Transatlantic Relations
Repairing U.S. - European Relations
Sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and
Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series
November 9-10, 2004
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD
The November 2004 Roundtable on Repairing the Transatlantic Partnership
was cosponsored by the Eisenhower National Security Series (ENSS).
It is part of a long-term series of conferences on transatlantic
relations sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign
Policy (NCAFP). These roundtables include policy analysts, academics,
and former and current diplomats from both the United States and
Europe.
The series began in May 2002 when three members of the National
Committee on American Foreign Policy met in Brussels with five European
researchers who agreed to participate. A first roundtable on Reinventing
the Transatlantic Partnership met in New York in October 2002, followed
by a second in Geneva in June 2003. In May 2004 we focused the attention
of the roundtable on Anti-Americanism in Europe. The accounts of
our preliminary meeting in Brussels in May 2002 and the following
three roundtables have been published as booklets (available on
request from the National Committee) and on our Web site (www.NCAFP.org).
The organizer of this roundtable prepared a series of questions
to be addressed by the presenters (two Europeans and two Americans).
These questions with brief introductory statements were sent to
presenters ahead of time. The format made for lively give-and-take
among presenters, discussants, and other participants. The presenters,
with their consent, are identified in this report. In order to encourage
a free and frank exchange of views, participants in the ensuing
discussion and some serving currently in official positions have
not been identified. The policy recommendations are those only of
the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.
Special thanks go to Professor Bernard E. Brown, the National Committee’s
project director on transatlantic relations. He drafted the framework
questions, moderated the discussion, and wrote this report. Thanks
also to Major James Craig and Mr. William C. Angerman who organized
the participation of members of the Eisenhower National Security
Series. It is a pleasure to acknowledge Mutual of America Life Insurance
Company’s continuing support of this project.
George D. Schwab, President
National Committee on American Foreign Policy
SUMMARY OF ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
THEME 1. This will be an “icebreaker”
question, just to get things going. We want to get some sense of
European views on the status of transatlantic relations.
QUESTION 1. There have been many serious disputes between Americans
and Europeans since World War II (Suez, Vietnam, disarmament, Bosnia,
etc.). Is the current crisis qualitatively different? Does it call
into question the fundamentals of the transatlantic partnerships
or not? Is it your sense that transatlantic relations since the
crisis over the use of force in Iraq have gotten better or worse?
What do you consider to be the most important foreign policy differences
between the United States and Europe at present?
EUROPEAN VIEWS
Philippe Errera, Presenter
Are there now fundamental differences between the United States
and Europe that may call into question the transatlantic partnership
itself? In his view, too much has been made of these differences.
The crisis over Iraq has been both overestimated and underestimated.
It has been overestimated by those who believed that it revealed
fundamental differences over the threat of terrorism or the danger
in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In Iraq we
all believed that WMD capabilities existed to one degree or another.
In Iraq on both sides the goal was the same: to deal effectively
with this threat. On both sides, also, there was agreement that
force could and should be used if needed. The presenter rejected
the argument by Robert Kagan that the Europeans chose diplomacy
over force and the Americans force over diplomacy. Both sides believe
that diplomacy must be backed by force.
The speaker added that there is also a risk of underestimating
the crisis or making too little of it. The disagreements cannot
be reduced to a clash of personalities. Some observers hoped that
if we could bring about changes in the cast of characters, we could
awaken from this awful nightmare and go back to the way it used
to be; but this cannot be done. This crisis was qualitatively different
from preceding crises; it was revelatory of tectonic shifts in geopolitical
structures. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and then of the
Soviet Union, there was no longer a threat of massive military attack
from the East. We cannot go back to the kind of genuine collaboration
that existed during “the Golden Age” of the cold war.
The breakup of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars that followed hid
for a time this underlying shift in American interests; but now
it is clear that a fundamental geopolitical change has taken place.
Europe is no longer the prize; it is no longer threatened directly
by a hostile power and therefore is no longer central to the security
of the United States. This, observed the presenter, should be seen
as a positive development, a direct consequence of the fact that
the West won the cold war. The threat we face today from jihadist
terrorism is different.
In American calculations following 9/11, Europe was an afterthought
or was seen as a hindrance, particularly in planning for and carrying
out the military campaign in Afghanistan. Europeans had to fight
their way into the order of battle in order to be alongside American
troops in Operation Enduring Freedom. The invocation of Article
5 by NATO was initially turned down by some in Washington before
the refusal of NATO’s offer of assistance was seen as political
and diplomatic folly. What is Europe then if it is no longer the
prize? The Bush administration wanted to extend the “unilateral
moment.” It became a question of precedence for some in the
U.S. administration. That is why the United States had a higher
diplomatic presence in Europe in the 1990s than was warranted by
fundamentals. But strategic shifts have to be taken into account.
We need to rebuild rather than just repair the transatlantic relationship.
Are transatlantic relations better or worse since the Iraqi invasion?
The presenter agrees that relations have improved but only superficially.
We do not yet know whether underlying shifts in the balance of power
are going to be taken into account in order to make improvement
more solid and long lasting. President Bush now wants to consult
with Europeans, but this could be simply a tactic inspired by short-term
domestic politics. To be frank, there were similar considerations
on the European side. President Chirac did not want the D-Day celebration
to take place under the cloud of Iraq. The presenter disagrees with
those observers who believe that Europeans will be driven to unity
in order more effectively to oppose President Bush’s policies.
There is no consensus among Europeans to create a united front against
the United States. For better or for worse a period of transatlantic
tension leads to intra-European tensions. For many Europeans the
road to Brussels still goes through Washington. He also observed
that objective factors are bringing both sides together. Europeans
and Americans have a common interest in fighting terrorism, preventing
the proliferation of WMD, and specifically in persuading Iran not
to build nuclear bombs. Even during the height of the crisis, cooperation
between American and French security officials was as close as could
be imagined in exchanging intelligence and planning strategy concerning
Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. But accord between Europeans
and Americans is still fragile because disputes over Iraqi policy
still continue. Iraq is still between war and peace. Even though
no serious analyst believed allegations of links between Saddam
Hussein and Al Qaeda, American rhetoric regarding Iraq is still
about making America safe from terrorists and bringing democracy
to the greater Middle East. This continuing dispute makes it more
difficult for Europeans and Americans to cooperate.
The international situation today is more open. The French hope
that there will be more genuine consultation. The issue has never
really been unilateralism versus multilateralism. These concepts
are ambiguous; the differences between them are a matter of degree.
We are not likely to confront another issue about which the United
States believes it must act to defend its vital interests over the
opposition of world public opinion. It was not merely a question
of opposition by France. The United States could not muster a majority
on the Security Council, including such countries as Mexico and
Chile with which there is a close political relationship. Both sides
now have an interest in cooperating. One of the open questions at
present is the Middle East. This French speaker wonders whether
President Bush this time will be willing to engage seriously in
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This is a promising avenue
for U.S.-EU cooperation. It will be interesting to see how the United
States reacts to the Solana plan on how to accompany the Israeli
disengagement from Gaza.
Dieter Kastrup, Presenter
The presenter began on an optimistic note. The reelection of President
Bush and a reorganized administration offer new opportunities. The
exchange of congratulations and messages after the election is encouraging.
President Bush says that whatever the past disagreements, we share
a common enemy, and he wishes to reach out to the European allies.
President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder both said they hoped to
find satisfactory solutions to numerous challenges through a close
transatlantic partnership. For the speaker, it is time for a new
beginning. He also alluded to proceedings of previous National Committee
on American Foreign Policy roundtables and made several observations:
He agrees that the renewal of the transatlantic partnership would
require massive and sustained effort and that something must be
done to increase or institutionalize dialogue that safeguards interests
on both side of the Atlantic and avoids paralysis when compromise
fails.
The speaker believes that the current crisis is qualitatively different
compared to serious disputes in the past. The U.S.-European relationship
has been shaken to its foundations. Over and beyond the immediate
issue of Iraq, the speaker sees fundamental differences between
Europeans and Americans concerning the nature of the global order.
The underlying issue is about global institutions that attempt to
moderate conflict. Who sets the rules? Is the national interest
of the strongest power the only yardstick for military interventions?
Does the alleged right of preventive war apply only to the United
States?
The speaker referred to a recent survey of European opinion sponsored
by the German Marshall Fund, whose results he found alarming. He
mentioned three aspects: (1) European support for strong American
leadership in the world has declined significantly over the past
two years. Europeans increasingly want the EU to develop into a
superpower that can act independently of the United States. (2)
Despite a transatlantic consensus on the nature of international
threats, there are sharp divisions over when to use force and under
what auspices. A broad majority of Europeans are unwilling to use
force without multilateral approval. Whether this view is shared
on this [the American] side of the Atlantic is a questions you can
answer yourselves. (3) Support for the United Nations as an institution
remains high in Europe, as well as in the United States. But a broad
majority of Americans would bypass the United Nations when vital
interests are at stake.
Europe and the United States are far apart on the nature of the
global order and are drifting further apart. The Iraq war reinforced
and accelerated this drift; it was a catalytic event bringing these
divergent views to the fore. Public opinion, as described in these
polls, raises doubt as to whether Europeans are still convinced
that we need each other. We are confronted with a picture of growing
emotional and political distance. The speaker is troubled by the
conviction, shared by an increasing number of Europeans, that the
stronger the European Union is, the less relevant is the United
States. Political leadership should act to stop this tendency. Otherwise
we run the risk that the nature of transatlantic relations will
be fundamentally changed and that its base will erode.
The speaker concluded that we need a strategic dialogue leading
to a common threat assessment, a common agenda, and a common strategy.
The first step is to agree on a common threat assessment. The most
frightening scenario is that terrorist groups may acquire WMD. In
this event a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale
previously possible only for states and armies. Another danger,
and risk, is regional conflict. It destroys human lives and physical
infrastructures. It threatens minorities and fundamental freedoms
and human rights and engenders extremism and terrorism. There is
also a danger and risk of state failure. Bad government, corruption,
abuse of power, weak institutions, lack of accountability, and civil
conflict corrode states from within. State collapse can obviously
increase threats from organized crime and terrorism. Put these different
elements together, and we could indeed be confronted with a very
radical threat.
Can we establish agreement between the United States and Europe
that no single country is able to tackle these problems? In the
speaker’s view, Europe and America depend on each other in
their fight against these new threats. We want to defend the same
values: the freedom and security of our citizens, open democracies,
and human rights. We are all in the same boat.
Is Europe ready to play its role? The speaker’s answer is
yes. He cited the European Security Strategy proposed by Javier
Solana and adopted by the Council in December 2003, which begins:
As a union of 25 states, with over 450 million people, producing
a quarter of global GNP and with a wide range of instruments at
its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player.
This means, said the speaker, that Europe is ready to share responsibility
for global security and building a better world. The European Union
is capable of doing the job on threat assessment (of which more
later). A second step is to continue to construct Europe, and a
third step is to agree on procedures and guidelines as we proceed.
On the agenda will be the issue of preemptive engagement and the
capacity of the United Nations in its present form. Can we agree
that threats cannot be tackled by military means alone? Of course,
military force is always a component of any comprehensive strategy.
Also on the agenda are concrete policies for specific areas, in
particular the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and the future
role of NATO.
To return to the question posed at the outset, are transatlantic
relations better or worse now? On the surface, they are better.
But as long as we have not tackled fundamental issues, concluded
Ambassador Kastrup, there will be no improvement.
In the ensuing discussion, a British diplomat observed that this
transatlantic crisis is more serious than those in the past. The
rhetoric has become extreme. However, the dispute has not reached
the point of disrupting the partnership. Up to now the breakup of
the Soviet Empire has led to problems, particularly in the Balkans,
comparable to previous collapses of empire. But the new threat,
terrorism, is different. We face an altogether unprecedented threat
that terror networks might gain control of WMD. In confronting this
challenge, there are fundamental differences between the United
States and the United Kingdom on one side and France and Germany
on the other. One important factor is that the military gap between
the United States and Europe is becoming greater. Only the United
Kingdom and France are investing sufficiently in defense. The price
of consultation is capacity. Without capacity, one is not in the
game. As for the possibility of new structures, the pragmatic British
believe it is usually easier to amend and repair rather than try
to produce something wholly new. It is very important now to restore
traditional diplomatic norms and practice. We need no more intemperate
outbursts and inexcusable gaffes. We must show deference and respect
for each other and for domestic political constraints.
An American discussant stated that foreign and strategic policy
can never stray too far from the societies that governments represent.
Foreign policy has to take into account the nature of public opinion
in a society. Europeans feel disdain for American culture and consider
themselves superior. Basically the ball is in the European court.
It is up to Europeans to decide whether or not the Union will develop
as a power.
Ambassador Hunter said that he was an optimist. Some people dismiss
the emotional bonds across the Atlantic as fluff and nonsense; but
in some ways they are the strongest bonds we have. They are the
reason why we show forbearance for one another’s follies. We
are also bound together by our economic relationship. During the
cold war it was necessary to resolve economic disputes in order
to maintain the security relationship. Since the cold war, the alliance
has been kept together by the emergence of a massive integrated
transatlantic economy despite the eruption of disputes over security
policy. This discussant opposed the war in Iraq, but now we have
no choice. Neither the United States nor Europe is monolithic; there
were disagreements over Iraq within every nation, including the
United States.
In response, Mr. Errera agreed that public opinion is important
and must be taken into account. Anti-Americanism is general throughout
Europe, including the United Kingdom. Because of the administration’s
rhetoric on the link between 9/11 and Iraq, Iraq was seen by most
Americans as a war of necessity for the United States, not one of
choice. Europeans saw it as the reverse. Europeans argued that Iraq
was a problem but that force should be used only after all options
had been exhausted. Americans heard this not at the best as advice
from a friend who has not helped when needed but at the worst as
helping the enemy. There is indeed, he affirmed, a crisis of confidence
that will last a long time. Europeans do not know whether the United
States has a broader strategy in dealing with the Middle East and
where it is leading the world.
Ambassador Kastrup agreed that Europe is not a monolith. The “new”
Europeans struggled to free themselves from Russian domination.
They want to join the European family but did not realize they would
have to yield so much sovereignty to Brussels. They have a deep
feeling of gratitude to the Americans, and rightly so. Without the
determination of the first President Bush, Europe would not be “whole
and free.” It is understandable that they have an emotional
alignment to America. In Germany, also, this feeling of gratitude
exists. Without the American commitment, we could not have achieved
our goal. This emotional element, said the speaker, should not be
lost.
* * * * *
THEME 2. Americans are trying to understand
the nature of the European Union and its evolution, especially as
regards foreign and security policy and a common defense. Prime
Minister Blair has hailed the new constitution (or treaty) as consecrating
a “Europe of nations.” President Chirac has termed the
EU “une fédération des états-nations.”
QUESTION 2. Where is the power to make foreign policy located:
in the nation-states or in EU institutions? To what extent is it
realistic to expect the United States to deal with the EU as the
representative of all of Europe? A Europe of 25, it has been said,
is “not your grandfather’s Europe,” that is, it can
no longer be driven by the Franco-German motor. Would you agree?
What are the implications of enlargement for foreign policy formulation
in the EU? Do you envisage an increasingly integrated Europe as
a partner of the United States or a counterweight to it?
Dieter Kastrup, Presenter
What is the nature of the European Union? It is difficult to explain
and difficult for Europeans themselves to understand. The “finality
question” has been kept open. The finality of the EU deliberately
was not defined in the convention that drafted the new constitutional
treaty. But that has not prevented Europeans from continuing their
efforts to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It
is written in plain language that Europe will take a big step forward.
We will create a CFSP; the member states will be committed to support
it and to refrain from any action undermining it. Europe will have
its phone number, along with a unified diplomatic service. The national
diplomatic services will not vanish. Both will act and have to act
together.
The EU, he repeated, has got its act together. The heads of state
and of governments have agreed on a strategy to deal with the new
security environment. The EU has identified five major threats:
(1) terrorism. (2) WMD. There is a possibility of an arms race in
the Middle East that will include the use of biological weapons.
The most frightening scenario is that terrorist groups will acquire
WMD. (3) Regional and ethnic conflicts. (4) State failure characterized
by bad government and the lack of accountability. (5) Organized
crime. He hopes that the United States and Europe can agree that
no single country can handle these problems. We are all in the same
boat.
Is Europe ready to play its role, asked the speaker? His answer
is yes. Europe is a global player and is ready to cooperate with
the United States.
Philippe Errera, Presenter
Mr. Errera turned to the question, with whom should the United
States deal: the EU institutions or the member states. His reply
was with both. The United States should deal with Brussels and the
national capitals. The situation in the EU, he conceded, is complex;
but this is generally the case in all political systems, including
the American. Whenever you deal with a complex organization, you
know that power is never only in one place. Even when a European
foreign minister has the word of the U.S. secretary of state, he
knows if his embassy in Washington is worth anything, it is only
part of the picture.
It is important to remember that the CFSP is a “common”
and not a single policy. A common policy must derive from member
states that have different interests. Depending on the issue, the
CFSP is a continuum, going from extreme divergences between member
states to a common policy implemented in Brussels. In between there
is a whole series of steps. For example, there was deep divergence
among the member states in the Balkans in the early 1990s notably
over how to deal with the proclaimed independence of Croatia. Now
there is so much convergence that EU institutions rather than the
member states are implementing policy. Outside of Europe member
states sometimes have different interests and conflicting policies.
There is no integrated EU policy regarding Iraq, and even less so
during the war. Consequently, depending on the amount of convergence
between the capitals and the amount of power handed over to Brussels,
the United States will continue to deal with both capitals and Brussels.
Having served for a year in the Bureau of European Affairs at the
U.S. State Department, the French speaker could assure his American
colleagues that the EU is not an enigma for American diplomats.
The U.S. mission to the EU in Brussels knows the system very well
and can read the EU like a book. Problems within the EU arise not
so much from differences among the members states themselves but
more often from differences between the first and second pillars.
There is a built-in rivalry between the Commission and the Council.
The member states in the Council could agree and give a mandate
to the High Representative for the CFSP. But the Commission, largely
for theological reasons, could refuse to take orders from the member
states, asserting its own authority over its instruments for external
relations. The new constitutional treaty makes an important change.
The new foreign minister will speak for both the Commission and
the member states.
The speaker returned to the question concerning the functioning
of the EU with 25 members. He agreed that the EU is no longer our
grandparents’ union and that the Franco-German motor will not
play the same role as before. But the notion that the Franco-German
motor drove the EU is something of a caricature. Rather, there are
small groups seen as legitimate for what they can accomplish. In
the past, notably during the 1990s, when France and Germany reached
agreement, they took into account the interests of a broad spectrum
of the member states, which could then be turned into a consensus.
The difference between the Iraqi crisis and the situation previously
was that the Franco-German position was not in the center; it was
one of the two sides. Therefore, no consensus could be delivered.
Disagreements between large and small states added to the bitterness
of debate.
How will the EU function with 25 states? Nothing will be accomplished
in the foreign policy field if we do everything at 25 from the start.
What is needed, as in NATO and other multilateral institutions,
is for small groups to take the lead and then build consensus. The
composition of these small groups will depend on the issue. If it
is policy toward Ukraine or Belarus, the small group will likely
include Poland. When we deal with the Mediterranean, Spain and Italy
will be in the core. It will be variable geometry based on what
individual countries can deliver.
There will also be a larger role for the Council Secretariat and
for integrated structures. It is physically impossible for 25 states
to draft a document. The upstream work, as was the case during the
drafting of the European Security Strategy, will be very important,
which is both an opportunity and a challenge for our diplomatic
services. We will have to convince others, including those in key
positions working for Solana. Some national ministries are better
at this than others.
Americans will continue to deal with Brussels and key national
capitals. Then the question is how key national capitals bring along
the 25 with the right mix of leadership and consensus.
In the discussion a British diplomat stressed that the EU is already
a superpower as an economy but will not be a “power” unless
it spends more on defense. We cannot sustain an alliance while a
military imbalance is so great. An American specialist said that
the EU is a strange object, unlike any other important political
structure, yet it works. The successes of the European Union so
far have been remarkable. But he is more skeptical concerning the
project for a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the possibility
of coordinating policies with those of the United States.
In response Mr. Errera said that American reaction to the evolution
of the EU has a pattern. The first instinct is hostility. Thus the
single market was about Fortress Europe, the purpose of the euro
was to weaken the dollar, and the autonomous defense was intended
to weaken NATO. But as the projects took shape, hostility turned
into skepticism (“don’t worry, they will never get their
act together”) and then to resignation and, with luck, cooperation.
As for the CFSP, it exists in some areas and not in others. The
Balkans are largely now an EU operation; in Iran three European
leaders have forged a large consensus within the EU on strategic
policy. The EU is improving its military operational capacity. In
the Congo the secretary general of the United Nations made a phone
call to a European leader, and within a short time the EU conducted
a military operation without recourse to NATO assets. Will the EU
work with or against the United States? We have a diverse picture.
Sometimes we work together very well; at other times we do not.
It depends very much on the issues.
* * * * * *
THEME 3. Some observers believe it is time
for a dramatic new initiative to reinforce or relaunch the transatlantic
partnership. For example, Henry Kissinger (in Does America Need
a Foreign Policy?) argues that NATO can no longer serve as the sole
institution for Atlantic cooperation. A new vehicle, he says, is
needed for Atlantic cooperation. He suggests specifically an Atlantic
Steering Group, backed by a Secretariat, to develop parallel approaches
to world affairs and to manage differences as they arise. Walther
Stützel, to cite one more example, has called for a group of
eminent Americans and Europeans to propose a new Atlantic Charter.
QUESTION 3. Do you believe that new political structures going
beyond NATO and the Transatlantic Agenda are needed? If not, what
specific steps do you believe should be taken to improve U.S.-European
relations?
Philippe Errera, Presenter
Is it time for a new Atlantic Charter, he asked? President Chirac
talked of this possibility on his first state visit to the United
States in 1996. The political will may exist, but the speaker believes
this is not the right time. We should first examine and reflect
on the record of the Madrid Agenda, which is ten years old. It would
be useful also after the Iraq crisis to go back to fundamentals
and see what was in the original Atlantic Charter. It was a short
declaration consisting of eight general principles embodying the
common values of the United States and the United Kingdom and became
the starting point for the United Nations Charter. Europeans would
like to see a United States that is responsible, capable, and engaged
in the affairs of the world. Americans would like to see a comparable
Europe. There could be a symbolic advantage in drafting a new Atlantic
Charter; but he is a pragmatist. When we have successes under our
belt in terms of transatlantic initiatives would be an appropriate
moment. There have been some U.S.-EU successes notably in the Balkans
and in Afghanistan. As regards the Iranian issue, there has been
informal cooperation among three EU member states and the United
States, but right now there is no common U.S. policy (among the
different players in Washington) on Iran. If we can deliver some
positive results, then it would be a good time to create a new framework
for transatlantic relations.
In his view, NATO is not the right venue for this. American dominance
is built into its structure. The United States uses NATO as a “tool
box” and to contract out some activities. American exceptionalism
is also embodied in the way in which the integrated military structure
works. The United States and France are the least integrated members
of the alliance. Referring to Ambassador Cohen’s proposal for
a “clubhouse,” the speaker said that members should be
able to speak out without being clubbed. There are polite discussions
in the North Atlantic Council, but when some representatives get
out of line, he noted, they are frequently scolded by the United
States. In his view, NATO has largely lost the political consultation
function that it fulfilled during the cold war. He does not know
how to get that function restored. Could there be a U.S.-EU forum?
Possibly, but we have to do much more to make the institutional
relationship work. Transatlantic or U.S.-EU summits have become
a nightmare for both the United States and the EU; they often lead
to meaningless texts that do not reflect reality. Any new structures,
he believes, should be in the context of U.S.-EU relations rather
than NATO because there are more and broader tools available. In
any case, we have to get back to the business of listening to one
another and consulting seriously before launching bold, new initiatives.
Dieter Kastrup, Presenter
The presenter disagreed with his French colleague. The time has
come, he said, for a new beginning. Europeans and Americans need
to engage in a strategic dialogue leading to a common threat assessment,
a common agenda, and common policies. We should be able to agree
that no single country, not even the most powerful on earth, can
tackle complex global problems on its own. We should agree on guidelines
and procedures to deal with new threats. The Transatlantic Declaration
of 1990 produced a dialogue that cannot be called strategic. It
is “day-to-day business.” The strategic challenge confronting
both the United States and Europe was changed completely by the
9/11 attack.
For Ambassador Kastrup, NATO continues to be an indispensable forum.
The Prague Declaration at the NATO summit in 2002 contains provisions
that address post-9/11 developments. NATO has never been a purely
military institution; it has always been a forum for political dialogue.
But we need a genuine political dialogue that cannot be conducted
within existing fora. We should look for something new. Perhaps
we could make use of elements from all the proposals mentioned in
the framework questions. But it would be a mistake to turn this
task over to a private group of eminent persons, no matter how eminent
they might be. Political leaders should be in the driver’s
seat. This is a political decision, and it must be made by politicians.
Why should not the newly elected American president take the initiative?
President Bush should invite Europeans and Americans to come together
to try to define the tasks ahead of us. They could then appoint
personal representatives with the aim of drafting a document; whether
it is called Transatlantic Charter or not is unimportant. The speaker
believes that Henry Kissinger is right; some kind of permanent body
has to be established. Good people from Europe and the United States
must sit together and help produce ideas, sort out differences,
and define the common task. Is this politically naïve, he asked?
But what is the alternative? To sit and wait? It is time to act,
declared Ambassador Kastrup, and boldly!
In the discussion Ambassador Hunter commented on the role of the
CFSP and the European defense force. He has a rule of thumb: No
one makes money by betting against the success of the European Union.
But the CFSP will take a
long time to build and develop. There might be some incompatibility
between a European defense force and NATO. But he cannot think of
anything the Europeans might want to do in the military field that
the United States would oppose. No one has ever given him an example.
He also wondered why the EU should spend much more money on defense.
He doubts that it would ever need the amount of power that the United
States has. There may indeed be a need for Special Forces, but in
this regard there is already a European capability. The need is
for a U.S.-EU strategic partnership, which essentially will be nonmilitary.
He advises European friends to turn their eyes away from the American
political process. American power will be used globally no matter
which party is in power.
An American specialist contended that there are substantial differences
between the United States and Europe, particularly as regards preemptive
strikes and regime change. He argued that democracy may not be appropriate
in all circumstances, but regime change nonetheless may be necessary.
He was also concerned about the transformation of European society
through Muslim immigration. If current trends continue, he believes,
France may be a Muslim country in 50 years.
An American army officer pointed out that the European and American
strategy doctrines are quite similar as regards threat assessment.
The United States and the EU have complementary strategies. The
United States has an advantage in the use of hard power; Europe
an advantage in the use of soft power. The European model of soft
power and continuous negotiations has appeal in the rest of the
world. This army officer also finds it appealing, in particular
the emphasis on crisis prevention and management, human security,
and dealing with the root causes of terrorism (notably poverty).
Europe’s choice also is a reflection of its culture.
A participant representing the Eisenhower National Security Series,
Dr. Bryan T. van Sweringen, found inspiration in the speech by German
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in February 2004. Fischer called
for a new transatlantic initiative in the Middle East that would
build on the Mediterranean Dialogue already started by both the
EU and NATO. Fischer believes the crisis in the greater Middle East
is caused by modernization (which differs from the assertion by
the previous discussant that the root cause is poverty). An American
army officer suggested that any new transatlantic structure should
follow the model of the CFSP in its first stage by emphasizing consultation.
No state is required to do anything, but we all promise that we
will talk to one another.
Ambassador Cohen saw a contradiction between Ambassador Kastrup’s
statement that NATO is indispensable and his emphasis on the five
major security threats identified by EU strategic planners. Cohen
asked Ambassador Kastrup in what way NATO is relevant in dealing
with any of the five threats. Ambassador Kastrup agreed that NATO
is not relevant to these threats and therefore suggested that a
“grand transatlantic dialogue” is needed to develop new
approaches.
In responding to discussants, Mr. Errera said that the National
Security Strategy paper of December 2002 is a caricature of the
actual American position on preemption. The United States is now
backing away from it. On the other hand, Europe has never rejected
the possibility of the use of preemptive force. The difference is
between an explicit doctrine that provokes people and an implicit
option. On regime change: He does not see the United States going
out and changing regimes every day. And Europeans believe regime
change is sometimes needed. What France and the United States did
in Haiti recently was nothing other than regime change. He sees
a growing EU-U.S. consensus to favor reforms over stability. There
is no real difference, he added, between the United States and France
over the Ivory Coast. He is reluctant to attribute foreign policy
decisions to social forces (for example, the Muslim population in
France) and lobbying. The problem in France is that not enough attention
is being paid to the political, social, and economic integration
of Muslims. We all face a common challenge in terms of dealing with
the Islamic world.
Ambassador Kastrup said that NATO remains important but that in
order to deal with global problems, we must go beyond NATO. He also
agrees that the European and American strategic doctrines are virtually
identical. This means we have a common threat assessment. We do
not yet have agreement on measures to be taken. He was happy to
acknowledge that the European Union is the preferred partner of
the United Nations for peacekeeping missions.
AMERICAN VIEWS
The luncheon speaker, Ambassador Stuart W. Holliday, briefed participants
on several issues confronting the United Nations in order to provide
timely insight into the state of U.S.-European relations. He addressed
two areas of U.S. cooperation with Europe in the UN: peacekeeping
and counterterrorism.
American taxpayers contribute 27 percent of the budget for peacekeeping
plus a voluntary sum for some special operations. Although the presence
of American forces on the ground is not what others would like it
to be, they are present in UN-mandated peacekeeping missions in
Afghanistan and Haiti. The latter is an interesting example of Franco-American
cooperation. Dominique de Villepin and Colin Powell were on the
phone back and forth over the course of several critical hours,
trying to determine how best to keep gangs from entering Port au
Prince and discussing the longer term prospects for Haiti.
Another issue is where to draw the line between peacekeeping and
peace building. We are working with our European colleagues to define
more effectively the transfer of responsibilities from military
forces to international financial institutions, the Economic and
Social Council of the UN, and specialized development agencies.
In Afghanistan we have a good working relationship with our European
colleagues. In Bosnia we are preparing for a transition from a NATO-led
to an EU-led operation. In Sudan we also see eye to eye with our
European colleagues. We are all working together to get Sudan to
conclude the north-south peace process. In Lebanon we joined with
the French and the Germans on a resolution to push for the withdrawal
of Syrian troops. We have also conveyed to our European friends
our view that the issue of Turkey’s entry into the European
Union be addressed appropriately.
There has been long-standing cooperation between the United States
and Europe on counterterrorism. The Counterterrorism Committee has
been active in encouraging nations to enact and enforce counteterrorism
laws. Russia in particular, because of its own experience, is a
key partner with us in counterterrorism. The Nonproliferation Committee
is also serving a useful role in pressing states to keep track of
lethal technologies and to keep them out of the hands of nonstate
actors.
During the cold war the Security Council met hardly at all because
of the mutually assured veto. Now the Council meets almost daily.
A lot of vital work is going on, which would not happen without
U.S.-European cooperation. The ambassador also referred to the ongoing
issue of the International Criminal Court and whether peacekeeping
operations, to which the United States contributes so heavily, should
be coordinated with a court not supported by the United States.
Some agreement has to be worked out between the United States and
Europe on how to deal with the problem.
The forthcoming report on the reform of the Security Council will
present us with a thorny problem. Apart from questions about the
size and membership of the Security Council is a larger issue: the
relative importance of weapons of mass destruction (a major concern
in developed countries) and of small and light arms (weapons of
choice in the developing world). We have to work out a grand bargain,
concluded Ambassador Holliday, taking into account our mutual interests.
An animated discussion followed concerning proposed reforms of
the Security Council, which brought out many uncertainties and problems.
* * * * * *
THEME 4. We should now turn to the central
question: What forward-looking, concrete measures can be taken to
improve relations between the United States and Europe? In previous
National Committee roundtables, Ambassador Herman J. Cohen suggested
it is time to create a “clubhouse” of transatlantic democracies
where specialists could exchange information and try to coordinate
policies. Ambassador Hunter argues (in Foreign Affairs, September/October
2004) that the United States and the EU “form a natural community,
the common interests and values of which should be institutionalized
in a nonmilitary organization that could operate in the realm of
economics, politics, society and culture.”
QUESTION 4. What could this nonmilitary organization be? What should
be its structure? Is there sufficient political will on both sides
of the Atlantic to create such an organization? What steps specifically
could be taken to achieve this goal?
Does NATO have to be revamped in order better to address the new
postcold-war realities? What should be done by Americans and Europeans?
Will a European defense (as it gradually takes shape) strengthen
or weaken NATO?
Robert E. Hunter, Presenter
The presenter said it is a good sign that the National Committee
on American Foreign Policy and other private groups are concerned
about improving transatlantic relations. Americans and Europeans
are struggling collectively to define a future together. We can’t
stop the world and get off. Increasingly we and our European partners
will be faced with things we have to do in common whether we like
it or not.
Twice before Americans had to think through grand strategy: (1)
After Pearl Harbor when we drew up a plan to liberate Europe first
and then later to create the United Nations. (2) The age of the
cold war, the period of the great professionals like Hans J. Morgenthau
and Bernard Brodie. We are in a third period ushered in by 9/11.
Even though the United States was a superpower after the end of
the cold war, we did not believe there were any immediate threats.
It was a kind of holiday from strategy and from history. We have
to engage in fundamental thinking all over again. After 9/11 we
have to reexamine some of the old theories, rework them, and get
a new generation to reappraise our situation. The challenge now
is just as complex and important as during World War II and the
cold war. September 11 was the first significant attack by a foreign
power against the American mainland since 1814. It has focused our
minds. We must, of course, meet immediate needs and create a world
order for the future. In the 1990s NATO was transformed in order
to meet the new challenge of facilitating democratization and providing
stability in the Balkans and East Europe. This task was summed up
in Senator Lugar’s catch phrase: “out of area or out of
business.” That mission was accomplished. NATO is now busily
at work. There is no malaise in the alliance. The European NATO
country that has the most armed forces deployed abroad, he noted,
is France. A French general is in command of the NATO mission in
Afghanistan. NATO can still play a role as the primary locus of
strategic discussion across the Atlantic, though perhaps not the
exclusive role it had in the past. But there are many things it
cannot do or cannot do well. Transatlantic cooperation in dealing
with terrorism has been excellent, but little of this work is done
by NATO. A number of security issues, notably dealing with WMD,
are handled through other institutions. We encounter problems when
NATO is asked to perform functions for which it was not designed
or is not suited. The great strength of the European Union is its
ability to take a foreign policy and security problem at the outset
and handle every aspect of it through the onset of military action
and beyond. It is a seamless web. NATO does not have that crisis-
management capacity. How can we arrange structures to take advantage
of their respective strengths?
The two great repositories of capacity are the United States and
the collection of countries increasingly identified as a collectivity
called the European Union. Both are democratic systems, both are
capable of projecting power beyond their borders, and both have
trained personnel and effective nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
We should be inspired by the great bursts of transatlantic cooperation,
the first of which was the Marshall Plan, which linked economic
development to security. The Washington Treaty creating NATO also
referred to political and economic links as part of security strategy.
Increasing integration and the enlargement of the EU have been
leading to a Europe, as President George H. W. Bush said, “whole
and free.” The EU works for everybody and against nobody. That
France and Germany will not go to war against each other or even
think about it is a historic accomplishment.
Perhaps it is time, the presenter continued, for the United States
and the European Union to take the next leap forward and do things
together outside of the realm of collective defense. Examples that
come to mind are health, education, and economic development, which
require action by both governments and nongovernmental organizations.
He suggested that we should add to the National Security Council
people directly responsible for involving the private sector and
NGOs in activities that advance American national interests. The
distinction between defense and other missions is being blurred
even for military forces, which are now heavily engaged in peacekeeping
and nation building.
In the speaker’s judgment, we need to institutionalize relations
between the United States and the European Union. It is not enough
to issue a declaration, as in 1990. The people responsible for security
in the United States, the individual European states, and the European
Union should be interacting in a regular way. Who will take the
lead in creating new structures? Bureaucrats always say no. Only
a firm lead by the president of the United States and appropriate
people in Europe can put these ideas into play and place a political
“chapeau” over existing structures. The expertise is available
and can be marshaled by political leaders. If you have the political
leadership, you can get the institutional structures. We need think
only of relations between NATO and the EU in the early 1990s, when
it was said that both organizations were based in Brussels but lived
on different planets. Their separate existences have ended; both
organizations are now meeting regularly. We must take another great
leap forward in transatlantic relations, building a strategic relationship
on a functional basis with political leadership on top. Inspiration
is needed from the nongovernmental sector in order to make things
happen.
During the cold war we had a lot of transatlantic economic problems.
We dealt with them because we needed the resources to confront the
Soviet Union and compete for hearts and minds. We got over economic
problems for strategic reasons. Today the reverse is true. We now
have a three-trillion-dollar relationship across the Atlantic. To
sever it would be an injury of supreme historic folly. We should
now use the increasingly integrated transatlantic economy as a bridge
across security disagreements, which are kinds of growing pains.
At this stage we do not need a precise blueprint of new structures.
There is no magic answer. A proposal made by John Kerry during the
recent campaign might be appropriated by the victor. President Bush
should sponsor a summit of leaders of both NATO and the European
Union. To give it nonpartisan appeal, it should be put forward in
the spirit of George Marshall and Harry Truman. The EU is a locus
of power, as is NATO; we need the EU plus NATO. The presenter added
as a postscript that the security problem in Afghanistan also requires
all of us to address the problem of opium production and traffic.
In response to a question about the possibility of using the NATO
Partnership for Peace (PfP) as a starting point for transatlantic
institution building, the speaker said that the PfP is very useful,
but it is not about power. Neither is the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). A new transatlantic institution
must be a locus of power. The United States, individual European
governments, the EU, and NATO have power, whether political, economic,
or military. An effective structure must somehow encompass all of
them.
Herman J. Cohen, Presenter
The presenter suggested we have lessons to learn from the Balkan
crisis and its buildup. The Iraq crisis was almost a self-fulfilling
prophecy. There were tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic that
led to the crisis over Iraq. At the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia
at the start of the Clinton administration, Americans were arrogant
in dealing with Europeans, telling them what to do in Bosnia. On
the other hand, Americans had the feeling that greater European
cohesion was based on opposition to the United States. In international
conferences on landmines (Ottawa Convention), greenhouse gas emissions
(Kyoto Convention), and the International Criminal Court (Rome Treaty),
Europeans refused to negotiate compromises. Their policy was, take
it or leave it. An impression was conveyed to the U.S. government
that Europe was being built by saying no to America. The French
were especially good at systematic opposition, but all of Europe
was doing it. If Europeans had made reasonable concessions, the
United State would have been aboard on all these treaties.
Both sides, in his view, have learned something from the Iraq crisis.
The United States has learned that unilateral war on a big scale
is not sustainable domestically for financial and political reasons.
The second Bush administration is condemned to return to the multilateralism
of the Bush senior administration. Europeans have learned that they
cannot construct the EU in opposition to the United States. They
should learn how to manage the superpower rather than try to block
it.
What gestures now can be made by each side to build confidence?
The notion that the United States is the only superpower should
be seen by Europeans as a positive element. American power is the
only guarantor of world stability. You know there is world stability
when the superpower does not use its power. Because of the superpower
there is no violence in the Taiwan Straits, Kashmir, East Asia,
and elsewhere. Europeans should appreciate the role of the United
States as a guarantor of, not a danger to, world order.
What can the United States do to win European confidence? The presenter’s
main suggestion (which he knows will upset some people): It is time
to remove life support from NATO. As long as NATO exists, an autonomous
European defense force will not develop as fast as it should. The
EU is making a unique contribution to a certain kind of world order,
which we should nurture and help develop. NATO has become a symbol
of American domination and should be dissolved. The president of
the United States should declare that NATO has served its purpose.
NATO is not a suitable instrument for dealing with the main threats
on the horizon. This will please Europeans and also compel the EU
to work seriously on security issues. We must now concentrate on
building an equal relationship between the United States and Europe.
We have to deal with the European Union. It should not be that difficult
to get the EU to work with us in joint efforts on security issues,
even if they have many telephone numbers. The commander of American
forces in Europe will still be able to coordinate with European
commanders after he takes off his NATO cap.
In the discussion that followed, Ambassador Kastrup disagreed with
the American presenter. He believes that NATO still has a vital
role to play. The East Europeans would be disappointed were NATO
to disappear. NATO has established an important link with Russia.
He sees no alternative to NATO, whose arrangements are of the greatest
importance. This German discussant prefers to see Europe as a partner
of the United States, not as a rival superpower. Europe should not,
in his view, define itself as a counterweight to the United States.
He recognizes that European public opinion wants to become independent
of the United States as soon as possible; but he opposes this policy.
It is the responsibility of political leaders to reshape public
opinion.
For Philippe Errera, Ambassador Cohen has the courage to look at
facts as they are. However, no one in Europe wants the United States
to declare that NATO should close up shop. In reality, NATO is “no
longer there.” For France, the EU should be autonomous –
independent of the United States, though not necessarily in opposition.
The EU should be able to cooperate with the United States without
going through NATO. In case of disagreement, we should negotiate
and then go on with our lives. He pointed out that an increasing
number of Americans also want the EU to play a larger role.
We may be doing too much transatlantic navel gazing, Mr. Errera
continued. The real issues are outside of Europe. For example, the
EU and the United States believe that the Kosovo war was legitimate.
Most of the world, however, does not agree. He also suggested it
will be difficult to continue tactical cooperation on terrorism
and counterterrorism unless we agree on strategy. The French believe
they are fighting global jihadism and that their society and survival
are at stake. But, unlike the United States, they take into account
the fact that many issues, notably Chechnya and Palestine, have
local contexts. We must deal with them separately. NATO is not the
best place for the strategic dialogue we need about terrorism and
policy toward the Islamic world. There is also basic disagreement
concerning the Middle East. The United States sees Israel as a beleaguered
democracy. The EU believes that the current U.S. administration
is no longer an honest broker and has become a partisan of Ariel
Sharon. He wonders what useful purpose is being served by the Quartet
(the United States, the EU, Russia, and the UN Secretariat) in the
Middle East at present.
Ambassador Hunter urged that we return to reality concerning NATO.
Europeans are able to talk about autonomy because they know that
NATO is not going to collapse and that the United States is not
pulling out. They have room to maneuver within the American commitment.
Before taking any action, they must first shore up the American
commitment. They have done so with every administration. They have
been fearful that George W. Bush might go the other way, and so
they are going out of their way to cement relations with him and
to make sure that the United States is not going to abandon NATO.
If NATO did not exist, we would have to invent it. Interoperability
established through NATO makes it possible for Europeans to work
together.
Much of what Europeans accomplish is made possible because there
is a NATO and an American commitment to Europe, continued Ambassador
Hunter. Everybody is comfortable with the idea of America as a superpower
as long as we don’t do stupid things. That is why they worry
about Iraq and worried about Vietnam. But we came back from Vietnam.
We are prepared to do the heavy lifting when it is necessary. Russia
remains a worry, as events in Ukraine and Belarus have reminded
us. If the United States is going to be around, it must be in an
institution it can help run or run in a major respect and where
everybody works together and not separately.
If it were not for NATO’s existence, European military forces
would not be with us in Afghanistan today. Why? Europeans want to
make sure that the United States keeps engaged in Europe. They are
participating in activities out of area because they do not want
the Americans to lose interest in NATO. The Greeks were overwhelmingly
opposed to NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo. But they stuck
with NATO because they wanted Americans to be there in order to
do other things, like establish standards for interoperability.
Everybody loves what the Europeans are doing on defense. But when
it gets down to the heavy lifting, everyone turns to NATO. In fact,
the whole European Union defense structure is designed to go up
to a certain point, with the understanding of a handover to NATO
if the going really gets rough. It may be different in the future,
but that will be many years away. Even the French know it. The French
are realists. They will bargain hard; but when the chips are down,
they will be there.
If we were to wrap up NATO tomorrow, there would not be a European
replacement performing the same function. Europeans rely on American
leadership and ability to do the heavy lifting. The U.S. government,
whether the president is Republican or Democrat, can take decisions,
commit and deploy forces, and get people to pull together. Take
away NATO and the first people to complain would be the Europeans
and not just the East Europeans who are terrified of being left
in the lurch to face Russia by themselves or be dominated by other
Europeans.
Of course, we have to change NATO, continued Ambassador Hunter.
But de Gaulle only acted as he did in 1966 to buy space for French
policy and to deal with the German problem, which led to détente.
If de Gaulle had thought we would then leave Europe, he never would
have touched NATO.
Ambassador Cohen said that eliminating NATO does not mean that
the United States has to leave Europe. NATO has become a symbol
of America’s “droit de regard” (control) over Europe.
This is not a real partnership. The president should propose a replacement
for NATO by another form of partnership that is really equal. Ambassador
Hunter replied that not a single member of Congress or of any U.S.
administration would want the United States to maintain a military
presence in Europe were it not for NATO. If the Europeans want us
to leave, we will pack up and leave. But the Europeans would then
be on their own if they have problems in the future, for example,
with Russia. The United States would then handle the Middle East
by itself and be much tougher in economic dealings. Why eliminate
NATO if it will just be replaced by something else? Why not start
with something that Americans already support? Look at the declaration
by the 1999 Helsinki European Summit that the European military
force will operate only where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The
primacy of NATO is agreed on by all members of the European Union.
Why would Europeans want to fight anywhere in the world by themselves
if they could do it through NATO and with Americans beside them?
But the idea that the United States will stop the Europeans from
using force independently, he said, is nonsense.
Another discussant asked about the possibility of the Europeanization
of NATO. After the first Gulf War there was a chance that France
might return to the integrated military command structure. Why not
appoint a European supreme commander? Then people would no longer
believe that NATO is under American control. You could still have
a four-star American general in charge of U.S. forces in Europe.
Ambassador Hunter replied that SACEUR (supreme allied commander,
Europe) is an American because Europeans insist on it. When we wanted
to change the name to comport with other allied commands, they said
no. They wanted it shown that the United States has a European vocation
through NATO. If you said to the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff, here is a four-star billet for use somewhere else, he
would thank you. As regards the reentry of France into the integrated
military command, we agreed that the Southern Command in Naples
could go to a European, provided Europeans furnished the major part
of the naval assets for the Southern Command. That has not happened.
Incidentally, were that to happen, the NATO country most eligible
for the command would be Turkey. The basic question is whether the
Europeans really want NATO to be taken apart. Would they like the
United States to remove its supreme commander and its troops and
just leave? Ask them.
An American military officer contended that Europeans will lean
less toward NATO as they develop their capabilities. They plan to
have all capabilities in place by the end of the decade. Ambassador
Hunter said that the Europeans are not developing capabilities to
the extent of being able to dispense with NATO. They are not going
to spend the money. They have two million people under arms but
cannot find 20,000 to deploy. He considers himself probably the
most pro-European person in or out of the American government in
terms of supporting the European military effort. But he does not
believe they will achieve full capabilities for a long time. The
emperor really has no clothes.
Mr. Errera disagreed with Ambassador Hunter’s statement that
Europeans are in Afghanistan or conducting military operations elsewhere
in the world because they are afraid that the United States will
leave Europe. This is inconsistent with the notion that we have
shared values and interests. There will be a decreased American
troop presence in Europe, and the troops that remain will be using
Europe as a forward staging ground for Middle East operations. As
American interest in Europe declines, Europeans will want to conduct
their own joint projects. Take the EU operation in Bosnia. Europeans
saw that a NATO bureaucracy unhappy with the EU takeover wanted
to assign the work on the ground to the EU but maintain NATO control
at every level. In this situation Europeans had the clout but were
denied responsibility. There are already 70,000 European troops
deployed in the world and 20,000 British troops in Iraq. What Europeans
today have in terms of capabilities for deploying forces outside
of Europe, they obviously will have tomorrow. They will be able
to do so within either NATO or the EU. Ambassador Hunter replied
that we were now talking about details within a framework of actions
we are trying to take together. Whether we work through NATO or
another institution, there is no reason to close down NATO if it
can do the mission.
A lively discussion followed concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.
There was general agreement that this issue has to be addressed,
but there is discord concerning tactics and strategy. An American
specialist was critical of European and especially French policy
supporting a corrupt Palestinian Authority that is not a viable
negotiating partner. Mr. Errera said that Sharon’s tough line
helped Arafat just as he was losing credibility among Palestinians.
Dr. Schwab called attention to a 2001 National Committee on American
Foreign Policy conference attended exclusively by Muslim scholars,
journalists, and former diplomats. They all agreed that a sovereign
Israel in the midst of Islam is unacceptable to Arab Muslims in
the long run. Peace can only come about with a change of the Muslim
mind-set. Ambassador Hunter commented that it is critically important
to stop the killing now. Just waiting for people to change their
minds will not work. The starting point for a peace process has
to be that nothing will be done to compromise Israel’s security.
Some Europeans have wavered on this point; they will have to demonstrate
their good faith if we want to work collectively on a solution.
We need a massive effort to assure the success of the Israeli pullout
from Gaza, reconstruct Gaza, make it a Palestinian state, and move
from there. In the event of a cease-fire and the beginning of a
political settlement, he said, it may be NATO’s next job to
provide a U.S.-led implementation force. To be continued at another
roundtable.
THE DISCUSSION: AN OVERVIEW
The tone of this fourth National Committee roundtable on transatlantic
relations was distinctly more optimistic than that of its three
predecessors. In the roundtables held in October 2002 (New York),
June 2003 (Geneva), and May 2004 (New York), there were heated disputes
concerning unilateralism, the use of force in Iraq, anti-Americanism
in Europe, and appropriate tactics in dealing with the threats of
terrorism and rogue states not only among Americans and Europeans
but within these two camps as well. Participants in this November
2004 roundtable generally agreed that relations between the United
States and Europe have become less tense and less conflicted, though
some were concerned that underlying differences had yet to be faced.
In retrospect, a relaxation of tensions has been a natural development
because of the evolution of the political situation. In the aftermath
of 9/11, the United States was determined to strike back at Islamic
terrorist networks and at the state (Afghanistan) giving them sanctuary
and wished, rightly or wrongly, to have freedom of action rather
than share responsibility for a military campaign with its European
allies. Necessarily the emphasis was on unilateral action rather
than multilateral collaboration and greater reliance than usual
on military force. When France and Germany actively campaigned against
American and British policy in Iraq, a low point was reached in
transatlantic relations. After the lightning victory of American
and British forces in Iraq, policymaking power shifted from the
Defense Department to the State Department and the National Security
Council (NSC), despite the intensification of a lethal insurgency.
A large American embassy was established in Baghdad, policy was
coordinated by a diplomat in the NSC, and emphasis was placed on
reconstruction, the formation of a provisional Iraqi government,
the preparation of elections, the reduction of Iraq’s debts
to foreign creditors, and the gigantic task of stabilizing the greater
Middle East.
Inevitably the volume of consultation between the American and
European governments increased, thus meeting the most persistent
demand of the European side.
The Bush administration sought the cooperation of the United Nations,
invited European participation in the reconstruction of Iraq, and
assured Europeans that their economic as well as geopolitical interests
in Iraq and the Middle East will be taken into account. In addition,
Americans and Europeans are discovering (if ever they forgot) that
they have common interests in dealing with the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by Iran, the possible access of terrorists to WMD, and the
continuous threat of attacks by Islamic jihadists (particularly
in light of the March 11 bombings in Madrid). This roundtable also
took place one week after the reelection of President Bush, eliminating
the hopes of many Europeans for a fresh start with a different president.
Responsible European leaders have to temper past criticism and deal
more soberly now with the second Bush administration; in turn the
American president may feel sufficiently self-confident to forgive
and forget and to reach out to traditional allies. There is a downside
for the Europeans in this turn to multilateralism. They cannot simply
complain and criticize. They will have to step up to the plate,
make compromises, and assume responsibilities.
Although all participants agreed that the transatlantic climate
of opinion is now healthier, there is also a general sense that
improvement is tactical rather than strategic. Fundamental differences
between Americans and Europeans remain, and they are structural
rather than a matter of personalities. We cannot go back to “the
Golden Age of the cold war,” as one European diplomat put it,
when Soviet forces, massed only 25 miles from Hamburg, threatened
and intimidated Western Europe. Americans and Europeans then had
a vital interest in presenting a united front to discourage any
thought of attack. The geopolitical world has changed irrevocably.
There is no longer a mortal threat of the invasion of Europe by
a hostile power; the United States and Europe now have a large degree
of autonomy from each other. Each side can indulge in nationalistic
and even jingoistic feelings of superiority or, to reverse the image,
can indulge in the luxury of denigrating the other side.
Nonetheless, all participants in the roundtable agreed, the United
States and Europe pay a high price for disunity and discord. First,
they must still work together on lingering and irksome problems
in Europe; notably bring about durable political solutions in the
Balkans; stabilize Eastern Europe, including Ukraine; and integrate
Russia into the European and global economies and security systems.
In the sphere of greater chaos and danger outside of Europe, the
chances of managing crises are incomparably better when Americans
and Europeans cooperate and collaborate. When Americans and Europeans
are at odds or, worse, work at cross purposes, global problems are
more difficult if not impossible to resolve. We all agreed that
Western unity is better than disunity. But what can be the new basis
of cooperation? Are Europeans ready to assume greater responsibilities?
Is the European Union able to speak with one voice and to become
a genuine “power” in the domain of foreign and security
policy?
Discussion at the roundtable reflected discord within Europe itself
concerning the capacity of the European Union to act as an equal
partner of the United States. Some participants contended that the
EU is on the way to creating an effective Common Foreign and Security
Policy, with a foreign minister speaking for both the Union and
the member states. Others thought that member states remain the
power centers in the domain of foreign and security policy but that
some power is now located in EU structures and is bound to increase.
In separate discussions with former and present State Department
officials, National Committee members found skepticism concerning
the EU as a partner. There is a general appreciation on the American
side that dealing with Brussels is a convenient way of communicating
with all members of the EU, even though most important issues must
be negotiated beforehand with the key nation-states.
NATIONAL COMMITTEE
ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The National Committee on American Foreign Policy believes that
an initiative by political leaders to improve and better structure
transatlantic relations will resonate within civil society on both
sides of the Atlantic. Several participants in the roundtable said
that only one political leader in the world has the power and prestige
to launch any initiative and that person is the newly reelected
president of the United States. The National Committee concurs that
the ball is in the American court. If a bold new policy is to be
proposed and carried out, it can be done only if the second Bush
administration provides a firm lead.
What to Do?
No specific blueprint for new transatlantic structures emerged
from our roundtable for good reason: That was not the task before
it; nor would it be appropriate to limit options. But it would be
useful to put on the table a number of ideas worth exploring. (a)
In previous roundtables Ambassador Cohen proposed a “clubhouse”
for democracies in which specialists would exchange views on threat
perception and crisis management. (b) Henry Kissinger has proposed
the creation of an Atlantic Steering Committee, with its own Secretariat,
that would coordinate strategic policies for the transatlantic partnership.
(c) Walther Stützel has suggested that a group of eminent persons
should draft a new Atlantic Charter. (d) Ambassador Hunter has called
for the institutionalization of the relationship between the United
States and the European Union that would include NATO. (e) Some
leading economists urge that collaboration between the American
and European trade commissioners be extended to the political level
by creating a kind of G-2 (the United States and the EU) for foreign
and security policy. As one European participant observed, elements
of all of the above ideas could be a starting point for serious
deliberation.
How to proceed? At the roundtable a former European diplomat suggested
that political leaders designate a group of eminent persons (or
comité des sages, committee of wise men) to study all of
the above proposals. A similar procedure in the past led to the
sweeping transformation of NATO. A former American diplomat suggested
that the president of the United States call for a 26summit of leaders
of member states of both NATO and the European Union to consider
the state of the alliance and make specific recommendations for
new structures. Details can be worked out later; motivation is all.
Vouloir, c’est pouvoir!
The Role of NATO
Does NATO have a vital role to perform in the postcold-war era,
or should it close shop? Europeans then would have an incentive
to do more for their own defense, and the United States would be
free to concentrate on crises outside of Europe. This issue was
raised during the roundtable, sparking a lively debate. Most participants
believe that NATO continues to perform important functions for the
transatlantic community, particularly in helping stabilize the Balkans
and all of Eastern Europe and coordinating policies toward Russia.
The National Committee on American Foreign Policy believes that
NATO to a great extent adapted to the challenges of the postcold-war
era, as evidenced by the determination of East Europeans to enter
the alliance. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) has been one of the
most successful diplomatic initiatives of recent years, drawing
into its structures neutral countries like Finland, Sweden, Austria,
and even Switzerland. The PfP has evolved as a mini-NATO with parallel
political and military structures, permitting states aspiring to
NATO membership to gain valuable experience in order to qualify
for full membership and nonmembers to collaborate with fellow Europeans
and Americans without fanfare. NATO also has created a mutually
beneficial set of committees and councils where important issues
are regularly discussed. A multinational staff (at Supreme Headquarters
in Mons, Belgium) has inculcated a sense of community within the
American and European military establishments. NATO is poised to
assume new functions in the greater Middle East. However, NATO is
not the central institution in the fight against international terrorism.
It is not an appropriate instrument for purely political discussion
and negotiation or for crisis prevention and management. The need
now is for some kind of structure to provide a strategic political
dimension now missing in security discussions at NATO and economic
cooperation through the New Transatlantic Agenda.
What Else Might Be Done?
If the nays have it, if the new U.S. administration declines to
launch a bold initiative, or if the consensus is that the timing
is not right for the creation of new transatlantic structures, much
still can be done to help develop consistent if not parallel policies
on each side of the Atlantic. The National Committee strongly urges
a revival of the practice, suspended since the Iraq crisis, of regular
meetings of the political directors of the four major transatlantic
powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany),
known informally as the Quad. Each of these powers has a network
of contacts throughout Europe. When the Quad is in agreement, its
members can mobilize support in the European Union and the Security
Council. When the Quad fell apart over Iraq, the result was the
paralysis of multilateral institutions. No issue on the horizon
(notably regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons; Iran, North
Korea, or the Middle East) is as divisive as was the use of force
in Iraq. All of Europe shares with the United States vulnerability
to terrorism and an interest in a stable and peaceful Iraq and greater
Middle East. As the Iraq issue evolves into a problem of reconstruction
and stabilization, conditions will be favorable for the revival
of the Quad. One of the items on the agenda would then be the institutionalization
of transatlantic political relations to parallel cooperation in
the military and economic domains.
The United States and the European Union
The geopolitical relationship between the United States and the
European Union, even assuming the ratification of the new constitutional
treaty, will remain asymmetrical. The United States has a federal
system and the separation of powers, but it can speak with a single
voice and deploy massive armed forces rapidly. Despite impressive,
indeed amazing, progress toward European economic unity, power regarding
foreign and security policy remains largely in the nation-states.
It is clearly in the interest of the United States to encourage
and engage with the developing Brussels institutions, above all
because it is an efficient way of communicating with all of Europe.
The United States must deal with the member states directly and
with Brussels.
The Contribution of Civil Society
We at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy propose
to continue our series of roundtables in which American and European
diplomats, former diplomats, scholars, and members of the transatlantic
community can discuss common problems with a view to adopting forward-looking
measures that will advance common interests.
PANELISTS
NCAFP HOSTS
Dr. George D. Schwab
President, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Professor Bernard E. Brown
Project Director, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
ENSS COORDINATORS
Mr. William C. Angerman
Program Director, U.S. Army Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security
Series
Major James Craig
Program Manager, U.S. Army Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security
Series
PRESENTERS
The Honorable Herman J. Cohen
President, Cohen and Woods International
Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Mr. Philippe Errera
Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
France
The Honorable Stuart W. Holliday
Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs
U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN
The Honorable Robert Hunter
Senior Adviser, RAND Corporation
Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO
The Honorable Dr. Dieter Kastrup
Former Foreign Policy and Security Adviser to Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Albert Bildner
Member, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Professor Michael Curtis
Secretary, National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Mr. Joe Drach
Deputy Chief, Regional Policy and Politico-Military Affairs Division,
U.S. Army
Major Patrick Howell
Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military
Academy
Dr. Ray Raymond
Political Officer, Consulate General of Great Britain
Donald S. Rice, Esq.
Senior Vice President, National Committee on American Foreign
Policy
Mr. William M. Rudolf
Executive Vice President, National Committee on American Foreign
Policy
Major Tina Schweiss
Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military
Academy
Professor Ronald Tiersky
Eastman Professor of Political Science, Amherst College
Dr. Bryan T. van Sweringen
Europe Liaison Officer, U.S. Army
Mr. Harry Wall
Harry Wall and Associates, Intl.
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