The Middle East: Islamic Law and Peace
POLICY STATEMENT ON IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES: THE
CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE
March 2002
March 15, 2002
Dear Reader:
In view of ongoing discussions that are taking place in
the U.S. foreign policy community concerning whether the United States
should resume diplomatic relations with Iran, the National Committee on
American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) looked at this issue once again. After
debate and deliberation the NCAFP decided to issue the third and most
extensive revision of its Policy Statement on United States-Iranian
Relations, which was originally published in July 1997. Incorporating
the Committee's projections of the effects that the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, may have on U.S.-Iranian relations, the current
publication has been retitled Policy Statement on Iran and the United
States: The Challenge of the Future (March 2002) from Policy Statement
on United States-Iranian Relations: Today and Tomorrow (July 1997,
Revised April 2001).
The policy recommendations proposed in the March 2002 publication
are the same as those originally published in July 1997. In contrast,
the July 1997-April 2001 conclusions have been revised to reflect the
changes that have been made in the March 2002 publication. Nevertheless,
the original conclusions, which, the Committee believes, are still relevant,
have been reprinted in an appendix to this publication.
As it does with all its publications, the NCAFP encourages
you to read, reflect on, and discuss its Policy Statement on Iran and
the United States: The Challenge of the Future.
Sincerely,
George D. Schwab
President
Contents
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
- The United States must articulate its interests in the region of
the Persian Gulf Those interests can be summed up as follows:
- to make common cause with countries that oppose terrorism in all
its forms,
- to secure free navigation in the Persian Gulf,
- to ensure unhampered trade, including the free flow of oil,
- to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction, and,
-
to encourage the promotion and the protection of human rights
as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
-
The ultimate aim of U.S. policy toward Iran must be Iran's return
to the community of responsible nations.
-
The United States must make clear to the rulers of the Islamic Republic
as well as to the people of Iran that it is neither an enemy of Iran
nor of the Islamic religion.
-
The United States must also make clear that it will enter into a
dialogue with the government of Iran whenever that government demonstrates
a commitment to the rule of law at home and abroad.
-
Whenever appropriate, the United States should enter into unofficial
communication with Iran. The United States should encourage cultural
and educational exchanges, as it did with the Soviet Union despite
mutual enmity. In this respect, special broadcasts of news and cultural
programs to Iran would undoubtedly enhance the country's receptivity
to civil society.
-
The United States must reinvigorate its efforts with friends and
allies to coordinate policies, including those pertaining to trade.
Above all, the United States should not allow its very real concerns
about Iran's international conduct to restrict its options;
-
Under no circumstances should the United States give the impression
that it lacks resolve or favors appeasement, for such reactions would
be perceived only as weaknesses.
Introduction
Since 1979, when President Carter broke off diplomatic relations with
Iran after the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the ensuing
hostage crisis, the United States and Iran have been estranged. From the
beginning of his rule, Ayatollah Khomeini branded the United States as
the "Great Satan." Since 1993 the United States has called the Islamic
Republic a rogue or an outlaw state that sponsors international terrorism.
It imposed sanctions on Iran and Iraq in what came to be known as a "policy
of double containment." In 1996 President Clinton signed legislation designed
to strengthen the sanctions. Six years later, the State Department annual
report still includes Iran among nations that sponsor international terrorism.
Nevertheless, the reluctance of European allies to follow the U.S. lead
has prompted a number of independent think tanks to reevaluate the U.S.
stance toward Iran. In the summer of 1997 the NCAFP Persian Gulf Study
Group held a series of meetings on the subject. Outside experts were invited
to address the meetings. The results of those discussions were summarized
in a report published in July 1997 under the title "Policy Statement on
United States-Iranian Relations: Today and Tomorrow." A revised text of
this report--confirming almost all the previous conclusions of the Study
Group--was published in April 2001.
In the wake of Sepember 11, 2001, a number of political and press commentators
surmised that a change had occurred in Iran's attitude toward the United
States. Indeed President Khatami expressed dismay about the attacks against
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and communicated his condolences
to the victims' families on behalf of the people of Iran. Then, at the
beginning of the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, Iran pledged assistance
in search-and-rescue operations for any downed American pilot on its soil.
Moreover, it authorized transit flights of humanitarian assistance to
Afghanistan. Later, during a meeting at the United Nations, Iran's foreign
minister shook hands with the U.S. secretary of state for the first time
since the end of the 1979 hostage crisis. Officials at the White House
and the State Department greeted Iran's actions as signs of a desire to
cooperate in the war against global terrorism. On the basis of such information
and comments, the debate about the relationship between the United States
and the Islamic Republic of Iran apparently has been recast on new grounds.
In the 1997 report the advocates of dialogue with Iran were identified
as "engagers" and their opponents as "containers." Those appellations
have been retained in this report.
The Argument
The New Arguments of the "Engagers"
Many engagers believe that the tensions that have long strained U.S.
-Iranian relations are beginning to ease. The tone of speeches given by
high-ranking Iranian officials appears to have lost its aggressive edge
toward America. President Khatami carefully avoids any inflammatory language.
A majority of people, especially members of the younger generation, openly
express their sympathy for the United States. In the opinion of the engagers,
a balanced relationship between the two countries may gradually develop
if the United States seizes new opportunities.
Moreover, the engagers say, Iran and the United States have common enemies
arising from the new situation created by the war against global terrorism.
In fact, the Sunni Taliban, at odds with the Iranian Shiites, killed some
of Tehran's diplomats in Afghanistan. Bin Laden, also a Sunni, is not
viewed with confidence by Tehran. At another level, the Iranians (like
the Americans but for different reasons) regard Saddam Hussein with great
suspicion. It is said that Iran's casualties in the not forgotten, bloody
eight-year war that he imposed on them amounted to more than one million
dead and wounded.
In the view of engagers, President Khatarni has so far succeeded in reintroducing
Iran to the world community despite U.S. efforts to isolate it. Indeed
Iran recently signed security agreements with Saudi Arabia and improved
its relations with Bahrein, Egypt, Jordan, and a number of other Muslim
states. Also, it has strengthened its relations with the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Turkey. In the field of oil
and natural gas, it has been discussing deals with China, Japan, South
Korea, and a number of European oil companies. As a consequence some American
corporations, especially energy related companies, jointly met with the
Iranian foreign minister while he was in New York City to attend a UN
meeting. Most of those companies were already lobbying the White House
and Congress to drop the U.S. unilateral sanctions against Iran that prevent
them from signing agreements with the National Iranian Oil Company.
The engagers add that today Khatami is locked in a dangerous fight with
the religious conservatives and other anti-American elements who are blocking
his reforms and opposing his openings to the West. In the view of such
engagers, this should prompt the U.S. government to help the beleaguered
"moderate" cleric by easing tensions with Tehran and abandoning sanctions.
Khatami's fall might indeed strengthen the hard-liners and destabilize
the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, improved relations with Iran would
further isolate Iraq in the region and would therefore satisfy even the
most radical clerics of the Islamic Republic.
Since September 11, 2001, the period in which the United States has endeavored
to enlarge and strengthen its coalition in the war against terrorism,
the camp of engagers has attracted many newcomers, including politicians
and business people. The engagers are confident that the inclusion of
Iran in the coalition would be very helpful in achieving a final victory
over international terrorism and in ending the economic difficulties that
beset the United States. Not only has the camp of "engagers" increased
its ranks, but an American-Iranian lobby that is in contact with President
Khatami's government, as well as some "engagers" in U.S. business and
academic circles, is working to broaden such initiatives. The most active
lobby is the American-Iranian Council (AIC).
American-Iranian Lobbies
Founded in 1997, the American-Iranian Council became active at the turn
of the century. It engages in close relations with the Iranian government
of President Khatami, with many American Iranians who support the Islamic
Republic, and with American politicians and business people who are eager
to reestablish political and economic relations with Tehran. In the Council's
view, "the political tensions of the past decades have caused harm to
both states," and "in the long term, Iran and the United States must work
together ... to promote democracy, political stability, economic development,
and business relations." According to its founders: "Today there is a
generation of Americans and Iranians who are free from the agonizing memories
of the past. If the gulf between the two governments can be bridged, this
new generation of Iranians and Americans will be able to put the past
behind them and start afresh. The one million Iranian Americans are a
natural bridge for the purpose." The Council seeks to "promote constructive
dialogue and increased understanding and to provide a framework for cooperation
and positive change."
In December 2001 AIC organized a major conference on "Revisiting U.S.-Iran
Relations' in New York City and a fund-raising gala dinner in Washington,
D.C., to honor Dr. Madeleine Albright. In her speech the former secretary
of state "apologized" for the harni done to Iran by U.S. policies¹
and expressed the hope that relations between the two countries would
be reestablished soon. Actually Dr. Albright more or less repeated remarks
that she had made as secretary of state in 1999 after President Clinton's
observations at a "millenial" event.²
American-Iranian groups hostile to the Islamic Republic reacted by criticizing
Dr. Albright's position. In the view of those groups, which are generally
hostile to the present Iranian regime, not only did the United States
not "harm" Iran, but it often helped the besieged country, especially
during and after World War II. (They refer to 1946 when the Soviet (Red)
Army was driven out of the provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and the
United States gave financial aid to promote the economic development of
Iran.) These American-Iranian groups maintain that if anyone is obligated
to apologize, it is the present Iranian government that has "murdered"
some Americans and has held others hostage and encourages the perpetuation
of what has become a daily slogan: "Death to America." American Iranians
opposed to the theocratic regime add that a softening of American policies
toward Tehran would be dangerous at a time when younger generations, who
appear to be favorably disposed to the United States and to represent
a majority of the people, are taking to the streets and shaking the foundations
of the regime. In the opinion of these American Iranians, any friendly
gesture toward Iran in the present context would be construed by the Iranian
silent majority as American approval of the repressive regime in Tehran.
To that argument American Iranians favorable to the Islamic Republic
of Iran retort that as demonstrated by the last elections, the majority
of Iranians, including the younger generation, support President Khatami
and his "reformist" faction; the United States should therefore begin
a dialogue with the present Iranian government. American Iranians opposed
to the rule of the mullahs consider President Khatami part of the ruling
clergy. They have concluded that not only has he not delivered any of
his promised reforms after six years in power, but he has also acquiesced
in the imposition of harsher measures of repression on opponents and even
members of parliament.
The Arguments of the Containers
The arguments of American containers are slightly different from those
of American Iranians opposed to the theocratic regime. American containers
state that according to the latest State Department report on the "Patterns
of Global Terrorism," Iran is characterized as "the most active state
sponsor of terrorism." Moreover, in the annual list of human rights violators,
Iran occupies a high position. Therefore, Iran should not be rewarded
by the liffing of sanctions or given any other favor.
The containers, alluding to recent riots and demonstrations against the
theocratic regime in Tehran and other cities, have concluded that the
Iranian authorities are out of touch with the Iranian public. The majority
of Iranians are struggling very hard to feed their children while the
government is pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into its nuclear
program and other programs involving weapons of mass destruction. In addition,
when it doesn't promote terrorism, Iran provides a haven for well-known
terrorists such as the American murderer of a former Iranian diplomat
in Washington, D.C., and for Imad Mughniyeh, a founder of Hezbollah and
the mastermind behind the 1983 attacks on the marine barracks and the
American Embassy in Beirut, as well as many other anti-American terrorist
operations. Incidentally, Mughniyeh has the same American price tag on
his head as that appraised for Osama bin Laden: 25 million dollars.
The containers maintain that the recent seizure of a ship filled with
50 tons of Iranian arms bound for the Palestinian Authority highlights
Iran's active opposition to peace in the Middle East. Moreover, they reiterate
that in a sermon delivered on December 14, 2001, Hashemi Rafsanjani, former
Iranian president and current chairman of the powerful "Guidance Council,"
stated that the "vast Muslim world" could easily survive nuclear war while
"tiny Israel" would be completely destroyed. For his part, Iran's supreme
leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, speaking recently about Israel, said that
"this cancerous tumor of a state should be removed from the region." The
containers add that Iran is also arming and funding the Lebanese Hezbollah
and encouraging it and other fundamentalist organizations to conduct terrorist
and military operations against the Jewish state.
Therefore, the containers contend, rather than engage with Iran, the
United States should pressure its allies to cooperate actively in isolating
the Iranian government. They also point out that the Iranian clerics in
power continue to denounce the United States as the "Great Satan," noting
that they commemorated publicly and with pomp on November 4, 2001, as
they have every year since 1979, the seizure of both the American Embassy
and the 53 diplomats as hostages for 444 days. Speaking of the recent
antigovernment riots and demonstrations, the containers remark that the
pro-American feelings of the opponents of the regime underline the contradiction
between American ideals of democracy and individual freedoms and American
policies toward Iran. They affirm that it is the lack of American involvement
with Tehran's government that explains the Iranian people's expression
of sympathy toward the United States. Indeed in Muslim countries where
Washington supports and helps autocratic governments, the people hate
the United States. A warming of relations with the clerics in power in
Iran would not help the reformers. On the contrary, it would prolong the
life of the theocracy and the grip of the hard-liners. Time is on the
side of the modernizers, not the religious establishment. Having defeated
the mullahs in Afghanistan, the United States would put itself in an untenable
position if it were to court those in Tehran.
The containers add that Iran has not abandoned its quest for nuclear
armaments and other weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological,
and long-range missiles). In their opinion, beginning a dialogue now would
apparently yield no positive results, for it seems that neither the supreme
leader (Khamenei ) nor the president of the republic (Khatami) can deliver.
Indeed they lack the religious rank and authority to question decisions
made by Ayatollah Khomeini who not only branded the United States the
"Great Satan" but also signed the edict calling for the murder of the
British writer Rushdie.
Toward a Balanced Policy
As the revised 1997 "Policy Statement" prepared by the NCAFP Persian
Gulf Study Group indicates, a third group of experts emerged in addition
to the "engagers" and the "containers." Those experts proposed a more
nuanced and flexible approach to relations with the Islamic Republic of
Iran based on "political realism." To be sure, their views have also changed
in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United States. Although
some of their opinions reflect notable differences, one can find common
threads of agreement among them.
Most of them acknowledge the fact that since the 1990s, the Iranian people
in general and the younger generations in particular have been longing
for individual freedoms, more moderate, leadership and even some kind
of separation of government and religion. Those aspirations, which led
to the success of Khatarni in two successive presidential elections, were
apparent in 2000 and prompted the Clinton administration to seek ways
to support and strengthen their credibility. The then secretary of state,
Madeleine Albright, made overtures to the Khatami government and offered
to ease some economic sanctions as a first step. This political gesture
was not reciprocated.
Again, immediately after September 11, the Islamic Republic at first
seemed to offer help in the war against terrorism. In addition to pledging
assistance in search-and-rescue operations for downed American pilots,
it promised support for the installation of a coalition Afghan government
in the period after Taliban rule. Yet it continued to send arms to the
Lenanese Hezbollah and to the Palestinian Authority as well as to some
warlords in Afghanistan, forcing Washington to deliver a strong warning
to Tehran.
Consequently, it seems that friendly gestures toward the Islamic Republic
of Iran will not be reciprocated. The real decision makers are the hard-line
clerics around the supreme leader Khamenei and not the "reformers" in
President Khatami's cabinet.
Some experts are now wondering whether the "dialogue" sought by Iranians
linked to Khatami as well as by American engagers will ever be possible
without basic changes in Iran. As one commentator stated bluntly in a
recent column, helping Iran to achieve "moderation" requires a "careful
reading of whether the Iranian people are yet ready to depose the ruling
clerics."³
Political realism doesn't mean intervention in the internal affairs of
other countries. The "nuanced and flexible" approach of the "third" group
of experts aims at striking a balance between two imperatives. From a
geopolitical perspective, Iran is an important country that must be included
in any arrangement involving the security and stability of the Persian
Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and the Middle East region notwithstanding its
future political and religious orientations. On the other hand, the United
States must continue to be careful not to ignore the desires of the majority
of Iranians (and specially the youth that represent more than 60 percent
of the population) and precipitate their alienation from a democratic
and secular society.
To formulate such a balanced policy it is necessary to consider the obstacles
to normalizing relations between Iran and the United States. Those obstacles
can be summarized as follows: Iran's promotion and support for international
terrorism; its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction; its opposition
to and scuttling of peace efforts between Arabs as well as Palestinians
and Israelis; its intervention in the internal affairs of regional countries;
its gross violations of human rights; its refusal to revoke an edict imposing
a death sentence on Rushdie.
Until now Iran, like many other countries of the region, has denied most
of the allegations discussed above, claiming that they are unfounded accusations.
But September 11 has completely transformed the international environment.
The war against terrorism, in which many countries in all regions of the
world are cooperating with the United States, is an all-encompassing operation
that will continue for a long time. Its success depends on the lack of
tolerance for exceptions: All states will be expected to abandon giving
help or shelter to terrorists irrespective of their goals and ostensible
justifications. Iran cannot ignore or reject the notice that President
Bush served on the international community in behalf of the United States
in his address to Congress after the September 11 attacks: Iran must abandon
its policies toward the terrorist organizations of the Middle East and
the Persian Gulf or "suffer the consequences."
At any rate, the experts say, for its own sake Iran needs to reintegrate
itself in the international community as a reliable member in good standing.
It cannot ignore the advantages of normalizing its relations with the
United States. Indeed a development of that kind would allow Iran freer
and easier access to international capital markets. Moreover, Iran needs
highly advanced U.S. technology to achieve the modernization of its lagging
economy.
Conclusions
Since the resolution of the 1979 "hostage crisis," the United States
has offered to enter into talks with representatives of the Iranian government
provided that Iran renounces its support for terrorism and its quest for
nuclear weapons. Dialogue should be encouraged by all possible means.
But it should be conducted according to carefully defined terms that cannot
be misconstrued as signs of weakness on the part of the United States.
The Iranian authorities have never given clear evidence of their willingness
to enter into such a dialogue. Unofficial private intermediaries have
never been able to give reliable overviews of expectations, and Iranian
officials always maintained that they had no desire to engage in official
dialogue with the U.S. government. On the contrary, Iran is continuing
to provide assistance to terrorist organizations and is pursuing its quest
to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Instead of improving, its poor
human rights records has in some cases persisted and in others worsened.
The relationship between Iran and the United States has unfortunately
remained in a state of stalemate for many years. The hopes triggered in
1998 by the landslide election of President Khatami, a relatively "moderate"
midranking cleric, were not fulfilled despite some moves on the part of
the Clinton administration. Iranian officials continued their anti-American
rhetoric.
September 11 has changed the situation to some extent. In the war against
international terrorism, the geostrategic position of Iran should make
it an important player in the all-out war against international terrorism.
Obviously, Iran cannot continue to give refuge to terrorists and other
kinds of political murderers and extremists without paying a price; it
cannot continue to fund organizations such as the Lebanese Hezbollah or
send arms openly or covertly to them as well as to the Palestinian Authority
or Afghan warlords without suffering consequences.
If Iran really wants to rejoin the international community now, it doesn't
need to engage in a dialogue. It can show its desire by taking a number
of decisions, including adopting measures in accordance with its constitution
to ensure respect for human rights and to eradicate all discrimination
based on sex, race, ethnicity, and faith. At the international level,
Iran should implement measures that indicate its disavowal of and support
for terrorism, take no action against Middle East peace efforts, and make
a credible pronouncement that it has decided not to acquire nuclear weapons.
Then the United States should respond to the Iranian position by taking
steps to settle outstanding claims between the two countries, to release
remaining Iranian assets, to lift sanctions, and to propose other acts
designed to normalize relations. Later, after such preliminary steps have
been taken by both sides, the two countries should commence a continuing
and direct dialogue aimed at promoting economic and cultural cooperation
in the interest of the Iranian and the American people.
If Iran does not disengage itself from supporting terrorist activities,
it may become a target of the forces that are striving to eliminate international
terrorism; in that case it would harm its own assets and its population.
The United States has recently told the highest Iranian authorities to
refrain from intervening in the post-Taliban affairs of Afghanistan. The
capture of a ship loaded with Iranian arms bound for the Palestinian Authority
as well as the frequent visits of Hezbollah leaders and operatives to
Tehran are telling occurrences that could not be hidden. It seems that
a time of reckoning has come.
It can only be hoped that the Iranian authorities do not doubt the resolve
of the United States to win the war against international terrorism and
will be willing directly or indirectly to cooperate with the United States
and its allies. If that proves to be the case, most of the hurdles in
the way of dialogue and normalization between the two countries would
be removed. Given the forces of reason and moderation that have arisen
among the Iranian population and in some political and religious circles,
it seems that a change in the policies of the Iranian government concerning
militant Islamic fundamentalist organization is possible. The NCAFP should
seize all 10 opportunities and launch a special program designed to meet
the challenges of the future facing the United States and Iran in their
relations with each other.
Notes
- Since the 1979 revolution and the seizure of the U.S. Embassy, during
which 53 diplomats were taken hostage and held for 444 days, Tehran's
propaganda has claimed that the United States committed "crimes" against
Iran.
- "Remarks at a Millenial Evening: The Perils of Indifference."
- George Melloan in The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2002.
APPENDIX
Conclusions to Policy Statement on United-States Iranian Relations:
Today and Tomorrow (July 1997, Revised April 2001)
1. U.S. concerns about the current conduct of the Islamic Republic of
Iran fall into four categories: state sponsorship of and assistance to
international terrorism; encouragement of dissidence in and between Muslim
governments friendly to the United States in particular and to the West
in general; opposition to and disruption of the Middle East peace process;
covert plans to develop nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
2. The policies of the United States and its allies have not produced
any noticeable change in the interntional conduct of the leaders of the
Islamic Republic. U.S. economic sanctions, although not supported by the
European Union, have created domestic hardships for the present Iranian
regime, including rising unemployment, skyrocketing inflation, and the
loss in value of the rial versus the dollar.
3. According to many observers, the last election in Iran indicates that
a majority of the population wants change: a loosening of the rigid religious
restrictions imposed by the Islamic Revolution, the modernization of social
codes, especially those pertaining to women and youth, and in general
a more open society. Intelligence and other information at our disposal
suggest that a majority of the popultion of Iran is not only favorably
disposed to many things Western and American but would also welcome improvements
in relations between Iran and the United States. It is also clear that
the present leaders of the Islamic Republic, although still castigating
the United States, are looking for ways to improve economic relations.
4. Relations between the United States and Iran must be considered in
terms of both the short- and long-term goals of American foreign policy,
first, with respect to the Persian Gulf countries and, second, with respect
to global concerns. In this regard Iran has been a cultural, a political,
and a national entity for three thousand years. Moreover, its geostrategic
location means that it cannot be ignored in any definitive arrangements
concerning the security and economic development of the states bordering
the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, Iran should not be indiscriminately
linked with Iraq in a policy of "double containment."
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