Russia and Central Asia
Stability in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan. A
Report (with Policy Recommendations) on U.S. Interests in Central
Asia and U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations
May 2005
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD
The National Committee on American Foreign Policy
(NCAFP) initiated a Project on Central Asia after 9/11 to focus
on U.S., Russian, and Chinese interests in the former Soviet Republics
of Central Asia and on the common interests of those parties and
others in the region in stability, notwithstanding important differences
among them. Mindful of the political, economic, and military significance
of Kazakhstan to the region, the NCAFP decided to make the country
its initial focus of inquiry and analysis. The Committee and representatives
of the Kazakhstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs engaged in a series
of meetings designed to find a way to improve understanding between
the two governments. Kazakh authorities have been conducting a public
relations campaign to remind the United States of Kazakhstan’s
voluntary renunciation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), of
common economic interests, of the secular nature of their state,
and of the human rights record of the government, which is better
than those of their neighbors.
The Kazakhstan government is bound by several imperatives:
- Achieve a smooth “change of guard” that avoids
the succession struggles that occurred in Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgzystan.
- Pursue prudent political reforms without disturbing the existing
order.
- Maintain a strategic balance among Russian, Chinese, Middle
Eastern, and Western interests.
- Address legitimate human rights concerns so that they no
longer damage the image of the country.
In consultation with Kazakhstan, the NCAFP has
designed its Central Asia Project to:
- Provide a forum for a confidential exchange of views between
U.S. and Kazakh experts on issues of common concern.
- Achieve a better understanding of Kazakhstan’s predicaments
and a better way to convey American priorities.
- Find ways for taking advantage of Kazakhstan’s friendship
and its growing standing in the Muslim world to foster U.S. political,
economic, and strategic interests in the area.
- Identify overlapping U.S. and other Great Power interests
in the area.
Kazakhstan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Kassymzhomart
Tokaev met with the NCAFP Central Asia Project group twice in New
York City and invited the Committee to send a fact-finding delegation
to Kazakhstan to meet with senior government officials and others
in Almaty and Astana the last week in April 2005. The NCAFP’s
five-member delegation consisted of Senior Vice President Donald
S. Rice, Treasurer Richard R. Howe, NCAFP Central Asia Project Director
Dr. Michael Rywkin, Ambassador Peter Tomsen (ret.), and Dr. Peter
Sinnott, director of the Caspian Sea Project at Columbia University.
Before going to Kazakhstan, the NCAFP conducted a roundtable on
Central Asian affairs in New York on March 23, 2005. In addition,
the NCAFP delegation engaged in briefing sessions with U.S. government
officials and other Central Asian experts in Washington, D.C., on
April 6 and 7, 2005. On their return from Kazakhstan, the NCAFP
delegation attended debriefing sessions with U.S. government officials
in Washington, D.C., on May 11, 2005.
The NCAFP expresses its gratitude to the government
officials, scholars, and policy analysts, both in the United States
and Kazakhstan, who took time from their busy schedules to confer
with our Central Asia Project group. A list is included in the appendix.
All conversations were off the record. The National Committee on
American Foreign Policy alone is responsible for the conclusions
and policy recommendations in this report.
Special gratitude goes to the Committee’s
Central Asia Project Director Dr. Michael Rywkin, who is the author
of this report. Without his deep substantive knowledge of the countries
of the region and insight into the political situations, nationalities,
ethnic relationships, and other issues of the former Soviet Republics,
the NCAFP’s Central Asia Project could not have developed to
its present status that offers the potential for being a long-term
Track I and/or Track II engagement involving the United States,
Kazakhstan, and the other countries of Central Asia.
I also thank my fellow officers, Donald S. Rice,
who headed our delegation to Kazakhstan, and Richard R. Howe. They
join me in expressing the Committee’s gratitude to Ambassador
Peter Tomsen and Dr. Peter Sinnott for participating in the delegation
and providing invaluable assistance and expertise.
The NCAFP delegation’s trip to Kazakhstan
would not have occurred without the generosity and hospitality of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan and
the Perspektiva Foundation. Funding for events in the United States
and for travel to and from Kazakhstan was provided primarily by
generous contributions from the Shelby Cullom Davis Foundation,
as well the NCAFP, certain NCAFP trustees, and others.
The views expressed in this report are those only
of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy
George D. Schwab, President
National Committee on American Foreign Policy
INTRODUCTION
The nations of Central Asia, surrounded by Russia,
China, and South Asia, comprise the geopolitical centerpiece of
the Eurasian continent. Their location makes them both a buffer
and a passageway between East and West. Central Asia is a major
energy producer. The region is capable of reducing the world’s
dependence on oil from the Middle East. Central Asia is thus subject
to crosscurrents of political, economic, and military interests
and pressures. It is also at the crossroad of narcoterrorist traffic
that originates in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the region has
enjoyed relative stability because of its large population of moderate
Muslims, secular governments, and (unlike the cast of mind that
prevails in the Southern Caucasus) Moscow’s positive or neutral
attitude toward the region. This situation may be changing. The
presidents of the five republics — all but one former Communist
party leaders — are reaching retirement age. Nevertheless,
presidential successions are far from settled. Kyrgyzstan’s
president, Askar Akayev, was recently ousted from power. Tajikistan,
despite years of peace after a bloody civil war, is still unstable.
Uzbekistan, led by an authoritarian leader, is experiencing turmoil.
Turkmenistan, ruled by an isolationist dictator, appears stable
on the surface but has the potential to erupt. Islamist extremist
ideas are seeping through southern borders, and anti-American feelings,
although not widespread, are growing. Burgeoning populations and
economic stagnation are driving living standards down.
Of all the so-called stans, Kazakhstan is the
richest and the largest state in the area. Like Kyrgyzstan, it has
one of the least repressive regimes in Central Asia. The country
has a considerable Euro-Russian population and a technically educated
elite. It is predominantly secular and pro-American, harbors few
extremists, and does not share borders with Iran and Afghanistan.
Rich in energy and mineral resources, Kazakhstan has been able to
extend the benefits of its economy to a larger share of the population
than in any other Central Asian republic. In addition, Kazakhstan
has absorbed a large migrant labor force from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan.
But Kazakhstan is not without problems. Corruption
and nepotism are endemic. Clan allegiance is still a factor in every
aspect of life. As elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), economic development is uneven throughout society,
resulting in great contrasts between rich and poor. The middle class,
though growing rapidly, is still not sufficiently large. The human
rights situation, though better than elsewhere in the region, is
unsatisfactory. The opposition complains about the electoral process
and the lack of access to the mass media.
The Regime in Kazakhstan
The government of Kazakhstan is generally viewed as
mildly authoritarian but benevolent. It is much less repressive
than the government of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan’s principal neighbor
and competitor for regional leadership. The regime’s shortcomings
can be attributed to the insecurities of the postindependence period;
according to many observers, there is bound to be further political
liberalization, which would reflect the economic liberalization
that has already taken place. The U.S. system of the division of
power is lacking in Kazakhstan. The president, essentially free
from checks and balances, exercises the broadest executive power
with considerable influence over, and little interference from,
the legislature and the judiciary. Local governments are even more
constrained — the principal rationale being the multiethnic,
multicultural, and multireligious nature of the state, the fear
that such diversity will result in appeals to the parochial interests
of voters in local elections that must be countered only by the
presence of a firm unifying force at the top. The power behind the
president seems to reside in his immediate family and the permanent
members of the National Security Council. However, young, modern
thinking, and often Western educated members of the elite who have
been given positions of power greatly improve the prospect for the
ultimate political liberalization of the country.
The parliamentary election of September 2004, in which
only one opposition candidate gained a seat, represented an overall
reversal of progress that had been made. Subsequent developments
have led to widespread criticism in the United States about the
lack of progress toward democratization. In order to deflate U.S.
pressures, the regime stresses its support of common goals from
oil to Kazakh’s participation in the coalitions that support
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its arguments both emphasize
the menace caused by chaos and instability and echo alternating
refrains such as “You don’t understand our culture”
and “Don’t interfere in our internal affairs.” Some
officials contend that after the next presidential election, the
president will give more emphasis to democracy and social programs.
Kazakhstan’s Strategic
Interests
Kazakh officials contend that their country’s
national survival is dependent on the maintenance of a stable equilibrium
among the great powers. From their point of view, the ideal would
involve Kazakstan’s assumption of a buffer position while outside
powers exercise mutual restraint, permitting Kazakhstan to continue
to strengthen its economic and political systems as an independent
member of the international community. Kazakhstan’s nightmare
depicts an aggressive great power rivalry, which could turn the
country and the rest of Central Asia into an arena of great power
contention. Analysis of the contemporary situation, however, suggests
that concurrent advancements in Sino-Kazakh and Russian-Kazakh economic
cooperation are diminishing the possibility of Great Power competition
over Kazakhstan.
To break out of its landlocked isolation, Kazakhstan
is pursuing a policy of diversification for its transit and exit
routes — pipelines, railroads, and roads — and would welcome
an Iranian option for one of its oil pipeline routes.
It is in the strategic interest of Kazakhstan to promote
amicable U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations, including cooperative
consultations on Central Asia and Kazakhstan. It is in Kazakhstan’s
interest to avoid a Russian-Chinese convergence, joined by Iran,
against a perceived U.S. reach for hegemony in Central Asia. The
enlargement of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and prospectively
in the Caucasus may eventually stimulate Chinese-Russian collusion,
complicating Kazakhstan’s geopolitical environment. To quote
Minister of Foreign Affairs Tokaev, Kazakhstan is “quite vulnerable
at the geopolitical level.” So far nothing untoward has happened,
permitting the Kazakhs to exercise free rein in pursuing closer
relations with the United States, including military arrangements.
Regional Leadership
Confident in the economic achievements of their country,
Kazakh officials spoke about their readiness to use the banking
sector and surplus capital to extend Kazakhstan’s economic
influence into the region. In Kyrgyzstan these endeavors are already
underway. We were informed that Kazakh capital is ready to fund
capital-starved Georgia through joint ventures and supplying oil.
Obstacles to regional leadership are daunting because
of the lack of substantial progress toward achieving free-market
reforms in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan and the ambitions
of Uzbek leader Karimov to be the leader of the region. Regional
instability may lead to a loss of Kazakh investment. Moreover, Central
Asia accounts for only 3 percent of Kazakhstan’s foreign trade–a
situation that Kazakh officials attribute to the lack of economic
liberalization in the region (“You cannot be half-pregnant
with a market economy”) and to the overly repressive nature
of the Turkmen and Uzbek regimes.
A Fragile Statehood
Our interlocutors occasionally revealed worries that
centrifugal ethnic sentiments may undermine national unity. The
most striking rendition of this fear was voiced during our meeting
with a high official who indicated that Russian, Uzbek, and other
minorities appear to have a weak allegiance to the state. Moreover,
according to a recent poll, only 40 percent of ethnic Kazakhs identify
themselves with the Kazakh state rather than with their own horde,
or tribe. The prospect of turmoil in Uzbekistan could send ripples
of instability into Kazakhstan. A worst case scenario would produce
regional fragmentation followed by increasing acts of outside interference
undertaken by neighboring Great Powers. Some observers have attributed
Nazarbayev’s authoritarianism to an attempt to address the
fear that ethnocentrism will spiral out of control.
An Economic Success Story
The brightest achievement of the country is its economic
success. According to data provided to us by government officials,
Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew from
$700 to $2,700 during the last decade, a rate of growth second only
to China’s. Moreover, according to the same source, the purchasing
power represented by this amount of money is equivalent to $5,500
in the United States. During the same period, the living standard
increased from 60 percent of Russia’s to 90 percent, and projections
indicate that both standards will soon be equal. By the middle of
this century, Kazakhstan expects to catch up with Poland and Hungary.
Foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan amounts to
$30 billion, of which $20 billion is from the United States. Exports
in 2004 amounted to $21 billion (three-quarters from energy), and
imports totaled $13 billion. Kazakhstan’s principal trading
partners are the European Union and Russia. The government is hoping
that Kazakhstan will be admitted to the World Trade Organization
(WTO). It considers its application, submitted in 1996, to be as
strong as Russia’s, which also is pending. Though many of Kazakhstan’s
energy and mineral resources have been developed, many others can
be harnessed. Kazakhstan is eager to attract private investment
in the manufacturing and consumer sectors, which would be used for
local consumption as well as exports as various new means of transportation
are developed.
According to government statistics, Kazakhstan’s
GDP amounts to 73 percent of that of Central Asia and the Southern
Caucasus combined. Taxes from small- and medium-size enterprises
furnish 53 percent of the country’s revenues. (Oil provides
25 percent.) Unemployment in the capital is almost zero compared
with 8 percent in the country as a whole.
The most critical issue for Kazakhstan is breaking
out of its landlocked, isolated geographic position by opening exit
routes (rail, roads, and pipelines) in all possible directions.
Historically Kazakhstan has been constrained by its location and
the mandate that was enforced when it was part of the Soviet Union
to export through Russia on terms that were not always favorable.
Recent events, however, have opened new opportunities. In particular,
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline provides an alternative route to
the West through territory that is not Russian. Moreover, it is
available on a nondiscriminatory basis, making the Russians more
reasonable in negotiating terms for the use of their facilities.
Furthermore, the American presence in Afghanistan is promoting the
peaceful development of trade routes from that country to and through
Central Asia. Although much of that trade today consists of narcotics
shipped through Central Asia to Russia and the West, the possibility
of using those routes to find outlets to the south for Kazakh exports
is a welcome prospect. Iran is also said to be interested in developing
trade with Central Asia, although the outlet in that direction \
would be relatively small unless a pipeline or other transit facilities
(roads, rails) that traverse Iran to the Persian Gulf could be built.
Many businessmen express serious concerns about recent
developments in the country. Complaints have been made about unreasonable
or unrealistic tax audits. Also, many contend that the most promising
economic opportunities are made available to or are directed toward
certain favored companies and groups. Some areas of the country
remain backward and untouched by modernity. These developments may
account for the reluctance of some investors to commit further investment
capital even though objective macro indicators indicate a favorable
climate for investment.
Kazakhstan’s Powerful
Neighbors—China and Russia
The Chinese play an important role in shaping Kazakhstan’s
geopolitical balancing. Bilateral and multilateral ties reflect
Beijing’s inroads into Central Asia. A pipeline paid for entirely
by China is currently under construction from the Chinese border
to a point close to the Caspian Sea. Moreover, plans are being developed
to construct a uniform gauge railroad from China through Kazakhstan
and Russia all the way to Berlin, enabling Chinese goods to reach
European markets relatively rapidly. Although the construction of
the railroad will primarily facilitate Chinese exports to Europe,
the project offers numerous opportunities for Kazakh goods to move
in both directions. Still the Kazakhs are worried about the signs
of Chinese expansionism around the periphery. A top Kazakh official
surmised that despite Russian inducements, all of Central Asia could
end up in the yuan zone rather than the ruble zone.
Russia is considered as both a potential long-term
threat to Kazakhstan’s survival as a sovereign state and as
a counterweight to Chinese ambitions. But the diversification of
oil routes, as well as the Chinese and American presence, counterbalances
Russian influence. Expressions of concern were voiced about the
Russian population’s doubtful allegiance to Kazakhstan in the
event of a crisis. If the 32 percent of the population in Kazakhstan
that is ethnic Russian is added to the 60 percent of Kazakhs who
reported in a recent poll that their allegiance is subnational rather
than national, the situation appears even more ominous. Consequently,
good relations with its powerful neighbor to the north remain imperative
for Kazakhstan. President Nazarbayev reportedly makes a point of
staying in close contact with President Putin — twice a week
by phone.
Renunciation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD)
The NCAFP delegation was told many times about the
dimensions of the arsenal of WMD that fell into Kazakhstan’s
hands after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991: 1,216 nuclear
warheads (plus the means of delivery), as well as chemical weapons.
During Soviet times some 456 nuclear tests were performed on Kazakh
soil at the enormous Semipalatinsk testing grounds. In addition,
116 tests were conducted above ground. In 1991 Kazakhstan possessed
the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world (equal to 55,000
Hiroshima bombs). In the field of space research and exploration,
the Baikonur space facility on Kazakh soil is still operating under
a renewed Russian lease. Numerous complaints were voiced that Kazakhstan’s
goodwill and leadership in making the historic decision to destroy
its WMD have neither been completely understood nor appreciated.
Muslim Extremism
From the perspective of the officials we met, the
danger of Muslim extremism in Kazakhstan is different from that
in neighboring Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. Extolling the stability
that Kazakhstan has achieved as contrasted with the possibility
of ferment and chaos elsewhere in the region appeared to be the
general line. The arrest last year in Uzbekistan of ethnic Kazakhs
from Uzbekistan, as well as the capture in Kazakhstan of a 16-member
cell of a splinter group from the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
seemed troubling but not alarming. The name Hizb ut-Tahrir (an Uzbek
extremist group) drew little comment. Our Kazakh interlocutors did
not treat this issue as a priority for Kazakhstan. Moreover, there
seemed to be an air of complacency about Muslim extremists within
Kazakhstan’s borders and evidence of relaxed security around
key government buildings. A recent law, however, requires the registration
of all religious groups and prohibits some that are known to be
associated with extremist movements.
Kazakh View of Kazakh-American
Relations
On the positive side, the Kazakhs welcomed America’s
enhanced post-9/ 11 attention to Kazakhstan, regarding it as beneficial
in a number of ways such as smashing the Taliban in Afghanistan,
stopping the infusion of Muslim extremism and its jihadists into
Central Asia from northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, positioning
American forces at the route of narcotics from Afghanistan (not
many positive results so far), and balancing the influence of Kazakh’s
huge Russian and Chinese neighbors. The government recently decided
to increase dramatically — from 500 to 3,000 — the number
of Kazakh students whom it is sponsoring at colleges and universities
abroad. After studying primarily in the United States, the students
will return to Kazakhstan, where their predecessors now occupy positions
of power and influence, cementing mutual understanding and good
relations between Kazakhstan and the West.
The Kazakh military seemed satisfied with their country’s
increasing military relationship with Washington. They emphasized
all aspects of military cooperation, including cooperation in combating
terrorism, promoting Caspian security (the Caspian Guard Project),
and establishing air corridors and implementing landing rights offered
to the U.S. Air Force.
On the negative side was the suspicion that the real
U.S. goals in Kazakhstan mainly center on U.S. access to current
and future Kazakh energy resources. One Kazakh’s comment, “Do
they want oil or democracy?,” suggested that the United States
would be satisfied only with oil. Statements by some Kazakh officials
also reflected the suspicion, probably fanned by Russia, that the
U.S. policy emphasis on democracy and human rights is ultimately
aimed at regime change in Kazakhstan, specifically at installing
a government that will do American bidding.
The New Capital in Astana
A great deal of Kazakhstan’s efforts and investment
has gone into building a new capital in Astana (the former Tselinograd,
capital of the Virgin Land region chosen by Nikita Khrushchev for
a grandiose agricultural venture). Moving the capital from Almaty
to Astana was motivated by several considerations: the desire to
assert a greater Kazakh presence in a predominantly Russian region
of the country and to create distance between the capital and the
Chinese border— away from both the influence of the dominant
Elder Zhus (Horde) and the more liberal Almaty environment. Between
1997 and 2004 the population of Astana increased from 270,000 to
530,000. (By 2030 the population of the capital at Astana is projected
to reach 1.2 million compared with the approximate 1.7 million inhabitants
who are living in Almaty. We were told that $5 billion has been
invested in this modernistic city, and an additional $2 billion
is slated for subsequent investment. Two other priorities are central
to Kazakhstan’s state-building effort: the development of oil
fields and oil pipelines and private developments such as a massive
financial center that is in the planning stages in fast-growing
Almaty.
Views Expressed by the
Opposition
The opposition leaders we met emphasized the judgment
that stability and democracy are linked. They would like U.S. officials
and visitors to discuss human rights and electoral issues during
all their encounters with local officials (“We long for Western
values” and “reject the examples of Singapore and Malayasia”).
They wonder why resolutions of the kind introduced in the U.S. Congress
criticizing Belarus have not been extended to Kazakhstan. They complain
of the lack of access to radio and television and oppose Kazakhstan’s
efforts to gain the presidency of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2009. Opposition leaders dismissed
recent polls evaluating their popular strength at 15 percent as
government sponsored. They also dismissed the National Commission
on Issues of Democratization and Civil Society, a presidential commission
created under the sponsorship of the National Security Council to
promote exchanges of opinions among political parties, because they
consider it as a bogus substitute for genuine political competition.
The opposition is afraid that the United States will
not do much to ensure the transparency of the next presidential
election. This conclusion, they contended, proved correct for all
Kazakh elections held since 1991.
Main Conclusions
The NCAFP delegation reached the following conclusions
at the completion of its fact-finding mission in Kazakhstan.
- During the decade and a third that has elapsed since achieving
its independence, Kazakhstan has become the leading state in former
Soviet Central Asia in terms of such criteria as GDP, GDP per
capita, privatization of the economy, volume of exports, rate
of economic development, volume of energy production, effectiveness
and transparency of the banking system, development of transportation,
growth of technical education, and so forth.
- The process of democratization, though still unsatisfactory
by U.S. standards, has been superior to that undertaken by each
of the other post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. Opposition
parties and groups, though restricted in their access to electronic
media, are allowed to publish newspapers, to hold small meetings,
to equip their offices with telephones and fax lines, and to travel
abroad. Opposition leaders are more often harassed than jailed,
although there have been some violent episodes. On the positive
side, both the Kazakh political establishment and the opposition
are conscious of the geopolitical position of the country, which
necessitates maintaining a balance among Russian ambitions, growing
Chinese influence, Middle Eastern Islamist inroads, and Western
pressures. The principal disagreement between the U.S. and Kazakh
governments relates to whether political and economic liberalization
can proceed simultaneously or whether economic liberalization
must occur first.
- Kazakhstan is fast becoming a key energy producer— behind
the Gulf States and Russia but on par with North Sea producers.
Its production and known reserves are growing, and its role is
steadily increasing. The country is doing what it can to diversify
pipeline routes in order to decrease its dependency on Russian
pipelines (and their often high transit fees) for its exports
to the West.
- Kazakhstan’s armed forces, though small in number, are
the best trained in the region. They receive assistance from the
United States and other sources. The army is becoming professional,
has a qualified officer corps, maintains close contacts with the
U.S. armed forces, and participates in the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program. The training language of
the army is still Russian, but an understanding of English is
growing rapidly. The percentage of ethnic Russians in the armed
forces, though declining, remains substantial.
- Kazakhstan is ethnically, religiously, and linguistically tolerant.
It shows little discrimination against non-Kazakhs, non-Muslims,
or Russian speakers. Ethnic Russians, however, are less visible
than in the 1990s, and since independence the ethnic Kazakh proportion
of the population has increased from less than 40 percent to a
majority. Concurrently the ethnic Russian representation in public
institutions has declined. The urban population is predominantly
secular, the Russian language still predominates, and mixed marriages
are not uncommon—at least in the capitals. Affirmative action
from Soviet times benefits native Kazakh job applicants to the
detriment of Russians. It has reduced rather than eliminated opportunities
for non-Kazakhs.
- The principal political preoccupations of the present regime,
which has been in power since independence, are internal political
stability, the preservation of the country’s independence
through balancing relations with its Great Power neighbors, the
war on terrorism, and narcotraffic. The Confederation of Independent
States is dismissed as outdated, and a new Kazakh foreign policy
doctrine is under consideration. Except for objections raised
to the levels of internal controls maintained in Kazakhstan in
the name of stability, U.S. interests coincide with all other
Kazakh policies.
- Most governmental agencies and independent observers are concerned
about the situation in the rest of Central Asia, especially neighboring
Uzbekistan where they predicted an almost imminent danger of “explosion”
(i.e., violent political unrest and turmoil) triggered by declining
standards of living, harsh rule, and the rise of religious fanaticism
provoked by the desperate situation. The Kazakh government is
concerned about the possibility of a massive influx of refugees
into southern Kazakhstan in such an event. The stability of post-Turkmenbashi
Turkmenistan is regarded as questionable, though less threatening
to Kazakhstan given the relatively small common border. The situations
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are viewed as unsettled.
- Russian ideas about enticing Kazakhstan into the ruble zone
are dismissed as unrealistic. Kazakhstan sees itself as a partner
rather than a client of Russia and perceives China, not Russia,
as the fastest growing force in the area. The presence of American
capital is welcome for its value and as a counterweight to Chinese
inroads.
- Kazakh officials maintain that the country is ready to become
the locomotive of a Central Asian economic “union” by
providing capital and assistance to neighboring states. Given
relations with Uzbekistan and the isolation of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan’s
plans appear to be premature, awaiting regime changes in those
countries. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, is a recipient of Kazakh
aid, and Tajikistan may be a candidate as well.
- Kazakh officials were very concerned about whether the U.S.
secretary of state would certify Kazakhstan as a country that
“has made a significant improvement in the protection of
human rights during the preceding six-month period” as required
by Congress before funds can be allocated. Although U.S. assistance
to the Kazakh military is significant and Kazakhstan has benefited
from other U.S. foreign aid funding, the officials were primarily
concerned about the political impact of a negative decision, which
could discourage foreign investments and blacken the image of
the country. (Subsequent to our meetings with Kazakh officials,
Secretary of State Rice notified Congress that she could not make
the certification but had granted a waiver in light of U.S. national
security interests.)
- Kazakh authorities are appealing to the United States for support
of their candidacy to assume the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009.
Germany reportedly supports Kazakhstan’s candidacy. This
issue is important to the government because occupying the OSCE
chair would buttress President Nazarbayev’s prestige both
domestically and internationally. It would also strengthen Kazakhstan’s
claim to regional leadership and remind the world that Kazakhstan
is an important “European” nation.
- Kazakh officials contend that the country’s post-Soviet
renunciation of its arsenal of WMD, its secular attitude combined
with its ability to maintain an atmosphere marked by the absence
of religious tension, the lack of serious conflicts among ethnic
groups, the positive feeling toward the West in general and the
United States in particular, and especially President Nazarbayev’s
role in implementing those policies should be better appreciated.
NCAFP Policy
Recommendations
To sum up: The United States and Kazakhstan share
a vital interest in the continuation and ultimate success of Kazakhstan’s
political and economic transition to a mature, functioning, secular,
democratic state. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan transcend oil and
Kazakh support for the war on terrorism. They include Kazakhstan’s
strategic importance as a moderate, pro-Western, secular Muslim
state that contains a large non-Muslim population that can serve
as both a model and a stabilizing force in the region; Kazakhstan’s
strategic location as a land bridge from Europe to East and South
Asia; and its potential for being the engine of growth, investment,
and economic development in Central Asia. As seen through the prism
of the Bush Doctrine, Kazakhstan, of all the Central Asian countries,
has the greatest potential for achieving a relatively fast-track
transition from authoritarian pluralism to an acceptable form of
functioning democracy.
Based on the fact-finding conclusions of the NCAFP
delegation and the summary of U.S. interests presented above, the
National Committee on American Foreign Policy makes the following
recommendations consistent with American foreign policy interests.
- U.S. policy should assist and not undermine the basic Great
Power equilibrium that Kazakhstan is attempting to sustain in
order to maintain its independence and pursue economic development
and modernization. It is in the interest of the United States
to forge special relationships with Central Asian countries in
order to contribute to the stability of the region. U.S. policy
should be sensitive to the fragility of Kazakhstan’s geopolitical
position.
- The United States must show more understanding of the Kazakh
reality given that it has experienced only 13 years of independence;
has pursued privatization and democratization for only a brief
time; must accommodate a multiethnic, multitribal, and multireligious
population; and has to confront instability in neighboring states.
Steady improvement, not rapid progress, should be the expectation.
American pressure should be exerted but not overused. To promote
mutual understanding, the United States must make an effort to
explain to the Kazakhs how the American political system functions,
something a society that has emerged from a Soviet system finds
difficult to comprehend.
- The United States must continue to emphasize that American interests
in Kazakhstan are not limited to oil, security, and counterterrorism.
It also must communicate the fact that because Kazakhstan is a
secular Muslim state that contains a large non-Muslim minority,
is sympathetic to the West, and is undergoing rapid economic development
that is providing a better standard of living for the diverse
population, the country is of vital importance to U.S. interests
and those of the entire region as well.
- U.S. interests would be served if Kazakhstan’s burgeoning
free market becomes the engine of growth in Central Asia and if
Kazakhstan becomes more financially engaged in the Southern Caucasus.
Kazakhstan’s ability to play a leading role in the economies
of the other republics of the region, as well as make investments
in the Southern Caucasus, would have a stabilizing effect on the
region as a whole. According to all accepted criteria, Kazakhstan,
as the leading state in former Soviet Central Asia, should be
the centerpiece of U.S. efforts in the region. Its rapid development
requires the informed attention of the U.S. government and the
skillful formulation of an appropriate foreign policy.
- The United States should encourage Kazakhstan to create an opening
to the south through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan to
Pakistan, India, and the Indian Ocean. This opening would proceed
slowly as trade and transport routes develop naturally in the
wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Transregional commerce
between Central and South Asia will have a beneficial effect on
world politics. Substantial progress has been made in rebuilding
and augmenting Afghanistan’s road network connecting South
Asia, the Indian Ocean, and Central Asia. Railroads and pipelines
are on the drawing board and could go forward if stability in
Afghanistan is attained.
- The United States has a legitimate interest in promoting democratic
values by basing foreign aid to Kazakhstan and Central Asia on
individual regimes’ records of protecting human rights. The
current certification process mandated by Congress, which requires
the secretary of state to find that significant improvement has
taken place during the preceding six-month period or grant a waiver
for national security reasons, is hardly the most effective leverage
that can be exerted. Consideration should be given to a revised
process that would give the secretary of state more discretion
in responding to the observance of human rights in the region
by rewarding progress or withholding benefits in a time frame
that would not be limited to six months. The NCAFP supports the
recent decision of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to waive
the requirement. We believe that it would have been counterproductive
to American foreign policy interests to cut off such U.S. foreign
aid to Kazakhstan as IMET and U.S. democracy projects.
- The United States should make clear to the Kazakh leadership
what incremental steps Kazakhstan can take to achieve a favorable
finding; for example, the appointment of independent observers
or monitors to electoral commissions, the proper counting of ballots,
the public posting of protocols at the precinct level, improved
access to media, and the right of assembly. How to devise and
implement such measures may be an appropriate focus of Track I
or Track II engagement.
- The United States should coordinate its efforts with the European
Union to promote open societies, free and fair elections, and
humanitarian goals in Central Asia in order to prevent the inference
that American preoccupations with the area are mere reflections
of U.S. foreign policy aimed at achieving U.S. dominance and securing
the flow of oil. Coordination with EU countries would increase
leverage on human rights issues and electoral reform in Kazakhstan
given its interest in acceding to the OSCE chair in 2009.
- The United States should continue to support and encourage educational
and cultural exchanges with Kazakhstan as a means of stimulating
mutual interests and understanding. Kazakhstan has begun to increase
its support for these exchanges, and the United States should
advance this effort by facilitating both the processing of visas
and the acceptance of Kazakh students at U.S. universities.
Appendix
Hosts: Kazakhstan
The NCAFP expresses special thanks to our hosts in
Kazakhstan. We are especially grateful to Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Kazakhstan H. E. Kassymzhomart Tokaev. He met
with the NCAFP Central Asia Project group twice in New York and
invited us to send a fact-finding delegation to Kazakhstan. Also,
we thank H. E. Kanat, B. Saudabaev, and H. E. Yerzhan Kazykhanov,
Kazakhstan’s ambassadors to the United States and the United
Nations, respectively, for their assistance and express our appreciation
as well to Serik Zhanibekov, counselor of Kazakhstan’s Mission
to the United Nations, who handled all the technical arrangements
with great skill and accompanied us in Kazakhstan. We express thanks
as well to the Perspektiva Foundation, whose representatives, Birjan
Murataliyev, Alexander Sosnin, Victor Seipulnik, and Shamil Tyncherov,
assisted in making our appointments; keeping us on schedule; translating
when necessary; and wining, dining, and accommodating us in every
way imaginable.
Interlocutors
We are grateful also to the following high-level government
officials in the Republic of Kazakhstan and the United States and
to other individuals and nongovernmental organizations that took
time to meet with us to discuss the issues covered in this report.
Republic of Kazakhstan
(in chronological order)
Government Officials
The Hon. Imangaly Tasmagambetov,
akim (mayor) of Almaty
The Hon. Askar R. Yelemessov,
deputy governor of the National Bank of Kazakhstan
The Hon. Semylok Raimbayev,
deputy minister of justice
The Hon. Nartay Dutbayev,
chairman of the National Security Committee
The Hon. Alexei Y. Volkov,
vice minister of foreign affairs
The Hon. Erik M. Utembayev,
deputy to the secretary of the Security Council
The Hon. Vladimir Shkolnik,
minister of energy and mineral resources
The Hon. Marat Y. Tolibaev,
deputy akim (mayor) of Astana
Major General Bulat Sembinov,
deputy minister of defense
Other Individuals
Bektas Mukhamedzhanov,
general director, International Institute for Modern Politics
Zharmakhan Tuyakbay,
chairman of the Democratic Forces Forum of Kazakhstan
Amirzhan Kossanov,
cochairman of the Democratic Forces Forum of Kazakhstan
Nongovernmental Organizations
The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Kazakhstan Institute
for Strategic Studies, which cohosted a “Conference on Central
Asia as a Land Bridge Between Europe and China” with the cosponsorship
of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Kazakhstan.
The United States
Department of State (in Washington)
Daniel Russell,
director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs
John Fox,
director of the Office of Caucasus and Central Asian Affairs
in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Kent Logsdon,
deputy director of the Office of Caucasus and Central Asian Affairs
in the Bureau of European and Asian Affairs
Jonathan Mudge,
Kazakhstan desk officer
John Parker,
division chief, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(in Kazakhstan)
The Hon. John M. Ordway,
U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Kazakhstan
Mark Asquino,
deputy chief of the U.S. Mission to Kazakhstan
Department of Defense
Brigadier General Jeffrey Remington,
deputy director of political and military affairs for Asia, the
Joint Staff
Colonel Randy Warner,
Central/South Asia division chief
Colonel Jerry Sullivan,
Central Asia branch chief
Colonel Scott Norwood
National Security Council
Matthew J. Bryza,
director, Aegean, Caucasus, and Central Asian Affairs
Other Individuals and Nongovernmental Organizations
Martha Brill Olcott,
senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Michael Ochs,
staff adviser, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARTICIPANTS
We are grateful to the following individuals who participated
in a roundtable on March 23, 2005, at the NCAFP’s headquarters
at 320 Park Avenue, New York City.
Dr. Rafis Abazov,
lecturer, the Harriman Institute at Columbia University
Dr. Hilda Eitzen,
independent expert
Richard R. Howe, Esq.,
NCAFP treasurer
Dr. Gulnar Kendirbai,
lecturer, the Harriman Institute at Columbia University
Jenny Lyons,
U.S. Peace Corps and the Harriman Institute at Columbia University
Donald S. Rice, Esq.,
NCAFP senior vice president
William M. Rudolf,
NCAFP executive vice president
Professor Michael Rywkin,
NCAFP Central Asia project director
Dr. George D. Schwab,
NCAFP president
Dr. Peter J. Sinnott,
director, Caspian Sea Project at Columbia University
Dr. Christophr Walker,
Freedom House
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