The Middle East: Islamic Law and Peace
Summary of the January 10, 2002, Roundtable on Militant
Islamic Fundamentalism in the 21st Century
April 30, 2002
Dear Reader:
The January 2002 "Roundtable on Militant Islamic Fundamentalism
in the 21st Century" was the second in the National Committee on
American Foreign Policy's series on Islamic Law and Peace in the Middle
East. As in the instance of the first roundtable in this series, which
was convened in May 2001, the closed-door and off-the-record discussions
by Muslim scholars teaching at U.S. universities and former Muslim diplomats
now residing in the West addressed core problems facing Islam that not
only affect the beliefs and the life-styles of Muslims in the Middle East
but also have far-reaching implications for the world beyond Islam.
The frank discussions that ensued and the conclusions that were reached
by the discussants at the second roundtable are summarized in this (not-for-attribution)
report.
On behalf of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, I thank
Mutual of America for its generous support of the Committee's activities
and acknowledge, with gratitude, the support provided to the roundtable
by the Edith C. Blum Foundation and individuals such as Sandy Frank, Thomas
J. Moran, Sheila Robbins, and Clarence Schwab.
Sincerely,
George D. Schwab
President
Contents
Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the NCAFP has called attention to the expanding
danger of international terrorism whose nature changed after Ayatollah
Khomeini's seizure of power in Iran. A few years after the establishment
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the NCAFP realized that a new kind of
activist had appeared--a "believer" ready to sacrifice his or
her life to destroy what the terrorist organizations' leaders dubbed as
enemies of Allah; these diehards knew that if they were killed, hundreds
would obey the summons to take their place. The spread of suicide bombings
and other kamikazelike operations extended the "martyr culture"
of Shiite extremists to the Sunnite radicals. The religious leaders of
these terrorist organizations promise their followers immediate access
to Paradise and special recognition by Allah. In the meantime they provide
financial compensation for the families and organize networks of social
services to gain recognition and recruit willing operatives.
The NCAFP has frequently noted a common thread that runs through these
militant groups: Wherever they strike, they pursue three goals. First,
they aim at overthrowing the governments of Muslim countries because,
in their view, the leaders have strayed from the "right path."
Consequently, they want to replace them by theocracies. Second, they seek
to destroy Israel, which they consider an extension of the hated West
implanted in the "House of Islam." Third, they aspire to renew
jihad (holy war) in order to bring Europe and the United States as well
as the rest of the planet under the flag of Islam. To them Western culture
(including Christianity and Judaism) represents the greatest danger to
Islam, which is the "last and final" message of God and therefore
should be obeyed and respected by all humans.
Although they share some interpretations of the Koran with the majority
of Muslims, who do not approve of their terrorism and extremism, the militants
constitute only a tiny minority among Muslims. In order to draw a distinction
between them and mainstream Islam, the NCAFP, in the 1980s, coined the
phrase "militant Islamic fundamentalists" (MIF).
The barbaric attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, confirmed
the danger that these fanatic extremist groups--funded or protected by
particular states, institutions, and rich individuals--pose to the civilized
world. After that tragedy, the NCAFP thought it useful to consider diverse
aspects of MIF and the means to counter its development. That is why it
convened on January 10, 2002, a roundtable consisting of a number of distinguished
intellectuals who are recognized experts in several fields pertaining
to the Muslim world. The subject proposed to the participants was "Militant
Islamic Fundamentalism in the 21st Century."
The purpose of this report is to make available to the foreign policy
community the views and suggestions that were voiced at the roundtable.
Definition of MIF
One panelist remarked that in academic circles and in the European media
the term "Islamism" is generally used to designate the phenomenon
of "militant Islamic fundamentalism." Actually Muslims reject
altogether the "fundamentalist" appellation on the grounds that
it comes from American "Protestantism" and therefore cannot
apply to Islam. Nevertheless, there is a strong element of "fundamentalism"
in the phenomenon. That panelist added that "militant Islamic fundamentalism,"
or "Islamism," is far from being new. For instance, although
a number of Muslim historians affirm that Cordoba was destroyed by Christians
from northern Spain in 1236, in fact, the event took place much earlier
at the hands of North African Talibanlike people who conquered that capital
city of Western Islam in the 12th century.¹ They destroyed every
trace of "civilization," using arguments similar to those made
by the Taliban in Afghanistan. For instance, they forbade music, dance,
poetry, the arts, and female education. They imprisoned thinkers, burned
books, and demolished monuments. Such "antijoy" movements, which
concentrate solely on the worship of God and exclude other activities,
exist in the history of other religions, but in the Muslim world they
became chiefly a political phenomenon.
It was also observed that sometimes militant Islamic fundamentalists
call themselves mujaheed (performer of jihad). According to a panelist,
after the start of the resistance to the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan,
the term "jihadi" gradually replaced "mujahid" because
the first opponents of the Communists were not Islamic militants but nationalists.
Later "indoctrinated militants" from among Afghan refugees in
Iran and Pakistan were sent into Afghanistan. Before turning against the
Soviets, those militants eliminated the nationalists. When volunteers
from Arab countries arrived in Afghanistan, they were referred to as Arab
Afghans. Now everybody speaks about Al Qaeda fighters.
In mainstream Islam people recall a saying of prophet Muhammad distinguishing
between "lesser" jihad (holy war) and "greater" jihad
(the fight against the evil in oneself). Jihad literally means striving,
and in the Koran it means striving in the path of God. Some theologians
and jurists express the opinion that there is no concept in Islam of jihad
as aggressive combat. In any case, when bin Laden joined the Arab Afghans,
the term "jihadi" gained currency. Actually, before him, Sheikh
Omar Abdur Rahman (who was indicted in the first attack on the World Trade
Center in 1993) rejected the saying attributed to the prophet as sheer
fabrication. He said that there is only one jihad, the holy war against
"infidels." Mainstream Muslims called the followers of bin Laden
"jihadis" in order to distinguish them from the "mujahiddin"
who fought against the Soviets.
Several panelists observed that the phrase "militant Islamic fundamentalist"
or the term "Islamist" covers a variety of militants. There
are such "radicals" among Sunnis (a majority of Muslims) as
well as Shiis (a sect representing about 10 percent of all Muslims). In
each of these groups, the extremists subscribe to slightly different interpretations
of the Koran.
One panelist distinguished three kinds of fundamentalism: theological
fundamentalism, which can be considered very narrow-minded in terms of
issues of salvation; populist social fundamentalism (as, for instance,
populist religious movements in the United States) that is a "normal
aspect" of pluralistic civil societies; and religiously inspired
political movements that use violence. It is the latter that specifically
concerned this roundtable.
Speaking of bin Laden's Al Qaeda, one participant connected it with the
ideology of a group of scholars called Salafis who lived in the 18th and
19th centuries in Yemen. Another panelist recalled that diverse fundamentalist
interpretations of the Koran superseded less orthodox readings of the
scriptures in the 12th and 13th centuries throughout the Muslim world.
From time to time extremist and violent movements emerged. They appear
in the present against the backdrop of "basic" fundamentalism.
As previously indicated, the NCAFP coined the phrase "militant Islamic
fundamentalism" in order to draw a line between terrorist activities
and mainstream Islam. As several speakers remarked, a vast majority of
Muslims do not share the radical ideologies of the militant fundamentalists
and, more often than not, reject and condemn acts of violence such as
hostage taking and the September 11 attacks.
One panelist stated that one can find in the Koran and in Islamic theology
whatever one likes. MIF is a political problem. In his view, the world
is, to put it simply, divided into two "camps": on the one hand,
countries struggling to develop on the basis of democracy, free markets,
and human rights; on the other hand, regardless of apparent differences
in their political systems, states that lack civil society and have created
despotic if not totalitarian regimes. According to him, most Muslim countries
are in the latter camp. Many events similar to the September 11 attacks
have already taken place inside those countries: the massacre of the population
of Hama, Syria, by the army; the truck bombing of a U.S. marine barrack
in Beirut, Lebanon, by Hezbollah; the use of chemical weapons against
the inhabitants of Halabj a, Iraq; the massacre of Kurds in Iran; and
so on. The militant Islamic fundamentalists say that Muslim nations are
in a sorry situation because the people are not "good Muslims"
and the leaders have strayed from "true" Islam; therefore they
should become more Islamic and better Muslims.
Bin Laden and "Salafism"
Although militant Islamic fundamentalist groups present a number of common
characteristics, diverse causes and theological interpretations explain
their emergence in different parts of the Muslim world. Speaking of bin
Laden and Al Qaeda, one panelist singled out the "Salafi" movement
and the ideology that developed around scholars who lived in Yemen in
the 18th and 19th centuries. Within that movement bin Laden represents
a fringe that can be called radical Salafism. His particular world view
can be understood by looking at the roots of this ideology in Islamic
intellectual history. Its teachings were marginal and opposed by mainstream
Islamic thought. The majority of Muslims in the modern period are either
Sunnis (about 90 percent) or Shiis (10 percent). Bin Laden and his followers
are Sunnis. The distinction between the two groups pertains chiefly to
a dispute over the spiritual and political leadership of the Muslim community
(Umma) after the death of prophet Muhammad. In political matters two principles
are strongly identified with the Sunnis: first, not "pointing fingers"
at the other group and not declaring fellow Muslims "infidels";
second, prohibiting rebellion against Muslim rulers as long as Islam remains
the religion of the state and Islamic law (Sharia) is enforced. Sunnis
argue that adherence to these two principles is crucial in order to maintain
social order and to avoid warfare among Muslims that might lead to the
demise of Islam itself.
The "Salafi" branch of Sunnism dates to a small group called
Ahl al-Hadith whose central ideas were crystalized in the teachings of
ibnTaymiyya, a l4th-century scholar who was willing to brand fellow Muslims
heretics and to declare that rebellion against Muslim rulers who did not
apply the Sharia was permissible.² Salafism's hallmark is a call
to modem Muslims to revert to the "pure" Islam of the prophet's
generation and the two generations that followed?³
The message of Salafism is utopian. Its adherents seek to transform the
Muslim community and to ensure that Islam as a system of belief and governance
will eventually dominate the globe. In his October 7 statement referring
to the September 11 attacks, bin Laden said: "These events have divided
the world into two camps: the camp of belief, in which there is no hypocrisy,
and the camp of unbelief. May God protect us and you from the latter.
It is therefore necessary for every Muslim to rise up in defense of Islam."
In an interview with al-Jazeera (TV) in 1998, bin Laden affirmed: "Our
goal is to liberate the lands of Islam from unbelief and to apply God's
law so that when we meet Him in the hereafter, He will be pleased with
us." Even to Muslims opposed to his actions, bin Laden appears to
be a man sincere in his beliefs who rejected life as a rich Saudi to live
according to his principles. He is a kind of "Islamized" Robin
Hood--a refreshing notion to the masses who are used to their own leaders
being corrupt, murderous, venal, and hypocritical.
Salafis are not against technological progress but abhor innovations
(in belief as well as in the practice of religion) that are not anchored
in their conception of the pristine Islamic age. Muslims should adhere
to a strictly literal interpretation of the Koran and to the sayings of
the prophet Muhammad. Salafis consider themselves the sole correct interpreters
of the Koran. To a lesser or greater extent, therefore, other Muslims
are "deviant" innovators. Obsessed with God's "oneness,"
they condemn all forms of polytheism and unbelief, even among fellow Muslims.
They abhor the Sufis, especially those who visit the graves of the "holy
masters." They hate Shiis as well as the followers of the traditional
schools of law. Eternal salvation is at stake, they believe, and they
take very seriously the concepts of heaven and hell. They are true and
sincere believers who want to grab power in order to ensure "salvation"
for all Muslims and the whole world. Their appeal lies to some extent
in the "simplicity" of the answers they provide to the problems
of the world.
In its radical form, Salafism leads to the practice of finger pointing
(takfir: calling fellow Muslims infidels). This is exactly the meaning
of bin Laden's November 4 statement to the effect that Muslims who were
not with him were by definition infidels. In order to cross the gates
of paradise, Muslims should carry out bin Laden's religious edict (fatwa)
calling on believers to kill Americans and destroy American assets.
Ibn Taymiyya's teachings were picked up by Abdal Wahab who allied himself
with the Saud tribe toward the end of the l8th century. His "reformist"
message galvanized the tribes of central Arabia. In 1805 the Wahabis destroyed
the tombs of the companions of prophet Muhammad. Their excesses horrified
the majority of Muslims, leading the Ottoman sultan (who was also the
caliph of all Muslims) to send an Egyptian military force that destroyed
the fledgling Saudi state. Immediately after World War I and the collapse
of the Ottomans, King Abdel Aziz Ibn Saud reestablished the Saudi kingdom
based on the Salafi doctrine, which still is its official ideology.
Aware of its potential for radical extremism, Ibn Saud fought and vanquished
his own radicals in the early 1930s. The radical Salafis raised their
heads again in November 1979 when they seized Mecca's Great Mosque. The
Saudis today adhere to the two principles of Sunnism that forbid finger
pointing and rebellion against Muslim rulers. As a consequence, the Saudi
minister of Islamic affairs declared in the aftermath of September 11
that obedience to Islamic rulers is obligatory, meaning that bin Laden
is a deviant. Actually the rupture between radical Salafis and the Saudi
regime goes back to the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. By allowing American
troops on Saudi soil, the Saudi leaders became deviants in the eyes of
radical Salafis, and therefore their overthrow became licit. This, rather
than the sanctions against Iraq or the Palestinian-Israeli situation,
is the main issue for bin Laden and his followers, although both problems
are important to them. Most Muslims do not appreciate or understand such
legal arguments as the one about the presence of American troops in Saudi
Arabia. But they react enthusiastically to bin Laden's role as a leader
and symbol of Muslim resistance to both domestic and Western oppression.This
reaction is supplemented by a century of argument voiced by Arab rulers
who contend that all the problems of the Muslim world stem from foreign
intrigue (conspiratorial theories) and not from Arab policies.
There are several reasons why Arab regimes have not clearly condemned
bin Laden; first, reluctance to finger-point at fellow Muslims; second,
the United States has not provided evidence incriminating bin Laden; third,
the fear of violent retaliation by radical Salafis has convinced those
leaders to remain silent.
Other Causes of MIF
One panelist observed that the political leadership of the Muslim world
has failed to prevent theological fundamentalism and populist religious
movements from becoming violent political movements. Those leaders have
sought to control and dominate the religious expression of their citizenry.
The panelist cited Turkey as a case in point: The government attempts
to impose its own version of religious orthodoxy by "bureaucratizing"
Muslim clerics. The United States, on the other hand, is the example Muslims
should follow: It ensures the right of all religious believers to exercise
their faith in a political system that does not sanction any state religion.
Such a balance between civil society and political power is essential.
The same panelist said that in order to develop Egypt economically and
socially, the government not only identified domestic groups that it considered
"reactionary" but also decided to teach people how to think
in order to build a modem society. The government wanted Egyptians to
understand that the state was the source for solving all their problems.
In Islam "communal solidarity" is an important part of religious
expression. Thus in the Islamic Middle Ages, private endowments financed
all sorts of welfare activities. Actually the most successful populist
violent movements are those that deliver this type of aid to people. If
there is not enough of a legitimate outlet in civil society for religious
movements to act as if they have a stake in the society, they will eventually
turn violent. In the past the endowments provided material resources for
religious scholars independent of the state. When theologians are supported
by the state and become "bureaucrats," they lose their credibility.
That participant cited the case of some Egyptian clerics who complained
to journalists interviewing them after September 11 that nobody took them
seriously because of their association with the government.
Another panelist linked the surge in MIF to the corruption of the ruling
regimes in Muslim countries. To him such regimes are not substantially
different. All have destroyed civil society and created despotic, even
totalitarian, governments. Their extraordinary control of the economy,
of financial resources--of the whole society--is compounded by their absolute
control of the means of coercion centered in the military, the police,
the special guards, and the various secret security services that ensure
that corrupt, unelected regimes are accountable to nobody, not even to
Allah. The monstrous, powerful state apparatus suffocates energy emanating
from society.
There is also an "incestuous" relationship between the ruling
classes and business. In Iran, for instance, the supreme guide, who claims
to represent God on earth, is also on the board of directors of the company
that has a monopoly on importing office furniture and is a major shareholder
in Iran's main automobile factory. In Indonesia in the last days of the
Suharto regime, one couldn't move from anywhere that didn't belong to
the dictator and his family. In Bahrain one big palace belongs to the
emir and another to the prime minister and so on. The Muslim world as
a whole doesn't produce any of the world's leading products. It lacks
great intellectuals, artists, and scientists. To justify this situation
some members of the ruling "elite" claim it is attributable
to the fact that people stray from Islamic law. Consequently, the solution
is for society to become more Islamic and for people to become better
Muslims. In the past 20 years or so, the Muslim world has become very
Islamic, but it is worse off than it was in the 1980s. Most of the MIF
in the world today was created by the Muslim states themselves. The participant
cited the example of Kuwait, where more than 70 Islamic "charities"
directly or indirectly finance terrorist groups. People opposed to such
regimes also advocate more Islamization of the societies.
In fact, the core of the problem is not religious. It is social, political,
and economic. All debates tend to become theological: Muhammad said this.
He didn't say that. Is this in the Koran? Unfortunately, international
debate has fallen into this trap. Experts and politicians spend a lot
of time wondering whether bin Laden is theologically correct or not, when
it should be obvious that he is a politician fighting for power in the
name of religion. He may exert appeal through his religiosity and his
Spartan way of life, but his objective is strictly political. Recently
he shrewdly added to his long-standing diatribes against the United States
and the Saudi royal family arguments drawn from Muslims' deep sense of
frustration over the condition of the Palestinians, the continuous occupation
of Arab lands by Israel, and the sanctions against Iraq.
Another panelist insisted that these issues are some of the main sources
of the expansion in MIF. He too cited the difficult economic and social
conditions of the majority of the Arab people. He drew attention to the
demographics: Seventy percent of all Arabs are under the age of 25; there
are no civic institutions or enterprises to absorb young energies; all
this presages an explosion and explains the appeal of Islamic radicalism
to many Muslims, especially to the younger generation.
One participant expressed the opinion that poverty and economic difficulties
have no bearing on the behavior and actions of militant Islamic fundamentalists.
Bin Laden and the suicide hijackers of September 11 did not come from
the slums of the Muslim world. Moreover, the Koran forbids Muslims to
question social differences, which are the will of Allah to which Muslims
should submit. Insofar as attributing MIF to the "nature" of
Islam, the panelist remarked that Islam, like other faiths, is neither
violent nor nonviolent. A religion is what its believers and leaders make
of it.
The same panelist referred to remarks by others that almost all Muslim
countries, even those that are basking in petro-dollars, are steeped in
underdevelopment. Yet in the year 1002, the Muslim world was the most
advanced and prosperous part of the globe. This complete reversal of fortune
was due to the triumph of the most orthodox interpretations of the Koran
around and after the 12th century. In its first four centuries, the Muslim
world was relatively open and tolerant. But Islam turned fundamentalist
in the Middle Ages and remained so thereafter. It rejected its scientists
and thinkers and stood still while the West advanced and accomplished
scientific and technological revolutions. After the Middle Ages most religions
accomplished their aggiornamento and aligned themselves with a
changing world. Oddly enough, Islamic clerics followed the reverse path.
As a result, a "time gap" developed between the Muslim world
and the West. One can say that Muslims remained more or less in the 12th
century while Western countries moved on. In other words, the Muslim and
the Western worlds are far from contemporaries.
In the second half of the 19th century, the encounter with an aggressive
and technologically superior Europe triggered many modernizing movements
in Muslim countries. But most of the modernizers failed, and the ultraorthodox
activists reemerged in the final years of the 20th century and eventually
succeeded, as Khomeini did in Iran. The toppling of the shah by the ayatollah
encouraged other radicals among Shiis and Sunnis to resort to violence
for political gains. Therefore, one can say that the "time gap"
between the Muslim world and the West is one of the essential causes of
MIF.
But if Khomeini's success in seizing power in Iran and in establishing
a Muslim theocracy that became a model for activists in many countries
explains to some extent the recent surge in violent groups, other causes,
other panelists maintained, should also be mentioned. First, it should
be noted that the concepts of martyrdom and suicide operations were introduced
by the Iranian Shiite government and used in Lebanon against Israeli,
American, and French troops and during the war against Iraq. Second, as
several participants remarked, the defeat of Arab armies by Israel in
1967 sounded the knell of Arab nationalism and restored the prestige of
religious activists. As early as 1970, old religious militant groups reappeared,
and new ones such as Jihad in Egypt and Hezbollah in Lebanon came into
existence. Third, the rise in the price of oil in the 1970s allowed the
Saudis, Kuwaitis, and others to fund many clerics and Islamic schools
and mosques around the world, including those in Western countries. Those
mosques and schools became nests of terrorists. Fourth, the cold war and
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted the United States to train
and help the worst militant fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan and other
Muslim countries. As usual, American (and other Western) policymakers
concentrated on immediate problems without bothering about the consequences
of using religious fanatics. As one participant put it, this was a kind
of Frankenstein policymaking: creating a monster that in the end turned
against its creator.
Conspiracy Theories
Many panelists reiterated that militant Islamic fundamentalists, like
a majority of Muslims, blame the West in general and the United States
in particular for the sorry state of their countries. Citing the Crusades
in the 11th and 12th centuries, colonial rule in the late 19th century
and in the first half of the 20th century, and economic and political
imperialism in the second half of the twentieth century, radical Muslims
accuse the West of waging continuous war against Islam. As an Iranian
cleric once put it, the Crusades never stopped.
One panelist observed that the denunciation of the West and the United
States by militant Islamic fundamentalists has been curiously compounded
by an expanding group of Western intellectuals and academics called postmodernists
who criticize Western rationalism and propound what they call relativism.
In the views of those academics, all the ills of the third world (including
the Muslim world) stem from Western policies of economic and political
exploitation. As a result, Muslim students in American and European universities
return home with anti-Western sentiments that facilitate their recruitment
by radical religious groups. Indeed one should not forget the number of
highly educated people around MIF leaders. In Iran many such "intellectuals"
joined Khomeini in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Egyptian and Pakistani
doctors, engineers, and even atomic scientists have contacted bin Laden
and Al Qaeda. Palestinian doctors and intellectuals help the militant
group Hamas. In Lebanon many highly educated Shii are members of Hezbollah.
It was observed that militant Islamic fundamentalists, even those who
have been educated in Western institutions of higher learning, cling to
more or less absurd conspiracy theories instead of considering the mistakes
made by their own religious and secular authorities in the past and in
the present. Many believe that the United States and Israel are conspiring
to erase Islam from the planet. Right after the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, rumors spread throughout the Islamic world that
Israel was the perpetrator and had warned Jews not to go to work in Manhattan
on September 11. Such fantasies still distort Muslim public opinion.
Agendas
Most MIFs believe that the West, inspired by Satan, is conducting a vast
conspiracy against the Muslim world, which started with the Crusades and
has continued under many guises, including colonialism and imperialism.
After World War II the "infidels" implanted Israel in the "House
of Islam" as a first step in the realization of their plans. They
also corrupted most Muslim leaders and plundered the natural resources
of Muslim countries. Moreover, the steady decline of the Muslim world
is a "sign" of God's wrath, signaling that the time has come
to resume the jihad against "traitorous" leaders as well as
the infidels. One participant cited several high Islamic authorities.
In one quote, Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, affirmed
the following belief: "We are at war with America as our Prophet
was at war against the corrupting empires of his time. Because we believe
that Islam is the One and Only true faith, it is incumbent on us to fight
until the entire humanity either converts or submits to Islamic authority.
This natural march of human history is resisted by America, which is offering
a life of corruption and debauchery and waging a war against Islamic values
all over the world."
That participant quoted Dr. Zaki Badawi, a "very moderate"
British Muslim leader: "Islam is a proselytizing faith. As such it
has either to win new territory all the time or to retreat and decline."
Khamenei hopes to achieve proclaimed Islamic goals through seizing American
hostages, organizing demonstrations at which American flags are burned,
and financing militant anti-Western groups. Badawi pursues his targets
through "peaceful" propaganda. Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda sought
to achieve the same objectives by organizing the September 11 attacks
and other terrorist operations. The same panelist recounted the harangue
that Sheikh Saleh Ben Humaid, the imam of Mecca, Islam's holiest place,
delivered to an audience on January 5, 2002: "The World Order imposed
by America is a dark one characterized by arrogance, haughtiness, humiliation,
and disdain. It is characterized by tyranny, the annihilation of nations,
domination, and monopolization. These are attitudes that provoke legitimate
hatred. What kind of a system is this monstrous manifestation of conceit
and arrogance? It becomes even worse when domination and arrogance exercised
through violence [are said to be carried out] in the name of legality,
thus assuming a programmed systematic course." The sheikh went on
to ask: "Can Islam turn its face away from the crimes committed against
its children everywhere? Can Muslims allow their most sacred values to
be trampled underfoot by a power that recognizes no god but money and
guns?" That participant added that textbooks in countless schools
from Malaysia to Nigeria tell Muslim children that the world is divided
into two antagonistic camps: The "House of Islam" and the "House
of War" (countries not ruled by Muslims). Children are taught that
there can be no peace between the two until Islam triumphs. The most that
can be allowed in that ongoing war is a truce that would have to be renewed
every 10 years.
In the view of another participant, such statements help in defining
the agendas of the various militant Islamic groups, which can be summed
up as follows: expelling the infidels from the House of Islam (for instance,
removing American servicemen and servicewomen from the "sacred"
soil of Saudi Arabia, as demanded by bin Laden); overthrowing the secular
Muslim leaders who cooperate with the West; establishing Islamic republics,
as in Iran and Sudan; removing Israel from the Islamic soil of Palestine;
multiplying attacks in the "House of War"; and, finally, resuming
the "great" jihad against the West in order to bring the planet
under the banner of Islam. In the resumption of the holy war, all means
of combat are licit: assassinations, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and
regular warfare.
One panelist said that both mainstream and militant Muslim clerics beckon
Europe and America to the "right path." They want to convert
all and make no secret of their goal. In their view, the new century will
be a century of spirituality in which the "oriental man" (meaning
Middle Eastern) will deploy his "thousand years" of spiritual
experience in order to bring the West out of "darkness."
Why Hatred of the West?
Recriminations against the West in general and the United States in particular
are multiple: colonialism, imperialism, plundering Muslim countries' natural
resources, backing Israel, and so on. All the participants alluded to
them in different contexts, and some of them have been cited in the preceding
sections of this summary. But several panelists observed that they are
marginal compared to the essential accusation.
A panelist quoted from Mawdudi, a long-standing Pakistani militant fundamentalist
theologian of the 1930s and 1940s who propounded a theory of God's exclusive
possession of sovereignty: "Any institution or individual attempting
to assume political and legal sovereignty and seeking thereby to restrict
the jurisdiction of God to spheres of personal law or religious duties
is a usurper and a rebel. The truth is that no one can claim to be a lawgiver
save under the dispensation of God; no one can challenge the supreme authority
of God almighty in any sphere." To Mawdudi and all militant fundamentalists,
democracy is therefore a manifestation of Satan who told the first man
that he could disobey the law of God and pursue his own schemes. This
is precisely what the West is doing in the name of democracy. It tells
mankind that it doesn't need to obey the divine law, that it can make
its own human law by voting and so on. That panelist quoted from a March
1999 speech given at the University of Florence by the so-called Iranian
moderate President Khatami, who said that mankind is divided into East
and West. The East is the domain of the soul and the West of reason. Reason
led to the Renaissance, which led to modernity, which in turn led to oppression,
domination, and subjugation of the world by colonialism and imperialism.
The West, Khatami continued, is the prime exponent of rationality, whereas
the East is the giver of spiritual guidance.
To militant fundamentalists the "Judeo-Christian" West is the
enemy. Its values (democracy, secularism, human rights, individual freedom,
equality of women, and so on) contradict Muslim values and mores (total
submission to the will of God, theocracy, inferiority of women, and so
on). To them the existence of Western alien values constitutes a permanent
threat to the survival of Islam. They refer in particular to the United
States because it is the only remaining superpower and the leader of the
so-called free world.
Another panelist stated that militant fundamentalists as well as many
mainstream clerics despise democracy as a system of government. Ayatollah
Khomeini rejected it on the grounds that God alone is the legislator.
Ali ben Haj, ideologue of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (influenced
by Ibn Taymyyia) once declared in an interview: "My father and his
brothers-in-religion expelled France physically from Algeria. My aim is
to banish it intellectually and ideologically and get rid once and for
all of all those who still harbor the venom of democracy in their minds."
As a panelist put it, militant Islamic fundamentalists are determined
to set up a historical duel between the forces of democratic regimes (the
West in general and the United States in particular) and the forces of
despotic regimes (most Muslim countries).
How to Deal with MIF
Most of the participants concurred that the war against terrorism, even
if successful, would not by itself suppress the likes of bin Laden and
all terrorist networks. In order to cut off MIF, the war should be accompanied
by other measures, both inside and outside the Muslim world.
One panelist observed that "moderate" Muslims, many of whom
have been and continue to be oppressed by Arab and other Muslim governments,
do exist and must be encouraged to take center stage. Indeed most Muslims
have not heeded bin Laden's call to kill innocent Americans wherever and
whenever they find them. And this in itself constitutes a hopeful sign
for the future.
Another participant cited the existence of "liberal" elements
in the Arab world who have been intimidated by militant Islamic activists
over the last few years. A third panelist said that more important for
the future are the enlightened members of Muslim communities in Europe
as well as American Muslims who should be encouraged to express their
rejection of fundamentalist interpretations of the religion. This panelist
said that victory over the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was made
possible by the cooperation of the Northern Alliance. He added that ideologically
and intellectually there are "Northern Alliance" liberals and
democrats in many parts of the Muslim world. They can help defeat other
militant Islamic fundamentalist groups and should therefore be encouraged
and helped to do so.
It was observed that the problem of militant or radical Islam is at the
core of a larger and many-sided question concerning the nature of Islamic
politics and societies. Muslims make up a diverse group in the world.
There are moderate Muslims, state-sponsored Muslim clerics, radical and
moderate Salafis, secular nationalists, Sunnis and Shiis, Sufis, American
(and other Western) Muslims of many different kinds, and so on. Each confronts
a lot of problems that no one group can easily solve by itself. On the
other hand, the United States cannot play the primary role in solving
their difficulties. Total victory in Afghanistan will not end the problem
of radical Salafism. Many bin Ladens are positioned offstage in the Islamic
world, waiting to continue the struggle begun by Osama. The United States
can serve as a catalyst for moderate Muslims who are the only forces that
can ultimately defeat the militant radicals and promote a version of Islam
that is neither extremist nor antagonistic to the West. Such an objective
should be pursued by undertaking to convince the Saudis to stop funding
institutions and individuals that propagate Salafism. Very often the key
to most of the issues related to MIF is in the hands of regimes in Muslim
countries. There are other dimensions that must be considered, including
demographic and economic questions.
One panelist remarked that just as Muslim governments should not engage
in the business of theology, the United States should refrain from telling
Muslim populations what they should believe or do. For instance, pushing
for the introduction of democratic practices without heeding well-established
fundamental Muslim principles can only help people like bin Laden to tell
the masses that "This is a war against Islam; even if you don't engage
in terrorist activities and only observe daily prayers and fast and don't
drink liquor, they're going to suspect you of being some sort of radical."
That panelist deplored the unavailability in local languages of classical
texts concerning American democracy. In his opinion, a historic tragedy
occurred in the 19th century when Muslim rulers turned to France and other
European countries as they introduced political reforms. European democratic
political systems reflected the model of very centralized states, whereas
American democracy, based on federalism, would have been much more appropriate.
Structurally the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence is more akin to
the traditional system of government in the Muslim world. Similarly, the
West should have at its disposal accurate translations of texts pertaining
to Islamic law and jurisprudence. Westerners would then understand that
Islam is compatible with modem civilization. One does not have to accept
the theological precepts of Islamic law to understand its legal doctrine.
After all, Islam does not exempt Muslims from the laws of gravity or of
economic development.
Another participant, although agreeing with the idea of translating important
American texts on democracy, considered the initiation of a genuine local
democratic discourse in Muslim countries to be of more importance. This
endeavor could be helped by the translation of extant texts by Muslim
modernizers of the 19th and 20th centuries. One can find a democratic
tradition in many Muslim thinkers of the past such as the Iranian Saadi
and Nasser Khosrow, not to mention recent authors both in Iran and in
Arab countries.
A panelist observed that a change in the interpretation of the religion
can originate within Muslim communities in Europe and North America more
easily than in the Muslim world itself. According to him, the number of
"Western" Muslims is estimated at between 20 and 22 million.
Those Muslims pose both an opportunity and a threat. At the moment they
might be a threat because many of their organizations and mosques are
financed and controlled by the reactionary regimes in power in the Muslim
world. First, those Western Muslims should refute lies spread in the Western
media. For instance, far from being a symbol of Islam, the "hejab"
(the headwear worn by some Muslim women in some Muslim countries and in
the West) originated in 1975 in Beirut (Lebanon); it has nothing to do
with Islam. It is a political element or statement, like the Mao uniform
in China. It differs from what conservative Muslim women wore before 1975.
The same goes for beards. "Western" Muslims should seize the
opportunity provided by the freer space in Europe and America to create
universities that will train Muslim theologians and mosque imams because,
in fact, "Islamic theology" is dead.
In the same vein, another panelist said that American Muslims, as law-abiding
citizens, live according to the Constitution and the laws of the United
States that contradict some prescepts of Islamic law (for instance, those
relating to inheritance, women, divorce, and so on). Yet they consider
themselves good Muslims and practice their faith freely. They constitute
living proof that Islam and modernity are not at odds with each other.
Their presence in the United States bears witness to the fact that it
is possible to perform the leap from the 12th to the 21st century in a
reasonably short time and without any harm. Some critics say that changing
a mind-set would take a very long time. The communication revolution of
the last few decades belies this pessimistic opinion. Today information
and education circulate and influence people fairly rapidly. Such means
should be used intensively. The panelist added that American Muslim intellectuals
should be encouraged to help their coreligionists in the Muslim world
understand the necessity of emerging from eight centuries of stultification.
With their colleagues in Muslim countries American Muslim intellectuals
could organize seminars in which ways of joining the international community
of the 21st century would be discussed. The panelist quoted an American
Muslim businessman: "Today the Muslim world awaits a move in a modem
direction.... Perhaps Muslim immigrants in the West will ultimately become
the catalysts for a major ideological transition [that will occur] in
the global Muslim community. Nostalgia for Islam's glorious past may provide
comfort for some, but the future demands a mind-set open to change."4
Discussion and Conclusions
The following remarks were made during the discussions that followed
the participants' presentations.
Several participants, referring to the battle of "isms" that
characterized the 20th century, said that Muslims, in trying to define
their identity in relation to the globalized conflicts of the time, developed
"Islamism" as part of the answer.5
One panelist observed that in the 1930s and 1940s, fascism played a more
or less important role in the Muslim world, especially among popular movements.
The mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Hussein, traveled to Germany and met
Hitler whom he praised. That panelist cited a jurisprudent who wrote that
jihad means only that "Our Faith is to rule the world." In a
long footnote the jurisprudent tried to answer the question: "How
to live in an ideological age in which the world is divided into two camps--the
capitalist and the communist--that are trying to obliterate [each] other."
Although he disagreed with the jurisprudent, the panelist cited him because
he showed that the way in which Muslims understand their own tradition
and their relations with others is profoundly influenced by the context
of global politics. A vibrant liberal tradition existed in the Arab world
among both secularized and religious intellectuals. It collapsed after
World War II. It is important to explore and explain the causes of that
collapse.
Another panelist said that fascism in the prewar days appealed to the
clergy both in the Arab world and in Iran where Ayatollah Kashani said
that Hitler was the mahdi who was going to help liberate the Europeans
from the Jews and the Muslims from the European colonial powers (England
and France). Beginning in the 1950s and continuing into the 1960s, some
sections of the Muslim clergy looked to another kind of totalitarian ally
and found it in communists and various other brands of Marxists because
fascism had been defeated. At no point did they try to find allies among
democratic forces. They always looked for a totalitarian force outside
the Muslim world with which to ally against trends toward democratization
in their own countries. A majority of the Muslim clergy generally sided
with the secret police against Muslim intellectuals who favored democratic
change.
One participant observed that "reversionary" or regressive
trends constitute a feature that one finds in the history of Islam since
its inception. They became much more active after the 12th century because
of the triumph of various fundamentalist interpretations of the religion
that are still in force. Fundamentalism naturally begets totalitarianism.
Another panelist objected that MIF is basically a political movement that
should not be attributed to ancient theological debates. Yet another one
said that if Islamic fundamentalism, like Islam in general, is not monolithic,
all fundamentalist brands, even when they reject the theological bases
of other brands, in the final analysis, say the same thing: They proclaim
jihad and promote violence against the infidels. In practice, whether
Shii or Sunni, such radical groups cooperate against the "common"
enemy, the infidel, meaning the West. If one separates these movements
from their religious "coloration," it would become impossible
to reform Islam and eradicate the danger involved in the return of people
such as bin Laden.
One panelist looked at how MIF started. In the 1950s Arab nationalism
reached its zenith with Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. Expanding Arab nationalism
was anticolonial, anti-Israeli, and anti-American. It allied itself with
the Soviet Union. Its secularism frightened countries like Saudi Arabia,
which leaned toward Islamic nationalism. In those days a strong secular
atmosphere existed in most of the Middle East. On the streets one hardly
saw women wearing veils. There was a lot of openness; traditions were
breaking down. Suddenly the attempt to counter Arab nationalism with Islamic
nationalism changed the picture. Preoccupied by the cold war and secular
nationalism's leaning toward the Soviet Union, the United States found
the Islamic reaction very convenient. Outside funding of Islamic movements
began. When they were released from jail, those who had been persecuted
by Nasser and imprisoned in the 1950s and the 1960s headed toward the
countries of the Persian Gulf and found employment mainly as school teachers.
While in detention they had developed political casts of mind. Their new
sensibilities were different from those that characterized the people
of such countries as Kuwait, Qatar, the Emirates, and others, which were
rather apolitical. The immigrants politicized the whole region. They even
politicized the Saudi Wahhabi doctrine that had been stripped of its political
veneer by King Ibn Saud.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Islamic groups received increased
financial support and armaments. Eventually the "Islamists"
propagated "simple truths": "Everything is in the Koran";
"Islam is the solution"; and so on. Until September 11, the
development of the "Islamic" reaction against Arab nationalism
and secularism seemed tolerable to the United States because it served
its goals in the region. After the end of the cold war, the Americans
considered it in the context of the survival of "friendly" (or
what they dubbed "moderate") regimes.
Indeed liberals espousing democratic and secular ideas created only headaches
for local rulers who found a welcome relief in turning militant Islamic
fundamentalists against them. Liberals are highly educated city dwellers,
whereas conservatives--mainly Bedouins-are from the countryside.
The coming of Bedouins to the cities created the "desertization"
phenomenon--the "desert" invading the city--which has had a
bearing on everything, including business. The level of thinking is diminished.
Everything has been turned upside down, and "civilization" is
suffering.
One participant said that one of the reasons for the emergence of radical
and violent movements is the rupture with the past that occurred in the
intellectual tradition of the Muslim world. It started with colonialism
and was intensified by the regimes that took over after its demise. The
few small pockets that did not experience such a rupture are completely
marginalized. When people like bin Laden claim that they are expressing
"true" Islam, they are in fact propounding a completely invented
religion. There are different, competing, "invented Islams"
in the marketplace of radicalism, but very little space is left for real
scholars to think freely and speak credibly.6 Clerics have lost credibility
because the state has coopted them and controls what they say. As a result,
an intellectual crisis has stricken the Muslim clergy. One way to reestablish
a "coherent" version of Islam would be to fund the "marginalized"
scholars. Citing the cases of an American Egyptian professor of sociology
in Cairo and an Egyptian independent scholar, this participant described
what he called government policies of striking deals with radical groups
while pretending to be at the forefront of the fight against terrorism;
thus, for instance, the authorities tell a radical group that they want
them to forgo violent demonstrations against American bombing in Afghanistan;
in exchange, the group asks for the arrest of a scholar or another intellectual
who is opposed to militant Islam. That is not the way to deal with terrorists,
for it will make things worse in the long run. Instead, pressure should
be exerted on Muslim governments to abandon such practices and take real
and positive measures against terrorist groups.
The same panelist pointed out another practice of Muslim rulers that
creates favorable grounds for the spread of militant Islamic fundamentalism.
It has to do with the question of succession. Not only do rulers stay
in place as presidents for life, but they have begun to pave the way for
the transformation of their sons into "crown princes" who will
replace them after their deaths. The panelist cited Syria, Egypt, and
Lybia. Thousands of young people in Arab countries study hard in the best
universities of the world and become top experts in many fields, only
to be denied high positions that have been reserved for the unskilled
siblings of high-ranking officials. The American Egyptian professor mentioned
by the participant was imprisoned in Egypt for criticizing this practice.7
It is understandable, he maintained, that young, educated people turn
toward militants who want to overthrow such rulers.
That participant brought up the question of Muslim communities in Europe
and the United State. He estimated the number of Muslims living in the
United States at about four million. Many of them are very wealthy, but
only a few contribute generously to the campaigns of the political parties
as well as to local Muslim organizations that maintain direct or indirect
ties to militant fundamentalist groups. That is why so many extremist
"Islamists" from the Muslim world, including one of bin Laden's
top lieutenants, used to travel to the United States, where they could
raise more funds for their organizations than could be raised in Muslim
countries.
In Pakistan during and after Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorship, universities
distributed degrees to members of Islamist groups who easily obtained
visas to Canada and the United States. That and the help of an existing
network, which provided them with American wives and helped them obtain
green cards and citizenship, is how they created a power base in the United
States.The network is now very rich and powerful, and it intimidates and
even threatens the rest of the Muslim community.
That participant underlined many contradictions in U.S. policies. Even
after September 11, President Bush met several times with so-called representatives
of the Muslim community who in fact do not represent a majority of American
Muslims and are mentally or ideologically on the same wavelength as Al
Qaeda.
According to that panelist, there is a split in militant Islamic fundamentalist
groups. In one camp are those operating from caves and camps in mountains
and deserts to achieve their ultimate objective of killing Americans and
Europeans and destroying the assets of the United States and other Western
countries. In the other camp are those who are American citizens and think
that they can overtake the United States without destroying physical assets
and killing innocent people. Indeed they think they can influence the
two political parties and, through them, governmental decisions with their
campaign and other donations. They have set up approximately two dozens
charities and other organizations that help militant fundamentalist organizations
in the Middle East and indoctrinate American Muslims through a network
of schools and mosques. Rich American Muslims as well as oil-rich Muslim
countries fund such organizations, schools, and mosques. The U.S. government
has shut only a few since September 11.
The leaders of those organizations and mosques are continually being
invited to the White House and the State Department. Eighty per cent of
American Muslims voted for Bush, whereas American Jews voted en masse
for Gore. The leaders of rich American Muslim organizations boasted that
they had brought Bush to the presidency. They sent him a letter asking
for evenhandedness concerning the Palestinian and Kashmiri questions.
Moreover, for years they have been lobbying in favor of the Sudanese theocracy.
Their network in the United States is focused on foreign policy. Muslim
army chaplains come from institutions established by American Muslims.
There they were trained to adopt a mentality very close to that of bin
Laden's followers.
That panelist added that the contradictions in American policies that
have already been cited in this summary bewilder a majority of American
Muslims who are law-abiding citizens. They suspect that something is wrong
with American politics. It seems to them that what the United States suffered
on September 11 stems from something American politicians have encouraged,
if not created. For them it is still risky to take a clear stand in the
midst of so many Islamists in the United States. (One should remember
that a large number of American Muslims are political refugees who fled
the radicals in their countries of origin.) The United States is a country
that harbors masses of qualified anti-Islamist Muslims and the largest
number of rich and educated Islamists. The United States is also supporting
and helping a new Afghan government that includes several radical Islamists
as important ministers.
What Should Be Done?
One panelist suggested that an examination of Muslim associations and
institutions in the United States be conducted case by case because there
are some positive elements among them. He added that September 11 brought
a lot of changes and splits inside radical Islamic movements and suggested
the establishment of a dialogue with "Islamists" who abide by
laws and refrain from aggressive actions. In his opinion, what happened
to Arab nationalism following the 1967 defeat can well happen to militant
Islamic fundamentalism after the defeat of the Taliban and bin Laden in
Afghanistan. At any rate, if the environment that produced bin Laden is
left unchanged, then the same destructive network will reappear under
new and different names. In Western schools, information about Muslim
thinkers and their achievements should be taught, and in Muslim schools
a similar curriculum pertaining to Western philosophers and scientists
should be devised and implemented. Referring to the gradual opening in
Kuwait's society, the panelist expressed the opinion that things will
change for the better in the Muslim world.
Another panelist deplored the fact that the history of Western civilization
in colleges is taught separately from other cultures, particularly the
Muslim one. He expressed the hope that some reform would take place in
order to present all civilizations in one course attended by all students.
He added that novels and intellectual works by Arab writers should be
translated into English so that American students as well as the general
public can become familiar with the problems of the Muslim world. In his
opinion, all such initiatives would promote a better understanding between
the West and the Muslim world.
Other participants were less optimistic about the possibility of rapid
change in relations between the two worlds. One panelist observed that
a great part of the difficulties relating to the diversity of interpretations
of the Koran stems from the absence of a formal church. Most of the Islamic
associations are linked with governments. He emphasized the need for the
creation of a genuine "American Islam" that expresses its own
identity, wiliout being beholden to anybody financially and politically,
and propagates its understanding of the religion in its own way. Another
panelist expressed doubts about the role that American Muslims can play
in forming cultural trends in the Muslim world at large.
It was observed that the radicals use the United States as a base from
which they inflict suffering on people in Muslim countries and elsewhere.
One of their "weapons" comes from creating "phony"
academic traditions. For instance, the University of California at Berkeley
is teaching the thought of Khomeini as if he had been a great philosopher.
In Iran they use this as proof that Khomeini was a great philosopher and
thinker. Actually "Islamists" seem to suffer from a kind of
inferiority complex when they compare themselves to Westerners whose endorsement
they often seek. American Islamists do more harm to Muslims in the Middle
East than to local militant groups. In the United States these people
terrorize members of Muslim communities. The United States should remain
true to its values and defend them without compromise. At many international
conferences there is an allowance for Islamic exception. The other conferees
think that they should treat Muslims differently simply because Muslims
say that they are different. He stated that they should be treated like
everybody else. The panelist remarked that American leaders and officials
do a great disservice to the image of the United States by accepting the
pay of various Muslim regimes for acting as consultants or business partners.
In doing so they reinforce the notions of people at the local level that
Americans can be "bought." And that supposition creates ground
for anti-American feelings.
In the opinion of one panelist, the problem with radical populist movements
is that they have conferred on their own cultural traditions some sort
of eternal meaning, which means that if they gave up any one of them,
they would seem to be committing an unacceptable act of ontological compromise.
Such a philosophical error is the kind of thing that is usually corrected
through typical democratic processes. Denying to Arab Muslims the right
to work these things out and excluding from the political process the
people who hold to their traditions because, it is feared, they might
take over government will only retard political development. In this respect
Algeria is the quintessential example: It got a brutal military regime
and an unending civil war. The suspension of the democratic process is
utterly wrong. The United States must remain true to itself in order not
to be accused of adhering to double standards and not to lose credibility
and legitimacy. The tensions that Muslims face as a result of modernity
are not different from those that Koreans or Chinese people experience.
In fact, the United States has its own traditionalists who dislike a lot
of things that go on in the country.
Another participant said that "Islamists" should be countered
in the political arena and not be allowed to claim a kind of "sanctity."
Muslim societies cannot work out their problems because they have regimes
that do not allow them to develop in a normal way. What is happening now
is a kind of reaction: a "going backward," in comparison to
what existed even 30 or 40 years ago. This reaction, presented as "true"
Islam, should be opposed. The same panelist added that if we protect the
rights and freedoms of the "Islamist" lobbyists, we should also
protect the rights of the Muslim majority who are subjected to intimidation
by them. He said that wherever Muslims were offered a chance to adopt
democracy, especially to participate in elections, they seized it. We
must not assume as true whatever the most reactionary and retrograde elements
of the Muslim community say just because they are organized and have powerful
governments behind them. In this respect, a panelist recalled that when
the radical Islamists sought to fill the vacuum left by the exponents
of a waning Arab nationalism, they promised solutions for problems besetting
their societies. Now it has become obvious that they have no solutions,
and so there is an opening for something different and effective.
One participant criticized the "exceptionalism" that characterizes
American foreign policy toward the Muslim world. He gave the recent example
of Pakistan's president who launched a coup against an elected leader
and is hated by his own people yet is treated as a "good guy"
by the United States. He admitted that the circumstances of the war against
terrorism make that position understandable but expressed the hope that
after the war is over, the United States will reconsider its attitude.
Another panelist remarked that the predecessor of the present Pakistani
president had forced out the legal government, removed the leader of the
Supreme Court, and banned the main opposition party. He was about to arrest
the present president, who outmaneuvered him by acting first.
It was observed that the so-called Koranic schools in Pakistan prepared
recruits for bin Laden's Al Qaeda. The authorities have closed many of
them since September 11. One panelist expressed the opinion that a reform
of education is overdue in many Muslim countries and cited the successful
experience of Tunisia in this respect. He added that a revision of textbooks
is also necessary. Another participant, although approving the creation
of modem elementary and secondary schools in Muslim countries, said that
special schools to train Muslim theologians and mosque imams should be
set up in Europe and the United States where theologians trained in the
West are familiar with scientific matters. He even suggested the creation
of a modem "Islamic Theological Society" that would take advantage
of science and other kinds of knowledge. He indicated that theological
centers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia had come up with decisions about "cloning"
without knowing the scientific background of the question. He also cited
the nonsensical theory, aired by some theologians as justification for
the hijab, about the property of women's hair, which is said to emit a
kind of ray that drives men crazy. Theologians trained in the West would
be able to refute such notions.
One panelist, referring critically to Muslim private schools in the United
States, observed that their improvement is hampered by sinister accusations
continuously made against Muslim institutions: It is hard to improve the
schools when the institutions have to spend a lot of resources in an effort
to refute charges of conspiring to destroy the United States.
Concerning recent developments in Iran, one panelist said that the country
was in a kind of preinsurrectionary phase. Tehran is the only Muslim capital
where young people demonstrated in support of the United States after
September 11. Several participants concurred that any change in Iran's
policies or its government as a whole would have a beneficial impact on
the whole region. At the 11th hour the United States should not begin
to support a bankrupt regime that is in the throes of death. It should
make it clear to the present rulers that there can be no dialogue that
excluses the Iranian people. The Iranian authorities should not limit
their concessions to foreign policy matters; they should also offer concessions
in domestic politics. It is in the interests of the United States to befriend
a successor regime rather than the present one.
One panelist said that Iraq is an important key state in the region.
A change in Iraq would have a deep impact on Iran and on a great number
of other countries in the Middle East as well as on the peace process
between Palestinians and Israelis.
Concerning the latter conflict and its impact on anti-American reactions
on the "street" in Arab lands, a panelist stated that the issue
of Palestine affects all Arabs. There is a strong sense of personal identification
with the Palestinians, and what happens to them is genuinely felt by all
Arabs. Moreover, people feel that if the same treatment were meted out
to Americans or British citizens, the United States or the United Kingdom
would never tolerate it.
Another panelist added that U.S. foreign policy is perceived by ordinary
Arabs as driven only by its interests in the security of Israel and in
the free flow of oil, not by trying to find a just solution to the conflict
and other problems. At any rate the people of the Middle East have the
impression that the United States does not engage itself in their region
as it does in other regions such as Asia and Latin America. In the view
of that panelist, the reluctance of the United States to engage in Middle
Eastern affairs has created a vacuum that has been filled by radical Islamists.
He urged the United States to draw up policies for its long-term engagement
in the region.
Another participant expressed the hope that the United States would also
address the economic problems of the Middle East. He suggested a kind
of "Marshall Plan." Another panelist was of the opinion that
notwithstanding existing obstacles and difficulties, the United States
can and should improve its image in the region as well as its relationship
with the Arabs. He deplored the fact that American diplomats in Arab countries
often do not engage with the population even when the opportunity is given
to them. In his opinion, based on personal experience in Yemen, there
is no hatred of the United States except on the part of a very small minority;
if people resent some actions, they nevertheless genuinely admire America.
Several panelists reiterated that the United States had to persevere
in fulfilling the commitments it has made. One panelist reminded the roundtable
and the audience that the rout of the Taliban and the disbandment of Al
Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan have had a tremendous effect. Indeed bin
Laden did not get support from any Muslim country. If the United States
were to end its actions without achieving its goals in Afghanistan and
elsewhere in the war against terrorism, many would conclude that its policy
was neither genuine nor farsighted. The same participant added that whatever
the method envisioned (change of regime, dialogue, and so on), there has
to be a way to end the present negative situation that involves the Iraqi
people. A change in Iraq should be one of the priorities of U.S. policy
in the region. In Iran, the United States should support the electorate,
not the repressive government.
It was also observed that the funding of militant fundamentalist organizations
comes from some oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf: for instance,
Saudi Arabia in the case of Sunni groups and Iran for Shii groups.This
funding should be stopped immediately.
Several participants asserted that a military victory over terrorism
is not enough. The United States and its democratic allies should also
wage a "political" battle in favor of democracy and human rights
in the Muslim world. Indeed they are not at war against Islam but against
tyranny and repression. Their real friends in Muslim countries are not
the authoritarian rulers but the democrats and modernizers. As one panelist
put it, there are many people ready to fight the political battle in all
Muslim countries ftom Indonesia to Morocco.
A panelist said that one of the problems is that everybody wants to determine
U.S. foreign policy. For instance, the Arabs want to suggest to Washington
what should be done about the Palestinians and Chairman Arafat. The Israelis,
for their part, push their own agenda. The Pakistanis and the Indians
press the United States to accept their versions of their dispute over
Kashmir. Some states advise against taking action against states that
give haven to terrorists. And on it goes. The United States should base
its foreign policy on its own interests in each case. It should also remain
true to its values and principles.
Concerning U.S. engagement in the region, several participants underlined
the fact that there is no real effort to explain American positions to
the public in Muslim countries. It was suggested that the Voice of America
and other channels like those broadcasting to Iran and Afghanistan be
used for this purpose. One panelist observed that we are living in a "people-to-people"
era and that the United States should spare no effort in creating "people-to-people"
relations. In effect, it should enlarge to a considerable extent the only
contacts the United States has with people in the Middle East, which are
generally confined to businessmen and military leaders. The people of
the region hate the United States vicariously because they hate their
own governments. Where Muslim governments are friendly with the United
States, people hate Americans. The visits of several U.S. presidents to
Syria's dictator, Hafiz Assad, tarnished the image held of the United
States by the people of many Arab countries.
It was observed that in other regions, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) have greatly helped the processes involved in developing civil
society. According to one panelist, there is an explosion of NGOs in the
Middle East. For instance, every year the World Bank holds a Middle East
Development Forum in one Arab capital. NGOs participate in the forums.
The Europeans send senior ministers to those gatherings; in contrast,
the U.S. government is absent. Even the officials of American embassies
do not bother to respond to criticisms aired during the forums. It was
suggested that the United States send highranking representatives
to such conferences.
Participants
Professor D. Khalid Duran
Visiting Scholar
Mohammad H. Fadel, Esq.
Attorney
Dr. Shafeeq N. Ghabra
Professor of Political Science
Kuwait University
Professor Bernard Haykel
Member of the School of Historical Studies at the Institute
for Advanced Study, Princeton University
Assistant Professor, Middle Eastern Studies and History,
New York University
The Honorable Fereydoun Hoveyda
Former Ambassador of Iran to the United Nations
Member of the National Committee's Executive Committee
and Board of Trustees; NCAFP Project Director: The
Middle East: Islamic Law and Peace
Professor George D. Schwab, President
National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Inc.
Mr. Amir Taheri
Editor of Politique Internationale
Columnist for Asharq Alawsat, a pan-Arab daily newspaper (London)
Notes
1. This is a reference to the al-Muwahhidin dynasty (the Unitarians--corrupted
into Spanish: Almohades) founded by Ibn Tumart, a member of a Moroccan
Berber tribe, who assumed the title of mahdi. (See note 6.) His general,
Abdal Mumin, succeeded him in 1130 and propagated his fundamentalist doctrine
in an empire that included North Africa and Andalusia.
2. This participant recounted that during the time of ibn Taymiyya, the
Mongols invaded the eastern part of the Muslim world and converted to
Islam. But they did not apply the Sharia. Ibn Taymiyya declared them heretics
and argued that rebellion be launched against them.
3. Muslims of the early period are called the pious forefathers; hence
Salifi's reference to those early pious forefathers.
4. Munawar Anees in "Civilization," February 2000.
5. See the text under the heading "Definition of MIF."
6. In Shiism, the mahdi is the awaited twelfth imam who disappeared in
his childhood. The imammahdi dogma is an essential part of the twelvers
Shiite creed. In Summism, the mahdi restorer of the faith does not occupy
such a central place. At any rate, the belief in the coming of the mahdi
lent itself in the Arab world to the appearance of many pretenders in
all periods of Muslim history.
7. Professor Saad Eddin Ibrahim.
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