Russia and Central Asia
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA: DIFFERING
INTERESTS AND PERSPECTIVES
Summary of a Roundtable Held in New York City with Policy Recommendations
by the NCAFP
Cosponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy
and Dwight D. Eisenhower
National Security Series
January 9–10, 2006
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Contents
FOREWORD
The National Committee on American Foreign Policy
(NCAFP) initiated a Project on Central Asia after 9/11 to focus
on U.S., Russian, and Chinese interests in the five former Soviet
Republics of Central Asia and on the common interests of those parties
and others in the region. Notwithstanding important differences
among them but mindful of the political, economic, and military
significance of Kazakhstan to the region, the NCAFP decided to make
that country the initial focus of its inquiry and analysis.
Of the five Central Asian “stans,” Kazakhstan
has experienced a moderate form of Islam, is least infected by militant
Islamic fundamentalism, is largely pro-American, has a highly educated
and technically proficient elite, and has a form of government that
is gradually taking steps toward political reform. Moreover, Kazakhstan
is rich in energy and mineral resources that have transformed it
into a geostrategic playground for its huge neighbors, China and
Russia. In short, Kazakhstan’s significance dictates that the
United States be engaged in encourag-ing the development of a middle
class, as well as democratic forces in the coun-try, and in exploring
ways and means in which the countries of the region can cooperate
in the struggle against militant Islamic fundamentalism.
As early as February 2002, the NCAFP’s bimonthly
journal, American Foreign Policy Interests, featured articles on
Central Asia such as Professor Michael Rywkin’s “Central
Asia in the Forefront of Attention,” followed by Kazakhstan’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs H. E. Kasymzhomart Tokaev’s “From
Renouncing Nuclear Weapons to Building Democracy” (April 2004).
In March 2005, the National Committee hosted a conference in New
York on “Stability in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan.”
The conference was immediately followed by a briefing session with
U.S. government officials and other Central Asian experts in Washington,
D.C. At the invitation of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Tokaev,
the NCAFP sent a five-member fact-finding delegation to Kazakhstan
in April. On its return, the delegation attended debriefing sessions
with U.S. governmental officials. The sessions, in turn, were followed
by the publication in May 2005 of “Stability in Central Asia:
Engaging Kazakhstan. A Report (with Policy Recommendations) on U.S.
Interests in Central Asia and U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations.” (It
was subsequently translated into Russian.) Policy recommenda-tions
include provisions that the United States be “sensitive to
the fragility of Kazakhstan’s geopolitical position”;
that the United States “emphasize that American interests in
Kazakhstan are not limited to oil, security, and counterter-rorism”;
that the United States promote “democratic values,” including
adherence to the rule of law and the “observance of human rights.”
In October 2005, NCAFP Senior Vice President Donald
S. Rice represented the NCAFP at a conference in Washington, D.C.,
on “The Challenges of Kazakhstan: Regional and Global Impact.”
It was cosponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in cooperation
with the American Chamber of Commerce in Kazakhstan. Mr. Rice was
a presenter on the panel “Kazakhstan’s Strategic Involvement
in the Fight Against Terrorism, Global Threats, and Maintaining
Global Stability.”
On January 10, 2006, the NCAFP hosted with the Dwight
D. Eisenhower National Security Series the daylong, not-for-attribution
roundtable that is the subject of this summary (with policy recommendations)
titled “Stability and Security in Central Asia: Differing Interests
and Perspectives” for a number of experts, academics, and military
officers who are interested and involved in U.S. foreign and security
policy in the Central Asian arena. Following the roundtable, the
National Committee hosted a discussion of the same subject at the
annual meeting of its members and guests.
The policy recommendations in this summary are exclusively
those of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.
Special thanks to Dr. Michael Rywkin, the NCAFP’s
project director for Russia and Central Asia, who is the author
of this summary, and to NCAFP Senior Vice President Donald S. Rice,
Esq., NCAFP Treasurer Richard R. Howe, Esq., Dr. Peter J. Sinnott,
Ambassador Peter Tomsen, NCAFP Executive Vice President William
M. Rudolf, and NCAFP Trustee Ambassador Leon J. Weil, who have pro-vided
invaluable support. The NCAFP Central Asia Project has also enjoyed
the support of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series,
the Shelby Cullom Davis Foundation, and Mutual of America.
George D. Schwab, President National Committee on
American Foreign Policy
INTRODUCTION
U.S. relations with countries in Central Asia were
fundamentally affected by the attacks launched on the United States
on September 11, 2001. To support U.S. operations in Afghanistan,
the U.S. military negotiated significant access—over-flight
and air base arrangements—with Central Asian governments that
initially produced a sense of common purpose and goodwill, generating
concern in Russia and China. In 2005, events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
resulted in an unravel-ing of some of those arrangements and an
expansion of Russian and Chinese influence in the region. In light
of those developments and the strategic impor-tance of Central Asia
in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives, the National Committee
on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) cosponsored a one-day confer-ence
titled “Security and Stability in Central Asia: Differing Interests
and Perspectives” with the U.S. Army’s Dwight D. Eisenhower
National Security Series (ENSS).
The all-day program included nine presentations: “In
Search of Internal Stability and Development—Opening the New
‘Silk Road’ (Pipelines, Roads, Railroads, etc.),”
by Professor Peter J. Sinnott, director, Caspian Sea Project, Columbia
University; “What Happens After the Current Postindependence
Phase: Succession Problems, Balance, and Speed of Economic and Political
Reform, etc.,” by Professor Steven Sabol, University of North
Carolina at Charlotte; “Facing Militant Islamic Fundamentalism,”
by Zeyno Baran, director, International Security and Energy Program,
the Nixon Center; “Democratization at Variable Speeds,”
by H.E. Zamira Sydykova, ambassador from the Republic of Kyrgyzstan
to the United States; “Geopolitical Perspectives from Competing
Points of View”—“Central Asian Perspective,”
Dr. Murat Laumulin, deputy director, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic
Studies; “Russian Perspective,” Professor Vitaly Naumkin,
president, International Center for Strategic and Political Studies,
and director, Center for Arab Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies
of the Russian Academy of Sciences; “Chinese Perspective,”
Professor Elizabeth Wishnick, Montclair State University and research
associate, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University;
“Muslim Countries Perspective,” Zeyno Baran, director,
International Security and Energy Program, the Nixon Center; and
“U.S. Perspective,” Professor Gregory Gleason, University
of New Mexico. H.E. Yerzhan Kazykhanov, ambassador and permanent
representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations,
offered a brief commentary following the four morning presentations
under the title of “In Search of Internal Stability and Development”
and opened the discussion among the presenters and the ENSS participants.
In the absence of Matthew Bryza, deputy assistant secretary of state
for European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, who
had to cancel at the last minute to attend the inauguration of President
Nursultan Nazarbayev on January 11, 2006 in Almaty, Kazakhstan,
John G. Fox, director, Office of Caucasus and Central Asian Affairs,
U.S. Department of State, delivered a luncheon address on U.S. foreign
policy in the region.
The ENSS participants included Colonel Daniel G. Groeschen
(U.S. Air Force), chief, Central Asia South Asia Branch, HQ USCENTCOM,
Security Cooperation Division; Colonel Daniel M. Klippstein (U.S.
Army), division chief, Strategy, Doctrine, and Concepts Division,
HQ Department of the Army, Office of the G35 (Directorate of Strategy,
Policy, and Planning); Major Harry J. Lane (U.S. Air Force), country
director, Kyrgyz Republic, Security Cooperation Division, Plans,
and Policy Directorate (CCJ5-5C), United States Central Command;
Lieutenant Colonel Robin Phillips (U.S. Army), Northeast Asia desk
officer, Joint Staff J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate);
Major John E. Prior (U.S. Army), ENSS program manager; Lieutenant
Colonel James Ruf (U.S. Army), response development officer for
the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stability (S/CRS); and Colonel Michael D. Soule (U.S. Army),
J-5, branch chief, Central Asia South Asia (CASA).
This summary reports the views, perspectives, and
discussions that were developed at the conference and concludes
with a set of NCAFP policy recommendations.
IN SEARCH OF STABILITY AND
DEVELOPMENT
The conference devoted a great deal of time to the
current situation in Central Asia. The year 2005 was troublesome.
Reforms were slowed, sometimes reversed, and the vast majority of
the population experienced little improvements in living standards.
Nostalgia for the stability of Soviet times, for what the West regards
as a failed experiment, is on the rise. A series of internal developments
shook the area, bringing about political shifts and international
realignments. The four major events in the region were the ouster
of President Akayev in Kyrgyzstan— often called the Tulip Revolution—the
Andijon riots in Uzbekistan, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) meeting in Astana, the new capital of Kazakhstan, and the
presidential elections in Kazakhstan.
Popular discontent in Kyrgyzstan, though short of
revolution, ended in the ouster of President Askar Akayev, spreading
fear that regime change would come elsewhere in the region following
the example of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan was
shaken by popular riots in Andijon (in the Uzbek part of the overpopulated
and impoverished valley of Ferghana). They were harshly suppressed
by government forces. The regime of Uzbek President Islam Karimov,
stunned by international condemnations, reversed its international
alliances. Karimov put aside his distrust of Russia and sought refuge
with Moscow and Beijing, the first indifferent and the second hostile
to human rights causes. Karimov’s move was welcomed in both
capitals. Seizing the opportunity presented by the continued American
preoccupation with Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia and China joined
together to try to eliminate the post-2001 American presence in
the area. In order to lure Islam Karimov away from Washington, Moscow
conveniently overlooked the poor treatment of the Russian ethnic
minority in Uzbekistan. A grateful Karimov not only closed the American
military base at Khanabad but also allowed a Russian military presence
(something Uzbekistan had refused since gaining independence) and
adopted a militant anti-American stand in the international arena.
Only a last-minute effort by Washington, reinforced by the expectation
of financial rewards, saved the large American military base located
in Manas, Kyrgyzstan.
Kazakhstan, uncomfortable with the American role in
all the “color revolutions” in the former Soviet republics,
tilted slightly in favor of Russia and China. First, it reinforced
its participation in the SCO and then it allowed China to extend
to the Caspian Sea oil-producing area its oil pipeline linking Sinkiang
Province to less productive oil fields east of the Caspian Sea.
Furthermore, Washington’s reaction, reflecting hope that President
Nazarbayev would show enough confidence in his own popularity and
prospects for reelection to aim for less than the 91percent of the
votes that he received in the presidential election of December
2005, was prudent and did not affect mutual relations. Kazakhstan
maintained its policy of achieving an overall balance between great
power interests by maintaining its cooperation with the United States
in the field of Caspian Sea security and normalizing relations with
the new leaders in Kyrgyzstan by offering financial assistance.
The U.S. preoccupation with operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq and its inability to redirect its attention to Central
Asia offer opportunities to Moscow and Beijing to capitalize on
the situation and pursue their efforts to eliminate the U.S. military
presence in the region and limit American oil interests there as
well. Meanwhile Washington’s predicament of finding the right
balance between defending human rights and pursuing its own strategic
interests in the area will remain a source of preoccupation for
the competing powers in the region.
In general, the conference presenters emphasized that
most Central Asians remain passive actors in the political sphere;
they are more concerned with the daily necessities of life. There
is “reform fatigue” in all of the republics, even without
much reform. The “shadow” economy is still very active—in
much the same way that it helped people throughout the former Soviet
Union to survive the 1990s. Skepticism greets the rhetoric emanating
from the West or from the regimes themselves. Many people don’t
believe that any opposition party or individual has the answers.
The opposition in each republic, whether it is open,
as in Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, or clandestine, as in Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, or reduced to one party, as in Tajikistan, is
unified by one overriding issue—the replacement of the president.
Some standard promises are voiced by all opposition groups: the
elimination of corruption, fair and timely wages, better housing,
education, and health care. But unity of action is difficult to
achieve. Who can say that if an opposition leader were elected president,
he or she would be able or willing to relinquish the authority vested
in the presidency?
Some presenters were more positive than others about
progress in Central Asia, pointing out that after 15 years of independence
a lot has been achieved despite many obstacles. Central Asian states
have strengthened their independence and created their own state
institutions, working financial systems, currencies, military and
security institutions, political partnerships, legal systems, and
other institutions. Also positive is the fact that the states of
Central Asia have remained much more peaceful than many had predicted.
The likelihood of violent conflict is still very low. There has
been only one exception, the civil war in Tajikistan. But it was
terminated, and the peace agreement signed between the conflicting
parties was based on a power-sharing scheme in accordance with which
the mostly moderate Islamic opposition was incorporated into political
life. There was, however, a disagreement at the conference about
the reality of power-sharing in Tajikistan.
On the negative side, the Central Asian states are
said to be building their state-hood on the basis of priorities
that can lead to contradictions among different ethnic groups. Also,
a return to tradition, especially in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
has led to a serious decline in education accelerated by the brain
drain caused by the emigration of a large number of educated Russians
and Germans. Social transformations are no longer influenced by
the activity of the state but by its inactivity. The result has
been another wave of migrations, this time by local nationalities
going to Kazakhstan, Russia, and elsewhere for permanent or seasonal
work and a growing sense that the lot of most people cannot be improved,
especially in rural areas. Islamists have been quick to build on
the situation. Moreover, the use of oil revenues leaves a lot of
question marks. Many people in Central Asia share the view of a
former Venezuelan minister of oil who said that oil is the “devil’s
excrement.” It is feared that as the gap between the elites
and the general population increases, more grievances will be felt
and expressed by a majority of the people.
Another threat to development comes from clan relations
and patronage networks that are either based on kinship or territory.
They are very powerful and incompatible with modernization and the
democratization process. Whatever happens in the future in any of
these states, clan relations will remain the real basis of power
for successors of the existing presidents.
Finally, relations among Central Asian states remain
problematic. Eurasian integration, initially advocated by Kazakhstan’s
President Nazarbayev and subsequently endorsed by Russia’s
President Putin, is a concept on paper only. Visas are needed in
order to cross borders. Part of the Uzbek-Tajik border is mined.
Most people do not like this situation, which is one of the reasons
why some Central Asians support the idea of a world Islamic caliphate
that would not only open all borders among Muslim lands but would
also replace the need for nation-states.
RECENT EVENTS—BY
REPUBLICS
Kazakhstan Elections
During the discussion of the recent presidential election
in Kazakhstan, it was pointed out that although the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union
(EU) had characterized the election as “failing short of international
standards,” they evidently judged it to be an improvement over
previous elections, which they described as “falling far short.”
It was said that the West must embrace “countries making good
faith efforts to hold free and fair elections.” Others maintained
that Western media had documented numerous abuses of power and human
rights’ violations as well as press and media restrictions
in the months preceding the elections, and so one cannot simply
excuse everything because “autocratic rulers have governed
the lands of Central Asia throughout history.” Another comment
was made that as elections come to pass, the electoral process will
no longer be considered a singular event. In other words, it is
expected that the political process will become active, engaged,
and not ephemeral as it is extended beyond the brief electoral season.
Turkmenistan Succession Problems
According to the presenters, Turkmenistan continues
to be the most problematic state in the region. No reform has occurred,
and the regime has stunted all prospects for civil dialogue, the
development of civil society, and economic disengagement from centralized,
monopolistic control. The chief concern is that the continued absence
of social institution building could paralyze an already stagnant,
or moribund, economic situation. Turkmenistan has been consistently
cited as one of the worst governed former Soviet republics. The
potential for regime change may be near if speculation regarding
President Niyazov’s (Turkmenbashi’s) poor health is to
be believed. That, however, might be more destabilizing for the
region than mere regime change. A power vacuum could lead to competition
by neighboring states and great powers over the country’s hydrocarbon
reserves. Intervening in the transition from President Niyazov to
his successor might be more of a seduction than the republic’s
neighbors can resist. Conceivably Russia, Uzbekistan, and Iran could
become involved in the realignment of Turkmenistan both internally
and externally, and Kazakhstan might feel compelled to join the
fray.
Tajikistan’s Slow Recovery
Tajikistan was judged to be experiencing a difficult
recovery from the civil war. Indeed it can be maintained that the
situation has degenerated inasmuch as President Rakhmonov appears
intent on strengthening his grip on political power. Human rights
organizations cite examples of politically motivated arrests, the
curtailment of media independence, and minor protests that some
fear may escalate. The economic picture is dismal and the prospects
are dim given widespread corruption and reports of heavy crossborder
drug smuggling from Afghanistan. According to a relatively optimistic
view, there are more than 600 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and some independent mass media in the country, and the government
is building its policies on a multilateral basis. Mr. Rakhmonov,
who was considered a weak candidate for president, has proved to
be a successful leader and has managed to attract the support of
many internal and external actors. Russian border guards were replaced
by Tajiks last year. Other participants saw negative aspects. A
new Russian base is being constructed almost as close to the capital
as the one it is replacing. Drug seizures were down in 2005; for
example, Russian troops scarcely interdicted anything in the first
half of the year. In contrast, Tajik troops had substantial success,
but large parts of the border with Afghanistan remain barely patrolled.
The United Nations assists Tajikistan in combating drug traffic,
but money still comes from the transit of drugs from Afghanistan.
Kyrgyzstan’s “Color
Revolution”
The conference heard a description of the “color
revolution” in Kyrgyzstan, which took place in March 2005.
It followed sustained demonstrations through-out the country after
the February 2005 elections because it had become clear that President
Akayev was going to impose a referendum to extend his term in office.
Spurred by an independent media attacking corruption, nepotism,
and mismanagement, popular demonstrations undermined the regime,
which began to falter. By the morning of March 24 the regime collapsed,
and President Akayev was compelled to flee. Some participants warned,
however, that the ouster of the president should not be greeted
with much optimism. It has had little positive effect on the economy.
Some of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors are still uneasy about alleged
U.S. involvement. The new leaders, many previously associated with
the fallen regime, are confronting dire economic conditions and
have had little time in which to improve the situation.
Uzbek-American Split
Uzbekistan’s turnabout and tilt back toward Russia
in 2005 were widely discussed. It was argued that in view of his
Soviet communist background, President Karimov knew only how to
oppress all opposition movements, whether democratic or Islamist.
His oppressiveness has given legitimacy to the Islamists, who label
as illegitimate all the Central Asian regimes. According to the
West and human rights groups, the harsh responses by the Karimov
regime were solely to blame for Andijon. Other than voicing clichés
such as “you need to open up; you need democratic reforms,”
the West did not give help to Uzbekistan, much less offer guidance
about how to undertake constructive change in a way that would not
be advantageous to the Islamists. It was noted that the Algerian
coup d’état was accepted by the international community
despite the fact that it nullified election results. Moreover, it
is not only recognized by the West but by many in Central Asia as
well that economic development is a precondition for the development
of democracy, and it is deficient in many states of Central Asia.
In analyzing developments in the Uzbek-U.S. relationship,
it was noted that President Karimov thought that 9/11 would help
Americans to realize what he was facing. Despite President Putin’s
personal efforts to try to stop him, Karimov signed a strategic
partnership agreement with the United States, thinking he was in
the same boat with the Americans who would be sympathetic to his
oppressive measures or at least look the other way when they were
imposed. The situation changed in Andijon on the afternoon of May
13, 2005, when Uzbek troops suddenly fired on a crowd of at least
5,000. The crowd, largely composed of women and children, contained
armed Islamic militants who, the night before, had taken over a
prison and attacked a nearby military barracks. Eyewitness accounts
described the killing of many hundreds as the troops fired indiscriminately
and the armed militants’ seized government hostages to shield
themselves from the fire. The regime’s failure to conduct an
investigation led Western powers and international organizations
to demand an international investigation, which the Karimov regime
continues to reject. It was not only Karimov who panicked. People
around him told him that this was a terrorist uprising, and Russian
senior government officials, just before Andijon and immediately
afterward, claimed that they had clear evidence that some of the
rioters were hard-core terrorists from Afghanistan. This assertion
was part of the Russian intelligence and security services’
efforts to turn Karimov against the United States. Many people in
Uzbekistan, whether in government or in opposition, have said they
believe that Americans were behind the riots in Andijon.
The Andijon context enabled SCO to take full advantage
of the situation. Chinese and Russian leaders have clearly identified
three evils—extremism, radicalism, and separatism—that
concern all Central Asian nations. There is a sense that no one,
including the United States, Europe, or even NATO, can give them
the kind of support that Moscow and Beijing offer. In dealing with
terrorism/Islamic fundamentalism, many Central Asians do not think
they can get any real help from the United States despite the fact
that U.S. forces not only toppled the Taliban but also killed “Jumaboi,”
the military leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Karimov’s
greatest threat. U.S. policy, as defined by President Bush in his
second inaugural address, maintains that there cannot be stability
without legitimacy and legitimacy comes only from democracy. It
is a great slogan, but it just does not reflect what is going on
in the region now.
The view was expressed that the situation will get
worse in Central Asia over the next three to five years. Chinese,
Russians, and Uzbek officials saw Andijon from the same angle, whereas
the United States did not. The Chinese and the Russians, worried
about potential Islamist uprisings, are giving support to President
Karimov. When he left the meeting where he and President Putin signed
a strategic agreement, President Karimov said that the relationship
was not only strategic but union as well—a code word for Soviet-Union-style
relationships. Though it was an exaggeration, it contained a message:
Uzbekistan is returning to a military partnership with Russia that
many thought would not be possible.
IMPORTED ISLAM
A broad discussion took place about the problem of
Islamist inroads into Central Asia and especially into Uzbekistan.
Attention was drawn to the fact that radical Islam was first exported
to Afghanistan from Pakistan’s northwest frontier after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When Central Asia opened up in the
late 1980s–early 1990s, a lot of people wanted to learn about
Islam from imams and mullahs who flocked to the area, supported
by Saudi Arabia, Iran, other countries in the Gulf, and even Turkey.
Uzbekistan became the key country because of its population, location,
and strong Islamic traditions. It was also brought to the attention
of the participants that the bulk of Wahhabi imams who went to Uzbekistan
in the late 1980s and 1990s were from a large Uzbek community in
Saudi Arabia. They were descendents of tsarist-time émigrés
or of former Basmachis (equivalent to contemporary Afghan mujaheddin)
who took up arms against the Soviet regime after the October revolution
until their defeat in the 1920s. They are said to number between
200,000 and 400,000.
Initially Karimov and almost everyone else in Uzbekistan
and elsewhere in the region did not understand what kind of Islam
was coming to Central Asia—an Islam of a different color. Under
Soviet rule the elites largely forgot about their own traditions,
their own cultures, their own mixtures of Turkic and Central Asian
traditions. Central Asian Islam, containing a lot of Sufism, was
more spiritual that than of the Middle East. The kind of Islam that
was beginning to engulf Central Asia was very much the Saudi Arabian
Wahhabi version—very strict, very anti-Semitic, anti-American,
and politicized. A recent attempt to counterbalance it by introducing
moderate Islamic schooling with a modern curriculum in neighboring
Tajikistan, financed by the Agha Khan Foundation, has been hampered
by the Ismaili origin of the funds. The Ismailis are viewed as Shiia
by the Sunni of Central Asia.
The conference gave special attention to a group called
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a transnational radical Islamist organization. Its
stated objective is to overthrow the exist-ing world order and replace
it with a kind of Islamic caliphate that does not have much similarity
to the historic caliphate that disappeared with the fall of Ottoman
Turkey during World War I. It is viciously anti-Semitic and anti-American.
It was formed in the 1950s in the Middle East and subsequently became
a global organization. Since the war in Iraq, it has gotten even
stronger: Its messages are finding more resonance among disaffected
Muslims throughout the world. It is even growing in NewYork and
in other parts of the United States. This organization is headquartered
in London where it has been taking advantage of liberal attitudes
toward freedom of speech and religion. It has been doing considerable
damage to the reputation of European Muslims and is responsible
for directing a lot of prop-aganda against the treatment of Muslins
in Central Asia. Only after the July 2005 bombings in London did
Prime Minister Blair acknowledge that this organization should be
banned. But a liberal atmosphere toward the group continues to prevail,
and nothing has been done about it.
It was argued that an Islamic revolution is not likely
to happen in Central Asia with the possible exception of Uzbekistan
where the basis for Islamic mobilization and grassroots support
for Islamic culture are very strong. To people who are disillusioned
by the Karimov regime’s failure to improve their lives, especially
in rural areas that have never received much from the regime, Hizb-ut-Tahrir
is attractive. The ruling establishments exaggerate the Islamic
threat to generate support and to explain the pressures that they
exert on different groups. It was suggested that neither the elites
in Kazakhstan nor in Kyrgyzstan thought their country had a radical
Islamist issue. The Kazakh government, wishing to maintain good
relations with Saudi Arabia, has had a difficult time barring radical
Wahhabi preachers. Kyrgyzstan, seeing itself as a “poster child
for democracy,” felt immune. Islamic teaching was allowed,
especially in the parts of the Ferghana Valley that belong to Kyrgyzstan
and in the southern parts of Kazakhstan close to the Uzbek border,
where Hizb-ut-Tahrir and similar groups have strengthened themselves
over the last five years.
The Islamist threat, coupled with the color revolutions
that took place in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, has caused
Uzbekistan to worry about what America and the West in general may
be unleashing. Karimov said that Islamists like Hizbut- Tahrir are
acting like power-seeking revolutionaries in Georgia. That was the
situation that obtained when not only Karimov but other presidents
as well began to get nervous as they perceived that the American
push for democracy and the Islamist agenda were going in the same
direction, though with completely different end goals.
ENERGY, PIPELINES, AND ECOLOGY
The Caspian Sea Basin and U.S.
Oil Strategy
The total Caspian region, including Turkmenistan,
produces 1.8 million barrels of crude oil a day and exports about
1.1 million barrels a day. Kazakhstan alone pro-duces 1.3 million
barrels a day. This will grow to 3.5 million barrels a day by 2015,
according to Kazakh government statistics. Kashegan, the Kazakh
giant offshore Caspian field, alone has the capacity to reach 1.1
million barrels a day. The problem is the imbalance between productive
capacity and pipeline capacity and the need for unlocking export
routes for oil coming from landlocked Central Asian, mostly Kazakhstan.
Accordingly, the strategy of Kazakhstan is to have a multivector
pipeline system that avoids dependency on one neighboring country.
The recent controversy between Russia and Ukraine
shows that energy security is rooted in the diversity of supply.
The pipelines that the United States championed in the last decade
reflect its interests and those of other major oil consumers in
achieving a diversity of supply through a diversity of supply routes.
U.S. strategy has been based on supporting the construction of multiple
pipeline routes connecting Central Asia with the outside world but
avoiding Iran and Russia and allowing the Central Asian states to
build something on their own. At the same time, the United States
has been advocating that local economies diversify beyond their
natural resource wealth, eventually leading to economic stability
and democracy. It was observed during the discussion that despite
Kazakh oil riches, the U.S. air base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan has
to import oil from Russia and Turkmenistan instead of from the nearby
refinery at Chimkent in Kazakhstan that was operated by Petro-Kazakhstan
until its recent purchase by a Canadian company.
The U.S. approach was said to be working better on
the opposite shore of the Caspian Sea, where Azerbaijan has two
pipelines that skirt Russian territory—a completely rebuilt
pipeline that runs from Baku to the Georgian harbor of Supsa on
the Black Sea and can deliver about 200,000 barrels a day and the
just completed Baku–Ceyhan pipeline that flows to an export
terminal on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast; its potential of
1.0 million barrels a day may be reached only in a few years when
Kazakh oil flows across the Caspian Sea.
Thus the multivector pipeline system, even with increasing
oil production in Kazakhstan, may face a problem of too many pipelines
competing for limited supplies. Even the Tengiz pipeline of the
Caspian Pipeline Consortium in Kazakhstan, which goes to the Russian
Black Sea harbor of Novorosiisk, could top out, in the 700,000 or
900,000 barrels per day range, in a few years.
Chinese Deals
The conference discussed the issue of Chinese inroads
into the Central Asian oil market. One presenter underlined the
fact that China tried for a time to gain access to Kasheghan oil
fields in Kazakhstan. In December 2005 China completed the fast
track construction of a pipeline running from Atasu, Kazakhstan,
to its Sinkiang Province—a long but very limited pipeline in
terms of capacity. It will initially carry 200,000 barrels a day
and reach a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day within a few years.
In 2005, however, China changed the classification of oil deals
in the region, making it impossible for private investors to compete
with state identified oil firms now favored by the government of
Kazakhstan. Thus Canadian firms such as PetroKazakhstan are said
to be on their way out. PetroKazakhstan has been sold for four billion
dollars to the China National Petroleum Company. As a result, China
owns between 10 and 14 percent of the petroleum reserves in Kazakhstan;
the situation will change as new sources come online and further
corporate and national firms invest or divest.
This year China became the number one trading partner
of Kazakhstan, a status that is unlikely to change for a long time.
China’s next enterprise is a superrail line through Kazakhstan,
a cargo transport meant to solve problems arising from the difference
in the width of track gauges used by Russian and non-Russian companies.
The idea is that the trains will pick up maximum speed in Kazakhstan
and roll on to Berlin, taking 10 to 11 days off sea transport time—an
attempt by China to reach industrial Europe through Central Asia.
It is an interesting project, which may compete with the maritime
route from the East to Europe, an initiative said to have been suggested
by the Kazakh government, not the Chinese.
In summary, China perceives Kazakhstan, not the Middle
East, to be its energy heartland. China’s strategy will have
a tremendous influence in the region. The March 31, 1996, Chinese
Communist party Central Committee strategic paper (Resolution number
6, called the Strike Hard Campaign) dealt with Sinkiang separatism
and the large-scale settlement of Han Chinese. It contained four
paragraphs outlining Chinese intentions toward the handling of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The Chinese were quite clear about how
they intended to achieve influence. What has happened to date follows
that strategy.
Russian Inroads
Recent Russian inroads into Central Asia, propelled
by Russian oil and gas revenues, were given a great deal of attention
at the conference. An agreement was signed between Kazakhstan and
Russia last fall concerning the pipelines that go to Russia’s
Black Sea harbors, to Samara, and other places in Russia—all
points in a game of geopolitical struggle for Kazakh oil. The Russian
oil giant, Lukoil, acquired Nelson Resources. Russia’s Gazprom,
backed by President Putin, is primarily involved in Central Asian
gas, blurring the line between the state and the corporation. There
is a clear pattern of Russian inroads into other areas as well,
for example, by the Russian company United Energy Systems. (In contrast,
the energy from power plants being built in Tajikistan is intended
largely for export to China.)
Russia has a very favorable deal with Western Europe
where it has just increased its market share with respect to its
exports of natural gas, now approximately 25 percent of Western
European consumption. The goal is to make Western Europe more dependent
on Russian gas. The former German federal chancellor, Gerhard Schröeder,
signed on to promote Gazprom’s trans-Baltic pipeline initiative
to reach Germany without crossing Poland and Ukraine. Another inroad
for Russia was the building of the Blue Streak gas pipeline through
Turkey, opening a new market for Russian gas. It was suggested that
this project could not have been accomplished without massive bribes,
illustrating, by contrast, the difficulties Americans would face
in competing for such projects in the region in light of U.S. legal
restraints such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
In the view of one participant, however, Russia’s
successes are not without risk. The Russian national budget is overly
dependent on income from Gazprom and Lukoil fees and taxes. Russia
has failed to reindustrialize beyond the energy sector. Moreover,
its gas revenues depend on its ability to obtain cheaply a large
portion of the gas it needs from Central Asia. In 2004 it paid Turkmenistan
one-seventh the price that Western Europe paid. The situation is
marginally better for Turkmenistan now. Russia needs Central Asian
gas in order to continue its aggressive stance toward Ukraine on
a political level and toward Western Europe on an economic level.
The view was expressed that Russia may well overplay its hand since
no Central Asian leader can survive for long if he is seen as being
too dependent on Russia as an “elder brother”—to
parody the words that the Soviet Union used to describe its relationship
with its “national republics.”
Ecological Problems
The conference discussed three major ecological problems
faced by Kazakhstan and other countries of the region. First is
Kazakhstan’s inheritance of the former nuclear polygon at Semipalatinsk
located in its northeast territory. This polygon is known as a nuclear
site where about 500 nuclear explosions took place over a period
of 40 years between the end of the 1940s and the end of the 1980s.
The contaminated area covers a territory of 300,000 square kilometers,
which is roughly equal to half the territory of France. Kazakhstan
is trying to deal with this problem, and UN member states have supported
a number of resolutions on the issue. It is clear that this problem
has three dimensions: humanitarian, ecological, and economic. A
participant noted that Kazakhstan has not blamed any country for
the situation; instead, it has sought moral and technical support
from the international community to deal with the problems presented
by this huge contaminated area.
Another problem is the continued drying up of the
Aral Sea. The problem became well known as adjacent countries in
the region coordinated their efforts to cope with it. Kazakhstan’s
efforts to replenish the northern part of the sea have yielded some
success. But the problem is still there, and the attention of the
international community must be drawn to this tragedy.
The third important ecological issue in the region
that the conference discussed was water management. Kazakhstan is
a downstream country; its internal water resources furnish only
60 percent of its needs. Accordingly, the water manage-ment issue
is at the top of the agenda of cooperation among neighboring coun-tries,
including China. This issue is quite contentious for Uzbekistan
whose large, irrigated cotton economy is dependent on the headwaters
of sources in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan is wholly
dependent for most of its needs in agriculture and other enterprises
on water given to it by Uzbekistan.
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
FROM COMPETING POINTS OF VIEW
The conference devoted considerable time during both
the morning and afternoon sessions to Chinese-Russian cooperation
aimed at curtailing the inroads that the United States has made
into Central Asia since 9/11. Joint efforts began with the revival
of the dormant Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an economic
as well as a political and strategic security alliance originally
composed of China, Russia, and three Central Asian states. The key
party in this organization is the People’s Republic of China.
Largely at the initiative of the Chinese, SCO’s anti-American
move at the June 2005 Astana summit was aimed at fixing deadlines
for the decommissioning of U.S. bases in the area. It is by no means
certain that Russia or the Central Asian states would have tried
to take such a stand without China’s prodding. The main problem
for the SCO is how long the balance between Moscow and Beijing can
be maintained. How will growing Chinese influence affect Central
Asian security? What kind of response can the West mount to China’s
challenge? Experts, particularly in the Asian countries, regard
SCO as a counterbalance to the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE).
The security agreement signed in 1992 in Tashkent
under Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS’s) auspices
among Central Asian countries and Russia remained the main safeguard
against hypothetical external dangers and threats. But given its
diminishing role, the CIS did not prove to be an effective military
mechanism with the exception of its intervention in the Tajik civil
war. During the militant Islamist incursions into the region in
1999 and 2000 (in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), there were widespread
concerns about the organization’s practical value.
Another issue discussed was the economic, military,
and demographic situation of the Russian Federation. How long, it
was asked, can Russia be expected to fulfill its security obligations
in Central Asia as well as in the Caucasus? What has President Putin
done to carry out his intention to restore Russian influence in
Central Asia as well as in the CIS in general? Russia has taken
some steps toward achieving its goals by restoring some Soviet-era
military bases, taking control of Tajikistan’s hydroenergy
resources and of Turkmenistan’s gas export routes, achieving
a rapprochement with Uzbekistan, and gaining Kazakhstan’s participation
in some projects. But Russia’s ability to continue to project
its influence in the area is dependent on its economy, which is
overdependent on oil and gas revenues.
Central Asian countries and their leaders are concerned
about the U.S. military presence. Some, however, regard the American
presence as a necessary counter-balance to China and Russia, particularly
China. Nobody can ignore the great growth in Chinese influence,
discount its future impact on the region, and dismiss the concern
that its influence has engendered.
At the SCO summit of prime ministers, Beijing offered
to invest more than $900 million in the region in the form of Chinese
technical engineering assistance, which would translate into the
massive demographic presence of Chinese in the region. Russia and
Kazakhstan rejected the proposal. The conference addressed the following
question. Is the goal of China in Central Asia merely economic,
as Chinese officials say, or is it political and geopolitical as
well? Raising this issue poses additional questions about Chinese
relations with Russia, the United States, and Central Asia.
U.S. Interests and Policy
A key task facing the conference was identifying U.S.
strategic interests in Central Asia—a region in the world that
is geographically distant from the United States. The conference
identified three interrelated U.S. interests in the area: security,
energy, and reform. The most important issue is the future of the
U.S. military presence in the area. Another issue relates to the
question of whether the United States has a Eurasian strategy. During
the Clinton presidency, a new role—that of “security manager”—was
proposed for the United States in Central Asia. Establishing a U.S.-Russian
Federation consensus about strategy would be very important for
the region. But it would be complicated by the U.S. position toward
specific color revolutions.
It was asserted that the United States has no economic
policy toward Central Asia. For example, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) treats U.S. investments in Russian oil more favorably than
those in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the U.S.-Russian Investment Fund
is 15 years old, but there is still no such fund for Central Asia.
Recently a major Kazakh firm, Kazmis, was listed on the London Stock
Exchange but not in New York. A point was made that in monetary
terms U.S. assistance is very modest. Even the allocation of $9.6
million for military cooperation for all of Central Asia for the
coming year is relatively modest.
It was noted that the Afghan war continues to have
a strong effect on U.S. security interests in the region. In Central
Asia, the U.S. role in Afghanistan involves overflight rights, base
rights, and emergency diversion rights—arrangements that are
crucial to the American ability to prosecute the war. Next in importance
from a security point of view is drug trafficking. Right across
the border from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan is 80 percent
of the world’s opium production that reaches the outside world
through Central Asia. Most of those narcotics find their ultimate
markets in Russia and to a somewhat lesser extent in Central and
Western Europe; relatively little end up in the United States. Nevertheless,
it is important for the United States to help others in the war
on narcotics in order to obtain reciprocal security assistance.
There is a strong U.S. interest in preventing the
states of Central Asian from becoming narcostates where anybody,
including terrorists, can find a haven. For example, in summertime
as they waged war in Afghanistan and carried out related activity
in Pakistan, the commandos of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) crossed regularly into the Ferghana Valley in Kyrgyzstan.
They have changed names a few times and have splintered but still
operate in Central Asia, raising the possibility of providing transit
for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as narcotics.
The U.S. State Department’s decision to move
Central Asia from the European section to the South Asia section
engendered a great deal of concern among discussants. It was officially
justified by bureaucratic concerns over having one assistant secretary
dealing with 55 countries and the other with only eight. Nevertheless,
it might have sent the wrong signal to individual countries that
are trying to discern how the United States looks at the region.
Being perceived as part of the West helps reformers in Central Asia.
Kazakhs, for example, who discover that their country is no longer
part of Europe, regard the revelation as a huge vote of no confidence.
The conferees understood that the reorganization was
only a State Department bureaucratic change. Nonetheless it engendered
considerable discussion about the potential significance a similar
reorganization by the Pentagon, the Treasury, or other departments
of the U.S. government would have on other countries that also look
at Central Asia and the Caucasus together.
An argument in favor of the move was put forward based
on the necessity to stabilize Afghanistan by connecting the country
to the outside world with roads, railroads, telecommunications links,
and air routes to South Asia and Central Asia. That assertion gave
rise to a discussion of Secretary Rice’s initiative for integrating
the infrastructure of Central Asia and South Asia along the corridor
going through Afghanistan and then farther on to Pakistan and even
to India. The idea of piping gas through Afghanistan to Pakistan
and on to India, however, was seen by another presenter as unrealistic
because southern Afghanistan is still far from stable and India’s
security experts do not want to be dependent on a pipeline that
goes to Pakistan before it reaches India.
Infrastructure was then cited as another important
topic. The United States would like to see Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
sell hydropower to Afghanistan, then to Pakistan, and perhaps to
India. Others suggested that linking the entire region by fiber
optic communications is critical. Much is already underway with
direct or indirect U.S. assistance. The World Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, and USAID are working on hydropower transmission and generation
and on all-weather roads linking the region. Secretary Rice announced
a $1.4 million initiative for infrastructure integration, which
was seen by some participants as too modest.
USAID was said to be working on developing a regional
energy market and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is building a
bridge across the Pyandz River joining Afghanistan with the Tajik
road network up through Kyrgyzstan and on into Kazakhstan. Washington,
it was said, wants to see where and how the money can best be used
and whether the countries can work together as well as with international
financial institutions and other donors and investors, including
Russia.
It was suggested at the conference that after 9/11,
a lot of thinking in Washington was focused on American foreign
policy and security policy, on mistakes made in the Middle East
during the last 40 years of emphasizing stability over democracy
and of not getting unbiased information from the region, combined
with little appreciation of Central Asian culture and preoccupations.
Only in the last year or two has it become commonplace to talk about
the importance of clans in Central Asia and about the unintended
consequences of lecturing local officials about how to act.
The conference discussed the path that the former
Soviet republics took after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their
direction was determined by where they had come from—not a
propitious starting point for becoming a democratic society. U.S.
foreign policy toward the Soviet Union recognized the fact that
it was a large area. As the region came apart, it became clear that
it contained many different cultures and communities. Once the United
States recognized the newly independent countries, it formulated
its first objective: to prevent the Soviet Union from coming back
together again.
Russia, according to the U.S. government, is the pivotal
state in the region. If the post-Soviet transition did not work
in Russia, Washington concluded, it would not work in a post-Soviet
republic. Consequently, Washington had to make sure it got its Russian
policy right. Central Asian policy derived from that point of view.
Respecting the sovereignty of individual states and preventing Russia
from dominating them were key objectives. The evolution of the post-Soviet
era coincided with a particular juncture in history when the world
entered the process of globalization. That process changed the way
in which nation-states interact.
Globalization seems to punish countries that do not
integrate into the world economy. U.S. policy was designed to encourage
Central Asian countries to globalize and to adopt a legal and regulatory
structure open to investments from around the world. In other words,
Washington, on the one hand, urged Central Asian states to be sovereign
and independent and, on the other hand, encouraged them to “globalize”
and reduce restrictions that prevent interacting with other states—in
effect, to “lower” their borders. But to protect an emerging
nation’s own interests, “higher” borders may be needed.
In effect, U.S. policy advice was not very helpful. One example
is Kyrgyzstan, which endorsed democracy and moved to adopt it. It
was the first Central Asian country to move out of the ruble zone
in response to American, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
World Bank advice, issue its own currency, and join the World Trade
Organization (WTO). But Kyrgyzstan experienced the opposite of what
it expected. It expected a great increase in trade after it joined
the WTO. In fact, trade fell by about 30 percent the year after
it was admitted. U.S. policy was not dynamic in the region. It continued
to pursue the same objectives without paying attention to problems
that had arisen. Many NGOs, sponsored in part by the U.S. government
and in part by Western foundations, adopted mechanisms and ways
of thinking that did not find fertile ground in the region.
After 9/11, the situation changed. The United States
suddenly embraced Uzbekistan whose regime has been described by
many in the Western world as brutal and authoritarian. Central Asian
governments, especially in Uzbekistan, thought that the United States
would understand the constraints they were dealing with. In contrast,
Washington expected behavior that was not realistic. In effect,
Uzbekistan was trying to implement a set of objectives that were
different from Washington’s.
What the Western world fails to recognize when it
promotes reform and runs into reform fatigue is that some actors
have rational interests for opposing reform. Based on that premise,
it may be helpful to try to answer the following question. What
policy would be effective in helping the United States achieve its
objectives in the region? A view was presented (against objections
from others) that the primary U.S. interest in the region is based
on the role that Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan
can play in assisting the reconstruction of Afghanistan. According
to that point of view, U.S. interests in Kazakhstan— potentially
a large U.S. trading partner in the future—are twofold: developing
its trade relationship with Kazakhstan and providing assistance
for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
It was said that the United States had not managed
to take advantage of the secular nature of Central Asian authoritarian
regimes that are religiously moderate because of their adherence
to the Hanafi school of Islam and its strong Sufi influence. It
was suggested that even Uzbekistan should have been given some credit
for what it was doing right in supporting secular government, not
just criticized for what it was doing wrong. A participant quoted
the NCAFP report on Kazakhstan, which emphasizes that U.S. interests
in the country should not be limited to oil, security, and counterterrorism
but to Kazakhstan’s vital importance to U.S. interests in the
region; it is a secular Muslim state with a large non-Muslim minority
and pro-Western sympathies that is undergoing speedy economic development
and providing better standards of living for its diverse population.
Finally, it was argued that the United States ought
to recognize that not all cultures are alike. Throughout Central
Asia are clans that work outside formal political institutions that
are not synonymous with democratic processes. For example, USAID
workers have discovered after working with legislators to persuade
them to enact specific reforms that the legislature does not make
actual decisions.
Decisions, it turns out, are made on the basis of
things that have little to do with legislative structure or even
with a constitution. As U.S. policymakers seek to promote economic
and political reform in Central Asia, they must adapt to the cultural
and practical realities at the most basic levels of local society.
Russian Interests and
Policy
It was asserted that neither Russia nor the United
States has a policy in Central Asia. Instead, both indulge in reaction,
either underreaction or overreaction. Despite a measure of activism
evident in Russian policy toward the region during the last few
years, Russia, it was noted, is not about to sacrifice its resources
or to spend much money to pursue its interests beyond security.
It was reiterated that the main concern of Russia
is security. Economics is second. Russia’s increase in economic
investments in Central Asia for the first time last year was attributed
to President Putin’s belief and that of his government that
such investments can enhance Russia’s security in the region.
The Russian Aluminum Company invested up to two billion dollars
in Tajikistan’s hydropower stations and a new aluminum plant
that will use some of the power generated. Lukoil is active in Kazakhstan,
and Gazprom is active in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Such a huge
investment would have been unthinkable a few years ago. It was stated
that the Russian Aluminum Company’s investment would be a very
risky project for a private enterprise. It was also noted that Russian
companies investing in Central Asia are not without important foreign
investors, including prominent oligarchs with Uzbek ties.
Drugs are considered a serious threat to Russian security.
Russia has a real problem with drugs, drug trafficking, and drug
addicts, especially in some depressed regions of Siberia, the Urals,
and the north, where the price is low. Very little has been done
to stem the flow of drugs from all directions, and the traffic continues
to increase.
Islamic extremism and terrorism are also perceived
as considerable threats to Russia. It was emphasized that perception
is important to Central Asia. For example, it was suggested that
even a bureaucratic decision such as the transfer of Central Asia
from the European to the South Asian desk of the State Department
could be perceived by Russians and Central Asians as a sign of American
retreat. Russia seized the opportunity from the growing U.S.–Uzbekistan
split to fill the gap and occupy the niche that was left in Uzbekistan
by the Americans. The Russian position in the area is also reinforced
by the fact that large numbers of Uzbeks and Tajiks work in Russia
and a large Russian minority still lives in Kazakhstan. George Kennan
was quoted as having said many years ago that the effectiveness
of power, which radiates from every national center, decreases in
proportion to the distance involved. Distance speaks in Russia’s
favor relative to the United States.
Russia was said to understand the dangers emanating
from the weak position of the Uzbek leader and from denying the
fact that democracy cannot be imported into or imposed on Central
Asia. It was suggested that cooperation between Russia and the United
States would be in the interest of all, especially the states of
Central Asia.
Chinese Interests and
Policy
It was underlined at the conference that China has
been consistent in its political concerns about the region, especially
about the possibility that political change from Central Asia will
spill over into the neighboring Chinese province of Sinkiang (Xinjiang).
China shares a border with three Central Asian states: Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The part of China that borders on Central
Asia is the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, the largest Chinese province.
It accounts for one-sixth of Chinese territory but has a relatively
small population in Chinese terms—around 19 million people.
Forty-seven percent of that population is Uighur Muslim; 41 percent
is Han Chinese. Other groups that live in this region include one
million Kazakhs and smaller numbers of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks.
Moreover, more than 300,000 Uighurs live across the border in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan. The Han population in Xinjiang has been growing
because of efforts by Beijing to encourage the Han Chinese to settle
in this region. Their presence has increased from only 10 percent
in 1950 to slightly below 50 percent today. In essence, China is
very much concerned with what is happening across the border because
of overlapping populations.
One of China’s first tasks in the early part
of the 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was to secure
its borders with its Central Asian neighbors. The process of border
demarcation was controversial in some of the Central Asian states
(most recently in Kyrgyzstan where there were demonstrations against
the process), but now it has largely been completed. In July 2001,
the SCO emerged from the process of demarcating the borders and
from confidence-building efforts by China, its three Central Asian
neighbors (later, Uzbekistan), and Russia.
Concern about Islamic extremism and separatism is
not new in China. In 1996 a police campaign, called the Strike Hard
campaign, was directed against separatist activities in Xinjiang.
Human rights organizations point to the systematic persecution of
Uighurs by the Chinese government, and both the Chinese government
and Uighur organizations have interests, for different reasons,
in playing up Uighur separatist activities. It was stated at the
conference that even the Chinese government would acknowledge that
since the late 1990s there has been little indigenous Islamic radicalism
in Xinjiang, belying concern about outside influence, including
influence emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, the
level of military presence maintained by China in Xinjiang does
not indicate much concern about an indigenous Uighur terrorist threat.
Nonetheless, China and its neighbors in Central Asia have found
common ground in condemning “the three evils of separatism,
extremism, and terrorism.”
It was pointed out that to ensure stability in Xinjiang
it is necessary to promote economic development and expand economic
cooperation with Central Asia. Thus in March 2000 the Chinese National
People’s Congress endorsed a policy, called Go West, of developing
China’s inland provinces. Its centerpiece was the investment
of more than five billion dollars in a 4,000-kilometer east-west
gas pipeline linking Xinjiang’s Tarim Basin with Shanghai.
This pipeline has a capacity of 12 billion cubic meters per year
and became operational last year. Xinjiang has been slated to become
the center of China’s oil and gas industry, both by developing
its own resources, which contain one-third of China’s oil and
gas reserves, and by becoming a gateway to Central Asian oil.
Trade has been growing rapidly between China and Central
Asia, but the monetary amount is still quite small. For example,
half of Xinjiang’s trade is with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
In monetary terms, it amounts to less than two billion dollars per
annum. Nonetheless, Chinese investments in Central Asia have grown
rapidly since 1993, when China became a net energy importer and
began to seek alternative supplies. Recent difficulties in energy
relations with Russia in connection with Siberian oil projects also
play a role.
Since 9/11, the U.S. military presence in Central
Asia has complicated China’s geopolitical picture. In the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, SCO played a very marginal role. It lacked an
office and telephones, which U.S. military commanders discovered
when they tried to contact the organization. Since then, its charter
has been approved, and the organization has become institutionalized.
Its Secretariat is located in Beijing and is headed by a former
Chinese ambassador to Russia. China participated in SCO peacekeeping
and confidence-building military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in 2002,
with Kazakhstan and Russia and Tajikistan in 2003 (as well as with
Kyrgyzstan) and, most recently, in the summer of 2005, with Russia.
Since the emergence of the new leadership in China,
Chinese policy has resulted in greater activism directed toward
energy diplomacy and greater attention to Central Asia. China’s
Communist party First Secretary Hu Jintao’s first overseas
trip in the summer of 2003 was to Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, many
economic agreements were signed. China’s first crossborder
pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang became operational recently.
It represents an investment of almost ten billion dollars, a huge
commitment on China’s part that may mark the beginning of a
whole series of Chinese pipelines to other countries, including
Russia.
Finally, China has endorsed efforts to contain democratic
changes in Central Asia, especially of the “color revolution”
type. Concerned by events in Bishkek and Andijon, Chinese leaders
received President Karimov in Beijing, gave him the red carpet treatment,
and pledged $1.5 billion in investments, half in the energy sec-tor.
Since then, the Chinese have been very active throughout Central
Asia, prom-ising military aid to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (less
than three million dollars but not so little compared with U.S.
aid). The conference raised the question: What does all this mean
for China and Russia in Central Asia?
Areas of agreement between China and Russia involve
reducing the U.S. military presence in the region in order to constrain
pro-Western political change as well as classifying violence in
Chechnya and Xinjiang as terrorism, which would justify oppressive
countermeasures. Russia has been resisting Chinese efforts to enhance
multilateral cooperation within SCO, preferring instead to link
Central Asian states bilaterally with Russia via CIS institutions.
China would like to expand its access to Central Asian markets,
and that could happen if SCO became a multilateral organization
such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Finally,
there is distrust of Chinese intentions in Central Asia and concern
about the possibility of economic domination by China and population
imbalances such as those between the Russian Far East and China.
There is a feeling in Central Asia of being squeezed by the major
powers that are pursuing interests not always compatible with the
interests of the states in the region.
Focus on Turkey
Turkey is important for many reasons but primarily
because it is a member of NATO. Since the Iraq war, Turkish-American
relations have changed primarily because of the different approaches
that Turkey has taken to the Central Command (CENTCOM) and the European
Command (EUCOM). Turkey did not establish the same kind of cooperative
arrangement with CENTCOM that it had with EUCOM. Concerning Iraq,
Turkey shares the concern of many other countries, including China
and Russia, that the United States is creating instability in the
area. From the Turkish perspective, the United States initiated
the war to achieve worthwhile goals but was not prepared for the
post-Saddam situation. By extension, there is concern that the United
States may do similar things in Central Asia, the Black Sea region,
and other places in the area. Moreover, the Turkish military, even
those who worked in NATO, are drawing closer to Russia. Turkey regards
Russia as a partner in countering American moves in the Middle East
that it disapproves of, including “color revolutions”
and further interventions in the area. Turkish-Russian relations
have gotten stronger. President Putin met Prime Minister Erdogan
three times in 2005, and trends suggest that in a few years Russia
may become Turkey’s largest trading partner, replacing Germany.
President Putin, it seems, would like to draw Ankara away from NATO,
inducing Turkey to become an observer if not an eventual member
of SCO.
Many people in Turkey are very concerned that the
United States does not understand the full scope of the Islamist
danger—a concern shared by the Turkish military. There is a
sense that Washington is naive about Turkish Islamist developments
and their connections to the current Turkish government. The United
States seems to have lost some of its focus on maintaining Turkish
cooperation to fulfill its objectives in Central Asia. Moreover,
Turkish cooperation with the Russians, especially on gas, could
undermine the vision of creating the east-west corridor.
Finally, SCO dynamics and Turkish influence were discussed.
SCO might not have fulfilled its potential, but the July 2005 summit
in Astana was a turning point. It was said that had the summit not
taken place in Astana but in another SCO capital, the final statement
would have been even harsher toward the United States than the one
that was issued. Moreover, Iran has become a SCO observer. By changing
the organization’s dynamics, especially after the recent hardening
of Iranian foreign policy, Iran’s role can affect Central Asia
within the context of SCO. India has also joined SCO as an observer,
and it will be interesting to see which way India tilts. Recently
there was an announcement that an Iran-India-Pakistan gas pipeline
agreement had been signed. Opposing it has been a long-time U.S.
policy. According to the conferees, efforts to pull India toward
the West, whether by the United States or the European Union, depend
on the direction that Turkey takes.
NCAFP CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. strategic position in Central Asia, which
greatly improved between 9/11 and the beginning of the war in Iraq
and progressed further through the “color revolutions”
in the CIS republics, has deteriorated—the low point being
Uzbekistan’s shift after the Andijon uprising and the Astana
summit of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization in which Russia
and China combined their efforts to push back U.S. inroads into
the area. Those developments require a rethinking of U.S. policy
objectives and strategy in the region to reflect changed circumstances.
The NCAFP has reviewed the Main Conclusions and Policy
Recommendations that it presented in its May 2005 Central Asia report
titled Stability in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan, A Report
(with Policy Recommendations) on U.S. Interests in Central Asia
and U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations, which are attached as an appendix
to this summary. The NCAFP believes that these conclusions continue
to be sound and reaffirms its policy recommendations.
Set forth below are the NCAFP’s conclusions that
were formed after analyzing the proceedings of the January 2006
conference on substantive issues that bear on U.S. policy in Central
Asia and policy recommendations relating to such issues.
- There is a compelling need for a dynamic U.S. foreign policy
in Central Asia—one that has made provisions for identifying
and seizing opportunities and responding to setbacks with appropriate
action, including damage control.
- The republics of Central Asia cannot resist combined Russian/Chinese
pressure without a larger commitment from the United States supported
by the European Union.
- The NCAFP expects that China will eventually overplay its hand
in Central Asia, fueling local apprehensions and Russian suspicion.
The U.S. government will be in a position to take advantage of
such an opportunity if it presents itself as the Chinese and the
Russians did at the SCO summit after regime change in Kyrgyzstan
and the Andijon uprising had occurred.
- There is a broad sense that U.S. policy, seen to be supportive
of regime change such as occurred in Kyrgyzstan, lacks follow
through.
- With both Russia and China flush with trade surpluses and in
a position to back their state-controlled firms, Western enterprises
may no longer be able to compete on their own without government
support. U.S. policymakers should examine economic areas of strategic
importance to U.S. national interests for which government support
might be made available to private enterprise in the form of tax
incentives, credit enhancement, and other measures.
- Although support for human rights and democratization is built
into U.S. foreign policy, progress cannot be expected uniformly
without regard for traditions and local circumstances.
- The State Department’s shift of Central Asian Affairs from
the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to the Bureau of South
and Central Asian Affairs appears to be sending the wrong message.
To many in the region the reclassification seems to denote the
perception that Central Asia is not receptive to Western values.
Considerable fence-mending is in order. The United States would
articulate to good effect the connection between U.S. interests
in Central Asia and its activities in Afghanistan by identifying
and emphasizing mutual interests.
- U.S. policymakers should jump-start certain old initiatives
and implement new ones. Such initiatives should include resolving
the funding of the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan, strengthening
military-to-military programs, and playing a proactive role on
environmental issues.
- The conference regretted the fact that the U.S. government has
not called attention to the secular nature of the Central Asian
regimes and to the moderate form of Islam adopted by a large majority
of the population.
- Finally, there was a strong sense that increased educational
and cultural exchanges between Central Asia and the West are essential
to the furtherance of U.S. interests in the region.
PARTICIPANTS
Hosts
Mr. William J. Flynn
Chairman, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Dr. George D. Schwab
President, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Professor Michael Rywkin
Project Director, Central Asia Project, National Committee on American
Foreign Policy
Colonel Daniel M. Klippstein
Chief, Strategy, Doctrine, and Concepts Division, HQ, Dept. of the
Army, Office of the G35.
Major John E. Prior
Program Manager, U.S. Army Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security
Series
ENSS Coordinator
Mr. William C. Angerman
Program Director, U.S. Army Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security
Series
Presenters
Ms. Zeyno Baran
Director, International Security and Energy Program, The Nixon Center
Professor Gregory Gleason
University of New Mexico
John G. Fox
Director, Office of Caucasus and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department
of State
H.E.Yerzhan Kazykhanov
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan
to the United Nations
Dr. Murat Laumulin
Deputy Director, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies
Professor Vitaly Naumkin
President, International Center for Strategic and Political Studies;
Director, Center for Arab Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies
of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Dr. Steven Sabol
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Professor Peter J. Sinnott
Director, Caspian Sea Project, Columbia University
H.E. Zamira Sydykova
Ambassador of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to the United States
Dr. Elisabeth Wishnick
Montclair State University
Research Associate, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Attendees
Colonel Daniel G. Groeschen
Chief, Central Asia South Asia Branch HQ USCENTCOM, Security Cooperation
Division
Major Harry J. Lane
Country Director, Kyrgyz Republic, Security Cooperation Division,
Plans and Policy Directorate, United States Central Command
Lt. Colonel Robin Phillips
Northeast Asia Desk Officer, Joint Staff J-5 (Strategic Plans and
Policy Directorate)
Lt. Colonel James Ruf
Response Development Officer for Dept. of State’s Office of
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability
Colonel Michael D. Soule
J-5 Branch Chief, Central Asia South Asia
Mr. William M. Rudolf
Executive Vice President, National Committee on American Foreign
Policy
Donald S. Rice, Esq.
Senior Vice President, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Richard R. Howe, Esq.
Treasurer, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
APPENDIX
Main Conclusions and NCAFP Policy Recommendations from the NCAFP
Central Asia Project’s May 2005 Publication, Stability in
Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan, A Report (with Policy Recommendations)
on U.S. Interests in Central Asia and U.S. – Kazakhstan Relations
by Michael Rywkin, Project Director
Main Conclusions
The NCAFP delegation reached the following conclusions at the completion
of its fact-finding mission in Kazakhstan.
- During the decade and a third that has elapsed since achieving
its independence, Kazakhstan has become the leading state in former
Soviet Central Asia in terms of such criteria as GDP, GDP per
capita, privatization of the economy, volume of exports, rate
of economic development, volume of energy production, effectiveness
and transparency of the banking system, development of transportation,
growth of technical education, and so forth.
- The process of democratization, though still unsatisfactory
by U.S. standards, has been superior to that undertaken by each
of the other post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. Opposition
parties and groups, though restricted in their access to electronic
media, are allowed to publish newspapers, to hold small meetings,
to equip their offices with telephones and fax lines, and to travel
abroad. Opposition leaders are more often harassed than jailed,
although there have been some violent episodes. On the positive
side, both the Kazakh political establishment and the opposition
are conscious of the geopolitical position of the country, which
necessitates maintaining a balance among Russian ambitions, growing
Chinese influence, Middle Eastern Islamist inroads, and Western
pressures. The principal disagreement between the U.S. and Kazakh
governments relates to whether political and economic liberalization
can proceed simultaneously or whether economic liberalization
must occur first.
- Kazakhstan is fast becoming a key energy producer—behind
the Gulf States and Russia but on par with North Sea producers.
Its production and known reserves are growing, and its role is
steadily increasing. The country is doing what it can to diversify
pipeline routes in order to decrease its dependency on Russian
pipelines (and their often high transit fees) for its exports
to the West.
- Kazakhstan’s armed forces, though small in number, are
the best trained in the region. They receive assistance from the
United States and other sources. The army is becoming professional,
has a qualified officer corps, maintains close contacts with the
U.S. armed forces, and participates in the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program. The training language of
the army is still Russian, but an understanding of English is
growing rapidly. The percentage of ethnic Russians in the armed
forces, though declining, remains substantial.
- Kazakhstan is ethnically, religiously, and linguistically tolerant.
It shows little discrimination against non-Kazakhs, non-Muslims,
or Russian speakers. Ethnic Russians, however, are less visible
than in the 1990s, and since independence the ethnic Kazakh proportion
of the population has increased from less than 40 percent to a
majority. Concurrently the ethnic Russian representation in public
institutions has declined. The urban population is predominantly
secular, the Russian language still predominates, and mixed marriages
are not uncommon— at least in the capitals. Affirmative action
from Soviet times benefits native Kazakh job applicants to the
detriment of Russians. It has reduced rather than eliminated opportunities
for non-Kazakhs.
- The principal political preoccupations of the present regime,
which has been in power since independence, are internal political
stability, the preservation of the country’s independence
through balancing relations with its great power neighbors, the
war on terrorism, and narcotraffic. The Confederation of Independent
States (CIS) is dismissed as outdated, and a new Kazakh foreign
policy doctrine is under consideration. Except for objecting to
the levels of internal controls maintained in Kazakhstan in the
name of stability, U.S. interests coincide with all other Kazakh
policies.
- Most governmental agencies and independent observers are concerned
about the situation in the rest of Central Asia, especially about
neighboring Uzbekistan where they predicted an almost imminent
danger of explosion triggered by declining standards of living,
harsh rule, and the rise of religious fanaticism provoked by the
desperate situation. The Kazakh government is concerned about
the possibility of a massive influx of refugees into southern
Kazakhstan in such an event. The stability of post-Turkmenbashi
Turkmenistan is regarded as questionable, though less threatening
to Kazakhstan given the relatively small common border. The situations
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are viewed as unsettled.
- Russian ideas about enticing Kazakhstan into the ruble zone
are dismissed as unrealistic. Kazakhstan sees itself as a partner
rather than a client of Russia and perceives China, not Russia,
as the fastest growing force in the area. The presence of American
capital is welcome for its value and as a counter-weight to Chinese
inroads.
- Kazakh officials maintain that the country is ready to become
the locomotive of a Central Asian economic “union” by
providing capital and assistance to neighboring states. Given
relations with Uzbekistan and the isolation of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan’s
plans appear to be premature, awaiting regime changes in those
countries. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, is a recipient of Kazakh
aid, and Tajikistan may be a candidate as well.
- Kazakh officials were very concerned about whether the U.S.
secretary of state would certify Kazakhstan as a country that
“has made a significant improvement in the protection of
human rights during the preceding six-month period” as required
by Congress before funds can be allocated. Although U.S. assistance
to the Kazakh military is significant and Kazakhstan has benefited
from other U.S. foreign aid funding, the officials were primarily
concerned about the political impact of a negative decision, which
could discourage foreign investments and blacken the image of
the country. (Subsequent to our meetings with Kazakh officials,
Secretary of State Rice notified Congress that she could not make
the certification but had granted a waiver in light of U.S. national
security interests.)
- Kazakh authorities are appealing to the United States for support
of their candidacy to assume the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009.
Germany reportedly supports Kazakhstan’s candidacy. This
issue is important to the government because occupying the OSCE
chair would buttress President Nazarbayev’s prestige both
domestically and internationally. It would also strengthen Kazakhstan’s
claim to regional leadership and remind the world that Kazakhstan
is an important “European” nation.
- Kazakh officials contend that the country’s post-Soviet
renunciation of its arsenal of WMDs, its secular attitude combined
with its ability to maintain an atmosphere marked by the absence
of religious tension, the lack of serious conflicts among ethnic
groups, the positive feeling toward the West in general and the
United States in particular, and especially President Nazarbayev’s
role in implementing those policies should be better appreciated.
NCAFP Policy Recommendations
To sum up: The United States and Kazakhstan share a vital interest
in the continuation and ultimate success of Kazakhstan’s political
and economic transition to a mature, functioning, secular, democratic
state. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan transcend oil and Kazakh support
for the war on terrorism. They include Kazakhstan’s strategic
importance as a moderate, pro-Western, secular Muslim state that
contains a large non-Muslim population that can serve as both a
model and a stabilizing force in the region; Kazakhstan’s strategic
location as a land bridge from Europe to East and South Asia; and
its potential for being the engine of growth, investment, and economic
development in Central Asia. As seen through the prism of the Bush
Doctrine, Kazakhstan, of all the Central Asian countries, has the
greatest potential for achieving a relatively fast-track transition
from authoritarian pluralism to an acceptable form of functioning
democracy.
Based on the fact-finding conclusions of the NCAFP delegation and
the summary of U.S. interests presented above, the National Committee
on American Foreign Policy makes the following recommendations consistent
with American foreign policy interests.
- U.S. policy should assist and not undermine the basic great
power equilibrium that Kazakhstan is attempting to sustain in
order to maintain its independence and pursue economic devel-opment
and modernization. It is in the interest of the United States
to forge special relationships with Central Asian coun-tries in
order to contribute to the stability of the region. U.S. policy
should be sensitive to the fragility of Kazakhstan’s geopolitical
position.
- The United States must show more understanding of the Kazakh
reality given that it has experienced only 13 years of independence;
has pursued privatization and democratization for only a brief
time; must accommodate a multiethnic, multitribal, and multireligious
population; and has to confront instability in neighboring states.
Steady improvement, not rapid progress, should be the expectation.
American pressure should be exerted but not overused. To promote
mutual understanding, the United States must make an effort to
explain to the Kazakhs how the American political system functions,
something difficult for a society that has emerged from a Soviet
system to comprehend.
- The United States must continue to emphasize that American interests
in Kazakhstan are not limited to oil, security, and counterterrorism.
It also must communicate the fact that because Kazakhstan is a
secular Muslim state that contains a large non-Muslim minority,
is sympathetic to the West, and is undergoing rapid economic development
that is providing a better standard of living for the diverse
population, the country is of vital importance to U.S. interests
and those of the entire region as well.
- U.S. interests would be served if Kazakhstan’s burgeoning
free market becomes the engine of growth in Central Asia and if
Kazakhstan becomes more financially engaged in the Southern Caucasus.
Kazakh’s ability to play a leading role in the economies
of the other republics of the region, as well as make investments
in the Southern Caucasus, would have a stabilizing effect on the
region as a whole. According to all accepted criteria, Kazakhstan,
as the leading state in former Soviet Central Asia, should be
the centerpiece of U.S. efforts in the region. Its rapid development
requires the informed attention of the U.S. government and the
skillful formulation of an appropriate foreign policy.
- The United States should encourage Kazakhstan to create an opening
to the south through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan to
Pakistan, India, and the Indian Ocean. This opening would proceed
slowly as trade and transport routes develop naturally in the
wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Transregional commerce
between Central and South Asia will have a beneficial effect on
world politics. Substantial progress has been made in rebuilding
and augmenting Afghanistan’s road network connecting South
Asia, the Indian Ocean, and Central Asia. Railroads and pipelines
are on the drawing board and could go forward if stability in
Afghanistan is attained.
- The United States has a legitimate interest in promoting democratic
values by basing foreign aid to Kazakhstan and Central Asia on
individual regimes’ records of protecting human rights. The
current certification process mandated by Congress, which requires
the secretary of state to find that significant improvement has
taken place during the preceding six-month period or grant a waiver
for national security reasons, is hardly the most effective leverage
that can be exerted. Consideration should be given to a revised
process that would give the secretary of state more discretion
in responding to the observance of human rights in the region
by rewarding progress or withholding benefits in a time frame
that would not be limited to six months. The NCAFP supports the
recent decision of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to waive
the requirement. We believe that it would have been counterproductive
to American foreign policy interests to cut off such U.S. foreign
aid to Kazakhstan as IMET and U.S. democracy projects.
- The United States should make clear to the Kazakh leadership
what incremental steps Kazakhstan can take to achieve a favorable
finding; for example, the appointment of independent observers
or monitors to electoral commissions, the proper counting of ballots,
the public posting of protocols at the precinct level, improved
access to media, and the right of assembly. How to devise and
implement such measures may be an appropriate focus of Track I
1/2 or Track II engagement.
- The United States should coordinate its efforts to promote open
societies, free and fair elections, and humanitarian goals in
Central Asia with the European Union in order to prevent the inference
that our preoccupations with the area are mere reflections of
U.S. foreign policy aimed at achieving U.S. dominance and securing
the flow of oil. Coordination with EU countries would increase
leverage on human rights issues and electoral reform in Kazakhstan
given its interest in acceding to the OSCE chair in 2009.
- The United States should continue to support and encourage educational
and cultural exchanges with Kazakhstan as a means of stimulating
mutual interests and understanding. Kazakhstan has begun to increase
its support for these exchanges, and the United States should
advance this effort by facilitating the processing of visas and
the acceptance of Kazakh students at U.S. universities.
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