Northeast Asia Projects
Roundtable Summaries
Report on the National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Delegation Trip to the People's Republic of China and Taiwan
January 13-23, 2003
by George D. Schwab and Donald S. Zagoria
Sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Introduction
by George D. Schwab and Donald S. Zagoria
The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) sent
a small study group to China and Taiwan from January 13 to 23, 2003.
The group consisted of: president George D. Schwab; Dr. Kurt Campbell,
senior vice president, International Security Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Professor Donald S.
Zagoria, NCAFP project coordinator; Professor Robert A. Scalapino,
University of California, Berkeley; Professor David Denoon, New
York University; Mr. Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum/CSIS;
Mr. Derek Mitchell, CSIS; and Professor Ralph Clough, School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
In China, the group met with Qian Qichen, deputy prime minister
in charge of foreign relations; Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan; Deputy
Chief of Staff Xiong Guangkai; Zheng Bijian, President of the China
Reform Forum; Lu Zhongwei, president of the China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR); officials of the Taiwan Affairs
Office of the State Council, and many other officials and analysts
in PRC think tanks. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan told us that the
NCAFP, as a result of its Track II project on cross strait relations,
had become "very renowned in China's diplomatic circles",
that we had done "very useful work" in promoting U.S.-China
understanding, and that the Chinese side attached "great importance"
to our visits.
While in the PRC the NCAFP delegation also conferred with American
representatives. In Beijing, they met with U.S. Ambassador Clark
T. Randt and embassy staff. In Shanghai, the Shanghai Institute
for International Studies, in cooperation with the U.S. Consulate,
organized a meeting with prominent American businessmen.
In Taiwan, the group met with President Chen Shui-bian; Premier
Yu Shyi-kun; Dr. Eugene Y. H. Chien, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Tang Yao-ming, Minister of National Defense; Dr. Tsai Ing-wen,
Chair, Mainland Affairs Council; Chairman Lien Chan, KMT; Dr. James
Soong, People First Party; and several legislators, scholars, and
business leaders. The Chinese Eurasian Education Foundation organized
a seminar for the group. The delegation also met with officials
from the American Institute in Taiwan. The following executive summary
is based on reports written by several group members.
Executive Summary
Relations between the United States and China have undergone an
important transformation during the past year. The presidents of
the two countries have met an unprecedented three times within 14
months and have reportedly established a cooperative working relationship.
Both sides have agreed to downplay their most volatile differences
and to address common problems, especially the struggle against
global terrorism. On a recent visit to China by an National Committee
on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) group, the principal Chinese
"message" was that their leadership has concluded that
the next twenty years will be a period in which U.S. and Chinese
interests will be sufficiently compatible to constitute a "strategic"
opportunity.
According to our Chinese interlocutors, this period of "strategic"
opportunity means that good relations with the United States and
China's rising status in international affairs will allow China
to focus on its internal development during a period of political
and economic transition. The only discordant note was sounded by
some Chinese analysts who asked privately how long the United States
will remain focused on the war on terrorism, and whether "after
Iraq, is China next?" Otherwise, the Chinese were uniformly
optimistic.
Of course, this does not mean the Chinese have no concerns or grievances,
starting with Taiwan. Chinese spokesmen voice opposition to the
further participation of the United States in high-level military
talks with the Taiwanese, perceived U.S. involvement in Taiwan's
military exercises, and expanded U.S. military sales to Taiwan.
They raise questions as to why the United States did not show greater
interest in Jiang Zemin's proposal for missile withdrawal in exchange
for an end to U.S. military sales to Taiwan. And they warn the United
States to handle the Taiwan issue "properly" so as not
to encourage "separatists" in Taiwan.
At the same time, Chinese officials and analysts express confidence
that trends across the Taiwan Strait are moving in China's favor.
They seem to feel secure that increasing economic and social ties
between China and Taiwan are inevitable and that this will lead
naturally to integration, or, at least, a better strategic situation
for China vis-à-vis Taiwan over time. Senior analysts said
China would be patient, called Taiwan a "long-term problem,"
and they offered keen, mature insights into Taiwan's domestic dynamics.
They expressed recognition that regardless of who wins the Taiwan
presidential race in 2004, he will not be able to alter the status
quo across the Strait or accept "one country, two systems,"
given that the people of Taiwan desire to maintain the status quo.
PRC analysts also seem relieved by the evolving Bush Administration
policy towards Taiwan. They appear to have come to the reassuring
conclusion that the Bush Administration is neither overtly nor covertly
supporting Taiwan independence. President Bush told Hu Jintao in
May that the United States has a "one-China" policy, and
he restated this policy to Jiang Zemin in Crawford last October.
The Chinese now seem to believe that the Bush policy on the cross-strait
issue amounts to what some analysts are calling "double clarity"-
no use of force by the Chinese and no independence for Taiwan. One
influential Chinese analyst told us privately that he had come to
the conclusion that even though some American administrations may
"tilt" a little toward China or Taiwan, they all eventually
wind up in the middle because that is what American national interests
dictate. The fact that the Bush Administration did not support Chen
Shui-bian's August 3, 2002, statement about "one country on
either side of the Taiwan Strait" was probably another important
factor leading to this conclusion. After learning that Chen did
not get Washington's support for that statement and that many officials
in Washington were, in fact, annoyed by it, Beijing accepted it
more calmly.
Beijing is currently concentrating on pushing the Three Links (direct
air, postal and communications ties) with Taiwan, especially direct
air transportation, and blaming the Chen Shui-bian Administration
for retarding its development. There is likely to be some progress
on reaching an agreement during the next six months or so. Already,
a few charter flights have flown directly between Taipei and Shanghai
for the Chinese New Year. In fact, some Taiwan officials from the
Mainland Affairs Committee were on board for at least one of those
flights. The sticking point is "officiality." Taiwan insists
that the agreement on the Three Links should be negotiated between
the two governments. Beijing, in accordance with its "one China"
policy, insists that the agreement be negotiated between the airlines
and other private sector groups. We were told in Beijing, however,
that China might allow this issue to be finessed by permitting Taiwan
officials to be part of the "non-official" groups that
negotiate the details of the Three Links. All this, we were told,
depends on Taiwan's not seeking to publicize Beijing's concessions
or make too much out of them.
In sum, the PRC leaders believe that time is on their side with
respect to Taiwan, and their predisposition is to continue the moderate,
non-threatening approach, at least for the present.
Although Beijing is patient with regard to Taiwan, it is little
disposed to alter the fundamental political principles that it insists
upon as a basis either for reunification or for a resumption of
an official dialogue. Beijing continues to demand that Taiwan accept
the principle of "one-China," with both the mainland and
Taiwan a part of that China. It also contends that the formula of
"one China, two systems" should be the basis for unity.
At the unofficial level, one hears a few individuals suggest that
this formula might be altered to encompass such ideas as confederation,
but they express these thoughts softly and rarely. Most Chinese,
even on the level of think-tank analysts, do not see the need at
present for any basic alterations in the "two systems"
formula, despite the acknowledgment that this formula is not now
acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Taiwanese. The Chinese
think they can afford to wait.
On the broader international front, China wants a peaceful resolution
of the Iraq crisis and is unlikely to support any U.S. attack on
that nation unless it has strong U.N. support. However, the Chinese,
in the course of various meetings, did not raise this issue. Their
desire was to focus on other matters. On North Korea, China and
the United States share the basic objectives of a non-nuclear DPRK
and the avoidance of conflict. China also wants to avoid the collapse
of the North, knowing the huge economic and social problems this
would involve and the uncertainties that a unified Korea under the
ROK would create. Thus, China is prepared to play some role as mediator
or convener, but it wants to maintain its two-Koreas policy despite
deep private skepticism regarding the North's economic and political
system.
On other fronts, China will continue to seek favorable relations
with all of its neighbors, partly to create a buffer state system
against American encirclement. However, the atmosphere surrounding
China-Japan relations will continue to be cloudy due to past history
and the perceived strength of Japanese nationalism. Moreover, in
Southeast Asia, China is viewed as a rising power, both economically
and strategically; hence, countries there desire a balance of power
that centers upon the United States as the countervailing force.
This is well known in Beijing.
In sum, at present, there exists a strong basis for favorable PRC-U.S.
relations, with a desire on both sides to cooperate on a number
of issues and to live with the non-resolution of others. This could
be upset, however, by such events as a U.S. war against Iraq or
other strong evidence of U.S. unilateralism. China wants time to
tackle its internal problems and to advance both its economic and
strategic development.
In Taiwan, the atmosphere is one of some pessimism and uncertainty,
with few viewing the prospects for political cooperation between
the Chinese and Taiwanese governments as promising, despite the
continuing rise of economic and cultural intercourse.
Uncertainties about American policies, as well as the American
economy, add to the concerns. Yet the basic assumption among most
politicians and intellectuals is that the current Taiwan-PRC relationship
will continue basically unchanged for the foreseeable future, and
that U.S. support for the status quo will remain, thus underpinning
Taiwan's future.
Because Taiwan has undergone its worst economic slump in a generation,
as it gears up for the 2004 presidential election, economics are
at the top of the agenda for the Chen administration. Raising Taiwan's
international profile is now listed as a lower priority. A Chen
visit to the United States, though still viewed as desirable, is
recognized to be a practical impossibility this year. Taiwan officials
seem to have received the message that initiatives which raise tensions
across the Strait or cause problems in the U.S.-China relationship
will be frowned upon by a United States that is focused on the global
war on terrorism and other critical international security issues
such as Iraq. The delegation spent much time with Taiwan counterparts
addressing the "Three Links" issue, specifically establishment
of direct air links between Taiwan and the mainland. The leadership
clearly continues to harbor both economic and security concerns
about establishment of the links, and, thus, it has moved slowly
in proceeding along this course. Domestic and foreign businessmen
in Taiwan betray growing frustration with the leadership's pace
on the issue. Still, a Mainland Affairs Council study yet to be
released publicly has reportedly concluded that Taiwan would on
balance benefit from the links and that the security challenges
from the mainland would be manageable. The study notes that establishment
of the links would accelerate Taiwan's necessary transition to a
new economy. Such an economy, say many Taiwan analysts, will have
to be knowledge-based and ready to produce high value-added goods
and services. It will also be an economy in which Taiwan serves
as a center for research and development, finance and operations
for multinational and national businesses operating in the region,
particularly in China.
On the political front, many in Taiwan feel that the outcome of
the 2004 presidential election will depend upon the ability of Lien
Chien (KMT) and James Soong (PFP) to cooperate in some fashion,
with Mayor Ma of Taipei also a key element in the picture. The delegation
discerned no consensus on how or whether the opposition would succeed
in arriving at a unity candidate, although many cynics in Taiwan
were skeptical that a satisfactory agreement could be worked out.
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