Northeast Asia Projects
An Interim Agreement?
David G. Brown
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American interest in encouraging the negotiation of an interim
agreement between Beijing and Taipei to stabilize Cross-Strait
relations has surfaced again over the past year. The idea of an
interim agreement has been around for many years. Perhaps its
most serious proponent has been Professor Kenneth Lieberthal,
but other Americans also have offered suggestions on how to structure
such an agreement. Most recently Lieberthal presented a sophisticated
repackaging of the idea in a proposal for a 20 to 30-year “agreed
framework” for stability in the Taiwan Strait.
It is not surprisingly that interest in an interim agreement
increases during periods of heightened Cross-Strait tensions,
as has been the case since late 2003. Some time after the Taiwan
Strait crisis of 1996 and on the twentieth anniversary of the
Taiwan Relations Act, then Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asia and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth officially urged both sides
to consider the merits of an interim agreement. This was the one
circumstance in which senior U.S. officials endorsed the concept.
What do proponents have in mind in suggesting an interim agreement?
The core idea is to find a way to set aside fundamental differences
on matters of principle that have divided Beijing and Taipei for
decades. Rather than allowing recurrent crises to raise the threat
of a war in the Taiwan Strait, which would not be in anyone’s
interest, the parties should negotiate some interim arrangement
to ensure stability for an extended period. An assumption is that,
in the period of such an agreement, economic and social developments
in China and Taiwan would ameliorate Cross-Strait differences
that time would heal.
At the heart of various suggestions for the content of an interim
agreement, there are usually two core aspects. First, to meet
Beijing’s concerns about Taiwan independence, Taipei would
undertake not to declare de jure independence. To meet Taipei’s
concerns about its security, which are increasing as the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) modernizes, Beijing would formalize its
current policy that absent Taiwan independence, Beijing would
not use force against Taiwan. In addition, an interim agreement
might contain some agreement on the extent of Taiwan’s international
space during the interim period. Some proposals envisage an international
aspect in which at least the major powers would undertake not
to recognize Taipei’s formalization of an independent Taiwan
and the United States would reaffirm its opposition to China’s
use of force against Taiwan.
Why an Interim Agreement Would Be Beneficial
The past 18 months have given ample evidence of the instability
and dangers in Cross-Strait relations. It is commonplace to point
to the democratic politics of Taiwan as a key factor destabilizing
Cross-Strait relations. Domestic factors in both China and the
United States, however, also are sources of instability.
In 2003–2004, it was the election campaigns waged by Chen
Shui-bian, the Democratic Progressive party (DPP), and their Pan-Green
allies and supporters that were key sources of increased tension.
It is true that after both the March presidential and the December
legislative elections, President Chen backed away from much of
his more provocative campaign rhetoric. Nevertheless, until constitutional
reform changes the electoral calendar, it can be said that on
Taiwan there is at least a minor election every year and a major
election every other year. These democratic electoral campaigns
inevitably bring out the deep divisions in Taiwan society about
the island’s identity and political future and in the process
risk provoking Cross-Strait confrontations. This experience is
likely to continue.
China too has its domestic politics. Policymaking toward Taiwan
is still primarily a closed internal bureaucratic process. However,
the circle of those who need to be consulted appears to be gradually
expanding. It is clear that there are sharp policy difference
within these policy circles on an issue that all recognize is
central to China’s national interest and the leadership’s
legitimacy. In the years ahead, the impact of a more open media,
the Internet, and rising nationalism on this contentious policy
process is likely to increase. The danger that internal differences
could split the leadership or that domestic pressures could push
the leadership into an assertive nationalistic direction cannot
be dismissed.
Although the broad outline of U.S. policy on Cross-Strait relations
has remained consistent, U.S. policy has been subject to the shifting
winds of domestic opinion and emotional reactions to events. Election
campaign rhetoric has at times strained Washington’s relations
with Beijing, and new presidents have repeatedly taken some time
to realign their policies with the course that has best served
the national interest. These domestic pressures will continue.
Why So Little Interest in Interim Agreements?
If the logic of an interim agreement has been so appealing to
Americans for so long, why have Beijing and Taipei not seized
on the idea? Several factors appear to be at work.
The first issue involves each side’s basic principles. The
aim of an interim agreement would be to set aside differences
on matters of principle. For the Chinese this seems almost impossible
to implement in practice. The first step would be to get the parties
to the table. What would be the terms or conditions on which the
two sides would deal with each other in negotiating an interim
agreement? China’s one-China principle? With the Chen administration
in office in Taipei, the substantive and political gulf on this
issue is immense. Both sides would want conditions at least to
imply support for their principles. Talks on an interim agreement
could not be delegated to private associations to avoid such implications
because core government responsibilities would be at issue. Unfortunately,
Beijing has insisted since 1999 that even talks between the pseudo-official
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) require political preconditions.
Taipei’s call for talks without preconditions in fact masks
its fundamental negotiating objective of getting Beijing to deal
with it as a separate governing entity—an objective that
is as important to Chen as the one-China principle is to Beijing.
Let us assume that Beijing and Taipei were able to sidestep these
problems and start talks about an interim agreement on some pragmatic
basis. How would the content and form of an agreement not touch
on these same matters of principle? Would having the agreement
state that it was entered into without prejudice to either side’s
principles be sufficient and acceptable? A document bearing the
signatures or seals of persons representing both sides would inevitably
be seen in Taipei as Chinese acceptance of Taiwan as a separate
entity. On a technical agreement this might be overlooked in Beijing,
but on issues related to security and sovereignty it would seem
impossible for leaders in Beijing to look the other way. As one
Chinese analyst put it, it would have to be clear that the agreement
was between two parts of one country, not between two separate
countries. That issue could not be avoided. Should leaders try
to avoid it, they would be open to domestic attack.
This leads to domestic politics, the second impediment. Each
side’s leaders have to operate within a domestic political
environment loath to compromise with the other. Democratic politics
limits Taipei’s representatives. Nationalistic sentiment,
in part cultivated by the leadership, limits the maneuverability
of Beijing’s leaders. The issues are so emotionally charged
and so much is at stake that compromise is politically dangerous.
The most fundamental impediment is the gulf of distrust that
separates Taipei and Beijing. Distrust would undermine a simple
deal trading no independence for no use of force. Would Beijing
trust Taipei not to continue consolidating a separate Taiwan identity,
which it has asserted at home and abroad for more than a quarter-century?
Since Beijing would not do so, how would Taipei’s undertaking
on “no independence” be delineated in an agreement to
provide some assurance for Beijing? As one Chinese scholar put
it, “How would independence be defined?” This issue
would be more manageable if a Pan-Blue administration were in
office. On the other hand, Taipei would fear that the modernization
of the PLA would certainly upset the military balance over a generation,
leaving it in a much weaker position. What else would have to
be in the agreement to assure Taipei of its security at the end
of the period? Would Beijing be asked to accept unlimited arms
acquisitions by Taipei in the interim? Distrust would almost inevitably
raise such issues, not the least because domestic critics of such
a tradeoff in both Taipei and Beijing could be counted on to put
pressure on the negotiators to provide assurances on their fundamental
fears about the other.
Until 2004 Beijing had been placing greater emphasis on promoting
reunification than on preventing separatism. This was particularly
true in the context of the reversion of Hong Kong and Macau to
Chinese sovereignty. Beijing was trying to create a sense of momentum
from these reversions to put pressure on Taiwan toward reunification.
In this context, Beijing had no interest in proposals that would
defer progress on reunification for a generation or longer. The
idea of an interim agreement was out of sync with Beijing’s
policy.
Another impediment to an interim agreement has been distrust
of American motives. Stanley Roth’s mention of the merits
of an interim agreement awoke fears in Taiwan that the Clinton
administration was pushing Taiwan into unwanted negotiations with
Beijing. The response was to seek reassurance from Washington
that the United States would continue to abide by the six assurances
given to Taipei in 1982, particularly the assurance not to pressure
Taipei into negotiations. Despite reassurances, public concern
in Taipei over Roth’s statement continued for many months,
right to the end of the Clinton administration.
More recently Beijing has had new reason to distrust U.S. motives.
This is because Bush administration officials have at times publicly
called for Beijing to enter negotiations without preconditions,
thus siding with Taipei. Although Beijing analysts believe the
United States and China now share a common interest in blocking
separatism, they do not believe that Washington shares China’s
interest in promoting reunification. Most in Beijing have long
suspected that the United States opposes unification—a view
now expressed by characterizing U.S. policy as “no independence,
no war.”
Are Attitudes Changing?
In areas of tension it is a wise practice to be alert for signs
that new opportunities for negotiation may be opening. Over the
past year, Beijing has shifted to placing priority on deterring
separatism. The tone of Beijing’s statements on Taiwan has
become more moderate. Propaganda attacks on President Chen have
ceased. Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC) Chairman Jia Qinglin and President Hu Jintao have noted
that Beijing would talk with the leader of Taiwan regardless of
his past statements if he would endorse the 1992 consensus on
one China. They have said they would welcome steps by any party,
implicitly meaning the DPP, that moves “in the direction
of” accepting the one-China principle. They have noted that
the view that Taiwan and the mainland are both part of one China
is not only the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s)
view but also can be found in Taipei’s regulations and documents.
In enumerating the issues that can be discussed, President Hu
not only reiterated Beijing’s long-standing willingness to
discuss ending hostilities but also mentioned arranging military
confidence-building measures, an item raised by President Chen
last October.
Most significantly, President Hu addressed Chen in his four points
by saying,
Although welcome, Hu’s remarks reflect the depth of Beijing’s
distrust of Chen. Nevertheless, these various remarks seem to
be encouraging indications of a renewed desire by Beijing to find
a basis for resuming talks with Taipei. That said, nothing in
these developments suggests a particular interest in an interim
agreement per se. However, one Chinese scholar has noted that
there is some similarity between the spirit of the Antisecession
Law (ASL) and the concept of an interim agreement.
In one respect, the Chen administration is more open to the idea
of an interim agreement than the Lee Teng-hui administration was
six years ago. Rather than fearing pressure from Washington, Taipei
has sought to encourage the United States to play a more active
role in facilitating dialogue. This more positive attitude has
been strengthened since the Bush administration came out in support
of Taipei’s call for talks without preconditions. Last fall
Soong Chu-yu promoted a legislative proposal to strengthen Cross-Strait
peace. The People First party (PFP) legislative whip noted that
this legislation was based on the concept that as long as Taiwan
does not declare independence, the mainland will not use force
against Taiwan. When Professor Lieberthal visited Taipei last
November, Wu Jauhsieh, the chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council,
stated that the idea for an interim agreement was similar to President
Chen’s desire to establish a framework for peace and stability
in the Taiwan Strait. How much this later statement represented
serious interest in an interim agreement and how much it was an
understandable effort to garner support by seeming reasonable
and supportive to Americans is uncertain.
More recently the visit to China of the Kuomingtang (KMT) chairman,
Lien Chan, produced a joint statement recording the common views
of the KMT and the Chinese Communist party. Those common views
included opposition to Taiwan independence and the goal of a peace
agreement between the two sides. This indicates the possibility
that the basis for an interim agreement might exist if there were
a Pan-Blue government in Taipei.
The Way Forward
A series of steps by Beijing and Taipei that significantly reduced
tensions across the strait occurred in January and February 2005.
Beijing’s promotion of its ASL has set back these positive
developments. However, the ASL was less damaging than many in
Taipei had predicted and less than many in Washington had feared.
The ASL emphasizes Beijing’s desire for peaceful unification
and puts into legal form Beijing’s long-standing policy that
it reserves the right to use force as a last resort. Analysts
in Taipei have commented that the formulations used in the ASL
in some respects reflect a softening of positions taken by Beijing
in the past.
Both Beijing and Taipei said in February that they wished to
build on the success of the charter flights over the New Year’s
Spring Festival holidays. It is noteworthy that the arrangements
for the New Year’s charter flights were worked out by the
two sides without the direct involvement of third parties. When
political conditions are ripe for negotiations, Beijing and Taipei
can work things out. The antagonism in Taiwan against the ASL
and the domestic political fallout in Taipei from the visits to
China by opposition party leaders both have created at least temporary
impediments to resuming Cross-Strait contacts on transportation
and other practical issues. Getting past these developments will
take some time. Once the time has passed, it would be desirable
for both sides to resume the positive momentum evident at the
beginning of the year. It is hoped that the political climate
will be ripe for an effort to expand Cross-Strait transportation
arrangements building on the New Year’s charters. Success
in arranging mutually beneficial steps such as direct transportation
links can begin to build a sense of mutual trust on practical
issues and establish a climate in which more significant issues
can be addressed.
It also may be useful to consider whether the objectives of an
interim agreement could be reached on the basis of coordinated
unilateral statements of policy by Beijing and Taipei. Coordinated
unilateral statements could avoid many of the issues of procedure
and principle and focus on simple statements of government intent.
If the political context of the two statements reflected serious
undertakings by each side, that could provide some but not all
of the assurance that would be found in a formal agreement. Statements
of policy are by their nature not as binding as bilateral agreements.
Unfortunately, the natural occasion for such coordinated unilateral
undertakings would be a meeting between the leaders of the two
sides—a meeting that would face the same barriers of principle
that impede a bilateral agreement. It may be possible to coordinate
such statements without a meeting. The key would be whether political
conditions were ripe on both sides of the strait.
Even if progress on practical issues proves possible in the coming
year, it seems unlikely that conditions will be ripe for the consideration
of an interim agreement during Chen Shui-bian’s presidency.
About the Author
David G. Brown is associate director of Asian studies at the
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
(SAIS).
