Transatlantic Relations
ROUNDTABLE ON ANTI-AMERICANISM IN EUROPE: SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Bernard E. Brown, May 10, 2004
Printable PDF Version
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
The May 2004 Roundtable on Anti-Americanism in Europe is part of
a long-term series of conferences sponsored by the National Committee
on American Foreign Policy. These roundtables include policy analysts,
academics, and former and current diplomats from both the United
States and Europe.
The series began in May 2002 when three members of the National
Committee met with five European researchers who agreed to participate.
A first roundtable on Reinventing the Transatlantic Partnership
met in New York in October 2002, followed by a second in Geneva
in June 2003. We are grateful to Dr. Julian Lindley-French, formerly
director of transatlantic relations at the Institute of Security
Studies of the European Union in Paris and subsequently faculty
member of the Geneva Center for Security Policy, who coordinated
efforts on the European side. The accounts of our preliminary meeting
in Brussels in May 2002, the first roundtable in New York in October
2002, and the second in Geneva in June 2003 have been published
as booklets (available on request from the National Committee) and
on our Web site (www.NCAFP.org). We thank the European Commission
and Mutual of America for their generous support of those roundtables.
We have continued our examination of the transatlantic relationship
in a series of meetings in which members of the European diplomatic
community in New York have participated. In this roundtable on Anti-Americanism
in Europe, we experimented with a new format. The organizers of
the roundtable prepared beforehand “A Framework for Discussion”
offering a preliminary analysis of the topic and setting four questions
for participants to discuss. Several members of the roundtable volunteered
to prepare brief and pointed answers to those questions, sharing
with the group their own personal experience as diplomats, scholars,
and business people. The presenters are identified in this report.
In order to encourage a free and frank exchange of views, participants
in the ensuing discussion and those serving currently in official
positions have not been named. The policy recommendations following
the report are those only of the National Committee on American
Foreign Policy.
Special thanks go to Professor Bernard E. Brown, the National Committee’s
project director on transatlantic relations and the author of the
framework for discussion and this report. Thanks also to Professor
Joseph LaPalombara, who shared responsibility for selecting participants
and organizing the conference. It is a pleasure to acknowledge Mutual
of America Life Insurance Company’s continuing support for
this project.
George D. Schwab, President
National Committee on American Foreign Policy
A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION
Anti-Americanism in Europe is hardly new. But most observers agree
that it is now resurgent, carrying with it serious consequences
for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic. Any number of journalists
and researchers may be cited who report that anti-American sentiment
among Europeans has never been as intense and as deep since World
War II. (The United States was hardly admired in Germany during
the war or in France under Vichy.) On all sides we hear that Europeans
are not only critical of U.S. policies but also of the American
model of politics, economy, society, and culture. According to the
latest opinion survey sponsored by the Pew Research Center, released
on March 16, 2004, between the summer of 2002 and March 2004, U.S.
favorability ratings went down in France from 63 to 37 percent,
in Germany from 61 to 38 percent, and even in Britain from 75 to
58 percent. Favorable views of Americans, as distinguished from
the American nation, also hit new lows: 53 percent in France (down
from 71 percent in 2002) and 68 percent in Germany, though remaining
relatively high at 83 percent in Britain. As one indication of policy
implications, support for an independent European foreign policy
has gone up to 75 percent of the public in France (from 60 percent
in 2002), 63 percent in Germany (up from 51 percent), and even 56
percent in Britain (formerly 47 percent).
Another recent survey commissioned by the European Commission and
released in November 2003 indicates that many Europeans are now
hostile to and even fearful of the United States and its policies.
When asked which countries represent the greatest menace to world
peace, Europeans ranked the United States in sixth place, just after
such obvious candidates as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
The country considered by Europeans to be public enemy number one
(by 55 percent in France, 65 percent in Austria, and 74 percent
in the Netherlands) is Israel. Ceci explique cela. I am aware
that public opinion surveys are subject to error (in the case of
the Pew survey, an admitted margin of up to 5 percent), that responses
are affected by the way in which questions are phrased, and that
governments should not simply follow the polls. But let us take
opinion surveys as at least partial evidence of a trend: that anti-Americanism
in Europe now runs deep. Perhaps the first question that we should
address, then, is how deep and how significant is it?
Assuming that we are dealing with a real phenomenon, the next step
is to appraise its causes. For many, the cause is the Bush administration,
whose policies and style have alienated Europeans. French Defense
Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie declared in the run-up to the
war in Iraq: Europeans have no problems with the American people
but rather with this administration, in particular the “neo-conservatives”
and “radical neo-liberals.” But former French Foreign
Minister Hubert Védrine scoffs at the notion that the source
of all evil is the Bush administration. Since the disappearance
of the common enemy, he declared in an essay in Le Monde (December
24, 2003), such a belief is a way of avoiding the issue that confronts
Europeans and the rest of the world: how to confront a “Gulliver-U.S.”
resolved not to allow itself to be tied down by the “Lilliputians
of multilateralism” in a tough and conflicted world where the
United Nations is powerless. Even with another president, argues
Védrine, the United States will protect its sovereignty and
act unilaterally. British political scientist Christopher Croker
likewise states: “Nothing is more naïve than the claim
that the rifts are likely to end if Bush fails to be reelected in
2004 or if the Schroeder government loses power” (cited by
Robert Kagan, Of Power and Paradise, p. 106). Let us proceed on
the assumption that even if George Bush is voted out of office,
there is a need to hold this roundtable. Had Prince Hamlet killed
King Claudius in Act I, Scene 1, there would have been no play,
and the groundlings would have demanded their money back. What are
the underlying reasons for the flare-up of anti-Americanism in
Europe? Let me suggest some possibilities that may serve as a basis
for discussion.
The End of the Cold War
In the course of two roundtables sponsored by the National Committee
on American Foreign Policy in October 2002 and June 2003, American
and European participants disagreed sharply on virtually every international
issue. But all agreed quickly on the reason for the worsening transatlantic
relationship: There is no longer a threat of a sudden, massive attack
from the Soviet Union. Europe could not allow its alliance with
the United States to be put at risk when Soviet armored divisions
were massed only 25 miles from Hamburg. The United States also had
a vital interest in preventing the Soviet Union from dominating
or intimidating Western Europe. It was all for one and one for all.
With the collapse of European communism, Americans and West Europeans
no longer need each other as desperately as they once did. Europeans
do not have to take orders from the Big Boss, and Americans see
no need to accept directives or lectures on morality from quarrelsome
allies turning into rivals. Each side sees the other as arrogant.
Europe is now secure from invasion from the East or any other direction.
Perhaps its good fortune is due to America’s commitment to
defend Western Europe through NATO during the cold war. But political
leaders act on the basis of perceived national interests, not out
of gratitude for past favors. The very success of NATO has enabled
Europeans to resist American leadership, letting loose nationalist
sentiment that previously had been bottled up.
Europe Can Say No to the United States
The increasing integration of Europe is a revolutionary event that
has already changed the structure of power in the world. The European
Union (EU) now has a population 50 percent greater than that of
the United States and a comparable standard of living. There is
no longer a sense of inferiority, as in the period immediately after
World War II. A natural consequence of identifying with one’s
community is to consider that community superior to its neighbors
(usually for illusory reasons). A growing European nationalism supplements
the nationalism of individual member states. As they looked around
the world half a century after the end of World War II, Europeans
took justified pride in their relative prosperity and in the kinds
of political systems and welfare states they had created. Many believed
that their way of life was actually superior to that of Americans
in that they had established a better balance between states and
markets, the common good, and individual rights. “There is
a European art of living,” went a typical statement by then
French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (full text in Le Monde,
May 29, 2001). “Europe is the
space on the planet,” he continued, “where the rule of
law is best achieved. It is the only political grouping within which
the death penalty no longer exists. It is the land where respect
for the human person is pushed to its highest point.”
At the European summit meeting in Lisbon in 2000, the assembled
heads of government pledged to create within a decade “the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world,
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs.”
They added, in a swipe at the United States, that the goal included
“greater social cohesion.” In addition, European leaders
reaffirmed their intention to create a Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and eventually a common defense to back it up. The
member states of the EU have more troops under arms than the United
States. Why not combine them into a force as powerful as that wielded
by the United States? The Americans had learned more than two centuries
ago that in unity there is strength and
independence from foreign domination. The Europeans were at last
learning the same lesson. The new European goals are an echo of
the slogan proclaimed for the Soviet Union in the 1930s by Joseph
Stalin: “Catch up to and surpass America.”
Feeding this burgeoning European nationalism is profound resentment
that so much global power is concentrated in and wielded by the
United States.That the United States is the only superpower is a
constant theme in European political discourse. Well before the
election of George W. Bush, Hubert Védrine coined the term
“hyperpower” (hyperpuissance) to denote the massive
economic, social, cultural, and political, as well as military power
enjoyed by the United States. Never before in history, he declared,
have the subjects of an empire been so thoroughly and willingly
dominated. His intention was to denounce, not to celebrate, American
power. It is not healthy for the world order that so
much power is wielded by one nation, he said, even if that nation
is relatively beneficent. Were France the superpower, he freely
admitted, it probably would be resented even more. The diffusion
of power is a central theme in American political culture and is
at the root of its constitutional system. Hence out of respect for
the accomplishments of the American founders, Europeans (and everyone
else, for that matter), suggested Védrine, should create
independent centers of power.
But Europeans Are Frustrated
The EU remains and will remain in the foreseeable future a hybrid.
In the domain of economic and social policy, decisions are made
by qualified majorities and on the initiative of a supranational
agency, the Commission. But as regards foreign and security policy,
the power centers are the states. Giscard d’Estaing, president
of the European Convention, in presenting a draft constitution to
the public in June 2003, reminded critics that the European Union
is “an organization, not a political identity.” His use
of the term “political identity” called attention to the
importance of a sense of political community, which
does not now exist in Europe sufficiently to sustain a state. To
put it bluntly, the EU is not a state. President Giscard thus affirmed
previous declarations of British Prime Minister Blair and French
President Chirac that the EU is a “federation of nation-states.”
Although a function of policy coordination is vested in a high representative
of the CFSP (currently Javier Solana), all matters relating to foreign
and security policy now and under the proposed constitution require
the unanimous consent of the heads of member governments. The contrast
between the relative success of Europeans in forging economic unity
and their inescapable failure to create unity in foreign and security
policy has led to frustration and feelings of powerlessness in dealing
with the United States. As a result anti-American rhetoric frequently
is tinged with rage.
The Middle East Conflict
The perceived interests of individual European states and of the
United States are divergent in the Middle East. Europe has a more
direct economic stake than the United States in North Africa and
the greater Middle East. France and Germany in particular
had substantial economic and political ties with Iraq. These differences
between European and American interests are normal and more or less
manageable. Disagreement over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is
more difficult to resolve. Europeans are more sympathetic to the
Palestinians and view the United States as partial to Israel. It
is significant that the poll commissioned by the EU cited Israel
as the country posing the greatest threat to world peace and placed
the United States in sixth place. Anti-Americanism in Europe is
colored by hostility to Israel and perhaps by historic currents
of anti-Semitism.
Domestic Factors
Antipathy to American culture, society, economy, and politics has
always been a strong current in Europe particularly on the extreme
left and the extreme right and as part of home-grown nationalism.
Anti-Americanism in France, to take one example, is normal. Pro-Americanism
is aberrant and has to be explained. The hard core of anti-American
sentiment in France amounts to about one-third of the population
as measured by votes for parties hostile to the United States, to
which may be added probably another one-third that looks down on
all other nations, including the United States. On the first ballot
in the presidential election of April 2002, the two Trotskyite candidates
together received about 10 percent of the vote and the Communist
candidate almost 4 percent. These candidates and their supporters
retain a Marxist view of the world adjusted somewhat to place the
blame for the collapse of the Soviet Union on an unfortunate Stalinist
distortion. In their view capitalism remains evil and is responsible
for the exploitation of workers and the oppression of masses everywhere.
The United States for them is the global center of capitalism and
imperialism. Before the failure of orthodox communism in Europe,
the French Communist party averaged between 15 and 20 percent of
the vote, ranging up to 28 percent shortly after the Liberation.
The candidate of the Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, received
almost 17 percent of the vote on the first ballot in 2002, putting
him ahead of the Socialist candidate and in the runoff. The extreme
right has always been significant in France. Its roots extend to
the Old Regime and the Catholic church before the Revolution, Bonapartist
rule and monarchist restoration in the 19 th century, fascism (including
the Vichy regime) in the 20th century, and the perennial defense
of traditional groups threatened by modernization. For the
extreme right, the United States represents all that is wrong with
the modern world: lack of respect for hierarchy and the well-born,
a mass culture in which money dominates and drives out quality,
plutocracy masquerading as democracy, dehumanizing rationality,
and ruthless modernization. The American model of capitalism in
particular is under attack from both the worker-oriented left and
a paternalistic right. Add to the extreme left and the extreme right
general distrust of any foreign nation, in particular one that is
wealthy and powerful, and there is ample fertile ground for suspicion
of and hostility toward the United States whenever perceived national
interests are divergent.
In addition, about 15 million Muslims are now permanent residents
of Western Europe, creating new political pressures within democratic
political processes. It is inevitable that political parties will
seek support from this group, which is overwhelmingly hostile to
Israel and its presumed protector, the United States. A fiercely
anti-American force is now embedded in the structure of European
politics.
What Is to Be Done?
It is tempting to believe that anti-Americanism is a result of
ignorance or prejudice and can be eliminated by giving people more
accurate information. But tackling anti-Americanism directly may
well be fruitless. The hostility of many Europeans to Americans
is an expression of European nationalism and a reflection of domestic
partisan cultures. Whether or not anti-Americanism increases or
decreases depends on larger geopolitical trends. On the bright side
is the increasing integration of North American and European economies,
which is changing the political equation. As the economist Joseph
Quinlan points out, the transatlantic relationship is by far the
most important intercontinental relationship in the world. The pace
of European investment in America and of American investment in
Europe has been four to six times greater since the end of the cold
war than in the four preceding decades. Through direct investment
and mergers a transatlantic economy has emerged that is now about
one fourth the size of either the American or the European economy.
Disputes regarding antitrust policy and subsidies are serious; but
they affect perhaps 2 percent of total transatlantic commerce and
can be negotiated through agreed-on structures.
A dense network of links between American and European universities
and research institutes is also contributing to deeper understanding.
NATO has fostered the development of a transatlantic community among
diplomats and political leaders as well as the military. Above all,
there is a sense among the political classes in the United States
and Europe that they face common threats from instability in the
greater Middle East and from international terrorism and that their
common adversaries are exploiting political and policy differences.
The best way to deal with resurgent anti-Americanism in Europe
probably is to identify common interests and bridge policy differences.
But it will not be easy for an underlying
structural reason: The United States is a state, and the European
Union is a federation of states (or an "organization,"
to use Giscard¡'s term). Transatlantic relations will always
be asymmetrical until that distant day (if ever) when a transformed
European Union becomes a single "power."
The purpose of this framework for discussion is to enable members
of the roundtable to deal with the issue of anti-Americanism in
Europe and its ramifications and to help the group offer suggestions
for better managing the current crisis. A number of questions may
be posed for consideration by the roundtable. The following list
is intended to be suggestive; it is neither exhaustive nor limitative.
- Drawing on personal experience, how deep and how significant
do you think anti-Americanism is in Europe? To what extent is
anti-Americanism caused by the policies and style of the Bush
administration? Does anti-Americanism vary according to class
or status (masses versus elites, business people, intellectuals,
bureaucrats, et al.)?
- Are the United States and Europe evolving as different models
of democracy, economy, society, and culture? Are they drifting
apart to the extent that a “clash of civilizations”
is eroding the transatlantic community? Or are differences stylistic
and
insubstantial? How important is it that America “skipped
the stage of feudalism” (as argued by S. M. Lipset, Samuel
P. Huntington, Louis Hartz, et al., drawing on Tocqueville). Inasmuch
as the images and feelings of one people toward another are a
two-way street, is it worthwhile to consider the sources of anti-Europeanism
in America?
- Are American and European approaches to international issues
different and possibly incompatible? Reference should be made
to unilateralism versus multilateralism, the use of force (particularly
in dealing with genocide, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction
[WMD], failed states, etc.), and attitudes toward international
law and the United Nations.
- Is anti-Americanism due to structural causes—most important,
the status of the United States as a superpower and of Europe
as a federation of nation-states?
- In the light of our discussions, what is to be done? In order
to focus attention on and provide structure to the proceedings,
some participants volunteered to offer brief and pointed “prepared
answers” to questions of special interest to them, followed
by free-ranging discussion. Here is a summary of statements by
presenters and comments by discussants.
SUMMARY OF ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION 1
Drawing on personal experience, how deep and how significant do
you think anti-Americanism is in Europe? To what extent is it caused
by the policies and style of the Bush administration?
Herman J. Cohen, Presenter.
Topic: “The Mind-set of European Diplomatic, Political, and
Military Elites”
Emphasizing European approaches to problems of security, the speaker
made six major points.
- Europeans believe that the United States has retreated from
multilateralism. In their view, the multilateral approach to security
problems has been useful, notably in Bosnia and Kosovo. Multilateralist
approaches by Africans, for example, help greatly in dealing with
the problems of that continent. Europeans welcomed George H. Bush’s
speech to the United Nations toward the end of his term in which
he said that multilateralism would be the key to American policy.
He ordered a reluctant Defense Department to gear up for a role
in peacekeeping. When peacekeeping failed in Somalia, Americans
readily blamed the UN. As secretary of state, Madeleine Albright
barely concealed her disdain for UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali.
Distrust of the UN has persisted under George W. Bush.
- Europeans are critical of the United States for diluting international
conventions. They point in particular to its denunciation of the
antiballistic missile treaty and circumvention of the Geneva Convention
in dealing with prisoners at Guantanomo. The United States also
holds the record for not ratifying treaties already signed.
- The United States is seen as riding roughshod over reciprocity
in attempting to impose penalties on foreign companies violating
American laws regarding trade with Libya, Cuba, and other rogue
states. Europeans would like to engage with Iran through cultural
exchange, trade, and investment, but U.S. laws (even when not
applied) have a chilling effect on the private sector.
- Europeans believe that the United States is trying to reinvent
the wheel on terrorism. In their view, the United States discovered
nonstate terrorism only on 9/11, whereas they have experienced
terrorism since at least the 1970s (Irish Republican Army, Action
Directe, Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhof, Basques, Corsicans, as
well as Islamic militants). Americans did not ponder the lessons
the Europeans learned the hard way, notably the hijacking of a
civilian airliner by Islamic militants who intended to fly it
into the Eiffel Tower.
- Europeans fault the United States for not consulting them sufficiently.
For example, the United States made all the decisions in NATO,
which were accepted by them because the United States had the
deterrent. Since the end of the cold war, the Europeans have been
less tolerant of the American tendency not to consult them. Examples
of nonconsultation are Warren Christopher’s handling of the
Bosnia problem, which he simply turned over to the Europeans,
and the American assumption of command in Iraq.
- Europeans believe that the United States does not know its
own strength, which it uses without adequate consideration for
others; at the same time it is not aware of its own weakness.
When Hubert Védrine called the United States a hyperpower,
he was implying not only great power but also erratic behavior.
Europeans believe that they can keep some control over American
policy as it relates to Europe but that outside of Europe the
United States frequently does not know what to do. The U.S. experience
in Iraq indicates that the superpower is less super than it thought
it was. The speaker observed, in conclusion, that in his opinion
much of the European criticism of the United States is valid.
Stanton Burnett, Presenter.
Topic: “Differences Between Elite and Public Opinion
and Causes of the Decline in Esteem”
The speaker pointed out that public opinion polls do indicate a
general decline in esteem for the United States. Some of the increase
in anti-Americanism in Eastern Europe, according to survey research,
is caused by the rise of anti-Semitism. It is considered poor form
to express anti-Semitic sentiments but legitimate to lambaste the
United States for its presumed support of Israel.
Americans want to be loved, he continued. But that should not be
a fundamental concern of either taxpayers or the government. Our
goal should be to further American national
interests. Opinion surveys, however, show a close relationship between
some hard policy choices and overall feelings about the United States.
We do best when these are addressed with precise calculations about
which groups are salient for which policy issues.
Reliance on media products with the U.S. government label is less
effective, especially in Europe, than civilized discourse involving
U.S. officials and key European opinion leaders. Such contacts may
be either informal or carefully structured. American officials should
be sophisticated, have strong language skills, and be in contact
on a regular basis with
officials, journalists, scholars, and party leaders (including those
in the opposition). Our messages should appear to emanate from them.
With the end of the cold war, however, congressional support for
training and paying competent Foreign Service officials collapsed.
The speaker fears that our capacity to handle policy and consultations
has been grievously weakened. We are no longer as able to engage
European officials at the middle as well as top levels in civilized
discourse.
In the ensuing discussion, three American former diplomats who
served in NATO stated that the United States did in fact consult
with the allies. One said that the United States argued and had
to argue its case vigorously but eventually was able to bring the
allies
around. For example, the Europeans objected when the United States
declared that it would not tolerate the taking of hostages by Serbs
in Bosnia; at the time the Europeans had troops on the ground and
the United States did not. It was a serious dispute that had to
be handled through negotiation. A second former U.S. diplomat also
was emphatic that the United States consulted continuously with
the allies in NATO. Sometimes one European delegation was on board
at the beginning of the process and then swung into opposition and
had to be persuaded all over again. A third former U.S. diplomat
said that consultation at NATO varied with the issues and was more
concrete at some times than at others. But policy was always better
coming out of consultations than going in. One European diplomat
asserted that Europeans should stop complaining about multilateralism,
but several of his colleagues disagreed.
One European discussant argued that Bush’s policies did not
differ that much from Clinton’s, but the style was different.
People should be respected. Even if the substance of policy remains
the same, style is important. Europeans are not against the United
States, he said, but rather against the radical right in power.
They would like things to be as they were in the past. Another European
diplomat from a small country said that different policy choices
by Europeans should not be viewed as anti-Americanism. Military
might is not enough in itself. Everyone has something to contribute.
In approaching issues we should acknowledge the need for mutual
respect among allies. A former U.S. diplomat agreed. The effort
to go it alone in Iraq, he said, has failed. We do not need to be
loved; but we do need allies. Another former U.S. diplomat emphasized
the need to engage with allies in dealing with current crises in
Iran and North Korea.
An American academic discussant questioned whether the United Nations
is part of the solution or part of the problem. He pointed out that
the UN-supervised oil for food program in Iraq was thoroughly corrupt
and that as an intergovernmental organization the UN is no better
than its member states. Sudan has just been elected to the UN Commission
on Human Rights. But it is a country in which slavery still exists
and where a murderous ethnic conflict is raging. Multilateralism
has to be judged by its results.
Another American academic disputed the notion that Hubert Védrine’s
characterization of the United States as a “hyperpower”
was negative. Védrine used the term to designate the United
States as a kind of megapower in its own right, set off from a group
of lesser powers. Védrine defended François Mitterrand’s
vision of the world, which was not anti-American. For this discussant
the real villain in the Franco-American crisis over Iraq was President
Chirac. A former U.S. diplomat said that the United States is held
to a higher
standard. It stands for certain values and is looked to for moral
leadership. However, the United States threw away this advantage
when it imposed its views concerning the use of force in Iraq and
when it went along with Sharon’s policy of fostering settlements
at first in Gaza as well as the West Bank.
An American academic discussant returned to an observation made
by Dr. Burnett concerning anti-Americanism as a polite form of anti-Semitism.
He thought this to be the case, pointing to certain recurrent themes:
that Americans and Jews consider themselves a chosen people, are
powerful, and are at the head of a monstrous conspiracy to control
or dominate the world.
In response to discussants, Ambassador Cohen said that Europeans
really complain not about the lack of consultation but about the
fact that decisions are made ahead of time. The United Nations has
been a perfect instrument of American policy; Europeans cannot understand
why the United States is moving away from cultivating multilateral
institutions. Also, multilateralism is not confined to the UN. In
Kosovo it was impossible to secure a specific mandate from the Security
Council because of the Russian veto; multilateral action nonetheless
took place through NATO. For Europeans, reciprocity is understood
by the United States as a one-way street. As for terrorism, the
most effective policy is to root out the cells. Here the European
contribution is vital. In general, he tends to agree with the European
criticism.
Dr. Burnett added, in conclusion, that human rights rather than
democracy should be the touchstone of our relations with other countries.
Jimmy Carter had it right.
QUESTION 2
Are the United States and Europe evolving as different models of
democracy, economy, society, and culture? Are they drifting apart
to the extent that a “clash of civilizations” is eroding
the transatlantic community?
Michael Curtis, Presenter.
Topic: “The Clash of Civilizations”
There has always been some rivalry between Europe
and the United States, began the speaker, and differences in style.
Examples of rivalry would include Airbus versus Boeing; differences
in style are evident in the structure and policies of the Federal
Reserve Board and the European Central Bank, relative roles of the
state and markets, and the significance of religion in each society.
But differences may easily be magnified. On the role of religion,
for example, Europeans may consider Americans to be too religious,
whereas Muslims condemn Americans as too secular. Also, with enlargement
the new
members are more pro-American than many of the existing members.
We should also avoid excessive emphasis on murky literary terms
like modern versus postmodern or hard power versus soft power to
characterize differences.
Historically, going back even to the colonial period,
there has been a great deal of anti-Americanism on the part of Europeans.
European visitors castigated all aspects of American society and
culture, including even animal life, as inferior. These nationalist
prejudices persist in many forms. French extreme left intellectuals
in particular
have been vehement in condemning the United States, in calling for
the destruction of American power, and even in proclaiming that
the United States deserved the attack of 9/11. A milder version
of anti-Americanism identifies the United States with unilateralism,
Hobbes, and brute force, whereas Europe is linked to multilateralism,
Kant, and the rule of law. European pretensions are also expressed
in France’s mission civilisatrice and Harold Macmillan’s
observation that the United Kingdom could play the role of Greece
to the
American Rome.
But the contrast is overdrawn. The United States has
been compelled to act sometimes because Europeans were unable to
act. American unilateralism has protected Europe. The notion of
“soft power” is ambiguous. Furthermore, European foreign
policy is largely regional due to a decline in its ability to project
power. Weakness has led to envy and an obsession with the United
States whose policies are blamed for whatever goes wrong in the
world. Finally, the presenter called attention to the changing nature
of European society due above all to the mass immigration of Muslims.
Given continuing immigration and the galloping birthrate of Muslims
compared to Europeans, he wonders whether France might become an
Islamic state by 2050. This would lead to a real “clash of
civilizations.”
Paolo Zannoni, Presenter
Topic: “Differences Between American and European Economic
Models”
There are significant differences between U.S. and
European economic models on national levels, said the presenter,
and also on the European Union level. The extent of state intervention
in the economy is greater in Europe than in the United States. In
Europe, some sectors of the economy are dominated by state companies.
In the United States, government intervention is based on regulation.
As regards antitrust action, in the United States the government
looks at the effect of concentration on the consumer; in Europe
governments and the EU Commission take into account the interests
of producers and suppliers, as well as consumers and the role of
national champions.
Government intervention in the United States is generally
more limited, more focused on foreign trade, and sometimes affected
by foreign policy considerations. In Europe, government intervenes
more directly in the actions of producers and corporations; for
example, the French government’s recent decisions regarding
mergers in the pharmaceutical industry. European regulators are
more likely to protect credit institutions rather than investors,
as illustrated by the case of Parmalat. There are also stronger
links in Europe between financial institutions and manufacturing
interests, which can create fiscal problems. The European Central
Bank is quite different from the Federal Reserve.
Joseph LaPalombara, Presenter
Topic: “Anti-Americanism and the European World of Business
and Finance”
In the introductory statement prepared for this conference,
it is suggested that globalization—greater levels of economic,
financial, and commercial interdependence among nations—may
have the salutary effect of reducing anti-Americanism in Europe.
Much as one might wish this were so, the presenter has his doubts.
To be sure, one finds great respect and admiration for American
products, for the firms that produce and market them, and for relations
between the universities and the corporate world. American firms
are not just the objects of admiration; some envy and backbiting
about their success emerge as well. Although this should not be
misinterpreted as anti-Americanism in the more virulent sense, it
probably contributes to it in Europe as well as elsewhere.
But it is wishful thinking, he continued, to believe
that increased trade, foreign direct investment, and joint ventures
will bring about a decline in anti-Americanism. Global firms neither
shed nor lose their basic nationality by reason of having become
global—unless they are acquired by or merge with a much larger
foreign firm. In these circumstances the small firm will over time
assume the nationality of the other company. Persistent nationality
tends to be reflected in corporate culture, corporate style, a particular
way of doing business, or of organizing work or establishing relationships
among managers internally or with customers and others. It is equally
unlikely that the parent company of a global firm will lose its
basic identification with the country in which it originated. There
remain profound differences between European and American firms.
They encompass everything from the organization of the international
firm and relationships established between the parent company and
its affiliates to the compensation packages of top executives and
the propensity of the firm to engage in joint ventures.
Below the surface of politeness and cordiality in
business affairs, feelings of antipathy between American and European
managers run in both directions. European managers tend to view
American managers as both arrogant and lacking in culture. One reason
is that Europeans are drawn from a much narrower and more elitist
socioeconomic class, which tends to look down its nose at others
not similarly privileged. To a degree unheard of in the United States,
European managers come from the same educational matrices.
In the eyes of European corporate managers, American
corporate behavior in the global economy tends to mirror that of
the U.S. government in the international sphere: imperious, inclined
to insist that America knows best, equally inclined to impose policies
from the center, with only lip service to the recognition of autonomous
expertise and input at the periphery or local level. These attitudes
if left unattended, the presenter warned, will continue to aid and
abet more virulent feelings of anti-Americanism.
In the discussion that followed, one American observer
(a financier) said that in the 1990s American firms moved in and
virtually took over merchant banking in the United Kingdom, Germany,
France, and other countries. It should occasion no surprise that
American success did not endear us to the Europeans. An American
academic participant stated that business scandals in America led
to derision of the United States and fed feelings of European superiority.
But Europeans do not expose their defects as readily; hence the
superior attitude is hardly justified. Another American participant,
a former diplomat, conceded that there are stylistic differences
between American and European economic models but considered them
relatively unimportant. During the cold war the United States and
Europe were held together because they had a common enemy. Since
then much of the glue has been the increasing importance of the
transatlantic economy. The transatlantic partnership may be saved
by economic developments that will give us an incentive to manage
our political differences better.
The presenters then responded to comments made in
the discussion of differences between American and European economic
models. Mr. Zannoni agreed that European investment banks have been
largely taken over by Americans. He also agreed that Americans are
more likely to expose scandals and therefore be more subject to
criticism. This is a paradox. Professor LaPalombara said that the
tendency of European managers to condescend to Americans is not
anti-Americanism but feeds it. A positive step would be to persuade
American managers to refrain from preaching and to pay more attention
to local cultures.
A European diplomat returned to the “clash of
civilizations” theme. The United States is not as strong as
it thinks, he observed. We won the cold war not just through military
force but also through the force of ideas. Europeans and Americans
share the same ideals; but reality does not always measure up to
ideals anywhere. The gap between ideals and reality is greater in
the United States than in Europe. Democracy is more troubled in
the United States; there is more influence of money in politics,
less honesty in politics, a higher level of violence in the society,
and more reliance on the penal system. Americans place greater value
than do Europeans on the market economy, which has many imperfections
(fewer personal contacts and the distortion of market transactions
by politicians in power). Americans believe that human rights are
not violated in the United States, but they are. Americans are more
religious than Europeans, or so it is reported by opinion polls,
and so perhaps they might be better approached with reference to
religious values. Look how far we have drifted from Christian ideals.
We should be inspired by the example of the Good Samaritan and show
kindness to our neighbors and to those outside of our tribe.
QUESTION 3
What are the underlying or structural causes of anti-Americanism
in Europe? Factors to be considered may include the end of the cold
war, European domestic politics, the perceived divergence of national
interests, and the asymmetry of relations between the United States
and the European Union.
Joseph LaPalombara, Presenter.
Topic: “How the End of the Cold War and the ‘Death of
Socialism’
Have Affected Italian Attitudes Toward the United States”
With the end of the cold war, Italians were freed
to express themselves more openly about the United States. Critics
of the United States are now less liable to be accused of acting
as agents of the Soviet Union. Anti-American feelings have deep
roots in Italy, with three major sources: the extreme (Marxist)
left, the extreme right, and Catholicism. It is important to recognize
that widespread anti-Americanism in the Italian intelligentsia includes
some members of the Catholic elite. Many democrats are proud that
they lined up with the United States against communism. But many
resent American intervention in Italian politics, linking with the
Vatican to influence elections. In Italy, 9/11 elicited widespread
sympathy for the United States. Italians have had their own experience
of terrorism. But soon public opinion polls indicated an upsurge
of anti-Americanism. These polls show that up to half of Italians
have no sympathy for the United States. Many even believe the United
States got what it deserved on 9/11. About one-third of respondents
are die-hard anti-Americans, one-third are pro-American, and the
rest make up their mind on the basis of the issues. There is a negative
coalition of different groups who are anti-American for different
reasons such as nationalism, populism, left-wing politics, and resistance
to globalization. There is a deep-seated Catholic view that America
is overwhelmingly materialistic. The Catholic press frequently criticizes
the U.S. government and its foreign policy. Italians love Americans.
They are enthusiastic about American products, culture, and globalization.
But Italians
do not love the American government.
In Iraq, thousands of people, including women and
children, have been killed by American troops. News from Iraq feeds
latent hostility to the United States in Italy, and the situation
is destined or doomed to get worse. The United States also pays
a price for its perceived one-sided support of the Israelis. Why
should we expect the U.S. government, he asked, to be rewarded for
its policies and actions by pro-American attitudes?
Ronald Tiersky, Presenter.
Topic: “Some Structural Causes of Anti-Americanism”
The presenter defined anti-Americanism as violent
rejection of America in some form, whether society, government,
or foreign policy. He offered a contrarian’s view, that anti-Americanism
in Europe is fragile and will probably disappear. His argument has
three parts: (1) Except for core groups, current anti-Americanism
is subject to a pendulum movement.
Large sectors of the European business community and military establishment
are not anti-American. The recent assassination of the Chechen president
will also bring Russia and the United States closer together. (2)
Anti-Americanism spiked because of the Iraq war, which was a triggering
event. (3) The deepest disagreement between Americans and Europeans
is over the meaning of terrorism, particularly 9/11 in the United
States and 3/11 in Spain.
Europe and the United States face a common threat
of global terrorism. Immense damage can be inflicted by any country
that can make use of weapons of mass destruction. The terrorism
experienced by Europeans in the past (IRA, Basques, Corsicans, Red
Brigade, et al.) is not the same as the global terrorism that threatens
the entire West.
European and American interests are now intertwined,
and Europeans are moving in the direction of American policy. This
is indicated in the European Strategic Security Doctrine adopted
by the Council in December 2003, recent declarations of the interior
and foreign affairs ministers in Germany, and the simulation of
an attack with WMDs on NATO headquarters in Brussels with predicted
massive casualties. Javier Solana commented that such an attack
would be catastrophic. Compared to the danger created by a possible
linkup of WMDs and terrorist networks, European anti-Americanism
is a minor phenomenon. The danger is all the greater because terrorism
is turning into sheer nihilism. It is becoming blind rage for the
past humiliation of Islam going back to the Crusades and the resentment
of young Muslims for the perceived backwardness of their societies.
In the Islamist war against the West, there is no longer any relationship
between ends and means. Terrorists are fascinated by their own success
and by the damage they can do. Whatever the outcome of the war in
Iraq, global terrorism will continue.
There is still a fundamental difference, the presenter
continued, between the American and European governments on the
requirements of security in the new era. But the need for transatlantic
cooperation is crystal clear. As Senator Nunn said recently, we
are all in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. Anti-Americanism
is a new conformism but is already changing. We are one triggering
event away from the collapse of anti-Americanism in Europe. The
overriding danger today is global terrorism.
In the ensuing discussion a European diplomat said
that Europeans have much admiration for the United States but not
for its policies and particularly not for its foreign policy. There
was mistrust of the United States during the cold war, but it was
more shallow than today. There is a widespread belief that Americans
are interested only in money. Europeans constantly criticize the
death penalty, the lack of gun control, the addiction to big and
wasteful cars, and so on. They believe that America is a violent
society, though of course Europe is not without violence. Yet there
are admiration and envy. Parents want to send their children to
the United States for education or to launch careers. There is no
movement to boycott American goods.
Europeans, he declared, believe that President Bush
has no concern for European interests or public opinion. After 9/11
there was a “golden moment” of good feeling toward the
United States in European public opinion. But then the U.S. propensity
for “going it alone” alienated Europeans. Regarding the
war in Iraq, European governments were about equally divided. But
public opinion was on the side of nonintervention. The Spanish government
paid a high price for its support of the war. Americans and Europeans
disagree, continued this European diplomat, over the nature of the
terrorist threat. In the United States, terrorism is considered
an immediate danger; that is not the case in Europe. The United
States considers it normal that it should lead the world. Europeans
concede that the
United States is the greatest power but mistrust the way it proceeds.
There is a declining opinion in Europe that the United States should
lead the world. A significant percentage of Europeans now even consider
the United States a threat to world peace. There is also a basic
disagreement over Middle East issues. Europeans perceive the United
States as biased toward Israel. The causes of the growth of distrust
go beyond the personalities
of American presidents, who generally have not been popular in Europe.
Distrust of and even hostility toward American leadership preceded
the Bush administration. The United States is not committed to consultation
and multilateralism, as illustrated by its opposition to the Kyoto
Treaty on environmental protection, the Ottawa Convention outlawing
land mines, and the nternational Criminal Court. The United States
did not pay its dues to the United Nations, not even under Clinton.
All this reflects a pattern of unilateralist behavior.
Distrust of American policy, said this European diplomat,
goes deep. Historical memories of conflict with the United States
persist in many European countries. In Spain, for example, there
is still resentment over the War of 1898, particularly the way in
which the war started, and how Spain was deprived of Puerto Rico
and the Philippines. Spanish democrats also resent the support accorded
to Franco during the cold war. Franco had been a pariah, and the
United States permitted him to be rehabilitated. Spaniards also
criticize the way in which the United States treats Latin America
and pressures its governments to isolate Cuba. Spaniards do not
like Fidel Castro but want the United States to leave Cubans alone.
On the other hand, this European diplomat does not believe that
the European Union can replace the United States as a leader or
become an equal partner with the United States. Divisions within
the EU have led to a split over Iraq and the Middle East. Europeans
also do not want to spend money on arms. Nor can the United Nations
function effectively as long as the five permanent members of the
Security Council enjoy a veto power. Something should be done about
the Security Council veto, which vests too much power in Russia,
China, and France.
Can the image of the United States be improved? Yes,
by changing Middle East policy and engaging in more dialogue with
Europe and the rest of the world. But this European diplomat concluded
that no matter what the United States does, it will be resented
and envied.
Another European diplomat stated that since the end
of the cold war there has not been an automatic partnership between
the United States and Europe. He urged us to get rid of the term
“appeasement” when it comes to global terrorism. The battle
for the Muslim mind
is of the utmost importance. Europe and America are in this together.
A European discussant affirmed that Europeans are
used to terrorism but disagree with the Bush administration on how
to handle it. Terrorism in itself is not playing a role in anti-Americanism.
A key factor is European opposition to U.S. foreign policy. He said
he also believed that secular Europeans feel themselves increasingly
distant from religious Americans.
For an American former diplomat, Europeans believe
that Americans are naïve and utopian concerning the prospects
of democratization in Iraq and the larger Middle East. Europeans
rather admire the Egyptians, who simply wiped out their terrorists.
Europeans were not convinced that Iraq was the place to go. In his
view, Americans and Europeans have not yet begun a meaningful dialogue
on terrorism or the Middle East.
Another American former diplomat agreed that the bad
blood between Americans and Europeans is terrible. However, we have
no choice but to persevere in the Middle East. He warned that Americans
should not lapse into anti-Europeanism. There is no reason for Europeans
to spend more on arms, except for Special Forces, counterterrorism,
and intelligence. The EU contributes more money to the stabilization
program in the
Balkans than we do. Transatlantic cooperation through NATO is real
and valuable. NATO is now running the International Stabilization
Force in Afghanistan and may take over in Iraq. The French have
200 Special Forces in Afghanistan under U.S. command. The European
Union contribution in the Balkans and Afghanistan is just as relevant
as that of the United States. He called for a stop to name-calling
and for effective leadership on both sides of the Atlantic.
This same former U.S. diplomat believes that the Common
Foreign and Security Policy will come to fruition only as the final
act of European unification. It will be a healthy development if
it leads Europeans to spend more on defense. There is no action
by a European defense force that the United States would or should
oppose. There is a bedrock reason for the United States and Europe
to work together. In confronting the challenges of global insecurity
and terrorism, we are all in this together. Those who opposed the
use of force in Iraq thought it was a distraction from the war on
terrorism. We still have time to get it right, though it must be
done fast enough. He added that we also have to help the Russians
get their fissionable material under control.
Another American participant said it is normal for
the United States to follow its interests. He agreed that U.S. identification
with Israel is a problem for Europeans. Another American discussant
said that Israel is being made a scapegoat for the failure of the
Arab world to modernize, as is made clear by the Arab Human Development
Report of 2002 issued by the UN.
In response, the two presenters affirmed their previous
statements. Professor LaPalombara said the Europeans have been dealing
with terrorism longer than the Americans and are not prepared to
follow the American lead as they did during the cold war. The real
problem is the new U.S. foreign policy with respect to terrorism,
the Middle East, and particularly Iraq. If the style of American
policy does not change, the situation will remain disastrous. Anti-Americanism
in Europe, he concluded, is not fragile.
Professor Tiersky emphasized again that a terrorist
attack with weapons of mass destruction would be horribly different
from the kind of terror that Europeans have known until now. If
such an awful event occurred, European attitudes about America will
change.
QUESTION 4
What Is to Be Done?
In order to help bring together the many strands of
this complex interchange and bring into focus the major themes sounded
in the roundtable, presenters and discussants were asked to answer
Lenin’s question, What is to be done? In the order roughly
in which they spoke, here are their answers.
Herman J. Cohen said there should be a consensus on
both sides of the Atlantic that we are condemned to work together.
As during the cold war, there is no other option. Americans should
abandon their post-9/11 narcissism. Terrorism did not begin on that
date. We can learn and profit from European experience. The United
States must also accept the position that the use of overwhelming
military power is not exclusively the way to deal with terrorism.
Intelligence gathering is important, and Europeans have a lot to
offer. This is not a leader-follower situation. On the European
side there needs to be a greater understanding of U.S. strategic
interests in the Middle East. Europeans should try to broaden their
perspective. We need a real partnership.
For Stanton Burnett the revival of the United States
Information Agency may be desirable but is not important in itself.
The point is to recruit competent diplomats who can deal with large
sectors of the European public, not only elites and masses but also
those in between. We should encourage our diplomats to acquire regional
expertise and secure the strong involvement of Congress in the process
of recruitment and training.
Michael Curtis said that the rhetoric on both sides
has to be lowered. Differences are legitimate and should be discussed
and negotiated. We should attempt to communicate better with Europeans
and correct misunderstandings. The Kyoto Treaty on environmental
protection, the Ottawa Convention on antipersonnel mines, and the
Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court were all
controversial, involving interests that the United States considered
vital. Automatic anti-Americanism is not justified because of a
failure by Europeans and Americans to work out a compromise. Both
sides should coordinate policy on immigration, the protection of
oil resources, and the Middle East. Europeans should not assume
that the Israelis are solely to blame for the problems of the Middle
East.
Joseph LaPalombara said that we need a transatlantic
working group, which must focus on how to improve images across
the Atlantic, including study of the media. This is a high priority.
For Ronald Tiersky, we must make sure that the first
preemptive war is the last. There should be no more Iraqs. He also
believes that transatlantic strategic talks should begin as soon
as possible. We need a new transatlantic political culture fashioned
out of the old common culture. We need political leaders who will
educate public opinion. The Palestinian leadership, for example,
has not educated its public on the consequences of a real peace.
The temperature has to be lowered in civil society. European fixation
on the death penalty and prison systems in the United States is
exaggerated.
An American discussant stated that Europeans do not
really sympathize with American feelings of vulnerability. The war
against terrorism may go on forever. Americans and Europeans have
to come to agreement on the character of terrorism and how to deal
with it. They have to figure out how to help democrats and moderates
in the civil war now going on in the Muslim world. We also have
to get young Americans into public service.
A former U.S. diplomat acknowledged that transatlantic
conversations, which used to be civil, are now full of terms of
contempt. But debates are useful, both within the United States
and the European Union and across the Atlantic. He believes that
the United States and Europe are ready for a new partnership. There
is an opportunity now for a leap forward. The partnership skidded
off the rails over Iraq. Unilateralism has failed; we must share
decisions. President Bush, in his view, is ready to get back on
the path of multilateralism. Both candidates in the coming election
are preparing for a change in attitude and a new transatlantic partnership.
The roundtable, which at times revealed deep differences
between and among Americans and Europeans, thus ended on a rather
hopeful note.
THE DISCUSSION: AN OVERVIEW
The roundtable organizers wished to focus discussion
on specific issues in order to explore and clarify disagreements,
paving the way to proposals on a course of action. Deep discord
among the participants was revealed from the outset, perhaps even
more
sharply among Americans than between Americans and Europeans. Divisions
mirrored the passionate debate taking place outside our 34 th floor
meeting room as an American presidential campaign was gearing up.
A central issue throughout the session was unilateralism
versus multilateralism. European participants generally criticized
American policy, particularly under the Bush administration (but
also before) as unilateral; they asked for a turn or a return to
multilateralism. Some if not most American participants joined in
the denunciation of an American propensity to “go it alone.”
There was general agreement that consultation and dialogue are always
useful and that multilateralism in principle is preferable to unilateralism.
But how to apply the principle in crisis situations is not self-evident.
The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization no better
than the member states that compose it. Perhaps half the members
of the General Assembly have nondemocratic regimes; and Russia and
China are among the permanent members of the Security Council with
veto power. European states are unwilling to accord foreign and
security policy to the European Union, much less the United Nations,
though they largely share common political values.
A few participants considered the criticism of American
policy excessive and misleading. They argued that the United States
is continually consulting and negotiating with others, particularly
European allies, in a range of multilateral institutions, notably
NATO and the United Nations, as well as in direct contacts with
individual states. At some point it is necessary to make decisions
and take action. Multilateralism should not mean that European allies
can veto American actions or that Americans must do whatever Europeans
demand. As one European diplomat conceded, Europeans are themselves
divided and are not organized to be able to take a leadership role.
Indefinite paralysis or inaction could be catastrophic in dealing
with the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist networks.
Another issue was the nature of the threat of terrorism.
European participants with some exceptions thought that the Bush
administration exaggerated the danger posed by the Iraqi regime
and believe that Europe has greater experience of terrorism than
the United States. Some American participants agreed and urged the
U.S. government to take advantage of European experience in this
area. They also said that more emphasis should be placed on economic
assistance to the Arab world so that it could better cope with the
challenges of modernization. Some Americans, however, expressed
the belief that the new menace of global terrorism (the use of weapons
of mass destruction by Islamic fundamentalists to create havoc)
differs qualitatively from previous terrorism in Europe. Some European
participants affirmed that “we are all in this together.”
The fundamental question was whether or not the use of force was
justified in Iraq.
Anti-Americanism as a phenomenon did not arouse much
passion among these seasoned observers, American and European alike.
A fixed level of anti-Americanism is fairly normal in Europe. According
to American roundtable participants who are specialists on France
and Italy, die-hard anti-Americans constitute up to one-third of
the population (as measured by opinion polls and support for extreme
left and extreme right parties), and home-grown nationalists who
look down on all other nations, including the United States, may
account for another one-third depending on the issues. One European
participant claimed that American democracy is more troubled than
European democracy. Other Europeans and some Americans said that
Europeans liked Americans but did not like their government
and its policies. One American participant considered this distinction
untenable inasmuch as the government is elected and its policies
must be sustained by Congress and public opinion. A European diplomat
first sharply criticized the American government, all of its presidents
(not just the incumbent), and its policies (especially in the Middle
East). There were nods of approval when he added disarmingly that
the United States, because of its wealth and power, is bound to
be simultaneously admired, resented, and envied no matter what policies
it adopts.
NATIONAL COMMITTEE
ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A fundamental cause of the deep crisis in transatlantic
relations is the asymmetrical relationship between the United States
as a single state and Europe as at best a federation of states that
has little authority in foreign and security policy. As regards
economic issues, the United States and the European Union are pretty
much equals. But the United States is capable of deploying armed
forces anywhere in the world. European states are regional powers.
Whenever the United States decides to use its great
military power, there is bound to be resentment and resistance by
some and in the case of Iraq most Europeans. This asymmetry can
be eliminated if the United States disarms unilaterally or if the
European Union becomes a true “power”; neither development
is likely. The transatlantic crisis must be managed if it is to
be done at all within the existing geopolitical asymmetry. The National
Committee on American Foreign Policy makes the
following recommendations, which take into account the structure
of global power and are consistent with both American and European
vital interests.
- Aim for neither love nor fear but for respect. Several
American participants said that Americans want to be loved. It
is better for the Prince to be feared than to be loved, Machiavelli
said, for a relationship based on love depends on the subjects,
whereas a relationship based on fear depends on the will of the
Prince. The United States is not the Prince and Europeans are
not subjects, but Machiavelli’s insight has some relevance
to relations among sovereign states. Not only is it risky to depend
on the love of other people but it is also unrealistic. Most people
are attached to their own communities (through common culture,
institutions, and memories) and consider themselves worthy if
not superior to others. They are especially distrustful of the
wealthy and powerful, who may dominate them. However, to base
foreign policy on fear is also unsatisfactory. It creates widespread
resentment and resistance between sovereign states as well as
within them. Coercion always is an element in governance but by
itself can produce the very instability Machiavelli sought to
avoid. The U.S. government should strive to be respected, a difficult
challenge that at least is accepted by others as a reasonable
basis for relations among states.
- Increase consultation, dialogue, and communication with the
allies. The most persistent complaint of European participants
was that the U.S. government acts unilaterally, without bothering
to consult them. Some American participants, particularly those
who had served in or supported previous Democratic administrations,
agreed. One American former diplomat said that Americans do not
need to be loved, but they do need allies, and allies have to
be consulted.
The notion of consultation is ambiguous. A case can be made that
the U.S. government does indeed consult allies and negotiate with
others. There was no lack of consultation between the United States
and its allies within global conferences leading to the Ottawa
Convention on land mines, the Kyoto Treaty on the emission of
greenhouse gases, and the Rome Treaty establishing the International
Criminal Court. Many Europeans are unaware that the United States
declined to sign these conventions for plausible reasons. The
Ottawa Convention was hastily drawn, made no distinction between
“smart” mines (which self-destruct) and “dumb”
mines (which last forever and cause humanitarian problems), and
did not outlaw European-style antitank mines; at Kyoto the Europeans
refused concessions to the United States that they later made
to other industrial nations in order to get them on board; at
Rome the American proposal that prosecution be on reference from
the Security Council was not unreasonable. One American participant
expressed the belief that better communication is needed concerning
the rationale for American policies.
The almost universal sentiment among European allies that they
are not consulted is troubling. Images are important. Something
must be done to increase or institutionalize consultation and
dialogue that safeguard interests on both sides of the Atlantic
and avoid paralysis when compromise and multilateral action fail.
Several participants in the roundtable called for the immediate
creation of a high-level transatlantic working group with a view
to forging a new partnership. The National Committee on American
Foreign Policy endorses this call, which can help clear the air
and possibly lead to more effective transatlantic political institutions
to parallel the present regularized dialogue on economic and military
affairs.
- Diplomacy, not media blitzes. Controversy over the use
of force in Iraq and the proper way to meet the challenge of global
terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism will not be resolved by media
specialists. Vital national interests are at stake and need to
be promoted through competent and comprehensive diplomacy. The
National Committee on American Foreign Policy endorses the suggestion
made by several American participants that our diplomatic arm
be strengthened through the recruitment and training of regional
specialists and adequate financing. American diplomats with appropriate
language skills must be able to engage their European counterparts
in a systematic process of policy coordination. Repairing the
transatlantic alliance will require a massive and sustained effort;
it cannot be done on the cheap.
- Bring civil society back in. This roundtable highlighted
the utility of deliberation by Americans and Europeans, diplomats
and specialists. The task before us calls for the mobilization
of creative forces in civil society on both sides of the Atlantic.
The National Committee will make its contribution by sponsoring
roundtables that foster fruitful dialogue between Americans and
Europeans involving the worlds of the university, diplomacy, the
economy, and politics.
Participants
Dr. George D. Schwab
President, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Mr. William M. Rudolf
Executive Vice President, National Committee on American Foreign
Policy
Professor Bernard E. Brown
Transatlantic Relations Project Director
National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Professor Emeritus of Political Science, City University of New
York Graduate School
H.E. Inocencio F. Arias
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Mission of Spain to the UN
Mr. Eduardo Bohórquez
Chief Executive Officer and President
WestSphere Capital Advisors, L.P.
Dr. Stanton Burnett
Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Former Counselor, United States Information Agency
The Honorable Herman J. Cohen
President, Cohen and Woods International
Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Professor Michael Curtis
Secretary, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Rutgers University
H.E. Jean-Marc Hoscheit
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Mission of Luxembourg to the UN
Ambassador Robert Hunter
Senior Adviser, RAND Corporation
Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Professor Joseph LaPalombara
Adviser, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Senior Research Scientist, Arnold Wolfers Professor Emeritus of
Political Science and Management, Yale University
H.E. John B. Richardson
Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to
the UN
Professor Ronald Tiersky
Eastman Professor of Political Science, Amherst College
Mr. Paolo Zannoni
Partner, Head of Italian Investment Banking Business
Goldman Sachs International
|
