Northeast Asia Projects
Developing a Peaceful, Stable, and Cooperative
Relationship with China: A National Committee on American Foreign
Policy Report by A. Doak Barnett, Donald S. Rice,
William M. Rudolf, George D. Schwab, Donald S. Zagoria
July 1996
Contents
Foreword
A National Committee on American Foreign Policy Study Group consisting
of President George D. Schwab, Senior Vice President William M.
Rudolf, Vice President Donald S. Rice, member of the Board Donald
S. Zagoria, and Johns Hopkins University China specialist A. Doak
Barnett visited China and Taiwan from June 9 to 23, 1996. In China,
the host organization was the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign
Affairs under President Liu Shuqing and Vice President Zhang Wenpu.
The NCAFP delegation met in Beijing with PRC President Jiang Zemin,
Vice Premier Li Lanxing, several other foreign ministry officials,
including Zhang Yuejiao, director general of the Department of
Treaty and Law, and leaders of numerous Chinese research organizations,
as well as with U.S. Ambassador to China James Sasser and members
of his staff, including Brigadier General Michael T. Byrnes, the
defense attaché. In Shanghai, the delegation met with Wang
Daohan, former mayor of Shanghai and now head of China's Association
for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait. In Taiwan, the NCAFP delegation
met with President Lee Teng-hui, National Security Council Secretary
General Ding Mou-shih, Foreign Minister John Chang, and numerous
other officials, scholars, and politicians.
Before embarking, the NCAFP delegation was briefed in Washington
by Winston Lord, assistant secretary for East Asia and Pacific
Affairs; Kent Weidemann, deputy assistant secretary for East Asia
and Pacific Affairs; Robert Suettinger, director, Asian Affairs,
the White House; Jeff Bader, China desk officer in the State Department;
Alan Romberg of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff;
Colonel Karl Eikenberry of the Department of Defense; Thomas Fingar
and Carol Hamrin of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research; Robert Kapp of the U.S.-China Business Council;
Nicholas Lardy of the Brookings Institution; and Ralph Clough,
a China and Taiwan specialist at Johns Hopkins University.
The NCAFP group wishes to express its deepest appreciation to
those and other individuals whom we consulted in Washington, D.C.,
China, and Taiwan. It goes without saying that none of them is
responsible for the conclusions and recommendations in the report
that follows.
Introduction
The United States has a vital national interest in developing
a peaceful, stable, and cooperative relationship with China and
effective means for identifying common interests and managing
disagreements. No other foreign policy issues deserve a higher
priority. The stakes are high. China is a major world power. It
has the largest population in the world and is the world's most
rapidly developing major economy, which could conceivably become
the world's largest within decades. It is a nuclear power, and
it has the world's largest standing army. It has a permanent seat
on the UN Security Council, and its cooperation is essential to
the solution of many global problems. If the United States and
China become engaged in hostile confrontation, Washington will
have few allies, and it will be widely blamed for generating an
unwanted cold war with Beijing. Under such circumstances, it would
be difficult for the United States to develop or to sustain a
viable policy toward East Asia, a region of the world that contains
half the world's population, one third of its GNP, and the most
dynamic and rapidly growing segment of the world economy.
Following the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, U.S.-China relations
steadily deteriorated because of a volatile mix of conflicting
interests, mutual misperceptions, domestic political factors in
each country, and the lack of effective high-level dialogue. There
has not been a U.S. presidential visit to China in seven years,
the U.S. secretary of state has visited China only once in the
past four years, and there have been few cabinet-level exchanges
between the two countries.
Each side has a litany of complaints about the other. The United
States complains that China engages in serious human rights violations,
has unfair trade practices, sells nuclear and missile technology
to irresponsible states, and recently "bullied" Taiwan
by conducting a series of missile tests and military exercises
near Taiwan prior to the presidential elections there.
The Chinese complain that they don't understand the Clinton administration
policy toward China--whether it is containment or cooperation--and
that they receive many mixed signals. They believe that Washington,
while saying it wishes "constructive engagement," continually
resorts to pressures and threats of sanctions on trade differences,
nonproliferation problems, and human rights disputes. They charge
that they are demonized by the U.S. media and that many in the
United States talk about the "China threat" and the
need to "contain" China. They fear that the United States,
while ostensibly supporting a "one-China" policy, in
practice has taken actions that support separatist trends, especially
in regard to Taiwan. Beijing viewed Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's
visit to the United States last summer as a move designed to encourage
such trends and therefore required a strong Chinese response.
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, congressional resolutions on Taiwan
and Tibet, and White House meetings with the Dalai Lama are all
viewed by Chinese leaders as posing direct challenges to their
sovereignty and as being supported by some who desire to split
China. The United States is seen to be primarily responsible for
keeping China out of the World Trade Organization, and many Chinese
charge that the United States wishes a weak China. In a poll taken
in China last year, 87 percent of respondents indicated that they
viewed the United States as the most unfriendly country in the
world.
In recent months some steps have been taken by both sides to
check the deterioration in relations. In May U.S. Secretary of
State Warren Christopher made the first comprehensive speech on
U.S.-China policy of any high-level Clinton administration official.
Christopher reaffirmed the U.S. one-China policy, called for summit
meetings and regular cabinet-level exchanges, and expressed the
U.S. interest in a "secure, open, and successful" China
that would become a "strong and responsible member of the
international community." In the same month President William
J. Clinton, in a speech on the Asia-Pacific region, discussed
the U.S. interest in a "secure, stable, open, and prosperous"
China and announced that he would recommend the extension of China's
MFN trade status for another year without any conditions. In June
the United States and China signed a new agreement on intellectual
property rights, following new actions by the Chinese to clamp
down on factories pirating American films and CDs. The two sides
also reached an agreement that resolved a dispute on Chinese sales
to Pakistan of "ring magnets"--material that could be
used in the production of enriched uranium. The Chinese pledged
that in the future there would be "no assistance to unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities." In July U.S. National Security Adviser
Anthony Lake visited Beijing in an effort to lay the groundwork
for a presidential visit after the elections in November. Recently,
also, several U.S. senators and congressmen, including Sam Nunn,
Diane Feinstein, and Lee Hamilton, concerned about the prolonged
deterioration of U.S.-China relations and sobered by the 1995-1996
crisis in the Taiwan Strait, made important speeches calling for
a less confrontational, more balanced, and bipartisan U.S. policy
toward China. On the Chinese side, there were positive but wary
responses to Christopher's speech and to the apparent new tone
in U.S. policy and expressions of hope that concrete actions could
lead to improved relations.
Despite these encouraging signs, there remain formidable obstacles
to a substantial improvement in U.S.-China relations. Public attitudes
in the United States toward China are predominantly critical.
Many in Congress fail to see where U.S. and Chinese interests
coincide, and some view China primarily as a communist dictatorship
that has expansionist ambitions, a threat that must be contained.
U.S. intelligence reports, leaked to the American press, indicate
that China has sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan, and if these reports
are confirmed, the administration would be obligated by law to
consider new sanctions against China. Moreover, relations between
China and Taiwan, which plummeted to a new low after President
Lee's visit to the United States, which, was followed by Chinese
missile tests near Taiwan, have still not improved greatly, and
prospects for an early resumption of a meaningful Cross-Strait
dialogue are not good. In sum, there are a number of potential
"time bombs" that could explode and lead to a new downturn
in U.S.-PRC relations.
The members of the delegation from the National Committee on
American Foreign Policy who visited China and Taiwan in June 1996
believe that there are several keys to halting and reversing the
deterioration in U.S.-China relations and to developing a peaceful,
stable, and cooperative relationship with Beijing that will last
into the twenty-first century.
First, the U.S. president, his foreign policy team, and his administration
as a whole must give priority to establishing a coherent, long-range
strategic framework for dealing with China. They must make clear
to Congress and the American public the importance to U.S. interests
of positive relations with China and convince them that the U.S.
government has a sound strategy for managing this complex and
difficult relationship. The president must identify and articulate
what the common U.S. and Chinese interests are and how we can
promote them and clarify the issues on which the United States
and China disagree and how we propose to resolve or manage them.
Second, the President must mobilize support within the Senate
and the House of Representatives to convince Congress of the vital
importance of restoring a bipartisan U.S. policy toward China,
one that served our national interests so well between 1972 and
1989 but then fell apart after 1989.
Third, the United States and China must deal realistically with
the numerous issues that trouble their relationship--issues concerning
strategic and nonproliferation questions, economic relations,
differences over human rights, and problems posed by the unresolved
dilemmas relating to Taiwan's future--which will require continuing
efforts to manage. The gradual evolution of China into a major
military power and the recent emergence of China as a major economic
power create new opportunities but also pose new challenges.
Fourth, the United States must pursue a meaningful and genuine
one-China policy consistent with the three joint communiqués
that it signed with China in 1972, 1979, and 1982. The issues
relating to Taiwan's future have reemerged as the most dangerous
possible causes of military conflict in East Asia, and they must
be resolved peacefully. The United States must play a more active
role in encouraging both China and Taiwan to renew a political
dialogue and eventually to reach a political accommodation. The
United States must use active diplomacy to avoid being dragged
into a military conflict over Taiwan.
Finally, China, for its part, must better understand foreign
views and criticism and must demonstrate convincingly that it
will be more responsive to such views while working to narrow
differences that exacerbate problems in relations with its neighbors
and major Western powers. Greater openness is one major requirement:
China needs to make public more information about and grant greater
foreign access to its legal and prison systems. It needs to be
more open about its military doctrines, budgets, and equipment.
It needs to show greater flexibility in dealing with Taiwan within
the framework of one China. And after Hong Kong reverts to Chinese
rule in mid-1997, China must observe its pledges to abide by the
agreements concerning Hong Kong's reversion and its promise to
keep Hong Kong's system intact and viable for the next fifty years.
A Coherent, Long-Range Policy Toward
China
One of the major difficulties in establishing a stable U.S.-China
relationship since Tiananmen has been the absence of a coherent
U.S. policy. During the first two years of President Clinton's
administration, his policy was to link human rights and most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment of China, threatening to revoke China's MFN status
if Beijing did not modify its human rights policies. This policy,
which encountered strong Chinese opposition, lacked credibility
because it threatened U.S. economic interests in China and was
inconsistent with the Clinton administration's professed goal
of revitalizing the American economy through increased exports.
The linkage policy was abandoned in 1994 in favor of a policy
of "engagement," but the continuation of U.S. pressure,
threats of imposing sanctions on many issues, and the lack of
clarity about the purposes of engagement fueled Chinese suspicions,
particularly since the United States continued to couple its policy
of engagement with a policy focusing on human rights. Moreover,
the policy of engagement was accompanied by a good deal of rhetoric
in the American media about an emerging "China threat"
and the need to "contain" China, which led many in China
to suspect that engagement was designed to subvert China.
Also, the Clinton administration, even after adopting the policy
of engagement, continued to pursue a disjointed policy toward
Beijing. On the one hand, its human rights specialists made high-profile
visits to China and met with Chinese dissidents, and its trade
specialists threatened to impose sanctions if China did not comply
with U.S. demands, while the administration simultaneously sought
to strengthen Chinese cooperation in other areas of the relationship,
for example, in obtaining China's cooperation in achieving an
effective nuclear freeze in North Korea and in dealing with a
variety of nonproliferation issues.
The administration never attached to China the priority that
it clearly deserves. It was preoccupied primarily with domestic
issues and with hot spots such as Bosnia, the Middle East, Iraq,
and North Korea. One fundamental problem was the absence of any
clear strategic framework for U.S. policy. It was never clear
to the Chinese or to Americans whether the United States was treating
China as a potential friend or as a potential adversary.
In numerous meetings in Beijing and Shanghai in June 1996 between
members of the delegation from the National Committee on American
Foreign Policy and Chinese leaders, a recurrent theme was the
Chinese lack of understanding of U.S. goals toward China and mistrust
or at least suspicion about U.S. intentions. Does the United States
consider China a friend or an adversary? What are the real purposes
of the engagement strategy? Why has the United States been so
confrontational on so many issues?
One high-ranking Chinese official put it this way after discussing
a number of specific issues in U.S.-China relations: "The
general overall question is the key. What is the strategic intention
of the United States toward China? We are not so clear about that
U.S. think tanks designed the word engagement for President
Clinton. But we don't understand that word. Engagement can mean
a battle in a war, or it can mean the beginning of a marriage.
We are not clear which it is. Moreover, other words are often
used: containment, sanctions. So we are puzzled."
Some American officials, in conversations with us in Washington,
D.C., suggested that the Chinese really do know what U.S. strategy
toward China is but simply do not like it and therefore complain
that it is unclear. But this overlooks the fact that the Clinton
administration has sent mixed signals to China and is continuing
to do so. The important speech by Secretary Christopher in May
contained a number of basic themes that could contribute to the
definition of a new and clearer statement of U.S. aims, but President
Clinton failed to highlight these themes when he asked Congress
to renew MFN status for China a few days later. Indeed, these
two speeches seemed to highlight the lack of adequate coordination.
(The State Department was even forced subsequently to issue a
clarification of one of the phrases in the president's speech
that could have been interpreted by some as favoring a "theater
missile defense" for Taiwan--something his administration
does not favor.)
Defining a coherent, long-range strategic framework for dealing
with China requires (1) making it clear that the United States
is not hostile to China and understands that it shares important
interests with China; (2) initiating serious and regular high-level
dialogues designed to identify those common interests and to agree
on means to strengthen them; (3) reemphasizing the tacit bargain
in the three joint communiqués (1972, 1979, 1982) signed
by the United States and China, which require consistent U.S.
support for a one-China policy as well as the avoidance of military
pressures and threats from China against Taiwan; and (4) defining
differences and disputes between the United States and China,
establishing effective channels and the means to discuss them,
and, searching for ways to resolve or manage them.
Despite their differences, the United States and China share
many important common interests: They have interests in preventing
nuclear war, in gradually reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles,
and in ending nuclear testing. They have interests in stopping
the spread of weapons of mass destruction. They have interests
in preserving peace and stability in the world and in East Asia
in particular. They have interests in maintaining an environment
in which there is no encouragement for Japan to develop nuclear
weapons or to abandon the alliance with the United States. They
have interests in consulting about and in cooperating in the stabilization
of potential conflict areas such as the Korean peninsula and Cambodia.
They have interests in increasing trade and investment opportunities
with each other and in maintaining and broadening open access
to each other's markets. And they have interests in working together
with other nations and international organizations to solve problems
relating to environmental protection, energy and food shortages,
drug trafficking, terrorism, immigration and alien smuggling,
population problems, and control of epidemic diseases. All of
these require U.S.-China cooperation. Many Chinese confirmed the
belief of many American specialists on China that China's highest
priority for the next several decades will be to develop its economy
and to maintain a peaceful environment in Asia that will be conducive
to its economic and industrial modernization. We believe that
this will continue to be true in the period ahead if the United
States, China, and others cooperate to maintain peace and stability.
In defining and implementing a coherent policy toward China,
it is necessary to integrate our China policy into a broader policy
relating to the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. policy toward China
will not succeed unless it is supported by our friends and allies
in the region, including Japan and other significant nations of
Northeast and Southeast Asia. The United States needs to consult
more with other nations in the Asia-Pacific region about their
concerns regarding China and about how to involve China more extensively
and constructively in regional affairs. It is particularly important
to manage effectively our relations with all the major power centers
in Asia. Our goal must be to establish a stable equilibrium among
these various power centers. As Henry Kissinger has observed,
one of our biggest assets in Asia is the fact that we have fewer
real quarrels with Asian nations than they have among themselves.
As a result, the majority of Asians wish the United States to
act as the balancer of the Asian equilibrium and to preserve a
leadership role in the region.
Developing a long-range policy toward China also requires a greater
understanding within the United States of the challenges that
China's rise to great power status poses. At this stage of its
evolution, China's main concerns focus on sustaining its economic
growth and maintaining political stability at home rather than
on gaining regional predominance. But China is concerned with
a variety of issues relating to sovereignty and territorial integrity
that also concern its neighbors, and these will require compromises
to prevent open conflicts. The rise of China inevitably raises
new concerns not only in the United States but also in most Asian
countries because of China's size and its growing power, which
will clearly alter the Asian and the global balance of forces
over the next several decades. Because of China's growing international
role, it is imperative to integrate it into the international
community and to give it a legitimate stake in helping to maintain
global peace, stability, and prosperity.
The difficulty of defining and implementing a long-range policy
toward China is compounded by differences within the United States
between varied and competing domestic constituencies, but the
dangers and costs of not developing a coherent policy will be
enormous. As Senator Nunn put it in a speech to the U.S. Senate
on February 23, 1996: "The growing importance of China in
world affairs demands a purposeful, coherent, and consistent American
policy toward China. History is littered with the uninformed and
ineffective responses of an established power toward a rising
power. In modem history, we need only recall the pre-World War
II rise of Germany and Japan and the former Soviet Union ... and
the mistakes our country and the free world made in coping with
their rise. History should teach us that established powers must
provide consistent and credible signals about their expectations
and set forth reasonable terms on which they are willing to incorporate
the rising power into the international system."
The Need for a Bipartisan
Policy
A principal impediment to the establishment of a coherent policy
toward China has been the lack of agreement over China policy
between the administration and Congress, especially since 1989.
The absence of bipartisanship in the U.S. government reflects
the broader collapse of the public consensus within the United
States on how to view and deal with China. At one extreme, there
are some who view China as a brutal communist dictatorship that
has expansionist ambitions and consequently press for a tougher
policy toward China. At the other end of the spectrum, the business
community and many foreign policy specialists warn that isolating
China would be counterproductive and shortsighted and that none
of our allies would go along with such a policy. From 1972 to
1989 there was a strong public consensus that was favorable to
policies designed to strengthen U.S. cooperation with China. That
domestic consensus collapsed in the late 1980s for several reasons.
The original anti-Soviet strategic rationale for the U.S.-China
relationship was undermined by the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the end of the cold war. In addition, the framework for the
overall U.S.-China relationship was weakened by trade differences,
disputes over Chinese arms sales and nonproliferation issues,
and conflicts over China's human rights record. Most important,
the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 led to a sea change in how the U.S.
media and the U.S. public view China.
The absence of a bipartisan U.S. policy toward China has great
costs. It means that the United States continues to send mixed
signals to China, to Taiwan, and to the rest of Asia. Many in
China and in the rest of Asia as well now have doubts about whether
the United States, because it is so divided, is capable of pursuing
a coherent policy toward China and the Asia-Pacific region as
a whole. If this turns out to be their conclusion, the U.S. leadership
role in Asia will be substantially eroded.
The absence of bipartisanship also tempts foreign lobbies to
exploit the differences between the executive and the legislative
branches of the U.S. government in ways that can further weaken
U.S. foreign policy leadership and coherence. Taiwan already has
the second most effective lobby in Washington. The absence of
a bipartisan China policy has contributed to periodic crises in
U.S. relations with China, such as the one that erupted over the
visit of Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to Cornell in 1995. After
Washington indicated to the Chinese that the visit would not take
place, President Clinton reversed course when Congress voted almost
unanimously in favor of the visit. Because China had asserted
that in its view the visit would be a clear violation of existing
understandings, Beijing had to react strongly. It took the actions
that resulted in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996.
Restoring a bipartisan consensus on how to deal with China will
not be easy, but steps to do so are essential. The president,
supported by his foreign policy team, must take the lead in explaining
to Congress and the American public what the stakes are, why developing
a more cooperative relationship with China is so important, what
major interests the United States and China share, and what the
dangers are in continuing to drift toward confrontation. Some
members of Congress have already spoken out on the importance
of halting the deterioration in U.S.-China relations--Representative
Lee Hamilton, Senator Sam Nunn, Senator Diane Feinstein, and others;
they should take the lead in Congress to work constructively with
the administration to develop a more consensual approach to China.
Members of the U.S. business community, who have a huge economic
stake in halting the deterioration of relations, should redouble
their efforts, in cooperation with academic and other specialists
on China, to increase public understanding in the United States
of the importance of China to America's economic future. Finally,
there is an urgent need to begin regular summit meetings and high-level
dialogues with China's leaders, as proposed by Secretary Christopher
in his May speech on U.S.-China relations. This is essential not
only to make it possible for leaders in both the United States
and China to address their concerns more directly but also to
strengthen support within the United States--in Congress and the
media, business, academic, and other key groups--for more balanced
and effective approaches to dealing with U.S.-China relations.
Broadly speaking, there have been three phases in the evolution
of Sino-U.S. relations since the Chinese Communists took power
in 1949. The period between 1949 and 1972 was one of hostility
and confrontation that led to a bloody war in Korea, to crises
involving the United States over the offshore islands near China,
to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and to a polarization of Asia.
In this period there was little bipartisan cooperation on China
policy. The period between 1972 and 1989 was the most fruitful
in the history of Sino-U.S. relations since 1949. In that period
there was growing strategic and economic cooperation between the
United States and China based on a tacit bargain to uphold the
principle of one China, which has been upheld by six U.S. presidents
ever since. According to this bargain, the United States has dealt
officially with China while continuing unofficial economic, cultural,
and other relations with Taiwan. In that period, also, there was
a strong domestic consensus on U.S.-China relations, as reflected
in bipartisan cooperation in Congress. In contrast, in the period
since 1989, there has been no consensus or bipartisanship on U.S.-China
policy, and U.S.-China relations have drifted toward confrontation,
culminating in the spring of 1996 in the most dangerous military
crisis in the Taiwan Strait since 1958 and raising the specter
of a possible new cold war between the United States and China.
The contrast between those stages of U.S.-China relations underlines
how imperative it is for the executive and legislative branches
to work out a new consensus on policy toward China. The cost and
dangers of not doing so are great.
Military-Strategic and Proliferation
Issues
China has the largest military forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
Since the start of the 1980s, China has given priority to civilian
economic growth. In the 1990s, however, the Beijing regime has
begun to give increased attention to military modernization, which
has been facilitated by its successful economic growth. In the
decade ahead the Chinese government will continue to pursue military
modernization in a systematic but still gradual way. The Chinese
military establishment now commands increasingly serious attention
from the entire Asia-Pacific region. In the decades ahead China
will continue to increase its capabilities as a major, modem military
power, and future peace and stability in the entire Asia-Pacific
region will therefore depend fundamentally on the kinds of security
relationships that develop between China and the United States
and between China and other major powers in the region.
The present military-security relationship between the United
States and China falls far short of what the interests of both
countries demand. Both the United States and China are uncertain
about the objectives and policies of the other. They have lacked
regular military contacts. There is an urgent need now to establish
high-level dialogues between military leaders at many levels.
In these dialogues the achievement of greater transparency in
military matters--military doctrines, capabilities, policies,
and budgets--should be a major objective.
There is also a need for a broader military dialogue involving
China in existing multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN
Regional Forum and in discussions with all the major powers, especially
the United States and Japan. The United States should actively
develop regular high-level military exchanges with China and should
also encourage trilateral military dialogues involving the United
States, China, and Japan. Russia's strategic importance as a nuclear
power and its increasing arms sales to China make it necessary
to include the Russians in many regional dialogues. The long-range
aim of American policy in the Pacific should be to develop and
maintain a viable equilibrium among the major powers. To maintain
such an equilibrium, the United States must continue to have a
major military presence in the Asia-Pacific area, and it should
continue to maintain its bilateral alliances.
In their bilateral security dialogues, the United States and
China should seek to identify and to promote all of their common
security interests in the Pacific. The two countries share a special
interest in preventing the development of nuclear weapons and
in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. China
has so far played a positive role in helping the United States
obtain and maintain a nuclear-freeze agreement with North Korea,
and it is of great importance that U.S.-Chinese cooperation continue.
China also has played a cooperative role in ending the conflict
in Cambodia and in trying to stabilize the situation there. Although
China is now participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum, its cooperation
in this forum needs to be strengthened and broadened to enable
all the countries involved in the region to work toward cooperative
solutions of differences relating to disputed islands in the South
China Sea. One objective of the United States should be to continue
to draw China into full and cooperative participation in all nuclear
and missile nonproliferation regimes. Although it has not been
given much attention in the U.S. media, China in recent years
has taken significant steps in this direction. In 1992 it signed
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In 1994 it broadened its
1991 agreement to adhere to the guidelines of the Missile Technology
Control Regime, which restricts the sales of certain kinds of
missiles and missile technology. Recently the Chinese government
announced that after it completes one more nuclear test in 1996,
it will be prepared to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban,
now under negotiation in Geneva. And in 1996 the Chinese pledged
that in the future they will not provide nuclear technology to
"unsafeguarded nuclear facilities," that is, to facilities
not subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(this concession, among others, facilitated a Sino-U.S. agreement
on Chinese "ring magnet" sales to Pakistan and allowed
the United States to waive sanctions).
Nevertheless, there continue to be areas of disagreement between
the United States and China. One concerns China's probable past
sales of M-II missile technology to Pakistan. In June there were
press reports citing U.S. intelligence sources to the effect that
Pakistan was preparing to deploy Chinese-made M-II ballistic missiles,
which, if true, could require the U.S. government to impose sanctions
on China unless they are waived by the President.
Another issue concerns Chinese sales of technology for nuclear
energy plants and research reactors to Iran. Such sales are not
illegal because they are subject to IAEA inspection. Nevertheless,
the U.S. government is convinced that Iran has a nuclear weapons
program and that any nuclear related sales could contribute at
least indirectly to this weapons program, and therefore Washington
strongly opposes any such sales.
Differences on these two issues need to be addressed more effectively
in regular dialogues between the Chinese and American military
and political establishments. Beijing's leaders strongly assert
that China does not engage in nuclear or missile proliferation.
But the United States and China continue to disagree on specific
issues relating to nonproliferation. Several agreements between
the two countries, including the latest one on ring magnet sales
to Pakistan, indicate that China can make compromises involving
concessions if it is convinced that they serve mutual interests
in developing better overall relations. Because China has long
had a special security relationship with Pakistan based on mutual
concerns about India, however, the Chinese undoubtedly would be
reluctant to abandon that relationship completely. To resolve
the complex nuclear and missile problems in South Asia, the United
States should pursue broader discussions involving India, Pakistan,
and China.
All of these issues underscore the importance of developing effective
high-level military dialogues between the United States and China.
One possible step now is to arrange soon for a visit from the
Chinese minister of defense to the United States. A planned visit
was postponed twice during the past year and a half because of
the deterioration of U.S.-China relations. In the near future,
also, it would be desirable to explore the possibility of starting
regular continuing dialogues between the highest Chinese military
leader and the U.S. secretary of defense.
Economic Opportunities and Problems
During the past decade, China has been the most rapidly developing
major economy in the world, and its economic progress is likely
to continue in the period ahead. For almost two decades China
has undergone both rapid growth and economic reform. It has made
major progress in transforming its economy from a command to a
market economy. Sometime by the midtwenty-first century, China
could conceivably emerge as the largest economy in the world in
gross terms. Nevertheless, China still has serious economic weaknesses,
of which it is well aware. Although living standards have been
steadily rising, they are still relatively low in per capita and
comparative terms. China also faces major problems in dealing
with areas of poverty and in narrowing regional differences. China
still lags far behind the West in most areas of technology, and
it still faces great challenges reforming its inefficient state
enterprises, creating new fiscal and financial systems, controlling
inflation, coping with large flows of migrant labor, and dealing
with many other old and new problems facing a rapidly changing
economy and society.
In recent years China has emerged as a major participant in the
world economy. It is an increasingly important trading partner
for the United States, Japan, and Europe, and it is the largest
recipient of foreign direct investment in the developing world.
In the past five years U.S. trade with China has grown at a rate
of 25 percent annually, and U.S. foreign direct investment in
China has grown apace. Many large U.S. multinational companies
believe that their long-term viability depends on their being
major participants in China's economic development. For the United
States, China is currently its most rapidly growing export market
and a major source of imports for its consumer market. For China
the United States is its largest market (if China's large exports
to the United States via Hong Kong are included), an important
source of direct investment, and a major source of technology.
U.S. business leaders face a number of serious problems in their
economic relationships with China, but they have a large stake
in managing the problems. They are generally cautiously optimistic
about the future because of China's impressive growth rate and
the expectations that China's openness, transparency, deregulation,
and evolution under a rule of law will increase over time, as
has occurred in other Asian nations.
U.S. interests are increasingly linked to the nation's relationship
with China in a broader regional economy. The area that is commonly
called Greater China or the Chinese Economic Area (including China,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the city-state of Singapore) is emerging
as the most dynamic area of economic growth in the Asia-Pacific
region, which is the most dynamic area of growth in the world.
U.S. trade with the Asia-Pacific region has exceeded its trade
with Europe for the past decade or more. The continuation of economic
growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region will depend to
a significant extent on the success of China's economic development
and on the economic relationships between China and other Asia-Pacific
countries, including the United States.
The economic importance of China to U.S. interests is clear.
But building mutually beneficial economic relationships will depend
on the ability of both the United States and China to manage successfully
a variety of problems.
One major problem that has endangered U.S.-China economic cooperation
in recent years has been the annual effort in Congress to end
or impose conditions on normal trade relations (referred to as
most-favored-nation treatment). The possibility that the U.S.
government might not approve MFN or might impose conditions on
it has created serious uncertainties in U.S.-China economic relations
and, in fact, in overall U.S.-China relations because major changes
in the MFN treatment of China could threaten the basic framework
of U.S.-China relations. From the view of U.S. companies trying
to do business in China, uncertainty about U.S. policy on MFN
has increased concerns about risks in U.S.-PRC relationships and
created problems affecting U.S. competitiveness. That is why a
growing sector of the U.S. business community now believes that
China should be given permanent MFN and why Representative Lee
Hamilton recently said that Congress needs to consider "how
to end this corrosive annual exercise" and grant China the
same permanent MFN status that our other major trading partners
enjoy. (MFN refers to the normal, nondiscriminatory tariff treatment
that the United States provides to virtually all its trading partners--more
than one hundred fifty countries around the world.)
Granting permanent MFN to China would require changing or amending
the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act that mandates
that MFN not be permanent for nonmarket economics in countries
that do not allow free emigration. This amendment was specifically
aimed at the former Soviet Union and is a relic of the cold war.
It has little applicability to the realities of China today. It
should be given a decent burial.
Another step that would contribute to improving Sino-U.S. relations
is trying to resolve the current impasse over China's entry into
the World Trade Organization (WTO). This will not be easy. The
Chinese argue that they deserve entry because they participated
in the entire process of the Uruguay Round, signed the Final Act,
and made a commitment to fulfill the requirements of the WTO as
a "developing" nation. They charge that it is primarily
the Americans who are blocking their admission to that organization,
and they claim that there is growing European and Japanese support
for their admission. There is some validity to the Chinese arguments,
but they overlook the reasons for the U.S. reluctance to accept
China's entry as a "developing" nation, which also have
some validity.
The United States argues that China does not yet qualify for
WTO membership because its trade system is not sufficiently open
or transparent; it has sectoral policies affecting certain industries
such as automobiles that are too restrictive; it does not grant
sufficient market access in a number of service industries; and
so on. The United States says also that it has given China a "road
map" with directions for gradually meeting the entry requirements
of the WTO and expresses the hope that it can do so within a year
or two. The United States, however, also charges that China has
retreated since 1994, showing less willingness to meet some of
the WTO conditions, because it has come to realize that WTO membership
could do great harm to some of its state-supported industries,
which could lead to massive and destabilizing unemployment in
China. The Chinese concede that this is, in fact, a very large
concern.
The United States and China have real differences of interest
concerning WTO. But we believe that they should be resolved by
compromise and that it is in the interests of both countries to
bring China into the WTO as soon as possible. The United States
and China need to conduct detailed negotiations sector by sector
to reach an agreement on an appropriate schedule for China's entry
into the WTO. The United States should demonstrate more flexibility
in meeting legitimate Chinese concerns about the impact of WTO
membership on their domestic economy, especially on employment
and the viability of key industries. The United States should
also indicate to the Chinese that as the administration works
to resolve the problems blocking China's entry to the WTO, it
will also press Congress to grant China permanent MFN status.
(As things now stand, despite the fact that WTO rules provide
that each member country should grant permanent MFN to all other
members, the United States has told the Chinese that under current
U.S. law, even if China is admitted to the WTO, the United States
will not grant it permanent MFN because U.S. domestic law, embodied
in the Jackson-Vanik amendment, takes precedence over international
rules.)
The Chinese, on their part, need to demonstrate a greater willingness
to engage in serious negotiations and show more flexibility in
reaching agreement on the conditions for WTO accession. They must
recognize that China will have to compromise further, especially
by reducing obstacles to increased access to Chinese markets.
They should also recognize that they are unlikely to succeed in
gaining admittance to the WTO by exploiting divisions among the
United States, Europe, and Japan.
The issue of intellectual property rights has caused serious
strains in U.S.-China relations, but the United States withdrew
its threat to impose punitive sanctions against China in mid-June
of 1996 after U.S. negotiators said they had found firm evidence
that the Chinese government had really cracked down on movie,
music, and software piracy. Nevertheless, problems of implementing
agreements on intellectual property will doubtless recur; experience
in many other countries as well as China makes this clear. China's
recent efforts have been encouraging, leading some U.S., officials
to believe that as China's economy continues to grow and as China
develops its own software industry, a new domestic constituency
in China will be created that will see the protection of copyrighted
and patented goods to be in its own interest. When problems do
recur, it is important that China convincingly demonstrate that
it is genuinely committed to abide by existing agreements and
that the United States deal with disputes in ways that do not
endanger the overall relationship.
In the period ahead there will be many problems in U.S.-China
economic relations that will create strains, not least of which
will be the growing U.S. trade deficit with China. In dealing
with these problems, however, both countries must recognize that
their common interests require them to seek compromises.
The Human Rights Issue
The promotion of American values has been and should continue
to be an important part of American foreign policy, including
policy toward China. But Americans need to understand that (1)
it will take time for China to meet international standards on
human rights; (2) the United States must be realistic in determining
how best to promote our values and avoid actions that are likely
to be counterproductive; (3) promoting human rights in China is
only one of several important priorities of U.S. policy and at
times conflicts with other priorities; and (4) although China
continues to be ruled by an authoritarian one-party regime, the
reforms of the past eighteen years have produced significant advances
in certain of the most basic human rights (several hundred million
Chinese have been lifted out of poverty) and have led to the beginnings
of important political changes.
The conventional wisdom in the West has been that reform in China
has brought rapid economic growth and extensive changes in the
economic system but that there have been no significant political
changes. This view is oversimplified. Although it is true that
China's authoritarian one-party regime continues to suppress any
organization that aspires to develop into a political opposition
group, still represses dissident political activists, and still
commits many human rights abuses, there have been important political
changes in the past eighteen years in the direction of political
liberalization. Beijing has begun to build a legal and judicial
system. The National People's Congress and some congresses at
lower levels have begun publicly to debate policy issues that
affect ordinary citizens. A good deal of political authority has
been delegated to provincial, municipal, and local governments.
The devolution of authority to local levels of government has
been accompanied by steps to reduce the arbitrary power of local
party officials. There have been serious efforts to conduct village-level
elections, which are now increasingly open and fair.
Not only have most Chinese benefited from rising living standards
that have resulted from more than a decade and a half of economic
growth and reform, but as a result of the gradual loosening of
political controls, the vast majority of people in China now have
much greater personal freedom than they had in the past to make
choices about jobs, travel, ways of living, private interests,
and personal relationships. Many now choose to be detached from
politics, which was impossible in the Maoist era. Most Chinese
now have vastly greater access to information of many sorts; there
has been a spectacular communications revolution and an increasingly
widespread availability of televisions, fax machines, and personal
computers. Satellite dishes, which can receive CNN, are available
in most hotels and in many private homes all along the south China
coast. Tens of thousands of Chinese are now connected to the Internet.
It is true that China's present leaders have barely begun to
make the kinds of structural political changes needed to build
a genuinely representative system, with a free press, competitive
political organizations, and meaningful elections at the national
level. In fact, they still oppose such changes and may continue
to do so until China's economic and social development progresses
further. But some Chinese leaders clearly see the need for important
political changes in the future, and in recent years some have
favored cautious steps toward gradual political liberalization.
Virtually all Chinese leaders give the highest priority to the
need to preserve political stability and to prevent major social
and political disorder during China's difficult transitional period.
On the importance of political stability, a large number of reform-minded
intellectuals seem to agree. Nevertheless, many of the economic,
social, and political changes of recent years have been laying
the foundations for more far-reaching systemic political changes
in the future. The old Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology has eroded
to such an extent that it no longer shapes most national policies.
There has been a sweeping generational change of China's leadership,
which has brought to positions of authority at all levels a new
kind of younger, technocratic, pragmatic leadership. It is therefore
conceivable that there will be, perhaps even in the relatively
near future, an incremental process of political liberalization,
although even if this process occurs, it is not likely to lead
soon to Western-style democracy.
Given this background, how can the United States best promote
its own values in China? The lesson of the past seven years, since
the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, is that threatening or carrying
out sanctions or confronting China publicly and relentlessly on
the human rights issue produces few positive results and often
seems to be counterproductive. In fact, a case can be made that
U.S. policies on the human rights issue in China during recent
years have not only been ineffectual, but for the most part they
may well have strengthened Chinese hard-liners and Chinese nationalism
at many levels of society and prevented or delayed the resumption
of political dialogue at the highest levels. Yet such high-level
political dialogue is a necessary precondition for strengthening
communications and contacts at all levels of society, and it is
this process that may have the greatest long-term positive effect
on political liberalization in China.
Not only Chinese but also many other Asians have been critical
of the Clinton administration's use of pressures and threats to
try to compel other countries to meet human rights standards advocated
by the United States. In fact, at the annual UN conferences on
human rights in Vienna, it has been apparent that there is a deep
split between the U.S. views and those of most Asian representatives.
The majority of Asians have supported the Chinese on many issues,
even though many have been critical of abuses in China.
In developing a more effective and realistic policy to promote
human rights in China, the United States should keep in mind the
following guidelines: (1) the U.S. government should generally
rely on quiet diplomacy, as the United States has effectively
done in the past; (2) the administration and Congress should also
recognize that private, nonofficial efforts by American and international
institutions and organizations are often more effective in correcting
abuses in China than are highly visible and high-decibel official
U.S. government actions; the United States should encourage private
organizations' efforts to deal with human rights issues in constructive
ways; (3) the U.S. government should recognize that it is often
wiser to rely less on unilateral action and more on multilateral,
international efforts through the United Nations and other institutions
to bring the weight of international public opinion to bear on
human rights abuses, whether in China or elsewhere; (4) although
the United States should not hesitate to criticize human rights
abuses in China, it is important to recognize that a focus on
a few high-profile cases of dissidents may not always help them
and may actually weaken the cause of long-term political reform,
which is the primary requisite for building a legal framework
necessary to ensure the protection of human rights; (5) the United
States should place high priority on programs that will support
U.S.-China contacts, exchanges, and cooperation in fields relating
to legal and other kinds of institution building and to local
governance (some cooperative programs in these fields already
exist; many more are needed); and (6) for its part, Beijing's
leaders must recognize that for China to play an influential and
responsible role in the international community, the Chinese must
increase their understanding of other countries and must be prepared
to accommodate more fully and rapidly to international norms on
human rights. Efforts to improve human rights are now being pressed
worldwide, and China's policies must reflect its recognition of
this campaign.
The Taiwan Issue
The single most important and most difficult issue in U.S.-PRC
relations concerns Taiwan. The Taiwan crisis of 1995-1996 highlighted
dilemmas and dangers that, if not wisely managed, could create
dangerous threats to stability and peace in the entire Asia-Pacific
region. What is to be hoped for is that in the aftermath of the
1996 elections on Taiwan and the accompanying Chinese military
exercises in the Taiwan Strait, leaders in both Beijing and Taipei
will recognize potential dangers and seize present opportunities
to reduce them. The aim should be to work toward mutual accommodation
that will provide a basis for a new kind of political relationship
that will reassociate Taiwan with the mainland on terms acceptable
to both.
Not only should the United States give high priority to policies
that will strengthen cooperative relations with China, but it
must also recognize that its policies must encourage and facilitate
mutual accommodation between Taiwan and China. If future trends
do not lead toward compromise but instead lead toward Taiwan's
separation and independence, the result will almost certainly
be a new cold war in the region with a growing danger of major
military conflict between China and Taiwan, which could easily
involve the United States. Military conflict in the Taiwan Strait
could not only directly involve the United States, but it could
also destabilize the entire Asia-Pacific region.
Even though the Taiwan crisis of 1995-1996 involved military
shows of force rather than threats of war, it posed the most serious
danger of military clashes in the Taiwan Strait from accidents
or miscalculations since the late 1950s. This crisis was precipitated
by recent events, but its roots stretch far into the past. The
heart of the "Taiwan problem" can be stated fairly simply.
Leaders in the People's Republic of China remain firmly committed,
as they have been for several decades, to the short-term objective
of preventing Taiwan from achieving recognition as a separate
independent state, and they are prepared to use force if necessary
to block independence. They are also committed to the long-term
goal of reunifying Taiwan with the mainland by peaceful means
if possible but without renouncing the option of using force if
other means fail. Although a majority of nations, including the
United States, have accepted Beijing's position that there is
only "one China" (the PRC) and even though the United
States has "acknowledged" China's position that Taiwan
is part of China,¹ the government on Taiwan has continued
to enjoy de facto autonomy since the U.S. recognition of the PRC.
Taipei has succeeded over the years in maintaining quasi-official
relations with most nations. And in the past few years, Taiwan's
leaders have promoted a vigorous campaign aimed at upgrading the
regime's international status, increasing the official nature
of their foreign ties, and broadening representation in international
bodies--moves that Beijing has seen as directly challenging the
principle of one China and edging toward the independence of Taiwan.
In the 1980s Deng Xiaoping put forward a formula for political
reunification of both Hong Kong and Taiwan with the mainland:
"one country, two systems." In this formula, China promised
that for half a century after reunification, both Hong Kong and
Taiwan could maintain their existing economic and social systems
and enjoy a high degree of autonomy. In the case of Hong Kong,
this formula became the basis for long and difficult negotiations
leading to agreement between London and Beijing on a Basic Law
on which the Hong Kong government will operate after its unification
with China in 1997. In the case of Taiwan, Beijing promised that
after reunification Taiwan would enjoy even greater autonomy than
that promised to Hong Kong, including the right of Taiwan to maintain
its own armed forces.
Leaders on Taiwan were not attracted by the one-country, two-systems
formula and felt no necessity to accept it because Taiwan is separated
from the mainland by more than 100 miles of water and relies on
the U.S. security umbrella that it has carefully nurtured. Nevertheless,
Cross-Strait travel, communications, and economic ties began to
flourish in the 1980s. By 1995 total trade between Taiwan and
the mainland was estimated to have reached twenty-two billion
dollars annually, and Taiwanese contracted investments on the
mainland totaled almost twenty-nine billion dollars, of which
twelve billion dollars had been used. In 1993 a China-Taiwan political
dialogue began under the direction of new quasi-official organizations
established by both governments. Under this framework, four agreements
were signed on practical issues, and nine rounds of negotiations
at various levels took place between 1993 and 1995.
In early 1995, Jiang Zemin, Beijing's party general secretary
and president, tried to raise the level of political discourse
between China and Taiwan. In January he made an eight-point speech
on reunification that represented from Beijing's point of view
a major new conciliatory initiative toward Taiwan. Jiang expressed
a willingness to hold talks with "Taiwan's authorities"
on any subject as long as the premise was that there was only
one China. He also proposed negotiating an agreement that would
officially end the state of hostility between China and Taiwan,
and he suggested two-way visits of top leaders--in effect proposing
a summit meeting to discuss "state affairs." Taiwan's
leaders were not prepared, however, to begin broader political
talks with mainland leaders, and in his six-point speech in April,
responding to Jiang's proposals, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui
stated that a solution to the problem of reunification required
China to accept that two sovereign Chinese political entities
existed.
When China's leaders learned that Lee Teng-hui had been invited
to visit the United States in 1995, the news fueled their growing
concern about possible trends toward independence on Taiwan, and
they decided to make a major effort to prevent it. They warned
both the United States and Taiwan that if Lee made the trip, China
would react very strongly. Even though the trip was described
as "nonofficial," in Beijing's eyes it would have great
political significance, would be viewed as a serious violation
of the concept of one China, and would be seen as a breach of
the understanding that Beijing's leaders believed existed with
the United States that Washington would not permit visits by top
leaders from Taiwan.
China specialists within the executive branch concluded that
a Lee visit could result in another major setback in U.S.-China
relations. On September 27, 1994, Winston Lord, assistant secretary
for East Asia and Pacific affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that "We believe it would be a serious mistake
to derail this basic policy of several administrations by introducing
what China would undoubtedly perceive as officiality in our relations
with Taiwan. This is why the administration strongly opposes congressional
attempts to legislate visits of top leaders of the Republic of
China (on Taiwan) to the United States."
But within Congress there was almost unanimous support for giving
Lee a visa partly because of broad pro-Taipei and anti-Beijing
sentiment and partly because Taiwan mounted a large and effective
lobbying effort to build support for the visit. Initially President
Clinton accepted the recommendations against the visit made by
his top China specialists, and Secretary Christopher indicated
to Beijing's leaders that there would be no visit. Nevertheless,
responding to congressional pressure, the president ultimately
authorized the visit.
Lee Teng-hui's trip to Cornell was billed as "nonofficial,"
but he was accompanied by a large number of journalists, was warmly
welcomed by members of Congress, and made a highly political speech
(despite his pledge to U.S. officials not to do so). The Taiwan
media hailed the visit as a triumph, and Lee clearly regarded
it as a major milestone in Taiwan's campaign to raise its international
status.
Beijing then withdrew its ambassador from Washington and suspended
the Beijing-Taipei Cross-Strait talks. It also decided to draw
a line in the sand and to conduct major military exercises and
missile tests near Taiwan to demonstrate its determination to
halt trends that could lead toward Taiwan's independence. The
stage was set for a serious crisis, which unfolded in the months
between Lee's mid-1995 visit and the March 1996 presidential elections
on Taiwan.
In the military actions that China took following Lee Teng-hui's
visit to Cornell, Beijing's leaders had several objectives. Not
only were they determined to halt what they perceived to be Taiwan's
drift toward independence, but they were resolute in their efforts
to convince leaders in both Taipei and Washington that although
Beijing still hoped to work gradually toward eventual reunification
by peaceful means, Chinese leaders mean it when they say that
China is prepared to use military force if necessary to block
Taiwan's independence. They also wished to convince the United
States that any U.S. encouragement of efforts by Lee Teng-hui
to move toward independence will be strongly opposed by China
and to persuade Taiwan's leaders that it is time to begin a more
meaningful dialogue that can lead to political negotiations about
Taiwan's future relationship to China.
In its response to the crisis, the U.S. government was cautious
but forceful. Washington criticized China's military show of force,
but it also urged Taiwan as well as Beijing to exercise restraint.
The U.S. government reaffirmed its opposition to the use of force
to determine Taiwan's future; it reminded everyone of Washington's
obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide defensive
military equipment to Taiwan; and it dispatched two carrier task
forces to the Taiwan area to "monitor" the situation.
The Taiwan crisis of 1995-1996 demonstrated to Washington's foreign
policy establishment the gravity of the deterioration in relations
with China and the necessity of upholding a one-China policy.
Henry Kissinger, writing in The Washington Post of March 31, 1996,
undoubtedly reflected the views of many when he wrote that the
way out of the crisis requires (1) that Beijing sheathe its sword,
return to diplomacy, and show greater understanding of the values
that animate American conduct; (2) that Taiwan be given to understand
that American concern for a peaceful outcome does not extend to
reentering the Chinese civil war, either overtly or by subterfuge;
(3) that the United States should reaffirm the tacit bargain to
pursue a "genuine" one-China policy and that Beijing
should avoid using military pressure and threats; and (4) that
the United States must also now seriously encourage the resumption
of a Beijing-Taipei dialogue.
As of the summer of 1996, however, the prospect of an early resumption
of Cross-Strait dialogue, much less a real accommodation between
Beijing and Taipei, did not appear to be bright. In conversations
with our delegation, leaders in Beijing and Taipei took the position
that the other side was stalling and would have to make the first
move. One fundamental problem is the basic lack of mutual trust.
Beijing believes that Lee Teng-hui is set on a course of trying
to strengthen the basis for independence. Taipei believes that
Beijing is trying to isolate it internationally in an effort to
squeeze it politically.
For greater mutual trust to be built, Taiwan must work to convince
Beijing that its basic policy is not one of "creeping independence"
and that its endorsement of the principle of one China is not
simply a stratagem of giving lip service to the principle while
trying to build international support for Taiwan's independence.
Beijing must work to convince Taiwan that it will not insist on
any particular formula for reunification or any specific timetable
to achieve it, that it is willing to work to reach agreement on
a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's future that can later provide
the basis for a mutual renunciation of force, that it is genuinely
committed to granting Taiwan the high level of autonomy promised,
including Taiwan's right to maintain its own armed forces, and
that it is prepared to discuss in good faith how best to define
such autonomy in ways that can meet Taiwan's essential needs,
including Taiwan's desire for greater participation in international
institutions, while still upholding the principle of one China.
Beijing must also manage the reunification with Hong Kong in 1997
in a way that will not confirm Taiwan's fears.
This is a tall order. Probably the best that can be hoped for
in the near future is that each side will avoid taking actions
that the other regards as provocative, that both will show the
flexibility required to renew a serious political dialogue, and
that increased trade and economic relations will gradually improve
the long-term prospects for real political accommodation.
The United States should convincingly demonstrate its continuing
commitment to the one-China policy that has been endorsed by six
U.S. presidents. This policy has worked well for almost a quarter
of a century. It still provides a basis on which the United States
and China should be able to build a strong cooperative relationship,
and it has also made it possible for Taiwan to maintain nonofficial
foreign ties, to prosper economically, and to develop democratic
institutions. Taiwan has also been able to join international
institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, APEC, and the
Olympic Games with Beijing's acquiescence, and it is likely to
be able to broaden its international representation if Taipei-Beijing
relations improve.
Washington should now pursue a policy that encourages more explicitly
than it did in the past steps toward a political settlement of
Taiwan's future through dialogue and negotiations between Beijing
and Taiwan. The U.S. government has been right in its long-standing
position that the future of Taiwan can be settled only "by
the Chinese themselves." Any effort by the United States
to try to mediate between Beijing and Taipei would most likely
be counterproductive.
Washington should make clearer than it has to date that the United
States favors realistic efforts by Beijing and Taiwan to reach
a mutually acceptable political compromise. The United States
should try, to persuade Beijing's leaders that Chinese interests
will be best served by avoiding threats and showing greater flexibility
in its efforts to reach a political settlement with Taiwan. Washington
should work to persuade Taipei that Taiwan's future security will
depend fundamentally on the degree to which there can be peaceful
and cooperative relations between the United States and China
and between Taiwan and China as well as between the United States
and Taiwan. Taiwan's leaders should not expect--and Washington
should make clear to them that they cannot expect--that the U.S.
government will support or acquiesce in Taiwanese policies that
in its judgment could endanger stability in the region. The U.S.
government should continue to oppose Taipei's unrealistic campaign
for a UN seat. Under existing circumstances, it should also adhere
to the promise that Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff made
to Beijing that although future visits of leaders from Taiwan
to the United States cannot be excluded, they will be rare and
exceptional.
Implementing such policies will not be easy. Beijing will be
suspicious of many U.S. actions and may oppose some of them. Taipei
will oppose many of them, using its strong lobby in Washington
to try to influence U.S. policy. Many members of Congress will
probably continue to oppose or at least have reservations about
such policies. But unless the president and his foreign policy
team are willing, despite inevitable opposition at home and abroad,
to define and carry out a forward-looking strategy that will promote
long-term U.S. interests in maintaining important relationships
with both China and Taiwan, it is likely that difference over
Taiwan will continue to pose serious dangers. These could lead
to future crises in the Taiwan Strait--crises that would be extremely
damaging to U.S. interests in China and in the entire Asia-Pacific
region.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
To sum up: The United States and China share major interests
that will be of vital importance to the future of both countries
and to peace, stability, and prosperity in the entire Asia-Pacific
region. These two powers also have conflicting interests and confront
some serious problems that not only complicate their bilateral
relations but, if mishandled, might lead to confrontation or conflict
that could threaten the stability of the entire region.
It is imperative that the United States and China establish effective
working relations and strive to prevent conflicts, minimize tensions,
broaden strategic and economic ties, narrow differences, and build
mutually beneficial cooperative relations.
During the past seven years, instead of making progress in this
direction, U.S.-China relations have deteriorated. There has been
minimal political dialogue between the top leaders of the two
countries, and they have been enmeshed in acrimonious tensions
and conflicts over a wide range of issues, including nonproliferation
problems, trade disputes, human rights controversies, and unresolved
issues relating to Taiwan. Concern about U.S.-China relations
reached a high point in early 1996 when China, believing that
Taiwan was increasing its efforts to move toward independence
and that U.S. policy toward Taiwan raised doubts about Washington's
commitment to "one China," used missiles to make a major
show of military force--the first in thirty-eight years--to dramatize
Beijing's long-standing determination to prevent Taiwan's independence
and preserve one China. In the atmosphere of mutual mistrust that
had developed between China and the United States since the late
1980s, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 underlined the potential
dangers of deteriorating relations.
The United States has lacked many of the most important prerequisites
for an effective China policy throughout the last seven years,
including presidential leadership. After Tiananmen, President
Bush was unable to exercise leadership because of the general
climate in the United States of antipathy toward China. President
Clinton, since taking office in 1993, has not given priority to
China policy. This lack of presidential leadership has been one
critical factor explaining the absence of strategic vision and
clear objectives and priorities that has made U.S.-China policy
incoherent, fragmented, and ineffective. Since Tiananmen also,
there has been a large gulf between Congress and the administration,
which has made coherent policy toward China virtually impossible.
In May 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher made the first
major speech on China by any top administration leader since the
start of President Clinton's term. Christopher called for regular
summit meetings and periodic cabinet-level consultations. The
response of Beijing's leaders was positive but restrained. They
indicated that they wished to wait and see what concrete U.S.
policies the speech portended. To date, there has been relatively
little elaboration by President Clinton or others.
In both Washington and Beijing, the conventional wisdom is that
it is unlikely that any major dramatic U.S. initiative in policy
toward China can realistically be expected until after the U.S.
presidential election in November. But there is an undisputed
view in both capitals that the period immediately following the
election will be critically important for the future of U.S.-China
relations.
In this interim period, it is essential, albeit difficult, for
major efforts to be made to lay a sound basis for implementing
a more effective U.S. policy toward China beginning in early 1997
at the latest. If the U.S. government, under whoever is president,
is not able by early 1997 to begin to take major steps toward
halting the steady deterioration of U.S.-China relations, the
danger will be not only that this important relationship will
continue to deteriorate but that there could be a series of recurrent
crises over nonproliferation, trade, and human rights and a growing
danger of a major military crisis over the unresolved dilemmas
relating to Taiwan's future.
In light of these potential dangers, the members of the National
Committee on American Foreign Policy who met with key leaders
in China and Taiwan in June 1996 recommend the following.
- The U.S. president, his foreign policy team, and his administration
as a whole must give priority to the establishment of a coherent,
long-range strategic framework for dealing with China. They
must make clear to Congress and the American public the importance
to U.S. interests of relations with China and convince them
that the U.S. government has a sound strategy for managing this
complex and difficult relationship with China and Taiwan. The
president must identify and articulate what the common U.S.
and Chinese national interests are and how we can promote them.
He must also clarify the issues on which the United States and
China disagree and how we propose to resolve or manage them.
- As soon as possible, the two countries should start regular
summit- and cabinet-level dialogues based on realistic agendas.
- The president should strengthen his foreign policy team that
deals with China and use more effectively the experienced professionals
available to him.
- The president must mobilize support within the Senate and
the House of Representatives to convince Congress of the vital
importance of restoring a bipartisan U.S. policy toward China.
Unless the present gulf between the administration and Congress
is bridged, developing a coherent China policy will be virtually
impossible.
- A major effort must be made to define the interests shared
by the United States and China and determine how to strengthen
them and to identify the problems and disagreements between
the United States and China and determine how to manage or resolve
them.
- The United States must relate its China policy to its overall
policy in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. policy toward China
cannot be effective unless it gains the support of America's
friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region. The long-term
aim of U.S. policy in the Pacific should be to establish and
maintain a strategic equilibrium among the major power centers
and to ensure continued dynamic economic growth.
- Finally, we make the following recommendations on some of
the specific issues facing the two countries.
Military-Strategic Issues and Nonproliferation
There should be a regular strategic dialogue between the top
political and military leaders of each country in which they (a)
articulate their views on the nature of the postcold-war era and
identify the common interests of the United States and China in
working to promote peace, stability, and prosperity; (b) identify
the major trouble spots in the world generally and in Asia in
particular and strive for consensus on how the two countries can
realistically deal with these problems; and (c) discuss and attempt
to expand cooperation on specific military security issues such
as how to strengthen the nuclear and missile nonproliferation
regimes; how to increase military transparency on issues such
as budgets, doctrines, force planning, and arms sales; how to
strengthen mutual confidence among the major Asia-Pacific powers
in order to avoid a new arms race; how to strengthen Asia-Pacific
regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum in order
to deal with regional security issues; and how to resolve peacefully
the potential conflicts over such issues as territorial disputes
in the South China Sea, the future of the Korean Peninsula, and--most
important--the future relationship between the People's Republic
of China and Taiwan.
Economic Issues
The U.S. government should work to give to China permanent MFN
status, the normal, nondiscriminatory tariff treatment that the
United States provides to virtually all of its trading partners.
A major effort should be made to resolve the current impasse over
China's entry into the World Trade Organization through detailed
negotiations between the United States and China with the aim
of achieving an agreement as soon as possible on an appropriate
schedule for China's entry into the WTO.
Human Rights
The United States should develop a more effective and realistic
policy to promote human rights in China: (a) the U.S. government
should generally rely on quiet diplomacy; (b) the U.S. administration
and Congress should recognize that private, nonofficial efforts
by American and international organizations are generally more
effective in correcting abuses than highly visible U.S. government
actions; (c) the U.S. government should recognize that it is often
wiser to rely less on unilateral action on human rights issues
and more on multilateral efforts through the United Nations and
other institutions; (d) it is important to recognize that a focus
on a few high-profile cases of dissidents may not always help
them and may actually weaken the cause of long-term political
reform, which is the primary requisite for building a legal framework
necessary to ensure the protection of human rights; and (e) the
United States should place a high priority on programs that will
support U.S.-China contacts, exchanges, and cooperation in fields
relating to legal and other kinds of institution building and
to local governance.
Taiwan
The United States must pursue a meaningful and genuine one-China
policy consistent with the three joint communiqués that
it signed with China in 1972, 1979, and 1982. The issues relating
to Taiwan's future have reemerged as the most dangerous possible
causes of military conflict in East Asia, and they must be resolved
peacefully. The United States must play a more active role in
encouraging both China and Taiwan to renew political dialogue
and eventually reach a political accommodation. To China, the
United States must emphasize the need for a commitment to a peaceful
resolution and the importance of a harmonious Hong Kong transition
as opportunities to demonstrate the viability of a two-systems
approach and as a step toward long-term reunification. To Taiwan,
the United States must emphasize the risks of separatist trends,
the importance of continuing to adhere to the one-China formula,
and the urgency of renewing the Cross-Strait dialogue.
Note
- In the joint communiqué shifting diplomatic relations
to the PRC in 1979, the United States recognized "the Government
of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government
of China." The United States also acknowledged "the
Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part
of China." As Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord
said in a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on September 27, 1994, these formulations were repeated in the
1982 communiqué with China and have been reaffirmed by
each successive U.S. administration since then.
