The Middle East: Islamic Law and Peace
Summary of a Roundtable (Including Policy Recommendations)
on Iran: The Nuclear Threat and Beyond
September 7, 2006
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CONTENTS
Dear Reader:
On September 7, 2006, the National Committee on American
Foreign Policy convened its sixth closed-door and off-the-record
roundtable on the Middle East. The topic addressed was “Iran:
The Nuclear Threat and Beyond.”
Like its predecessors, this roundtable was conceived
and guided by Ambassador Fereydoun Hoveyda, the NCAFP’s project
director for the Middle East. Because of his illness in September,
the ambassador was not able to attend the conference or to review
the proceedings edited by Edwina McMahon, senior fellow and associate
editor of American Foreign Policy Interests. He died in November.
Nevertheless, he did reread the NCAFP’s 1997 policy statement
on Iran as well as its 2001 revision. As he did so, Ambassador Hoveyda
was so struck by its relevance that he expressed the wish to have
it reprinted. (Please see the appendix.)
The National Committee on American Foreign Policy
is especially grateful to Mutual of America and to its chairman,
president, and CEO, Mr. Thomas J. Moran; Mrs. Sheila Johnson Robbins;
Mrs. Eugenie Fromer; and Kenneth J. Bialkin, Esq., for providing
major support for this roundtable.
Sincerely,
George D. Schwab
President
INTRODUCTION
The moderator of the day’s proceedings in Ambassador
Fereydoun Hoveyda’s absence presented an overview of the roundtable
and the papers that would be given and discussed: two in the morning,
a broad commentary and an overview of the final presentation during
lunch, and one paper in the afternoon. Employing a medical metaphor,
he identified the questions that are implicit in all of the presentations:
Is Iran’s threat to a healthy regional body politic symptomatic
of a migraine, and if so, how to treat it while living with it?
Conversely, does it pose a threat similar to that of cancer, and
if so, how to prevent it from carrying out its deadly design?
The Iranian Perspective
In identifying the focus of his paper as an examination
of the nuclear issue as well as the defense policies that Iran claims
to be implementing, a presenter discussed political factors as well.
Acquiring prestige, he said, was a major inducement in Iran’s
decision to produce enriched uranium. Reinforcing its desire to
acquire the peculiar kind of international prestige that comes from
being a nuclear power are Iran’s anticipation of obtaining
the psychological reward of self-confidence that flows from success
in mastering nuclear technology and the prospect of recapturing
the key role that the country played in the Middle East before the
advent of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), as well as assurance
that Iran will be the unimpeded beneficiary of an independent source
of energy that is not based on oil—a commodity that may be
better for Iran to sell than to consume.
The presenter summarized the arguments that Iran has
presented to dispute the claim that its enrichment program has been
designed to yield weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In essence,
he declared, deterrence is the key to Iran’s defense policy.
By deterrence Iran means self-sufficiency in resources necessary
to defend itself against its perceived enemies—the United States
and its proxies. Iran does not have an air force, but it does have
missiles and claims to have the capability to summon a large army
that would fight to defend the homeland.
According to the presenter, Iran’s defense strategy
is logical and consistent—the opposite of the way it is portrayed
in the media. In addition to its supplies of missiles and its ability
to field an army, which constitute frontline forms of defense, Iran
uses insurgencies, propaganda, and border incidents as means of
deterrence. It deploys such tactics skillfully as it defends its
interests in the region and develops its relationships with Pakistan,
Afghanistan, the countries of Central Asia, and Iraq.
The inescapable conclusion that emerged from the presentation
was that Iran and the United States share one overarching goal in
the Middle East: stability. For Iran, stability in the form of a
stable polity in Iraq is a desirable objective as long as it does
not produce consequences that are contrary to the ideals of the
Iranian revolution.
In response to a question, the presenter maintained
that it would make no sense at all for the Iranian government to
give to rogue states or to groups of terrorists WMDs that would
create chaos and undermine stability in the region. The fear of
such a giveaway is only that—fear based on anxiety.
The Arab Perspective
In presenting the Arab perspective on the nuclear
issue, a presenter stated that the designation “Arab”
had to be disaggregated to reflect the fact that there are many
Arab points of view on what would happen in the region if Iran were
able to produce nuclear weapons as well as assume a dominant role
in the Middle East. He characterized Arab perspectives as conflicting
and divided along a number of fault lines that separate Arab leaders
from one another and from the Arab street. Even the Saudis, the
presenter observed, who have always regarded Iran as a threat and
a rival, have begun to question their attitude toward Iran. In the
summer of 2006, in pursuit of its revolutionary foreign policy,
Iran, through its support of Hezbollah, seemed to appropriate the
role of the Arabs in their struggle against Israel, achieving for
itself in the war in Lebanon perhaps its only revolutionary foreign
policy success in almost 30 years. The presenter discussed the apparent
alliances formed by Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian
territories and the composite threat that those relationships seems
to pose to Saudi Arabia where the Muslim Brotherhood branch that
operates in the country and claims to subscribe to the revolutionary
Wahhabi theology of the ruling Saudis proclaimed its support for
Hezbollah. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, a Sunni stronghold,
also expressed its support for Hezbollah. To the Saudis, it may
seem that their 50-year record of aiding the Muslim Brotherhood
has failed.
Its belief that Hezbollah won the war in Lebanon,
at least in the realm of symbols and propaganda where a lot of Arab
politics takes place, did not convince Saudi Arabia to continue
to support the Muslim Brotherhood. Instead, the Saudis informed
their erstwhile beneficiary that they will not receive further assistance
for the duration of their alliance with Hamas and Hezbollah. Will
the split already evident among the members of Hamas over supporting
Hezbollah become manifest outside the Palestinian territories, the
presenter asked rhetorically? No one can tell now, he answered.
He asserted that the answer, when it becomes evident, will depend
on two countries—Iraq and Lebanon. In his judgment, they seem
to be the central arena of the conflict among Iran and the three
Sunni countries of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. Private discussions
with Saudi authorities have revealed, the presenter disclosed, that
Saudi Arabia has determined that it can live with a nuclear Iran.
The Saudi belief in deterrence appears to be the operative factor
in that determination—a judgment buttressed by its alliance
with Pakistan.
Comments, Questions, and Answers
A presenter commented that the Arabs vacillate between
thinking that the United States will deal directly with an Iran
turned nasty and that the United States will cut a deal with Iran
behind their backs. In any event, they believe that the resolution
of the issue will hinge on two principal players—the United
States and Iran.
In response to a series of questions, a presenter
reiterated that the perspective reflected in his presentation represented
not his own point of view but that of Iran. From that perspective
he elaborated on points raised in his paper to address individual
questions posed by a number of participants. (1) Iran has no intention
of producing enriched uranium to produce nuclear weapons; instead,
it is interested in producing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
supplying nuclear technology, including weaponry, to rogue states
or groups of terrorists would confound reason and prevent the fulfillment
of Iran’s objective of promoting stability in the Middle East;
(2) Iran has no quarrel with Israel; Israel has become unpopular
in Iran not because of the situation in the Palestinian territories
but because of the perception that it is acting as the agent of
the United States; some Iranians think that Israel and Iran could
enter into a strategic alliance that would prove to be effective;
the Iranian president’s call for variations on the theme of
wiping Israel off the map is a rallying cry in a crude propaganda
campaign designed to appeal to the Arab street over the heads of
its pro-U.S. governments and thereby achieve the overarching goal
of the revolutionary state—assume leadership of Islamic countries—a
goal that would otherwise be very difficult for a non-Arab Shiite
state to achieve in a region where only 13 percent of the population
consists of Shiites; (3) Iran wants to exercise in the Middle East
a role that is commensurate with its perceived power in the region;
(4) the Iranian government seeks the removal of all sanctions and
restrictions that have been imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran
since the seizure of the U.S. embassy in 1979.
A presenter remarked that he does not agree with the
presenter’s assessment of the reasonableness of Iran’s
rulers. Pointing to their decisions to supply missiles to Hezbollah
in Lebanon and improvised explosive devices to the insurgents in
Iraq, he cautioned against trusting that the ideological rulers
of Iran will suddenly become sensible and observe international
law in their dealings with legitimate states, rogue states, and
terrorist groups.
A presenter asked about the political leadership of
Iran, namely, whom is one speaking of when one says Iran, a country
that, unlike its Arab counterparts, has institutions. Obviously,
the political climate is diverse, and contenders for power are numerous,
imbued with ideology, and determined to prevail. Identifying them
may shed light on the country’s objectives and the institutional
ways that can be used to control their conflicts.
A presenter estimated that thirty groups, each headed
by a cleric, provide the leadership cadre in Iran. Beyond the universal
leadership objective of preserving the regime, they have goals and
interests that conflict with one another’s aims. Nevertheless,
they come together to make collective decisions that also enhance
their individual positions.
A presenter expressed the judgment that the Iranian
leaders would use a nuclear weapon if they believed it would forestall
the crumbling of the revolutionary regime. Another presenter responded
that in his judgment, the leaders are not suicidal. He thinks that
if regime change were imminent, they would head for foreign capitals
with the capital they had accumulated. In that connection, he referred
to the treasure acquired by a past president of Iran who used his
position to become the wealthiest man in the country.
A presenter stated that despite the fact that Iran
has cheated on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), negotiations
rather than penalties have been employed to persuade it to change
its behavior and comply with the provisions of the treaty. Furthermore,
he wondered why Iran has decided to develop enriched uranium when
it does not have a nuclear power station. When the power station
built by Russia goes online in March 2007, Russia will be able to
supply all of Iran’s needs. The United States-European Union
package would give to Iran, within the protocol of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, all of the nuclear-enriched fuel the country needs. One
can only question why any country would reject such a beneficial
offer.
A participant asked what package of incentives could
be offered to Iran to dissuade it from developing the capability
to produce nuclear weapons. He mentioned membership in the World
Trade Organization, the provision of massive foreign technical know-how,
capital investment in petroleum industries, and security guarantees,
among other things. Such incentives, he observed, might drive a
wedge between the government and the people. A presenter responded
that the United States can negotiate only with the government and
not with the public. Those negotiations, he continued, could not
be conducted in public. He cited education as the first of many
such incentives that could be offered to Iran.
A presenter noted that security guarantees were granted
to Iran in the Algerian Accords that ended the American hostage
crisis in 1981. In fact, he stated, the accords prevent American
citizens from suing the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to him,
Iran rejected the recent U.S.-E.U. package of incentives not because
the proposal failed to enhance its interests as a sovereign state
but because it considered them to be inimical to its interests as
the embodiment of a revolutionary regime. In his judgment, as long
as the revolution’s representatives, the clerics who sit atop
each echelon of the bureaucracy, continue to rule on behalf of the
revolution and are determined to preserve their power against the
nation-state and the incipient power of the people, Iran will continue
to be a dangerous loose cannon.
A participant asked a presenter to give his personal
view, not that of the Iranian government, of why Iran would support
a democracy in Iraq. The presenter focused on the cultural composition
of the Iraqi population: 60 percent are Shiites, and probably from
20 to 25 percent of the Kurds in Iraq have an ethnic affinity with
the Persians of Iran. The presence of similar cultural groups in
a nearby state may enlist the Iranian people’s support for
a political situation in Iraq that would conduce to the benefit
of the Iraqi people. Conversely, it might generate their opposition
to a development that could lead to the eruption of civil war or
to the breakup of the state, the flow of refugees into Iran, and
instability in the region.
In commenting on the last answer, a presenter reiterated
the distinction between Iran as a sovereign state and Iran as a
revolution. If it functioned as a sovereign state, Iran would welcome
Iraq as a stable, free democratic neighbor that promotes stability
in the region. As a revolution, he asserted, Iran does not welcome
a democratic Iraq whose new government, political parties, and media
contrast with the IRI’s cleric-dominated, ideological, repressive
political system.
A participant asked how to interpret the Iranian president’s
remarks about Israel. What, she asked, did a particular presenter
think of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He replied that although the president’s
behavior is embarrassing, he is not stupid. President Ahmadinejad
has targeted a specific audience whom he hopes to mobilize in his
behalf. Instead of focusing on the intellectuals or others who live
and work in the cities of Iran, he addresses the peasants and the
workers in his drive to get elected and become the leader of the
Islamic world. Living in rural areas of Iran, they understand economic
development in a limited way as revenues derived from the sale of
oil. Consequently, Ahmadinejad has tailored his message to reinforce
their perceptions and to appeal to their parochial interests.
A participant asked a presenter to assess the nature
of the enmity between the Shia and the Sunni and the extent to which
their animosity affects U.S. policymaking. The presenter replied
that in most countries in which the Sunnis constitute a majority,
there was no enmity toward the Shia until the war in Iraq because
there was little interaction between the adherents of the two strains
of Islam. As examples he cited the Palestinians, who are Sunni,
as well as Jordan. Syria, personified by the ruling Alawites, he
stated, presents a different profile of believers, as do the adherents
of Wahhabism practiced by the royal family of Saudi Arabia and their
Sunni subjects. In essence, there are two countries in which Islam
is atypical, namely, Syria, where the rulers subscribe to the Alawite
strain, considered heretical by Shiites, and Saudi Arabia, where
hatred for Shiites and a spirit of anti-Shiism animate all who practice
Wahhabism. In Lebanon and Egypt, in contrast, there was no enmity
between the Sunnis and the Shiites until the war. The presenter
asserted that because of the influence of Al Qaeda or Wahhabism
or both, anti-Shiism is spreading throughout the region. He offered
the ironic conclusion that one of the ways to weaken Iran’s
influence in the region and diminish the influence of Shiism in
the Middle East would be to promote Qaedalike groups. Similarly,
the way to weaken Hezbollah, undermine its victory in Lebanon, and
counter its ability to forge an alliance with Sunnis would be to
provoke the involvement of Al Qaeda.
Additional unintended consequences of the war in Iraq
were identified in the next exchange between a participant who cautioned
against giving away too much during negotiations and a presenter.
Doing so, the participant stated, would provide incentives to others
to engage in hostile or threatening acts to secure a seat at the
negotiating table. The presenter stated that the decision to possess
nuclear capability is popular with the Iranian people who believe
that all great nations such as theirs are entitled to possess all
available technological advances that convey a status of superiority
among nations. Had Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons, the
presenter averred, his country would not have been invaded. Other
states such as Iran have drawn the logical conclusion that possessing
nuclear weapons will prevent both a preemptive attack and regime
change.
Why, a presenter wondered, would any democratic state
want to invade Iraq or Iran. Does any state want to invade Switzerland
or 21st-century Poland, he asked rhetorically? He cautioned against
assuming that the interests of such regimes as Iran are as legitimate
as their interests of state.
A participant asked a particular presenter whether
he shared his view that the U.S. presence in Iraq is preventing
Iran from becoming a hegemon in the region. The presenter voiced
his agreement.
In response to a participant’s question about
whether the presenters considered the differences between Iran and
the United States to be a cultural clash, a presenter responded
that he did and that the nature of the struggle accounted for its
intractability. He stated what it was not about—not about territory,
influence, and access to natural resources and markets and other
things of concrete value. Just as it is a clash of cultures, it
is a clash of visions—President Bush’s vision of the Middle
East versus President Ahmadinejad’s vision of the region.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the presenter asserted, should
not be dismissed. He is a proponent of the very strong ideological
movement known as Khomeiniism that controls the Iranian state apparatus.
Iran’s geostrategic position accounts for its potential power.
Located between the Caspian Basin and the Persian Gulf, Iran possesses
an abundance of natural resources such as oil and gas. It is using
those resources to advance its ideological goals. Two conflicting
messianic strains exist in Islam. The adherents of one are waiting
for the imman to come back. Therefore, they show no loyalty to any
regime. The exponents of the other, which calls itself the hasteners,
engage in provocative acts and provoke conflict and chaos designed
to convince the imman to return right away to establish peace. President
Ahmadinejad belongs to the hastener branch.
He continued by relating that in November there will
be an election of the Assembly of Experts that will choose the supreme
leader who has virtually unlimited power under the Iranian constitution.
If the president’s group wins a majority, Ahmadinejad and his
followers would be in a position to choose the next supreme guide
of Iran from its own ranks.
A participant asked whether the United States could
bring about peaceful regime change in Iran by generating pressure
within the country. A presenter stated that unless the present revolutionary
leadership trains a group to secede it, the regime will die out.
He referred to recent polls that revealed that an overwhelming number
of Iranians who are 30 years old or younger—a majority of the
population—don’t want anything to do with the revolution.
He singled out special provisions that have been made to obtain
an American education (considered advantageous by Iranian youth)
that would result in American degrees being issued by non-American
universities and the legitimizing effects of elections that are
likely to proliferate and become less constrained as Iranian voters
return to the polls to record their choices for government offices
and to support the fledgling process of democracy.
A participant returned to the question of the Shia
versus the Sunni and the possibility that either branch would enter
into an alliance with Al Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, or Hezbollah
against the interests of Saudi Arabia. After explaining why he thought
it possible that Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood might work
together under certain circumstances, a presenter stated that he
considered it very unlikely that Al Qaeda and the Shiites would
work together because the second generation of Al Qaeda leaders
have declared the Shia to be enemies of Islam. The presenter stated
that the Muslim Brotherhood, perhaps as a consequence of adopting
the tactic of seeking power through elections, has declared that
attempts to overturn the government of Egypt are illegitimate. On
the ground, however, things are different. One can observe the working
relationship established between Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim
Brotherhood, and Hezbollah. He recommended that outsiders, including
the United States, not take sides in the theological debates raging
between the Shiia and the Sunnis. Instead, the United States should
assess the consequences of ideological conflict on power politics
in the region.
A participant asked a particular presenter to suggest
how to deal with Iran’s financing of insurgencies in the region
and to relate whether Syria was providing the same kind of assistance.
The presenter replied that intervening to end such support would
be a very expensive way of trying to resolve the problem, doing
nothing would be a very unsatisfactory reaction, and trying to understand
the reasons behind the decision to support an insurgency may be
the best approach by default. For example, Iran’s support of
Israel’s enemy Hezbollah in Lebanon was based on the strategic
consideration that should the Israeli air force, against which Iran
has no defense, decide to take out Iran’s nuclear facilities,
Hezbollah would strike a retaliatory blow against Israel. The threat
of such a scenario amounts to deterrence of a different stripe.
The presenter remarked that a number of factors influenced
Iran’s decision to fund insurgencies—a decision that seems
flawed when one realizes that Israel was not regarded until recently
as Iran’s enemy. In fact, most of the Iranian people do not
support their president’s attempts to recast Israel in that
role. The presenter’s analysis of the situation has led him
to conclude that Khomeinist Iran fears the reemergence of Iraq as
an alternative center of Shia power.
A presenter turned his attention to Syria and the
Alawite heretical group that governs there. The legitimacy of the
regime comes from its success in maintaining itself as a frontline
state in the war against Israel, imperialism, and the West, as well
as regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan that are willing to make
deals with the West. The official ideology of the Syrian regime
is Baathist, making it the proponents of a fascist Arab nationalist
ideology that practically no one in Syria believes in or supports.
Hence the regime feels threatened. As a consequence, Syria has struck
alliances with Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, and elements of Al Qaeda
in Lebanon.
A participant asked a presenter to elaborate on the
Algerian Accords by describing the kinds of sanctions that were
imposed, assessing their effectiveness, and discussing whether the
prospect of removing them might spur the Iranians to enter into
negotiations with the West. The presenter replied that the Algerian
Accords, as modified in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, contain the
U.S. promise that any company that invests more than 25 million
dollars and, later, 40 million dollars in the Iranian energy sector
will not be allowed to invest and trade in U.S. markets. He stated
that they have not been applied uniformly, allowing many European
companies as well as a number of subsidiaries of Halliburton to
do business in Iran. As the leading topic on the prospective agenda
that
Iran issued in response to a proposal initiated by
the Clinton administration during the Khatami presidency was a Yaltalike
deal that would have divided the Middle East into specific spheres
of influence controlled by Iran such as Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq
and specific spheres under the influence of the United States such
as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. The proposal appeared to be
based on the concept of containment that prevailed during the cold
war. That could be option one. Another option would be for the United
States and Iran to work together in a condominium kind of arrangement
in the region. Such a development, he stated, might not be acceptable
to Turkey, Israel, the Arabs, the Pakistanis, and others. The third
option, he asserted, is regime change, an undertaking that need
not be accomplished immediately by invasion but by taking a resolute
stand against negotiating with a regime that is an implacable enemy.
The presenter declared that he is opposed to symbolic sanctions
because they do not work. So too is he opposed to “Salvation
Army” solutions designed to provide educational assistance
and other kinds of socioeconomic aid. He voiced the judgment that
Iran’s economy is not thriving because states and nonstate
investors do not want to incur the risk of investing in the Islamic
Republic of Iran while its quarrel with the United States is extant.
In any event, the pseudo-Marxist argument that postulates the primacy
of providing economic aid elevates economics over politics. If that
approach prevails, it will do nothing to alleviate the problems
of the Middle East, which are essentially political in nature and
require political solutions.
During lunch a presenter focused on illuminating the
relationship between the Shia and the Sunni. Statistics relating
to the sizable presence of Sunnis in Iran (2 million of a total
population of 12 million in the capital and 10 million of about
70 million in the country as a whole) and the absence of Sunni mosques
and officeholders throughout the Islamic Republic of Iran testify
to the rampant discrimination practiced in the country. The same
situation obtains in Egypt, though there the Shiites, not the Sunnis,
are the objects of discrimination and in some cases persecution.
Recently the situation has improved in Saudi Arabia where Sunnis
have been appointed as token members of parliament, as ministers,
and as ambassadors. A presenter recommended that the United States
not get involved in this historic conflict among Muslims in the
region.
Another presenter agreed that American involvement
in sectarian issues would be unwise but stated that the United States
has no alternative. U.S. involvement, however, should be limited
to, say, telling its ally Saudi Arabia that it favors or rejects
a specific kind of sectarian propaganda initiative.
The moderator related that in conformity with the
principle that Muslims of one strain cannot make an agreement with
those of another strain or with nonbelievers that can last more
than 10 years, the London Accords of 1996 between the Shia and the
Sunni of Saudi Arabia are now defunct. Consequently, from their
place of exile in London, the Saudi Shiites have resumed publishing
their antiregime attacks against the Saudi rulers. He stated that
thanks to the United States, the Shiites are in power in Iraq for
the first time; also, they are in government—both in the ministries
and in parliament—in Afghanistan as a consequence of the U.S.
intervention to root out the Taliban.
A presenter answered a question relating to the fact
that money and oil are fueling conflict in the Middle East. He discussed
the fact that the industry required comparatively few employees
and created a dependent population. He reported that 53 percent
of the Iranian population is on the government payroll. In effect,
oil has proved to be a curse rather than a solution to the economic
problems of Iran.
A participant raised the issue of how petrodollars
are spent to purchase weaponry to prosecute the Arab-Israeli conflict
and not to build schools, hospitals, and housing. A presenter elaborated
on the comment that the way in which oil revenue is spent is a curse.
He maintained that it decouples the relationship between effort
and reward that results from, say, building infrastructure and other
public goods that conduce to everyone’s benefit. He stated
that Saudis do not need to be innovative, efficient, industrious,
and entrepreneurial. The desire to develop such attributes and employ
them in a country where there is no satisfactory work to do inevitably
leads to lassitude, frustration, and the desire to emigrate. In
essence, he asserted, a country awash in oil revenues that are used
to enable workers to live without effort on largesse dispensed by
the government anesthetizes potentially productive people into accepting
their status as useless and habituates them to believe that they
are without merit.
Oil revenues, the presenter said, exert the same effect
on politics. In his judgment, petrodollars have played a very important
role in financing insurgencies fomented and fought by paramilitary
forces. For example, subsidies provided by Iran from its oil revenues
have enabled Hezbollah to buy arms and other material.
A presenter commented that the proposal made by the
Saudi king in 2002 is worth pursuing. In fact, he said, it can be
said that the Saudis are leading the Arabs toward a resolution of
the Arab-Israeli conflict. He expanded on the concept that people
are useless in oil-producing societies other than Norway, which
happens to be a developed country in the West. Just as people are
not needed to work in oil-producing countries in the Middle East,
they are not needed to vote and they are not needed to pay taxes.
Taking Saudi Arabia as an example, he stated that the government
imports foreign workers at a cost equivalent to one third of its
oil income and relies on the United States to defend the country.
A government that does not need people can act despotically when
it decides to do something, especially export revolution and its
peculiar brand of Islam.
A participant observed that dictators do not build
schools because educating people is not in their interest. A presenter
added that the obsession with Israel and anti-Americanism is a middle-class
phenomenon in the Middle East that appeals to the educated elite
in Arab countries. The obsession reflects the clash of two ideological,
subjective visions.
The subject of oil broadened to include a description
of an alternative plan developed by Kazakhstan to keep oil revenues
separate from treasury receipts and comments about the woeful condition
of the oil fields in Iran, the role played by China in trying to
secure its oil needs, and the question of whether Iran will build
a pipeline carrying natural gas through Pakistan and into India.
The Emerging Democracy Movement
A presenter spoke about democracy in Iran from the
perspective of nonviolent struggle—a strategy that he endorses
in his work with Iranian youth. He related that despite its status
as the second-largest oil producer and the possessor of the largest
oil reserves in the world, Iran is afflicted with unemployment,
inflation, insufficient economic growth, social tensions, a brain
drain, and a propensity toward disaster, as implicit in its death
rate from road accidents that exceeds that of any other country.
Its rate of incarceration is second to China’s, and, unlike
every other country in the world, it imposes the death penalty on
juveniles. Its minority non-Persian population contains a number
of ethnic groups, including the second-largest number of Jews outside
the region, as well as a number of refugees from Afghanistan and
Iraq. Dates crucial to the Islamic Republic of Iran are 1953, when
oil was nationalized and a U.S.-sponsored coup took place; 1963,
when Ayatollah Khomeni became the leader of the Islamic revolution
that established itself in Qom; 1979, when the Islamic Republic
was established; 1980, when the Iran-Iraq War began; 1995, when
the reformers came to power; 2006, when the reform movement failed
and a paramilitary state was established under President Ahmadinejad.
In the presenter’s judgment, the social and economic
crises in Iran provide a context for analyzing the emerging democracy
movement in the country. If it is to succeed, it must undermine
the pillars of support that empower the regime, namely the supreme
leader or guide who is at the pinnacle of power in the Islamic Republic
of Iran; the judiciary; the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Special
Forces; the police; and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security,
as well as the parallel security apparatus.
In essence, the supreme leader is accountable to no
one. The revolution, in the presenter’s estimation, has exerted
the greatest effect on the judiciary. Since its takeover by the
clergy, the judiciary has been severely impaired.
When the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Special
Forces, which number 350,000, are augmented by family and friends,
they appear to be a formidable force marching in the streets to
show their support for a supposedly popular government.
Supplementing the regular military is the force known
as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. It is nominally subordinate
to the minister of defense but is actually controlled by the supreme
leader. Like their former Revolutionary Guard cohort, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
they are also members of parliament.
Since the regular police and the revolutionary police
were combined, the force totals about 40,000. It includes border
patrol personnel and antiriot police and Unit 110, which the presenter
identified as being of particular interest to him. To counter the
adverse reactions to male police beating up women whose crimes involved
not covering their hair completely or using cellphones as they walked
on the city streets of Iran, women were recruited to join the ranks.
They have shown no reluctance to accost and arrest women presenting
themselves in public in a manner deemed to be beyond the pale of
fundamentalist Islamic deportment for women.
In the presenter’s judgment, the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security is smarter and more effective than SAVAK,
the shah’s Secret Service that it replaced, and much better
equipped and trained as well. Its members appear to be everywhere.
They can be found abroad too where they work with de facto expatriates
to carry out assassinations and other criminal acts orchestrated
by the leaders of Iran. The financial resources of the ministry
primarily come from the office of the supreme leader.
Three dates have assumed significance in the history
of the emerging democracy movement: July 8, 1999, the winter of
2005, and June 2006, when students, workers, and women demonstrated
in support of human rights. They are augmented by university graduates
who have organized themselves into a bloc and religious and ethnic
minorities. The main weakness of all of the groups is the lack of
leadership and organizational skills.
Among the issues that the presenter addressed were
nuclear technology as a security issue and nuclear technology as
a technology issue. He maintained that as far as the former issue
is concerned, Iran prefers to be North Korea, which was not invaded,
rather than Iraq, which was. The issue of technology, according
to the presenter, reveals how different President Ahmadinejad and
other Iranian Islamic fundamentalists are from conservative, traditional
fundamentalists who reject technology. Ahmadinejad and his cohorts
are like fascists in their fascination with technology and their
desire to acquire it. Their problem with the issue of nuclear technology
as a national right relates to their reluctance to embrace its underlying
spirit of nationalism. Islamists who seek an Islamic empire are
uncomfortable advocating nationalism.
According to the presenter, two aspects of nuclear
technology have been neglected by those who are spearheading the
democracy movement: nuclear technology as an economic issue and
nuclear technology as an environmental issue. He singled out the
diversion to technology of money that could have been used to create
jobs, fight inflation, stimulate economic growth, and prevent health
crises. The possibility of nuclear accidents and the mismanagement
of nuclear facilities are also issues of concern.
In concluding his presentation, the presenter stated
that a military intervention would have a significant negative impact
on the democracy movement in Iran at least in the short term. The
long-term results, he stated, would be quite unpredictable.
A presenter, in noting that U.S. labor unions and
other interest groups had done virtually nothing to support workers
in Iran, stated that ways of dealing with the Iranian regime were
not limited to bringing about regime change or doing nothing. There
are other options that involve extending support to the emerging
democracy movement in Iran.
A presenter answered a question about the kinds of
concrete support that the West can provide. He singled out the use
of an effective tactic such as pressuring the regime on two fronts—political
and economic. The presenter cited the assassinations of Iranian
Kurdish leaders that occurred in 1992 in a small restaurant in Berlin.
The murdered leaders were in the German capital to attend an International
Socialist conference. A German court called for the arrest of the
Iranian minister of intelligence and played a role in the indictment
of the supreme leader and the president of Iran. Other European
nations followed the German example by exerting diplomatic pressure
in the form of withdrawing their ambassadors. Another Iranian attempt
to kidnap one of its citizens and blame the disappearance on Germany
was foiled when German authorities refuted the Iranian government’s
claim that an Iranian dissident writer had boarded a German plane
in Iran but did not disembark from it in Germany. The German government’s
prosecution of both cases as well as its withdrawal of its ambassador
and its insistence that its European allies take the same initial
diplomatic step proved to be effective. In the presenter’s
judgment, Helsinki type sanctions work when they are implemented
by everyone concerned, including the Europeans, the Chinese, and
the Russians.
A presenter commented that although Iranians living
abroad are not in a position to assume leadership roles in the emerging
democracy movement, through a variety of undertakings they can help
to identify and train emerging Iranian leaders. He agreed with a
participant that it should be possible for a number of American
degrees, prized by Iranian students, to be obtained through the
Internet. In fact, he related, he had helped to formulate such a
program and worked on its development until he accepted his current
position. A presenter added that three of President Ahmadinejad’s
cabinet ministers earned American degrees online.
In answer to a question about the brain drain, a presenter
replied that it is a serious problem. After graduation many bright
Iranians stay in Europe and the United States. Part of the reason,
he said, is economic. Young doctors, for instance, must hold several
jobs at once in Iran in order to provide for their basic needs and
the needs of their families. Some work as cab drivers at night while
they are on call at the hospital. The best leave and never come
back. He stated, in response to another question, that the kinds
of aid that political parties and trade union groups gave to the
Portuguese Social Democrats in their struggle to achieve a peaceful
transition to democracy after the death of President Salazar could
be used to advantage by the emerging democracy movement in Iran.
That is why the Ministry of Intelligence is doing everything in
its power to propagate the false notion that the vaunted velvet
revolution that first developed in Eastern Europe is a device conceived
by the U.S. government to subvert other governments and establish
a regime in its own image. Accordingly, or so goes the official
argument in Iran, it cannot work in Iran. A presenter added that
in a UN report published last year, the brain drain in Iran was
rated the highest in the world. As Iranian doctors leave for Canada,
Iran imports doctors from the Philippines.
Is there really an underground in Iran, a participant
asked? If so, how cohesive is it? There are two was the reply—both
a political and a cultural underground. The latter, he stated, features,
among other attractions, music that its performers rap out in Farsi.
The political underground is of great concern to the Iranian authorities.
Its members have paid heavily for their opposition to the regime
and for their insistence that human rights are universal and ought
to be exercised in public.
A participant discussed the National Committee’s
track record in initiating track I½ and track II diplomacy
and asked a presenter whether either one of those diplomatic undertakings
might work in the case of Iran. The presenter replied that the regime
does not allow genuine nongovernment organizations (NGOs); nor does
it allow foreign NGOs to establish themselves in Iran. Any group
said by the government to be an Iranian NGO is actually a government
front organization staffed by government operatives. One country—the
Netherlands—has managed to advance the cause of the emerging
Iranian democracy movement by limiting the scope of its projects,
creating an Internet based radio station and an online magazine,
and giving Freedom House in Washington money to promote democracy
in Iran.
Another presenter voiced his support for track II
diplomacy, stating that despite the infiltration of informers, called
antennas, into meetings of democracy groups, such gatherings could
achieve critical mass and perhaps impel the government to recognize
the validity of the fledgling movement.
A participant, identifying the principals of track
I½ diplomacy as top government officials from such states
as China, Taiwan, and North Korea, as well as their counterparts
in the National Security Council and the State Department, and those
involved in track II diplomacy as scholars from think tanks and
government officials, asked a presenter whether it might be effective
to use track I½ diplomacy to deal with the Iranian regime.
He replied: Only in short-term situations—in meetings designed
to avert an immediate crisis. Another presenter stated that meetings
have taken place countless times between Iran and the United States
since the Islamic Republic of Iran was established. The agendas
have been relatively specific and the results have been successful.
In contrast, discussions about who is to set the agenda for the
Middle East have not taken place between the two sides because they
would involve an assessment of who possesses more power. In his
judgment, Iran’s legitimacy, like Syria’s, comes from
its profession of anti-Americanism. Once it abandons that guise,
the Islamic regime will fall.
The participant who posed the question about track
I½ and track II diplomacy said that he thinks it would not
be effective now because of all the infighting that is said to be
taking place among the leaders of Iran. He asked about its nature
and incidence. A presenter, in response, returned to a point he
had made earlier: As long as the leaders, who disagree about everything
except revolutionary ideology, are determined to preserve the revolution
at the expense of creating a sovereign state, they will reject long-term
negotiations with other states, especially with the United States.
The same participant raised a question about Iranian-Syrian
relations and the possibility of separating Syria from Iran over
the issue of Israel. A participant replied by comparing the forces
that constitute the divided Syrian opposition with the weak regime
in Damascus. Gathered at meeting places in Brussels and London,
the Syrian opposition has not evoked a welcome from U.S. observers
who are reluctant to support the Muslim Brotherhood—the nucleus
of the opposition—and offend the mullahs, the Saudis, and the
Egyptians who oppose the paramilitary force. The situation may be
changing, however. As the Syrian regime grows weaker, the United
States may decide to support those who are moving to topple it.
When asked to comment, a presenter gave his assessment that Syria
cannot be separated from Iran. In his judgment, all the sanctions
that have been imposed on Syria are not working. Further, the opposition
will be directed by the Muslim Brotherhood in combination with the
Baathists. A civil war could ensue that would spill over into Lebanon.
Chaos would reign in the region. Another presenter added his judgment.
He does not think that civil war will erupt in Syria. Instead, he
thinks that Syria, aided by Iran and Russia, will return to Lebanon
within the next three years. Accordingly, he believes that the need
for regime change in Syria is urgent.
A participant asked the presenters to elaborate on
a term used in the discussion: “a permanent U.S. presence in
the Middle East.” Do they think that such a presence would
be welcomed and could it be sustained? If so, where would it be
positioned? It was the judgment of all of the presenters that it
could be sustained wherever it was welcomed. A presenter related
that a number of Arab states, namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,
Egypt, and Jordan, maintain an association with NATO that could
grow to full membership status. Further, he remarked that Egypt
and Turkey, which, like Iran, have always played a role in shaping
the balance of power in the Muslim world, may reassert themselves
in the region through the NATO architecture. Meanwhile, Turkey must
resolve its status in Europe, and Egypt must deal with its acute
domestic problems.
In response to a question about Lebanon, a presenter
said that the situation there was very dynamic. Hezbollah receives
considerable sums of money from Iran. In effect it can be said that
Hezbollah is a client of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is impossible
to predict whether Hezbollah would be willing to give up its revolutionary
role in the region to become a dominant domestic player in Lebanon
and difficult to see how it can be uprooted from Lebanon in the
absence of civil war. A presenter asserted that he thinks Hezbollah
lost the war in Lebanon despite its claims of victory, which were
echoed in the Western media. He also asserted that what really matters
in Lebanon is U.S. policy toward the state. The United States, he
remarked, has the power. In subcontracting it to France, the Saudis,
and the Egyptians in varying degrees of decision-making authority,
America is making a big mistake. If a war erupts in Lebanon, it
will be between Iran and the United States. After losing the war
against Israel conducted by its proxy, Hezbollah, Iran is not likely
to make that mistake again.
The hosts thanked the presenters and the other participants
and assured them that the day’s discussions would be instrumental
in helping the National Committee on American Foreign Policy formulate
its policy recommendations on “Iran: The Nuclear Threat and
Beyond.”
THE HOSTS, THE PRESENTERS, AND
OTHER PARTICIPANTS
The Hosts
Mr. William J. Flynn
Chairman, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Dr. George D. Schwab
President, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
The Presenters
Dr. Ramin Ahmadi
Cofounder, Iran Human Rights Documentation Center
Dr. Bernard Haykel
Professor, Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies,
New York University
Dr. Fariborz Mokhtari
Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies,
National Defense University
Mr. Amir Taheri
Author and commentator for CNN
Other Participants
Dr. Giuseppe Ammendola
Adviser, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Mr. Robert L. Barbanell
Trustee, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Ms. Eleana Benador
Benador Associates, Inc.
Mr. Albert Bildner
Bildner Associates
The Honorable Donald Blinken
Trustee, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Mr. John V. Connorton, Esq.
Trustee, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Dr. Susan Aurelia Gitelson
Trustee, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Professor George E. Gruen
Senior Fellow and Adviser, National Committee on American Foreign
Policy
Ms. Cyrielle Jean-Sicard
Assistant to the President, National Committee on American Foreign
Policy
Ms. Madeline Konigsberg
Trustee, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Ms. Edwina McMahon
Senior Fellow, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Mr. Donald S. Rice, Esq.
Senior Vice President, National Committee on American Foreign
Policy
Ms. Sheila Robbins
Member, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Mr. Daniel Rose
Member, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Ms. Nina Rosenwald
American Securities Holding Corporation
Mr. William M. Rudolf
Executive Vice President, National Committee on American Foreign
Policy
Mr. Clarence Schwab
Member, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Mr. Walter P. Stern
Member, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
NCAFP POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
- The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) believes
that it is absolutely essential to acquire accurate and comprehensive
information about a country that appears to be on the verge of
obtaining the ability to produce nuclear weapons. To that end,
the NCAFP recommends that the U.S. government increase its intelligence-gathering
personnel, facilities, and operations in Iran.
- The NCAFP recommends that the United States use the tracking
methods it is said to have developed since 9/11 to prevent the
transfer of money and other resources to Hezbollah (a client of
Iran), which it uses against Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel. Similarly,
the administration should redouble its efforts to make Iraq’s
borders with Iran and Syria less porous.
- The NCAFP recommends that the administration consult with a
range of experts to help it make informed decisions concerning
whether to include countries other than Iran and Syria in deliberations
designed to stabilize Iraq. To be addressed, for example, are
the following questions: Should Turkey, an ostensible ally of
Israel, a long-term member of NATO, and a candidate in waiting
for admission to the European Union, be included, or would that
decision be likely to alienate the Kurds whose support is crucial
to promoting stability in Iraq? What workable tradeoffs can be
devised?
- The NCAFP believes that inviting only a self-confident Iran
and a very weak Syria to discussions designed to determine the
future of Iraq would heighten Iran’s belief that its power
status has given it the right to produce nuclear weapons and to
become the leader of an incipient Islamic Empire. Such a development
would appeal to Iran as a revolutionary regime, not to Iran as
a sovereign state. We recommend that the United States deal with
Iran institutionally as a sovereign state and as one of several
balancers in one or more blocs that should be formed on the basis
of deterrence in a region fraught with conflict.
- The NCAFP recommends that the administration enter into serious
and strategic discussions with its allies designed to determine
whether devising some level of association with NATO similar to
that which exists for several Muslim states in North Africa would
benefit and curtail the revolutionary aspirations of other states
in the Middle East.
- The NCAFP urges the U.S. government to support Freedom House
in its work with the emergent Iranian democracy movement. We also
recommend that the administration provide assistance to the Dutch
and Belgian governments and other groups that are working successfully
with dissident groups in Iran.
- The NCAFP appeals to U.S. universities to grant American degrees
directly to Iranian students who have completed the required courses
of study online or indirectly through other universities that
have enrolled them in authorized U.S. degree-granting programs.
Several caveats should inform the process, however. U.S. course
offerings should not concentrate on U.S. technology, which the
Iranian regime seeks to acquire and master. Instead, they should
focus on leadership and organization, two skills that young people
in Iran are said to lack. Moreover, the teaching of such skills
should be set in a democratic context that emphasizes openness
and free exchanges of ideas and other forms of participation,
cooperation, and compromise.
- The NCAFP appeals to American trade unions to end their silence
about conditions in Iran, support the fledgling trade union movement
there, and engage the International Labor Organization in furthering
the cause of Iranian workers.
- Echoing the words of Winston Churchill, the NCAFP affirms its
belief that in this critical situation, “Jaw, jaw, jaw is
better than war, war, war.”
APPENDIX
Conclusions to Policy Statement on United States–Iranian
Relations: Today and Tomorrow (July 1997, Revised April 2001)
- U.S. concerns about the current conduct of the Islamic Republic
of Iran fall into four categories: state sponsorship of and assistance
to international terrorism; encouragement of dissidence in and
between Muslim governments friendly to the United States in particular
and to the West in general; opposition to and disruption of the
Middle East peace process; covert plans to develop nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction.
- The policies of the United States and its allies have not produced
any noticeable change in the international conduct of the leaders
of the Islamic Republic. U.S. economic sanctions, although not
supported by the European Union, have created domestic hardships
for the present Iranian regime, including rising unemployment,
skyrocketing inflation, and the loss in value of the rial versus
the dollar.
- According to many observers, the last election in Iran indicates
that a majority of the population wants change: a loosening of
the rigid religious restrictions imposed by the Islamic Revolution,
the modernization of social codes, especially those pertaining
to women and youth, and in general a more open society. Intelligence
and other information at our disposal suggest that a majority
of the population of Iran is not only favorably disposed to many
things Western and American but would also welcome improvements
in relations between Iran and the United States. It is also clear
that the present leaders of the Islamic Republic, although still
castigating the United States, are looking for ways to improve
economic relations.
- Relations between the United States and Iran must be considered
in terms of both the short- and long-term goals of American foreign
policy, first, with respect to the Persian Gulf countries and,
second, with respect to global concerns. In this regard Iran has
been a cultural, a political, and a national entity for three
thousand years. Moreover, its geostrategic location means that
it cannot be ignored in any definitive arrangements concerning
the security and economic development of the states bordering
the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, Iran should not
be indiscriminately linked with Iraq in a policy of “double
containment.”
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