exchange among all the attendees during the conference
presentations and discussions. And you're giving each of the participants'
opportunities to express their views on resolving the nuclear issue.
Yesterday, in the context of the seminar, there was a contact
between Mr. DeTrani and Mr. Li Gun -- this was not a negotiation.
You know, again, we will see whether North Korea responds to the
overtures of others, such as the South Koreans. They've recently
had meetings with the North Koreas, as well as the urging of all
the other members of the six-party talks, to return to those talks
and engage in a constructive manner. I would just end by saying
that the proper venue to resolve substantive issues related to North
Korea's nuclear program is in the six-party talks.
Source: McCormack, Sean. Daily Press Briefing. U.S.
Department of State, July 1, 2005.
For Full Text: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/48896.htm
US, DPRK officials hold talks in New York
July 1, 2005
Officials from the United States and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks Thursday in New York on the
prospects of resuming the six-party talks on the Korean nuclear
issue.
The officials discussed the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula
when they were attending a two-day academic conference organized
by Professor Donald Zagoria of Hunter College.
Participants at the symposium included Ri Gun, director-general
of the DPRK Foreign Ministry and negotiator on the nuclear issue,
Joseph DeTrani, the US State Department's special envoy for the
six-way talks, Jim Foster, director of the State Department's Office
of Korean Affairs, Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State,
George D. Schwab, president of the National Committee on American
Foreign Policy, and officials from South Korea and Japan.
Source: People's Daily Online. "US, DPRK official hold
talks in New York." July 1, 2005.
For Full Text: http://english.people.com.cn/200507/01/eng20050701_193541.html
New York Contacts Between Korean and U.S. Officials End with No
Clear Breakthrough
July 1, 2005
…all three sides say frank discussions were held during
the security conference, organized by the U.S. National Committee
on American Foreign Policy, none were forthcoming on the specifics
of the contacts.
The U.S. State Department confirmed that its envoy Joseph DeTrani
met with Li Gun, the Pyongyang official at the conference, but stressed
that there was no negotiating during the meeting.
"It was a contact. I'm not going to characterize it beyond
that. I have said what we and the other members of the six-party
talks continue to wait to hear from the North Koreans is that they
will return to the talks. That's what matters."
Source: The Chosun Ilbo. "Six-Party Talk Participants
Exchange Views in New York." July 1, 2005.
For Full Text: http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200507/200507030005.html
US, DPRK officials hold talks in New York
June 30, 2005
[Donald] Zagoria stressed that he is optimistic about the resumption
of the six-party talks, saying both US and DPRK officials had a
"good exchange of views."
By June last year, three rounds of the six-party talks, which
involved the DPRK, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan
and Russia, had been held. The talks have since then been stalled
as the DPRK accused the United States of adopting a hostile policy
toward Pyongyang.
To revive the talks, officials from the United States and the
DPRK held negotiations last November, December and this May respectively.
Source: Xinhua online. "US, DPRK official hold talks
in New York." June 30, 2005.
For Full Text: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-07/01/content_3161686.htm
North Korean Diplomat to Meet With US Officials and Their Allies
June 30, 2005
Also, the State Department said it had agreed to grant a visa
to Li Gun, director general of the North Korean Foreign Ministry's
North America department, so he could attend a private conference
on North Korea organized by the National Committee on American Foreign
Policy on Thursday. But the department would not say whether any
meetings were planned.
Joseph E. DeTrani, a special envoy dealing with the North Korean
talks, is also attending the conference, and on Wednesday the officials
and diplomats said he would talk with Mr. Li, along with other representatives
from Japan and South Korea.
Source: Brinkley, Joel. "North Korean Diplomat to Meet
With US Officials and Their Allies." The New York Times,
June 30, 2005, sec. A.
US Department of State Daily Press Briefing
June 30, 2005
U.S. Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani, and
Office of Korean Affairs Director James Foster are attending a conference
in New York hosted by the National Committee on American Foreign
Policy. It's an academic conference…
…officials from governments of some of the other parties
to the six-party talks, as well as others, are attending this conference,
including from North Korea.
Source: McCormack, Sean. Daily Press Briefing. U.S.
Department of State, June 30, 2005.
For Full Text: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/48858.htm
US Urges N. Korea to set talks date, mulls Rice trip
June 23, 2005
US Officials and experts are looking to an academic conference
in New York on June 30 and July 1 as the next likely point of US-North
Korea contact.
The administration has approved a visit by Ri Gun, a senior
North Korean diplomat, to attend the conference, organized by Professor
Donald Zagoria of Hunter College…..
…"It's a positive sign that they gave him a visa.
It's a positive sign that Ri's coming. He wouldn't be coming if
he had nothing to discuss," one government expert told Reuters.
U.S. experts view June and July as a critical period for efforts
to resolve the nuclear crisis peacefully.
Source: Giacomo, Carol. "US urges NKorea to set talks
date, mulls Rice trip." Reuters, June 23, 2005
North Korean Official to Visit New York
June 18, 2005
The visitor is Li Gun, North Korea's director general of North
American affairs, who requested and was granted permission to attend
the summer meeting of the private National Committee on American
Foreign Policy, said State Department spokesman Adam Ereli.
Source: Associated Press. "North Korean official to
visit New York." Jerusalem Post, June 18, 2005.
US Approves visit by senior N. Korea official to New York
June 16, 2005
The approval signaled a flexible stance over North Korea as
Washington has refused to issue an entry visa when the same official
- Ri Gun, vice-director of the North Korean Foreign Ministry's US
Affairs Department - was invited to the same forum hosted by a private
think-tank last November.
"We've approved the travel," the official said, while
maintaining a cautious stance about whether to send US officials
to the forum. "we've also been invited…[ellipsis as received]
but have not yet made our decision." Last November's rejection
came after Ri was allowed to take part in the same forum hosted
last August by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.
© Copyright 2005 British Broadcasting Corporation
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political
Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring
Source: Kyodo News Service, Tokyo, in English. June 16,
2005
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