Northeast Asia Projects
The ROC’S (Taiwan’s) Quest for Wider International
Participation*
James C. Hsiung
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Introduction
This article examines the chances of Taiwan’s bid to widen
its international contacts and elbow room within the United Nations
family and in regional groupings such as the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU). A few
words clarifying the terms used in the article are in order. First,
‘‘international participation’’ instead of
more restrictive terms such as ‘‘membership’’
is used because it allows discussions of alternative avenues of
access while the door of formal admission to membership is closed.
Second, the term ‘‘ROC, or the Republic of China,’’
rather than the nifty name Taiwan is used for three reasons: (1)
Under the effects of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971),
it was the representation of the Republic of China, not of Taiwan
per se, that was effected at the United Nations (see the explanations
to follow). The seat of China has since been occupied by representatives
from Beijing, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). (2) The
government seated in Taipei has a president elected under the
Constitution of the ROC, not that of Taiwan. It is logical to
identify Taiwan by its official name, which is the Republic of
China. (3) The third reason involves considerations of political
prudence. As is well known, Taiwan’s increasingly curtailed
freedom of participation in international forums— from international
governmental organizations (IGOs) to free trade areas (FTAs)—stems
largely from the obstructionism of the PRC. Beijing’s obduracy
in trying to block Taiwan from international forums is prompted
by the expressed fear, rightly or wrongly, that the island is
out to ‘‘internationalize’’ its division with
the mainland as a first step toward cutting off its legal umbilical
cord from (the concept of) China. Keeping this in mind, therefore,
Taiwan might develop a more sensible approach toward seeking wider
international breathing space by avoiding the use of a name that
would reinforce a perceived quest for separatism in the eyes of
the international community. Moreover, there seems to be wide
consensus—from the United States, the EU, and a majority
of UN members— supporting the one-China concept. It would
be prudent for Taiwan to strike a pose as the ROC and when circumstances
so warrant take the option of falling back on some nomenclature
resembling ‘‘Chinese-Taipei,’’ the name Taiwan
is using to participate in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Olympic Games,
and other enterprises.
Although no one can guarantee how a name-choice strategy would
help to overcome Beijing’s obstructionist reflex, all things
being equal, it is obvious that a name that does not suggest a
rupture with the island’s Chinese roots would be less likely
to provoke Beijing’s instinctive revulsion. At least it would
be much harder for Beijing to make the antiseparatist argument
stick as a ground for blocking Taiwan’s bid to widen its
international participation.
A dual disclaimer should follow the afore-mentioned clarifications.
First, this article does not purport to be a full-fledged treatise.
Instead, it should be treated as a think piece meant to be thought
provoking while sizing up what looms on the broad horizon. Second,
this article reflects the effects of what an honest analyst should
do, weigh the known facts and try to see how they bear on the
topic at hand. No sides, one way or the other, will be taken to
judge the odds against Taiwan and the alternatives it might have
to cope with its international isolation.
This article will proceed in three parts. First, because to many
in Taiwan, including the government of President Chen Shui-bian,
the United Nations is of the topmost priority in the island’s
fight against international isolation, the UN will be dealt with
before other international forums. Second, next to the UN, many
in Taiwan who are genuinely concerned about being marginalized
in the region are eager to see Taiwan develop a participatory
relationship with ASEAN. The second section therefore will address
the likelihood of a Taiwan affiliation with that organization.
Third, because Taiwan is the third-largest trading partner of
the EU and the latter seems to have a more than casual concern
for the island, the next section will incorporate a discussion
of the prospect of a Taiwan-desired wider association with the
EU.
In each section the obstacles will be identified, and the remedies
if any will be ascertained.
Taiwan and the UN
Between 1949 and 1971, the ROC occupied the China seat in the
UN despite its relocation to Taiwan on losing the civil war on
the mainland, leaving it to its Communist nemesis. The latter
established a new regime seated in Beijing and known as the People’s
Republic of China in October 1949. When the PRC tried to send
a delegation to the UN, however, it was rejected by the General
Assembly. Every year until 1971 the Chinese representation question
was shelved under the ‘‘moratorium’’ formula
first suggested by Canada in 1950.
The seating of the PRC in the UN in 1971 was treated not as an
admission issue but as one of representation, namely: Which government,
between Taipei (ROC) and Beijing (PRC), should be accepted by
the world body as the rightful representative of China? In the
one-sentence operative part of Resolution 2758 (1971) that was
adopted, the General Assembly ‘‘[d]ecides to restore
all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize
the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives
of China to the United Nations. ...’’ Thus the PRC simply
took over the China seat from the ROC in the UN. As such, the
state of China, as an original member of the UN as defined by
Article 3 of the Charter, remains legally unchanged, despite the
change in representation.
Now, 25 years later, a reexamination of Resolution 2758 reveals
some eerie imperfections in wording that seem to have escaped
attention thus far. As background for this article, they deserve
a fresh scrutiny. First, in its preamble, the resolution declares
in part: ‘‘Recognizing ..that the People’s Republic
of China [sic] is one of the five permanent members of the Security
Council. ...’’ Obviously, the drafters and their supporters
did not double-check the original wording in the UN Charter. If
they had, they would have found that Article 23 of the Charter
explicitly states that ‘‘The Republic of China’’
(ROC), not the People’s Republic of China (PRC), heads the
listing of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
In fact, the PRC was not even in existence when the UN Charter
was drafted and signed; hence its name could not possibly have
been included in the Charter as a permanent member. The ROC, on
the other hand, was one of the four powers (along with the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union; France was in
exile) that in 1944 drafted the original text known as the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposals. After revisions made at the 1945 UNCIO conference
1 in San Francisco, this text became the UN Charter. That is why
the Republic of China’s name is inscribed in Article 23 of
the Charter. (It still is.)
Second, after naming the PRC’s delegation as the rightful
occupant of the China seat in the UN, the one-sentence operative
part of Resolution 2758 went on to say: ’’..to expel
forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the
place they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all
the organizations related to it’’ (emphasis added).
This part is not only redundant; it contains a serious flaw and
loophole, as will be explained later.
That the language used (‘‘to expel’’) is
less than parliamentary and diplomatic is beside the point. The
flaw is that the delegation to be ‘‘expelled,’’
as stated in the document, is identified as ‘‘the representatives
of Chiang Kai-shek,’’ not of the Republic of China.
The loophole is that by its explicit expulsion of the ‘‘representatives
of Chiang Kai-shek,’’ the resolution in effect keeps
the door open for Chiang Kai-shek’s successors. Strictly
speaking, according to the language of the resolution, the representatives
sent by any successor to Chiang Kai-shek in the ROC government
are not to be barred from taking the seat of ‘‘the Republic
of China’’ that Article 23 of the Charter identifies
as a permanent member of the UN.
The issue of legal nicety and nuances is being raised for two
reasons: First, it is hoped that students can be taught to draft
more professional and airtight documents. The second reason is
really a rhetorical question for Taiwan: If it was so serious
about ‘‘returning’’ to the UN, did these issues
ever occur to anyone in Taiwan’s foreign policy establishment?
Did anyone ever wonder what would happen if a ROC delegation were
sent to the UN by a successor of President Chiang Kai-shek to
claim the ‘‘Republic of China’’ seat as named
in Article 23 of the Charter? Like any other General Assembly
resolution, Resolution 2758 did not and could not possibly amend
Article 23 or any part of the Charter because amendments have
to follow procedures explicitly spelled out in Article 108 of
the same document. 2
If none of these points crossed the mind of anyone in Taiwan’s
foreign policy establishment or of its academics (and even if
it did, it was not followed by action), one obvious reason could
only be that they realized, quite correctly, that Taiwan’s
UN bid is a political battle and not a matter of legal or moral
debate. If that is true, and I believe it is, let us talk about
the politics of Taiwan’s participation in the UN, that is,
from a perspective that is politically realistic.
During the last 25 years, two measures have most frequently been
discussed in Taiwan as a possible way to secure a ‘‘return’’
to the UN. One is for Taiwan (under the name of ‘‘Taiwan’’
and not the ROC) to apply ad novo for admission as a new member.
The other is to try a reverse representation coup, getting the
ROC’s representatives accepted in the UN in lieu of the delegation
from the PRC.
For obvious political reasons, neither measure would have a chance.
The first measure (application as a new member) would be vetoed
by the PRC in the Security Council when Taiwan’s application
came before the Council for the review required before it makes
a recommendation to the General Assembly as specified by Article
4(2) of the Charter. In fact, as has happened to several attempts
by Taiwan, working through some of its few remaining friends in
the UN, Taiwan’s application would not even get onto the
agenda. The second measure (reversal of the representation coup)
would require a new General Assembly resolution; but it would
not have enough votes there to support it; 170 of the 191 members
now recognize the PRC.
Despite these odds, government leaders in Taiwan refuse to be
stopped in their urge and drive to join the United Nations. In
his Lunar New Year’s message of January 29, 2006, for example,
President Chen Shui-bian made a spirited plea for Taiwan to ‘‘enter’’
the UN under the name of ‘‘Taiwan’’ (thus
an application ad novo). Unexpectedly, however, the idea was shot
down by friendly fire as soon as it was floated. Adam Ereli, acting
spokesman of the State Department, told the media the next day
that the United States opposed Chen’s goal of promoting Taiwan’s
participation in the UN (particularly using the name of Taiwan)
because it would run afoul of the U.S. policy of not encouraging
any unilateral change in the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
3 He called the remark ‘‘explosive,’’ suggesting
that it was provocative to the PRC as well as contrary to U.S.
policy.
Without the backing of the United States, Taiwan’s most
important supporter, the island will not have access to the formal
mode of participation in the UN (membership) that President Chen
may have in mind. Under the circumstances, a realistic solution
would be to explore alternative modes of participation. The three
most often mentioned alternatives are the following.
First, an observer at the United Nations (and other organizations
in the UN family) has what is known as ‘‘access to fora’’
and the ‘‘right of participation’’ and hence
enjoys almost the same status as a member except for the right
to vote and, for that matter, the obligation to pay dues. An observer
may have the discretion of working through member states to place
items on the agenda or to draft resolutions for debate and a vote
by the members. Observer status, however, does not impute sovereignty;
nor is sovereignty a prerequisite for enjoying the status.
Second, without regard to sovereignty, an observer enjoys the
same complement of diplomatic immunities and privileges, although
they
Table 1.
Permanent Observers (State and Nonstate) at the United Nations
Headquarters
(I) Nonmember States Maintaining Permanent Observer Missions
at UN Headquarters
Holy See
Permanent Observer of Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations
(II) Entities and Intergovernmental Organizations having received
a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions
and the work of the General Assembly and maintaining permanent
offices at Headquarters
Palestine
Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations
African Union
Office of the Permanent Observer for the African Union to the
United Nations
Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization
Office of the Permanent Observer of the Asian-African Legal Consultative
Organization to the United Nations
Caribbean Community
Office of the Permanent Observer for the Caribbean Community to
the United Nations
Commonwealth Secretariat
Office of the Commonwealth Secretariat at the United Nations
European Union
Delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations
International Organization for Migration
Office of the Permanent Observer for the International Organization
for Migration to the United Nations
International Organization of la Francophonie
Office of the Permanent Observer for the International Organization
of la Francophonie to the United Nations
International Seabed Authority
Office of the Permanent Observer for the International Seabed
Authority to the United Nations
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
Office of the Permanent Observer for the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea to the United Nations
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources
Office of the Permanent Observer for the International Union for
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources to the United
Nations
League of Arab States
Office of the Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States
to the United Nations
Organization of the Islamic Conference
Office of the Permanent Observer for the Organization of the Islamic
Conference to the United Nations
International Committee of the Red Cross
Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross to
the United Nations
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Delegation of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies to the United Nations
Inter-Parliamentary Union
Office of the Permanent Observer to the United Nations
Sovereign Military Order of Malta
Office of the Permanent Observer for the Sovereign Military Order
of Malta to the United Nations
are sanctified by different legal sources from those that apply
to a regular UN member. What governs the process of applying for
and being granted observer status is a body of common law built
up from cases determined since 1948—to be exact, 16 cases
involving states and 17 involving nonstate actors such as regional
organizations, for example, the Caribbean Community and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO). In the past observer status was
granted to temporarily divided countries such as North and South
Vietnam before their reunification in 1975 and East and West Germany
before October 1990. Before formally becoming a member state,
Switzerland was also an observer. As of 2006 the only nonmember
state observer is the Holy See, whereas the 17 other observers
are nonstate entities ranging from Palestine to the European Union,
from the African Union to the International Committee of the Red
Cross (see Table 1).
The only conceivable complication is that opponents may try to
throw up roadblocks by pointing to a 1992 General Assembly resolution
requiring that as a prerequisite for observer status in the UN,
an applicant must have obtained membership in at least one international
governmental organization (IGO). 6 But from the cases examined,
this requirement is honored more in its breach than in its observance.
Yet if there is any doubt, Taiwan could point to its membership
(under the name Chinese-Taipei) in, for example, the Asian Development
Bank, which is listed in the official United Nations Handbook
as an IGO, as having fulfilled the prerequisite.
Third, applications for observer status are addressed to the
secretary general of the UN, who has almost the summary right
to make a final decision. In all the cases studied, when the secretary
general asked the General Assembly for a retroactive review following
a decision he had made on an observer applica-tion, the Assembly
invariably accepted his decision as final.
In the late summer of 1993, Beijing was seriously considering
what its policy should be if Taiwan submitted an application for
observer status to the secretary general of the UN. It was a time
when there was a groundswell of articulated yearnings among the
Taiwan populace for wider international participation beginning
with the UN. Beijing was willing to listen to a discussion (with
a visitor) of the possibility of withholding its objection to
such an initiative from Taiwan provided that observer status would
satisfy its yearnings and convince it to cease to agitate for
formal membership in the UN, which would create ‘‘two
Chinas’’ or ‘‘one China and one Taiwan,’’
neither of which was acceptable to Beijing. But word came that
at the UN 17 Latin American states, acting on behalf of President
Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan, were proposing for inclusion on the agenda
to be considered by the General Committee of the General Assembly
the item of Taiwan’s parallel membership application. On
August 11 Beijing’s representative at the UN, Ambassador
Li Zhaoxing, served notice to Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
that the PRC was opposed to Taiwan’s entry in any form, including
participation as an observer. (In Beijing, contact with the lone
visi\tor was abruptly ended.) In effect, Lee Teng-hui blew it
for Taiwan.
The reason for Beijing’s exasperation was implicit in its
view that the action by the 17 Latin American states confirmed
the PRC Foreign Ministry’s suspicion that mere observership
would not satisfy Taiwan whose true intention had been proved
to be parallel membership in the UN. Even worse, Beijing suspected
that the initial broaching of the idea of Taiwan’s observership
was a ruse to divert the Ministry’s attention, while the
island was working covertly through the 17 Latin American states
to sneak the membership issue onto the UN agenda. That suspicion
even discredited the lone visitor to whom Beijing, only a few
days before, had shown an initial willingness to listen to a discussion
of a possible observer status for Taiwan. Taiwan’s recurrent
bid for UN participation since the 1993 fiasco for parallel membership
has met with repeated defeat. By now, it seems, even some of the
most fervent former critics in Taiwan of the observer alternative
suggestion have turned around and regret that Taiwan lost a good
opportunity 13 years ago.
A Summing Up
Observer status is technically within reach. All things considered,
it is the most feasible way to provide an opportunity for people
in Taiwan to fulfill their urge to ‘‘return to the international
community.’’ The only thing standing between Taiwan
and observer status is not any legal barrier but the high profile
of Taiwan that arouses Beijing’s suspicion. How to overcome
this hurdle after several fiascos since 1993 is up to the government
of President Chen Shui-bian. If negotiation with Beijing is possible,
the foremost job would be to emphasize the point that observer
status does not infringe on the delicate issue of sovereignty.
Next, Taiwan needs to convince Beijing that such a status would
obviate any need for Taiwan to continue its attempts to seek parallel
membership in the UN. As an observer, Taiwan (presumably known
as ‘‘Chinese-Taipei’’) would have ‘‘access
to fora’’ and the ‘‘right of participation’’
described earlier. That would provide Taiwan with enough access
to the outside world to satisfy the yearnings of its domestic
constituency. The last possible hurdle is how Taiwan can meet
the PRC’s requirement that the island recognize the one-China
principle. 7 On that question, nobody can help Taiwan except President
Chen who has professed a theory that there is ‘‘one
state on either side of the Taiwan Strait’’ and has
proclaimed that he is not Chinese.
Taiwan and ASEAN
Many in Taiwan have raised the hope of cultivating a closer relationship
with the Association of South East Asian Nations or at least forming
a linkup with its unique network of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) as a way to break the island’s increasing regional
isolation. 8 For a meaningful discussion to take place, a brief
review of the background of ASEAN is necessary. It includes an
assessment of its attractions to Taiwan and commentary designed
to ascertain whether establishing a relationship with the organization
will or will not be within Taiwan’s reach.
First, ASEAN was created in 1967 with five member states (Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines). They were
brought together by their common concern for regional security.
Communist insurgencies in some parts of the region posed a threat
to them all. In little more than three and a half decades, ASEAN
has grown to 10 members and has moved beyond its initial security
concerns to articulate a primarily economic mission. Three original
guiding principles have continued to underscore the ASEAN way:
(1) Noninterference in other members’ domestic affairs; (2)
peaceful consultation; and (3) responsible consideration of other
members’ interests and sensibilities. It is quite understandable
that its three guiding principles, plus its earlier anti-Communist
vigilance, have enabled ASEAN to engender enormous interest in
Taiwan. Besides, Taiwan’s two-way trade with ASEAN reached
$37.9 billion by 2003, accounting for more than 13 percent of
the island’s total foreign trade. Taiwan’s foreign direct
investments (FDI) in ASEAN-7 totaled $364.5 million in 2003, down
from the $629.2 million total for 2001. 9
Second, the ASEAN regime offers its NGOs an unusual role with
regard to the association’s objectives. The principal objective
is to facilitate cooperation among member states in political,
economic, social, scientific, medical, and technological fields.
NGOs registered with ASEAN enjoy the privilege of attending the
association’s meetings, using the facilities of its Secretariat,
and having access to ASEAN documents.
Third, ASEAN’s activities in building free trade areas (AFTs)—one
of which, to be known as ACFTA, is with mainland China—would
most likely pose a stiff threat to Taiwan. All ASEAN member states
that are currently Taiwan’s close trading partners might
be diverted away from Taiwan because of their institutionalized
commitments to the China market. ASEAN’s trade with mainland
China has been on the rise since China’s accession to the
World Trade Organization in December 2001. By 2003, it reached
$62.6 billion, or 40 percent larger than Taiwan’s trade with
ASEAN. As shown earlier, Taiwan’s FDI in ASEAN-7 declined
following the PRC’s entry into WTO, whereas the mainland
Chinese FDI showed a pattern of steady increase in the region
(total for 1995–2003: $584 million).
Can Taiwan cash in on the potential benefits that may accrue
from a relationship with ASEAN? It has been a basic ASEAN premise
that regional security and economic health require a stable U.S.–PRC–Taiwan
relationship. In July 1999, however, Taiwan, under then President
Lee Teng-hui, proclaimed an explicit two-state theory, which demanded
that Taiwan be treated as a separate but coequal sovereign state
in dealings with mainland China. The claim immediately plunged
Cross-Strait relations downward. It also raised an alarm among
ASEAN nations. Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chock Tong
told ASEAN’s foreign ministers meeting in Singapore that
the three-way relationship was under stress because it was complicated
by the rift between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The rift,
in this view, resulted from President Lee’s ditching of the
‘‘one-China’’ principle—a principle that
ASEAN supports.
Consequently, since then ASEAN has kept Taiwan at arm’s
length. This is why the island’s bid to open negotiations
for an ASEAN–Taiwan FTA has not received the expected warm
response. After September 11, 2001, ASEAN established a regional
antiterrorism regime that encompassed not only member states but
also a few external nonmembers, including Australia and the United
States. But Taiwan was not invited to join.
Worse still, in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami disaster,
Taiwan was excluded even from the world tsunami relief summit
in early January 2005 that was held in Jakarta where the ASEAN
Secretariat is based. This happened despite the fact that Taiwan
at the time was the world’s eighth-largest donor to countries
that had experienced the disaster (later it was overtaken by three
other donors and became number 11). The worst hit was Indonesia,
the host country, which turned down Taiwan’s request to attend
the summit meeting as an observer. The reason given was that ASEAN
does not accept observers.
This sort of merciless exclusionism is an unmistakable sign that
any hoped for affiliation with ASEAN is fruitless for Taiwan.
Such a reaction is most likely to continue as long as the Cross-Strait
dispute between Taiwan and the mainland over the one-China question
remains deadlocked.
Some might ask whether Taiwan could try to gain access to ASEAN
through its elaborate NGO network. Indeed ASEAN’s NGO network
is extensive. A long list of 57 ASEAN-affiliated NGOs, in the
aggregate, represents almost all interests and industries (the
only exception is in the environmental area). But to obtain an
ASEAN affiliated NGO status, an NGO must be formed by nationals
of an ASEAN member state and registered in one of the member states.
The restrictions are explicitly spelled out in ‘‘Guidelines
for ASEAN Relations with NGOs’’ adopted in 1986. Following
the logic of the Guidelines, for Taiwan to have an NGO that could
gain ASEAN-affiliated status, Taiwan would have to become a member
of ASEAN first. Then its nationals could form an NGO registered
in Taiwan in order to qualify for ASEAN-affiliated status.
Taiwan and the EU
Taiwan is the third-largest trading partner of the European Union.
Two-way trade amounted to $35 billion in 1997 and $37.6 billion
in 2000. Yet under its 1994 New Asia Strategy—designed to
improve political contacts and upgrade market access in Asia,
in particular East Asia—the EU’s emphasis has increasingly
focused on the PRC. Following the Asian financial crisis of the
late 1990 s, the EU’s policy recognized China as the growth
engine of Pacific Asia, replacing Japan, whose economy has been
in the doldrums since 1989. An avenue of the EU’s access
to the region is through the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), an outgrowth
of a conference held in Bangkok in 1996 among 10 European states
and their Asian counterparts in the region. First billed as an
interregional process to promote ‘‘strong partnership’’
in trade and investments, the summit spawned a number of joint
undertakings involving the establishment of institutions such
as the Asian-Europe Environmental Technology Center in Thailand
and the Asia-Europe Foundation in Singapore. Other measures include
an Asia-Europe University program and links integrating a trans-Asian
railway network with the trans-European railway network.
ASEM’s biennial meeting since then has been institutionalized,
rotating its meeting site between European and Asian capitals.
Its membership has grown to 39, including all the 25 members of
EU, the European Commission, and 13 Asian states. 10 Taiwan, however,
is not among its members.
Nevertheless, the European Parliament (EP) is not unconcerned
about Taiwan. In 2002–2003 it adopted five resolutions concerning
Taiwan. Two of them called on the World Health Assembly to grant
Taiwan observer status. 11 The ‘‘EU Strategy Toward
China’’ (also known as the China Resolution), adopted
on April 12, 2002, contains a chapter on Taiwan; the EP seems
to have struck a balance between the PRC and Taiwan. Although
the China Resolution endorses the one-China doctrine and a majority
of the members of EP consider Taiwan as part of China, another
EP document, known as the ASEM Resolution, urges both sides straddling
the Taiwan Strait ‘‘to deescalate the arms buildup and
China, in particular, to withdraw missiles in the coastal provinces
across the Taiwan Straits’’ (Paragraph 17). Compared
to the ‘‘China Resolution,’’ which urges the
EU to ‘‘enlarge’’ ASEM to include India and
accept ‘‘Taiwan in ASEM,’’ the ASEM Resolution
reflects a relatively weaker or retrogressive position toward
the subject. It uses the term ‘‘association’’
instead of ‘‘participation.’’ The document,
nevertheless, reiterates the EP’s position that the political
pillar would support, as its first priority, ‘‘political
dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan’’ (Paragraph 16).
This inconsistency clearly demonstrates a lack of consensus among
members of EP (MEP), who are elected from the EU’s member
states by a system in which account is taken of relative population.
MEP groups are formed on the basis of political tendency, not
nationality. After the Amsterdam treaty (1999), the EP became
coequal with the European Council, forming in effect a bicameral
legislature. In March 1999, in a regulation on the subject of
third country nationals in the EU, the Council characterized Taiwan
as a ‘‘[t]erritorial entity and authority not recognized
by all member states’’ (Council Regulation [EC] no.
57499). 12
Although neither the EP nor the European Commission has defined
the EU’s one-China policy, all members of the EU recognize
the PRC, even though Taiwan maintains simultaneous ‘‘unofficial’’
relations with some EU members (e.g., Belgium, Austria, France,
the United Kingdom, and others). For the same reason that keeps
Taiwan out of ASEM, the island is excluded from the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) in long-term trade with the EU. Besides,
according to one report, Taiwan’s exports have been heavily
discriminated against by quotas, ‘‘voluntary’’
export limits, and tariffs used to prevent them from obtaining
access to the EU.
Despite those hazards, however, Taiwan still manages to be the
EU’s third-largest trading partner, as noted earlier. This
state of affairs is possible because despite its one-China policy,
the EU recognizes Taiwan as an economic and commercial entity,
allowing a vast ‘‘gray area’’ in which Taiwan’s
flexible approach (such as the use of ‘‘unofficial’’
relations and business-to-business agreements) has gained it a
niche in the EU market as well as helped channel the EU’s
FDIs to the island. As Chih-chieh Chou argues, with the necessary
flexibility, including the use of a name like ‘‘Chinese-Taipei’’
(used in ADB and APEC), Taiwan’s chances of being accepted
into the ASEM process are much better than they would be in trying
to ‘‘return to’’ or ‘‘enter’’
the UN in the name of Taiwan. 13 Chen sees great potential in
continuing the momentum of Taiwan–EU contacts and talks following
Taiwan’s entry into the WTO. For instance, the EU established
a ‘‘European Economic and Trade Office’’ in
Taiwan in 2003. Taiwan began a dialogue with the EU as early as
late 2002 in order to reach an FTA. 14
Chen has also concluded (see note 13, page 23) that Taiwan’s
inclusion in the ASEM process depends on whether its strategy
succeeds in three areas: (1) strengthening Taiwan’s economic
performance, which has been in decline since at least 2000 because
of the island’s deteriorating political relations with the
PRC (resulting in capital flights from the island because of uncertainty
about its security); (2) maintaining momentum and widening Taiwan’s
support among members of the EP; and (3) overcoming Beijing’s
objection.
Conclusion
The Taiwan people’s yearnings for wider international contact
and involvement run very deep and are not unreasonable. The obstacles
are formidable and the root cause is largely the opposition of
the PRC, which is blocking Taiwan’s access to many international
forums as well as institutional arrangements. Two reasons may
account for the PRC’s obstructionism.
First, Beijing is extremely sensitive—critics often say
paranoid—about the issue of sovereignty, namely that participation
in institutions and regimes created by states for the conduct
of state-related activities would confer sovereignty on Taiwan
outside the one-China diaspora. 15 Second is Beijing’s perception,
rightly or wrongly, that widened and unimpeded participation in
international forums would fortify Taiwan’s intransigence
in avoiding a serious dialogue with the mainland regarding a peaceful
resolution of their division.
Like the United States and ASEAN, the EU maintains a one-China
policy and has gone on record as endorsing a Cross-Strait dialogue
while characterizing Taiwan as a ‘‘[t]erritorial entity
and authority not recognized by all member states.’’
All this is prima facie evidence that the EU buys Beijing’s
argument against Taiwan’s participation in such international
institutions as ASEM. If this reading of the root cause of the
impasse is right—and it seems credible—then the key
to Taiwan’s ‘‘return’’ to the international
community lies in its ultimate ability to overcome Beijing’s
objections. On this score, only Taiwan’s government can help
itself by demonstrating that Beijing’s allegations are unfounded.
In the meantime, Taiwan’s chances of obtaining wider international
participation will be enhanced if it can eschew the issue of sovereignty
and be realistic enough to explore alternative ways such as obtaining
observer status in the UN. Taiwan has been successful in seeking
membership in important international forums not involving the
participation of sovereign states such as the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council (PECC). Although a nongovernmental organization,
PECC has formal ties with ASEAN such as its ‘‘Human
Resource Development’’ program. ASEAN’s Secretariat
handles funding for the training facilities established under
the joint program. Thus an invisible link or liaison is possible
between Taiwan and ASEAN through PECC.
A related point is that Taiwan need not be overly alarmed by
its seemingly helpless isolation. For instance, Taiwan is a member
of WTO. Despite the forebodings of the forthcoming ASEAN-China
Free Trade Area (ACFTA) conference alluded to earlier, the fact
is that Taiwan’s interests are protected under WTO rules,
especially the ‘‘Article XXIV Understanding’’
(named after Article XXIV of GATT 1994), which was adopted during
the Uruguay Round negotiations that led to the creation of the
WTO. One vital principle laid down in this understanding is that
regional trade areas (RTAs) to be formed by WTO members must not
leave any other WTO member worse off. It means in effect that
any RTA, such as the one that ASEAN and the PRC are hatching,
must not be at the expense of Taiwan or any other member of WTO.
Despite all the zeal it has invested in the quest for wider international
breathing space, Taiwan has not always done enough to exhaust
all possibilities, as, for instance, in the area of developing
FTAs. One example is a possible FTA with the United States that,
reports indicate, has been stalled because Taiwan has not done
enough to generate strong support in Congress and among U.S. business
circles. Another example is an FTA with mainland China. The potential
for a Taiwan-mainland FTA can be seen from statistics from the
period under Lee Teng-hui’s presidency (when his stringent
curbs marked trade with the mainland). From 1990 through 2001,
trade between Taiwan and the mainland amounted to U.S. $220.5
billion, yielding to Taiwan a $128.8 billion surplus. Taiwan’s
FDI on the mainland from 1989 through 2000 totaled $42 billion.
Even in 2001, during the first term of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency,
when relations with the mainland sunk to a new low, Taiwan’s
exports to the mainland increased by 31 percent to $30.5 billion,
generating a $20.5 billion surplus for Taiwan.
All these impressive advances took place despite the political
restrictions enforced by Taiwan. Under these restrictions, thousands
of products from the mainland were banned from Taiwan, and each
FDI project of Taiwan firms investing on the mainland had to be
kept under a ceiling of $50 million. Besides, no direct air, maritime,
and mail links were permitted with the mainland. For a Taiwan
businessman to fly from Taipei to Shanghai, a detour was and still
is mandatory through a ‘‘third party’’ midway
stop (usually Hong Kong) to change planes before proceeding to
the final destination. With customs and immigration inspections
plus waiting time added to reflect the extra flying distance,
the trip could easily take up to 10 hours, as opposed to the three-hour
flying time required if direct flights were permitted.
Although the benefits of a free-trade area between Taiwan and
the mainland are potentially enormous, it remains true that any
direct negotiations would require the lifting of the internal
political restrictions in Taiwan that have continued from the
Lee Teng-hui presidency (1988–2000) until this day. 16 A
free trade association with the mainland would not only facilitate
easier trade flows and investment projects across the Taiwan Strait,
but Taiwan could also avail itself of other opportunities such
as unrestricted access to China’s FTA with ASEAN (ACFTA)
when it materializes.
However strange it may seem, except for a lone voice that recently
raised the question of a Taiwan-mainland FTA, no one else has
shown serious interest in the prospect. Thus not all problems
frustrating Taiwan’s quest for wider international participation
came from external sources. Part of the problem is closer to home,
within Taiwan itself. 17
In terms of external obstacles, Taiwan’s bid to enlarge
its international participation, in the UN as elsewhere, is not
just a legal or moral problem. It is political in nature, that
is, caught in the crossfire of the sovereignty dispute with the
mainland and domestic political dissensions within Taiwan. Politics
is the art of the possible. It was possible for Taiwan to become
a member of the WTO because it was flexible enough to accept the
name ‘‘Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen, and Matsu.’’ 18 In other cases such as the Asian
Development Bank and APEC, Taiwan was flexible enough to consider
a variant form of ROC (the word China in ROC would create two
Chinas when juxtaposed with the PRC) and accept ‘‘Chinese-Taipei’’
instead.
This seemingly awkward name serves three important purposes:
(1) It skirts both the ‘‘two-Chinas’’ dilemma
and the ‘‘one-China-and-one-Taiwan’’ taboo,
leaving no ground for Beijing to grumble about; (2) it maintains
a distinct identity with dignity for Taiwan because the word Taipei
in the hyphenated name indicates that it is the capital of the
ROC, as Chungking was the seat of the wartime ROC government that
was the universally recognized government of China during the
Sino–Japanese war of 1937–1945; and (3) the hyphenated
name symbolizes that the ROC government, currently seated in ‘‘Taipei,’’
stands for ultimate reunion with the ‘‘Chinese’’
nation. Hence the name ‘‘Chinese-Taipei’’
literally disarms the PRC of any excuses for opposition. For Beijing
to object to ‘‘Chinese-Taipei’’ would be tantamount
to pushing Taiwan away from the prospect of an ultimate reunion
with the mainland. Beijing would have no choice but to accept.
The name ‘‘Chinese-Taipei,’’ therefore, has
proved to be Taiwan’s ‘‘open sesame’’
in its quest for wider international participation. Its latent
coercive quality (vis-a`-vis Beijing) lends the name a halo of
great respectability even though this point is not fully appreciated
by many in Taiwan.
In the final analysis, however paradoxically, those self-designated
‘‘patriots’’ who pledge to fight against the
island’s isolation by carving out an identity for it under
the distinct name of ‘‘Taiwan’’ (or potentially
the ‘‘Republic of Taiwan’’) will end up facing
doors that have been closed to them.
In a similar fashion, some other self-designated ‘‘patriots’’
in Taiwan have proposed an EU model for resolving the unification
problem with the mainland. Their rationale is that applying the
EU model would result in effect in a confederate system encompassing
the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as two coequal sovereign entities.
This may initially appear to be sensible to Taiwan. The trouble
is if a true EU model were to be enforced, the creation of such
an entity would require, first, that all barriers maintained by
either side regarding customs, immigration, travel, and communications
be dismantled. Taiwan’s current restrictions on mainland
visitors would have to be removed. The ‘‘three links’’
would have to be established in order to provide direct air, maritime,
and mail exchanges. The ceilings on investments from Taiwan on
the mainland would also have to be lifted. Taiwan’s current
ban on thousands of import items from the mainland would also
have to be removed. Is Taiwan’s government ready to do all
that?
Second, the EU model would also require both parties to accept
the use of one common currency. Since the mainland Chinese economy
is three or four times bigger than Taiwan’s in terms of total
(not per capita) GDP, what would happen if Beijing insisted that
the renminbi be used as the common currency. Taiwan could counterpropose
an equivalent of the euro or a freshly minted common currency,
something that might just be named yuan (the Chinese word for
a unit of money both in Taiwan and on the mainland). Is Taiwan’s
government willing to accept that as a substitute for the NT dollar?
By comparison, the Taiwan–PRC FTA formula would seem to
be a much better choice. It would give Taiwan much more discretion
because it could diverge from what the EU model requires, depending
on the outcomes of direct negotiations. Hence, like the other
‘‘patriotic’’ model that calls for jettisoning
all names in favor of that of ‘‘Taiwan,’’
the EU model, proposed by the likeminded self-designated ‘‘patriots’’
of Taiwan, will prove, paradoxically, not feasible despite the
good intentions of its proponents.
The ultimate moral of all this is that ‘‘good’’
intentions (measured by the intended good for Taiwan) are far
from enough and may prove to be counterproductive. They are a
poor substitute for prudent realism. Without the courage of facing
and accepting the hard reality as it is, Taiwan’s professed
goal of broadening its international role as a viable player will
most likely encounter more frustrating defeat that its 23 million
people do not deserve.
About the Author
James C. Hsiung is professor of politics at New York University
where he teaches international law, international politics theory,
and international governance. His teaching and research interests
extend to East Asian politics, Pacific Asian international relations,
and Asian political culture. Professor Hsiung directs the Contemporary
U.S.-Asia Research Institute, a New York–based think tank.
He is the former executive editor of Asian Affairs, a learned
journal published in Washington, D.C.
Notes
