After World War II, the United States fought costly wars in Korea
and Vietnam to rebuff communist aggrandizement. Now, however,
the United States is risking its paramount position in East Asia
through inept, ideologically driven policies and misplaced strategic
priorities. Obsessed with terrorism and Iraq, the Bush administration
has failed to deal effectively with the North Korean crisis. This
grave mistake is the proximate cause of declining American influence
and could cost the United States its alliances and its preeminence
in Asia, which is vital to America’s interests in the twenty-first
century. What options does the United States have to pre-serve
its interests and construct a hospitable and prosperous environment
in East Asia?
Strategic Implications of the Korean
Crisis
Washington’s handling of the North Korean issue has put
the United States at serious odds with all its allies and partners
in the region— South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. All
have urged the United States to pursue serious negotiations with
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), but the
U.S. performance has not matched their hopes or expectations.
China deserves great credit for having persuaded the United States
and North Korea to go to the negotiating table. Exasperated with
U.S. intransigence, China uncharacteristically openly pressured
the DPRK from 2002 on to accept U.S. demands for a multilateral
format and has been embarrassed since by U.S. ideologically driven
inflexibility. China has challenged U.S. allegations that North
Korea had a highly enriched uranium project, the premise on which
U.S. de-mands for “complete, verifiable, irreversible dis-mantlement”
(CVID) are based. All of our friends and allies, despite their
public stances, are profoundly disturbed by Washington’s
inflexibility. Recently Beijing appeared on the verge of abandoning
its mediation role because of Washington’s intransigence.
Washington’s slightly more forthcoming ap-proach at the
June 2004 six-party talks is welcome but likely stemmed from domestic
political considerations and a possibly cosmetic hedge against
Asian capitals’ remonstrance over U.S. inflexibility more
than an epiphany on the part of the Bush administration. Killer
conditions are still embedded in the U.S. positions, and we are
far from agreement. In late August talks, top Chinese experts
on Korea shared this analysis with me.
Korean Anti-Americanism Rising
The most affected is South Korea. After the U.S. record of maintaining
South Korea as one of its closest allies for 50 years, President
Bush undermined South Korean President Kim Dae Jung at their joint
press conference in March 2001 in Washington and then profoundly
shocked the South Koreans, as well as all other Asian friends,
by including North Korea in the “axis of evil” in his
State of the Union speech in January 2002. The alarming rise of
anti-Americanism in South Korea stems from rapidly diverging threat
perceptions in Seoul and Washington. Many South Koreans have concluded
that Washington is insensitive to Korean goals and that the Bush
administration has been ineffective in dealing with North Korea
and is thereby blocking hopes for North–South reconciliation.
Criticism of American arrogance and unilateralism in the face
of rising Korean nationalism played a sig-nificant role in the
fall 2002 presidential elections in South Korea. The result was
the surprise election of human rights lawyer Roh Moo Hyun. Roh,
whose young South Korean supporters favor rapidly expanding engagement
with the North and have resisted Washington’s hard-line approach.
The outcome of the April 15 elections in Korea also will affect
the nuclear stalemate, for the new National Assembly has undergone
a dramatic shift in its makeup, giving President Roh’s Uri
party majority status. The opposition also has realigned itself
by advancing a more forthcoming approach to the North. Legal support
for North–South exchanges and cooperation has become even
easier than it was before the election.
Recent polls consistently indicate that a majority of South Koreans,
particularly the young, see the United States as more dangerous
than North Korea based on the possibility that the United States
might attack North Korea. In contrast, China is seen as a more
constructive force. In a poll taken recently of the members of
the National Assembly, 55 percent favor closer relations with
China than with the United States. Reasons range from the common
Confucian values shared by China and Korea to the growing importance
of China as an economic partner and market for South Korean goods
and especially the constructive regional role China is playing
vis-à-vis North Korea. America’s 50-year alliance
with South Korea is at risk.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s decision in 2003 to
withdraw from the tripwire role that the United States played
on the Korean DMZ for 50 years was insensitive, badly timed, and
unhelpful. It only reinforced the Asian perception that the United
States is indifferent to the feelings and objectives of South
Koreans. President Bush’s announcement, without genuine consultations,
of the redeployment of 12,500 of the 37,000 troops stationed in
South Korea (3,600 of whom were dispatched to Iraq) further under-mined
faith in U.S. guarantees against a North Korean attack.
The Koizumi–Bush Partnership
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi seemingly has staked his legacy
on close cooperation with the Bush administration. He has pressed
for broadening the interpretation of the participa-tion of Japan’s
Self-Defense Forces in external contingencies by sending some
3,000 noncombat-ant humanitarian Self-Defense personnel to Iraq.
Tokyo is committed to joining Bush’s “missile defense
initiative.”
Prime Minister Koizumi has generally sided with the hard-line
approach of Washington. His reaction reflects both the public
anger in Japan over Kim Jong Il’s acknowledgment during the
Koizumi–Kim summit in September 2002 that North Korea had
kidnapped 13 Japanese, as well as Kim’s initial refusal to
repatriate the families of those still alive, and Koizumi’s
predilection to track Washington’s views on North Korea.
Nonetheless, Tokyo has joined South Korea, China, and Russia in
urging the United States to negotiate more flexibly with the DPRK.
Following his second meeting with Kim Jong Il, Prime Minister
Koizumi, on June 9, 2004, argued that Kim Jong Il’s willingness
to negotiate an end to its nuclear facilities should be tested
by Washington by presenting a genuine negotiating package of compensatory
actions for CVID. There are many Japanese across the spectrum
who disagree with Koizumi’s heretofore uncritical support
of Washington. Ultraconservatives have used the threat from North
Korea to argue for the de-velopment of nuclear weapons. Other
influential Japanese, in private, sharply criticize Washington
for its failure to show sufficient flexibility to resolve the
North Korean nuclear issue.
Japan clearly favors peaceful evolution and stability on the
peninsula and would not welcome either collapse or confrontation.
When North Korea fired its Taepodong ballistic missile over Japan
in August 1998, the Japanese became intensely angry at North Korea.
Many conservatives, however, were also angered by the United States,
charging that Washington had failed to protect Japan, despite
the U.S.– Japan Security Treaty. They argue that Washington’s
inflexibility and its exclusive focus on terror and Iraq are facilitating
a nuclear-armed North Korea and, in turn, feeding nationalistic
elements in Japan who advocate abandoning Japan’s nonnuclear
policy.
The Broader Asian Context
Both China and Japan have profound national security interests
on the Korean Peninsula. Clumsy, uncoordinated U.S. actions that
exacerbate the crisis on the peninsula have raised legitimate
questions in Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul about Washington’s
judgment.
None of the surrounding powers wants a nuclear-armed Korea, North
or South. But they also do not want confrontation caused by Washington’s
inept diplomacy. China and South Korea are acutely concerned about
North Korea’s economy. Its collapse could create dangerous
instability extending beyond its borders.
We must realize that the United States has become a determined
player in the Korean Pen-insula, where deep motivations, emotions,
and historic goals prevail. The hubristic attitude of the Bush
administration, the cavalier treatment of South Korean leaders,
and the ineffective policy instituted toward the North risk our
strategic position on the peninsula and possibly in all of Northeast
Asia.
If the outcome of this crisis is a nuclear-armed North Korea,
the reaction in South Korea and Japan will be harsh. South Korea,
Japan, China, and Russia will blame the United States for having
refused to talk seriously with Pyongyang. South Korea, Taiwan,
and even Japan might reconsider a nuclear option. Recent reports
of South Korean laser experiments in enriching uranium, however
explained, complicate the dangers of the unresolved nuclear threat
from North Korea.
Backdrop: KEDO and the 1998 Crisis
As a result of former President Jimmy Carter’s efforts in
June 1994 that led to the Agreed Framework between the United
States and the DPRK in October 1994, the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization
(KEDO) was established to build two proliferation- resistant
nuclear reactors and provide 500,000 metric tons annually of heavy
fuel oil in exchange for the termination of North Korea’s
nuclear programs at a place called Yongbyon. KEDO was the first
real attempt to test whether we could collectively deal with this
extremely isolated nation. For North Korea, it was a test of whether
it could deal with the noncommunist world. For Pyongyang, it was
an enormous step to adopt a policy premised on friendly coexistence
first with the United States and then, after Kim Dae Jung’s
“sunshine” initiative, with South Korea and Japan.
The Agreed Framework verged on collapse in early 1998, when Pyongyang
charged that the United States remained hostile to the DPRK, had
not lifted economic sanctions, had delayed the construction of
the light water reactors, and had not moved forward to normalize
relations—all promised in the Agreed Framework. At the time,
the United States suspected that secret nuclear activities were
underway at Kumchang-ri. If so, they would have threatened the
Agreed Framework. The atmosphere was further inflamed when a Taepodong
ballistic missile was fired over Japan.
Over the next year, former Defense Secretary William Perry consulted
extensively with South Korea, Japan, China, and many American
experts and then convinced the DPRK leadership that Washington
was genuinely prepared to end American hostility and to normalize
relations. Subsequently, the United States and the DPRK opened
the door to major progress on ending the other North Korean threat—long-range
ballistic missiles.
The evolution in North Korea from engagement through the Agreed
Framework, KEDO, the Perry process, the North and South Korea
summit in June 2000, U.S.–DPRK dialogue, and mis-sile talks
raised the hope of ending the 50-year threat to peace in Northeast
Asia. The first time in which all efforts appeared to converge,
it suggested turning the DPRK from a dangerous wildcard into a
less menacing and perhaps more constructive member of the community
of Northeast Asia.
The Bush Administration’s Refusal
to Reward “Blackmail”
Against this hopeful background, President Bush abruptly rejected
the Clinton administration’s achievements. In the stunning
press conference after his March 2001 meeting with South Korean
President Kim Dae Jung, President Bush publicly labeled North
Korea’s Kim Jong Il an untrustworthy dictator, seriously
embarrassing American ally President Kim Dae Jung and giving high
offense to Pyongyang. President Bush even more definitively abrogated
Perry’s achievement by including North Korea in the “axis
of evil.” Pyongyang concluded that the threat of “preemptive
nuclear attack,” outlined in the U.S. 2002 National Security
Strategy of September 2002, was aimed at North Korea. As a result,
Pyongyang expressed its fear that the DPRK would be the next target
after Iraq.
In deference to its preferred war on Iraq, the Bush administration
downplayed the North Korean threat, but in reality it fell into
a dangerous and unproductive self-imposed trap.
The Deepening Crisis
The administration broadcast that it would not submit to “blackmail”
or engage North Korea in negotiations to end the threat. President
Bush declared that the United States would pursue diplomatic channels
to resolve this problem, but instead the administration began
pushing Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia to exert economic
pressure on North Korea.
Despite claiming for more than a year to be “prepared to
talk anytime, anywhere, without conditions,” the United States
spurned talks for 21 months until State Department Assistant Secretary
James Kelly’s visit in October 2002 to Pyongyang. Severely
constrained by his instructions, Kelly demanded that North Korea
end its suspected enriched uranium project but refused to discuss
other issues, including a comprehensive proposal that North Korea
had tabled for resolving all issues between Washington and Pyongyang.
During the talks, according to American interpreters, the North
Koreans confessed that they were secretly building a highly enriched
uranium facility. It would violate the U.S.–DPRK Agreed Framework
of 1994.
After the North Korean “confession,” U.S. acceptance
of North Korea’s claims that the United States had “nullified”
the Agreed Frame-work was misguided. Washington should have continued
talks to resolve this new issue, as it had done in 1998. The intelligence
community estimates that North Korea could have produced 50–100
nuclear weapons in the 1990s had we not concluded the Agreed Framework.
Unwisely the Bush administration tossed the restraints out the
window. As a result, the crisis has steadily become more dangerous.
At U.S. urging, heavy fuel oil commitments were suspended by
KEDO. Pyongyang predictably announced that it would restart the
five-megawatt reactor that can produce enough plutonium each year
to build a nuclear weapon. They threw out International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and removed the seals on nuclear
facilities. North Korea regained control of 8,000 spent fuel rods
stored under the Agreed Framework and claimed to have reprocessed
them. It also ended its missile moratorium. Further ratcheting
up the pressure, Pyongyang claims that North Korea is strengthening
its nuclear deterrent, boldly suggesting that North Korea had
become a nuclear weapons state.
U.S.–DPRK Relations in Free Fall
In the aftermath of the North Korean “confession,”
which North Korea subsequently denied, U.S. policy toward the
DPRK evolved in a period of two years into the Bush administration’s
de-mand for “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement”
as a precondition to discussions of other topics. Washington has
been unwilling to accept a “freeze” on North Korea’s
nuclear programs, as Pyongyang proposed, which could produce a
context in which sequential, verifiable, reciprocal obligations
could conceivably serve as the basis for a comprehensive resolution
of all issues. Washington’s unyielding insistence on CVID
first barely masks the role of hard-line elements in Mr. Bush’s
regime, whose ultimate goal remains regime change in Pyongyang,
despite the administration’s claims to seek a “diplomatic
solution.”
Many reports indicate that Vice President Richard Cheney has
played a primary role in thwarting genuine negotiations and that
he and his like-minded conservative colleagues still seek to impose
economic sanctions that would compel North Korea to capitulate
on nuclear issues or face economic strangulation. Hard-liners
in Washington still cling to the fantasy that China and South
Korea will join in this policy to coerce the DPRK into collapse.
Cheney publicly remarked in Beijing on April 12, “There is
not much time” for North Korea to accept U.S. demands. He
also noted, “Time is not on our side.”
DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan agreed, telling a January
2004 American delegation that time was on the DPRK side. Kim noted
that “The lapse of time will result in the quantitative and
qualitative increase in our nuclear strength.”
Time is indeed on North Korea’s side.
North Korea Crosses the “Red Line”
The Clinton administration drew a clear red line against any
reprocessing of the 8,000 spent fuel rods. Preoccupied by Iraq,
the Bush administration backed away from that red line, emboldening
Pyongyang to violate that prohibition. President Bush and ROK
President Roh, after a meeting on May 14, 2003, in Washington,
declared that North Korea would not be allowed to have nuclear
weapons. In reality, President Bush did nothing after the DPRK
blatantly erased Clinton’s red line and boldly claimed that
it was building up its nuclear deterrent.
Nearly two years have passed since North Korea announced the
resumption of reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods recovered
from its five-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon. We can presume that
North Korean nuclear engineers have added a few more kilograms
of plutonium to their already suspect stocks, enough to build
six to eight more nuclear weapons. In addition, the highly enriched
uranium program, which the North is suspected of having with the
help of Pakistan, could possibly begin production of enriched
uranium within two years.
Despite these ominous moves, Pyongyang has repeatedly announced
that North Korea is prepared to negotiate the resolution of all
the issues of concern to the United States, including explicit
nuclear issues, while explicitly denying the existence of any
highly enriched uranium program. According to reliable Chinese
sources, Chairman Kim Jong Il confirmed the North’s willingness
to end its nuclear programs during his April 19– 21, 2004,
visit to Beijing.
Nevertheless, we may be moving beyond the point at which North
Korea might be willing to negotiate away its nuclear facilities,
especially if those facilities have increased “quantitatively
and qualitatively.” Pyongyang may well decide, in light of
the Bush administration’s continuing hostility and unwillingness
to negotiate, that its best protection from the Bush administration
is to become a nuclear-armed state. In any case, U.S. delays in
treating the nuclear issue seriously have steadily escalated the
dangers and the eventual cost of a settlement.
The hopes of late 2000 have been dashed, and we are in the midst
of a very dangerous crisis. The threat from North Korea is far
greater now than it was three years ago. (Since at least 2001
it has been a greater threat to U.S. national security interests
than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.)
The Radicalization of America’s
Foreign Policy
The administration’s obsession with Iraq, its downplaying
and even exacerbation of the dangerous crisis on the Korean Peninsula,
and its indifference and insensitivities to allies and friends
in Asia, coupled with a lack of focus on profound economic and
political evolution in East Asia, are seriously challenging and
even risking the stability of U.S. alliances and the preeminent
influence of the United States in East Asia.
Under President Bush, the United States has not played the constructive
leadership role to which our allies had grown accustomed during
the past 60 years. Instead, the United States under Bush has pursued
policies that risk and even promote war, a radical departure for
the United States. An implicit U.S. threat of a “preemptive
attack” against North Korea has alarmed our partners in Northeast
Asia.
To the consternation of those experienced Asian leaders, the
Bush administration arrogantly presumed to know better than they
how to handle North Korea. President Bush made this clear in his
initial meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, who
has spent his life thinking about the issue of North–South
Korean reconciliation.
North Korea is an unusual nation with a history, perceptions,
and ways of negotiating that are profoundly different from those
of the United States. Although we can hope for success, we cannot
demand that the North play or negotiate according to our rules.
We must deal with realities, not attempt to dictate rules that
are meaningless to Pyongyang. There are clear patterns of success
even in the limited history we now have with Pyongyang, but the
Bush administration seems determined to ignore what we have learned.
The vital national security interests of the United States and
its allies demand that Washington deal urgently and effectively
with North Korea. Attempting to postpone the efficient management
of this issue because of ideological or domestic political considerations
is unconscionable. North Korea may decide to force a denouement,
precipitating deadly conflict. Awaiting the disposal of Iraq and
other issues before dealing with North Korea may be irresponsibly
and tragically too late to avoid a catastrophic war or a nuclear-armed
North Korea.
Missile Defenses Cloud the Atmosphere
Closely related to North Korean proliferation issues is the administration’s
drive to develop and deploy a robust missile defense system.
After taking power, the Bush administration frequently pointed
to North Korea as the threat that required a missile defense system,
despite the fact that it did not pursue an effective strategy
for eliminating that threat. Prior to September 11, 2001, the
same conservatives who were promoting Iraq as a threat in the
Middle East seemingly regarded China as the prime candidate to
replace the Soviet Union as chief global villain. The Al Qaeda
attacks and terrorism supplanted the Chinese target temporarily
and fortunately at least some in the administration seem to realize
that China’s global role, including its performance in the
United Nations and in combating terrorism, outweighs its role
as challenger. But the same individuals who harbored concerns
that China would be the U.S. global rival in the twenty-first
century still promote missile defense as part of the global strategy
for dealing with the security dangers posed by China as well as
rogue states.
Thus while the North Korean threat was used to promote missile
defense, China still appears as if it will become an ultimate
target. With only 20 or so strategic nuclear weapons that could
reach the United States, a robust missile defense system could
attempt to counter China’s inter-continental ballistic missiles.
If the United States continues to pursue a robust missile defense
system, China will likely install multiple independently targeted
reentry vehicles (MIRV) on its current missiles, accelerating
an East Asian arms race. The initial deployment of the missile
defense system in 2005, long before it has been tested adequately
and certified as effective, and strong U.S. pressure on Japan
to join the system have given life to this questionable program.
Taiwan, of course, has shown great interest in the system, and
some Taiwanese planners think that participation in the U.S.–Japanese
missile defense system would be a silver bullet to deter China
from considering an attack on Taiwan.
Reinforcing the geostrategic shifts emerging from the North Korean
issue by pursuing the missile defense system, the Bush administration
is setting the stage for a strategic split in East Asia. Its fault
lines will pit the United States, Japan, and Taiwan on one side
against China, the Koreas, and Southeast Asia on the other.
This dynamic would engender a deepening gulf between China and
Japan. Doubts arising in Japan about the effectiveness of U.S.
policy in dealing with the North Korean threat and the effective
shift of the Koreas to China’s sphere of influence could
combine to feed nationalist fervor in Japan. Such a shift could
spark significant Japanese efforts to build their defenses as
hedges aimed at alleviating doubts about American judgment and
effectiveness in providing an adequate defense for Japan. Such
national impulses could erode Japan’s post-World War II nuclear
aversion and lead Tokyo to a decision to build nuclear weapons,
clearly well within Japanese capabilities but a seismic shift
in Japan’s military posture.
Meanwhile . . .in Southeast Asia
While the United States is focused on Iraq and terrorism, Asia
is moving forward without the United States to build new economic
institutions. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
plus three (China, Japan, and Korea) and the Northeast Asia annual
summits of China, Japan, and Korea are becoming major instru-ments
for coordinating economic policies and integration and implicitly
for making political ar-rangements for the future. China and ASEAN
have made steady progress on a free trade agreement (FTA) that
would include nearly 2 billion people with a combined GDP of $2
trillion by 2010. Fulfilling the Japan–ASEAN targets would
lead to the creation of an FTA by 2012 that would include the
more developed members of ASEAN (by 2015 to include Vietnam, Myanmar,
Cambodia, and Laos) engaged in bilateral trade of $700 billion
involving 500 million persons in ASEAN. South Korea and ASEAN
are negotiating an FTA to take effect in 2009 with the six original
ASEAN states. Also, an FTA will be negotiated with the remaining
four members by 2014. These efforts highlight Asians building
Asia without American involvement.
A profound divergence of interests between the United States
and its Asian allies seems to have emerged during the past three
years. The United States is not engaged effectively in these emerging
institutions of the future. These developments are positive, but
they may not serve America’s long-term interests or sustain
a preeminent American role in Asia.
With the end of the cold war, Asia is more interested in economic
development and integration into the global economy than in America’s
aggressive and potentially disruptive military policies.
Keeping pace with the rest of the world, anti-Americanism has
grown steadily throughout the region over the past two years.
American indifference (except its reaction to terror) and the
perception that the United States is anti-Islamic have stirred
deeply antagonistic attitudes in Indone-sia and Malaysia. Our
traditional ally, Thailand, has been focused on its economic future
and increasingly looks to China as its principal partner in the
future, a mood growing throughout Southeast Asia.
In Southeast Asia, ironically, only Vietnam seems to have reacted
to strategic developments by moving toward the United States,
principally for economic reasons but also as a hedge against the
widespread perception in the region that China is steadily and
effectively reassuming its historic role as the Middle Kingdom
of Asia.
Possible Options
The core question remains North Korea. At this point what are
our options?
The Bush administration can aggressively and essentially unilaterally
attempt to change the regime in Pyongyang. South Korea, China,
and Russia will not join in such an undertaking. Pursuing the
path advocated by the radicals in the U.S. administration raises
the grave risk of a war. With 11,000 long-range artillery pieces,
North Korea could attack or respond to an attack that could destroy
the capital of South Korea; kill an estimated million South Koreans,
American ci-vilians and military personnel, and Japanese; and
destroy South Korea’s economy and endanger Japan’s.
As noted, this approach is irrational but still holds great sway
within the Bush administration. It risks catastrophic war.
As a second option, the Bush administration can continue to dilly-dally
and not deal seriously with the North Korean threat. For its failure
to try to manage this very serious threat, Washington will be
condemned by all of its allies and friends in Northeast Asia.
Unlike Clinton, Bush has drawn only one set of red lines restricting
the export of or the transfer to terrorists of nuclear technology.
By focusing on the role of terrorists, he has played into the
hands of Kim Jong Il and allowed North Korea to reprocess the
8,000 spent fuel rods, restart the five-megawatt reactor to produce
more unspent fuel that can be reprocessed, and continue toward
the probable construction of the highly enriched uranium facility.
If we are not prepared to accept the horrors of war mentioned
above, then we may be faced with a dangerous North Korea that
possesses nuclear weapons in the heart-land of our strategic interests
in Northeast Asia.
In either case the United States will lose the strategic struggle
for preeminence in Northeast Asia, which is gathering speed.
China will assume that role by default. South Korea is already
moving rapidly into China’s sphere of influence. South Korea’s
trade with China has surpassed that with the United States. Its
political and security affinities for Beijing look as if they
are becoming increasingly close when assessed against the backdrop
of growing disenchantment with Washington. Seoul may even ask
that U.S. forces leave South Korea. Beijing could assume responsibility
for managing Korean matters irrespective of whether that means
the ac-ceptance of a nuclear-armed Korea. Koreans would be beholden
to China for the resolution of national security issues in Northeast
Asia, including the reunification of the Koreas under Beijing’s,
not Washington’s, auspices.
The Bush administration has, in effect, subcontracted American
responsibilities for resolving the Korean crisis to Beijing, an
ironic development in light of the fact that the United States
fought the Korean and Vietnam wars principally to curb China’s
influence.
As a third option, the United States can exercise its historic
leadership to negotiate a settlement with North Korea and lead
the six-party talks to construct a durable framework for peace
and prosperity in Northeast Asia.
Conclusion: New Strategic Directions
A broad five-point strategy could promote a more promising environment
for American influence and probably avoid the dismal options that
have emerged.
