Transatlantic Relations
National Committee on American Foreign Policy's
Project on Reinventing NATO
Report and Policy Recommendations by NCAFP Study Group on NATO
July 1999
Contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington,
D.C. To commemorate and celebrate the occasion, the annual NATO
summit was held in Washington April 23-25, 1999. In 1998 the National
Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) decided to create a
study group to review the evolution of the Alliance, including relations
between the United States and Europe in general and NATO in particular,
for the purpose of fortifying and enriching the data base that we
draw on as we articulate U.S. foreign policy interests in the context
of Europe and NATO, identifying challenges facing the Alliance,
and recommending steps to take in the continuing process of creating
an effective security structure for Europe.
The NCAFP Study Group (consisting of Professor Howard L. Adelson,
Dr. Giuseppe Ammendola, Professor Bernard E. Brown [the director
of the NCAFP's project on Reinventing NATO], Professor Michael Curtis,
Viola Drath, William J. Flynn [NCAFP chairman], Professor George
E. Gruen, Ambassador Fereydoun Hoveyda, Ann Phillips [vice president],
Ambassador Maxwell Rabb, Donald S. Rice, Esq. [senior vice president],
William M. Rudolf [executive vice president], Professor George D.
Schwab [president], and Professor Donald S. Zagoria [trustee]) as
a group or individually met with leading authorities and diplomats
on both sides of the Atlantic. They included Alyson J. K. Bailes,
political director of the Western European Union, Brussels; Valdis
Birkavs, foreign minister of Latvia, Riga; Robert Bradtke, minister,
American embassy, London; Lawrence A. Chalmer, director and NATO
staff officer at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C.;
William Thomas Harris III, political minister counselor at the US.
Mission to NATO, Brussels; John Holmes, private secretary to Prime
Minister Tony Blair, London; John M. Jones, deputy director for
political affairs, Office of European Political and Security Affairs
at the Department of State, Washington, D.C.; Ambassador George
F. Kennan, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J.; Guido
Lenzi, director, Institute of Security Studies of the Western European
Union, Paris; Ambassador Jack Matlock, Institute for Advanced Studies,
Princeton, N.J.; Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA (ret.), director,
National Security Studies, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C.; Jonathan
Powell, chief of staff of Prime Minister Tony Blair, London; Christopher
Prentice, head, Near East and North African Department at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, London; Robert Simmons, deputy director,
European Security and Political Affairs at the Department of State,
Washington, D.C.; Stanley R. Sloan, senior specialist in International
Security Policy, Congressional Research Service, the Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.; and Adam Thomson, head, Security Policy
Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.
The National Committee expresses its deepest appreciation to all
those we consulted in Europe and the United States. It goes without
saying that none of them is responsible for the report and the policy
recommendations made by the NCAFP's Study Group on NATO.
In addition to the NCAFP research activities that culminated in
an all-day workshop on March 25, 1999, a number of articles on how
the Alliance reinvented itself after the collapse of the Soviet
Union were published in the NCAFP bimonthly American Foreign
Policy Interests.* In fact, the Report and Policy Recommendations
of the NCAFP's Study Group on NATO, which was originally published
in the August 1999 issue of American Foreign Policy Interests,
has been published in this format in response to demands for the
text.
On behalf of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy,
I thank members of the NCAFP Study Group for their help in shaping
the Report and Policy Recommendations. Special thanks go to Professor
Bernard E. Brown for researching the topic in the United States
and Europe and for directing the NATO project for the NCAFP.
George D. Schwab
President
*William E. Odom, ''Challenges Facing an Expanding NATO," American
Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 20, no, 6 (December 1998): 1-11;
and Bernard E. Brown, "Reinventing NATO," ibid., vol. 21,
no. 1 (February 1999):1-14. See also the National Committee's policy
statement, For the Record, "NATO Enlargement, The Next Step,"
ibid., pp. 17-18.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A stable, prosperous, and democratic postcold war Europe is of
paramount importance to the United States.
1. To ensure a peaceful Europe, which is in the U.S. national interest,
the United States must
(a) remain an active member of NATO,
(b) work with its allies to expand and deepen Euro-Atlantic relations,
and
(c) work with its allies to enlarge NATO gradually.
2. The United States must work with its allies to strengthen the
Partnership for Peace but not at the expense of or in competition
with NATO, which is the cornerstone of US. security policy in Europe.
3. The United States must work with its allies to broaden the scope
of NATO's strategic doctrine to include security threats caused
by turmoil at the periphery of NATO's boundaries. In exceptional
circumstances NATO should project its power to regions bordering
the Alliance. But before such operations commence, clear goals must
be formulated and announced.
4. The United States must work with its allies whenever possible
to secure wide support for out-of-area operations from the world
community, including the Security Council of the United Nations.
5. The United States must encourage European members of NATO to
coordinate their defense policies and assume increased responsibility
for meeting the defense goals of the Alliance, as the British and
French governments agreed to do at St. Malo in December 1998. Europeanization
must develop within, not outside of, the Alliance; it must not duplicate
efforts or lead to cumbersome decision-making procedures.
6. The United States must urge the creation of a "Committee of
the Wise" ("comité des sages") similar to the Martino, Pearson,
and Lange Committee in 1956 and the Harmel Committee in 1967 to
consider what the Alliance should look like in the foreseeable future.
Among the issues: Is there a natural limit to the size of the Alliance?
Can an Alliance of twenty-eight (the existing nineteen plus the
nine aspirants) function effectively without institutional changes?
Are there conditions under which Russia could or should enter the
Alliance? What relations should exist between NATO and the European
Union, which are both based in Brussels but now worlds apart? Can
the Alliance be Europeanized without endangering the transatlantic
link? Will it be possible to maintain the unity of NATO without
further strengthening and deepening transatlantic institutions?
REINVENTING NATO: REPORT
The old NATO, as it existed before July 1990, could not have conducted
the kind of intervention that has taken place in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Such action was not envisaged, indeed was not even conceived of,
when NATO was created. The heart of the Washington Treaty is Article
5, which stipulates that an attack on one of the parties shall be
considered an attack on them all; each party will then take such
action "as it deems necessary." The Alliance worked; no attack on
a NATO member was made by the Soviet Union; therefore, Article 5
was never invoked. NATO forces first fired in anger in 1994 in enforcing
the "no-fly" zone in Bosnia, which is not a member of NATO and is
not covered by Article 5. The Alliance subsequently dispatched sixty
thousand troops to Bosnia to implement and then stabilize the Dayton
accord.
The experience in Bosnia is a dramatic illustration of the way
in which NATO has changed in the past decade and a harbinger of
things to come. Instead of preparing for a defensive war on its
own territory, NATO created a coalition that includes non-NATO members
in order to deploy troops out of area at the request of the United
Nations. Self-defense was replaced by crisis management and peacekeeping.
FROM THE OLD NATO TO THE NEW NATO
The new NATO came into existence in July 1990 as part of the intricate
negotiations between the West and the Soviet Union over the unification
of Germany and its continued membership in the NATO Alliance. Secretary
of State James A. Baker, in a critical meeting with President Gorbachev
in the Kremlin on February 9, 1990, asked directly whether a united
Germany, which would be the most powerful country on the Continent,
should be an independent power capable of playing off East against
West. Or, he continued, should Germany be tied to the European Community
and particularly NATO, which it could not dominate. For the first
time a Soviet leader did not automatically denounce NATO. Gorbachev
said he would "think about the German issue." In the course of the
next three months leading up to the summit meeting between President
Bush and President Gorbachev in Washington at the end of May, the
Soviet leadership reexamined and finally scrapped the assumptions
of the cold war. The lessons of the past, Gorbachev said to Baker
(even before holding a seminar), tell us that "Germany must stay
within European structures" and that American forces can be a stabilizing
influence. At a summit meeting of the American and Soviet presidents
that ended on June 1, 1990, in Washington, Gorbachev finally agreed
that a united Germany could remain a member of NATO, within which
it would be constrained by the other European states and the United
States; but, he added, NATO "must change."¹
NATO was reinvented in the three weeks between the end of the Washington
summit between Bush and Gorbachev on June 1, 1990, and the beginning
of the NATO summit at the end of that month. The Americans presented
to the heads of state a farreaching proposal: Create a more political,
less military Alliance; emphasize the threat from instability rather
than a hostile military force; involve former enemies directly in
NATO's deliberations and activities; invite East Europeans to establish
a formal liaison with NATO; reorganize NATO forces, converting from
sectors of national corps to multinational corps under integrated
military command; and declare that nuclear forces would be used
only as a "last resort."
With the support of Chancellor Kohl, the Americans were able to
overcome British and French resistance and secure the adoption of
a new strategic doctrine. It began with a dramatic assertion: The
threat of a massive attack against Western Europe had diminished
and no longer provides "the focus for allied strategy." The major
security threat instead was identified as coming from economic,
social, and political difficulties in East and Central Europe. The
first set of NATO functions mentioned was encouragement of the growth
of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful solution
of disputes. NATO's second function was to serve as a "transatlantic
forum for allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital
interests, including possible developments posing risks for members'
security and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields
of common concern." The way was now wide open for political dialogue.
The invitation to former enemies to attend the North Atlantic Council
met with an enthusiastic response, leading to an expansion of contacts
between NATO and the East European states. A "Partnership for Peace"
(PfP) was proposed by President Clinton in October 1993; virtually
all the states of Central and Eastern Europe hastened to join. Most
striking is membership initiated by the neutrals. Austria, Finland,
and Sweden (all members of the European Union) entered the PfP,
as did Switzerland. The PfP involves members in a program of action,
not merely dialogue, that has transformed relations between NATO
and the rest of Europe. Each partner must submit to NATO a proposal
concerning its military and political participation in the program,
indicating the specific joint efforts in which it is interested.
NATO establishes a menu of programs, including reform of military
establishments and officer training; cooperation on environmental
and ecological problems, crime and drugs; joint military exercises;
and joint participation in both intervention and stabilization forces
in the Balkans. It is up to each member to choose from that menu.
Countries that want to be considered for eventual membership participate
in a wide range of study groups and joint efforts.
In May 1997 (barely three years after the PfP was launched), NATO
created an upgraded or "enhanced" PfP and replaced the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Most
partners (Russia is the main exception) are more cooperative than
some of the full members. The enhanced PfP, capped by the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council, is changing the terms of debate about the future
of the Alliance.
NATO'S Impressive Successes
The leaders of the Western nations and officials of NATO are to
be congratulated on the way in which they have converted NATO from
an organization devoted exlusively to collective self-defense into
a pan-Euro-Atlantic collective security system. The emphasis has
shifted from defense against an attack from the East to crisis management
and the promotion of democratic stability and prosperity. Although
the National Committee on American Foreign Policy supports NATO's
intervention in Kosovo, it has serious reservations concerning the
way in which NATO has responded to two major challenges: ethnic
conflict in the Balkans and the deepening of transatlantic institutions
(which will be dealt with below). Let us begin with initiatives
that the National Committee applauds and whose further development
it wishes to encourage.
The Partnership for Peace
The Partnership for Peace has been even more successful than its
founders could have hoped in 1993. The National Committee strongly
recommends that the PfP be enhanced further; it is rapidly becoming
a "virtual" NATO, preparing the way for full membership of former
members of the Warsaw Pact, the Baltic States, and the neutrals.
But care must be taken not to weaken the Alliance as it expands.
The experience of Hungary is a model for those members of the PfP
who aspire to full membership. The Hungarians were keenly disappointed
in 1992 when an invitation for membership was not extended by NATO.
Looking back, the Hungarians now see that an invitation would have
been premature. NATO was not ready for it, and neither was Hungary.
"We still needed to develop a firm basis for our evolving democratic
institutions and economic and financial structures," recently stated
the Hungarian ambassador to NATO, "as well as for the reform of
our armed forces." Hungary prepared itself for full membership by
participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (and its
successor, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) to appreciate
the political dimension and especially "the depth of the transatlantic
link." The Hungarian experience is a model for future members: participation
in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, enhanced status in the
PfP, and becoming a member in everything but name before formal
admission.²
Enlargement
The process of enlargement cannot be limited to the entry of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. "The enlargement o NATO eastward
has been inevitable since the Alliance adopted its new strategic
doctrine in 1990. Engaging in a political dialogue with the new
democracies led to joint activities organized within the Partnership
for Peace. The security of all of Europe now passes through NATO,
and the Eastern democracies cannot be excluded. The question is
not whether to enlarge but when and how.
Most of the candidates for admission, especially those due south
and west of Russia (notably, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and eventually
Ukraine), do not now meet the NATO criteria of political and economic
stability and military professionalism. Extending NATO's security
guarantee to the Baltic States would be premature, providing a hostile
reaction from Russia. But calling a halt to enlargement would send
the wrong signal. A reasonable step would be to extend an invitation
to at least one country to make the point that the door is open
while the Alliance takes time out to digest the admission of the
three new members. The most likely candidate for immediate entry
into NATO is Slovenia, which has made solid progress toward democratization.
It would also provide a land connection between Hungary and the
rest of NATO.
But enlargement should not be considered a numbers game or an automatic,
mechanical process. It is an expression of the need to complete
the new architecture of a Euro-Atlantic collective security system.
The nations most qualified, in terms of their political and economic
stability and commitment to democratic values, are the neutrals:
Finland, Sweden, and Austria, all members of the European Union
and, more important, of NATO's Partnership for Peace. Within the
framework of the PfP, Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic States, along
with NATO members Denmark and Norway, are already engaged in programs
of special interest to the Nordic region, including joint military
exercises. Similarly, Austria is becoming more active in administering
aid in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans and in the diplomacy
of the region. That Switzerland has joined the PfP is another sign
of underlying changes in European public opinion on security questions.
Nevertheless, the issue of whether there is a natural limit to
NATO's size and whether institutional changes are needed to accommodate
new members should be faced. A NATO of twenty-eight (the existing
nineteen plus nine self-declared candidates for admission) may have
to be organized in a different way.
The National Committee believes it was a mistake not to issue an
invitation to Slovenia at the Washington summit. There is a danger
of losing momentum. Consequently, the National Committee welcomes
the new Member Action Plan, which permits aspirant nations to increase
their participation in PfP programs and provides for the periodic
review of progress in meeting NATO criteria. It is especially important
to encourage the involvement of Finland, Sweden, and Austria in
joint programs with fellow members of the PfP and NATO; they may
well play a key role in the evolution of NATO as a pan-Euro-Atlantic
collective security system. If the European Union absorbs the Western
European Union (its now autonomous defense arm), the neutrals may
even be required to join NATO as a condition of their participation
in a European defense organization. Although enlargement is no longer
the burning issue it was two years ago, preparing new countries
for membership must remain an Alliance goal.
A New Strategic Doctrine
The new strategic doctrine adopted in 1990 has been overtaken by
events. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the explosion of
ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, and the creation of an increasingly
active Partnership for Peace, it is time for a clearer formulation
of NATO's strategic doctrine.
The new Strategic Concept approved at the Washington Summit is
a workmanlike updating of the Washington Treaty, broadening the
security guarantee under Article 5 to reflect the new geopolitical
functions of NATO. The new Strategic Concept retains the commitment
to cooperate in case of an armed attack against the territorial
integrity of any member state. Article 6 of the new concept goes
on to state: "Based on common values of democracy, human rights,
and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception
to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue
to do so." The National Committee hopes that a preamble or declaration
of principles will be adopted in the future that will enable the
people of the Euro-Atlantic community to review and renew their
commitment to the underlying rationale and purposes of the Alliance.
Russia
In adopting a new strategic doctrine in 1990 and the RussiaNATO
Founding Act in 1997, the Alliance welcomed the Russian commitment
to democracy, including respect for the rule of law, an open society,
and a free market. Now that Russia is a democracy, the Western goal
should be to make it an integral part of a new security architecture
in Europe. But the road to democracy in Russia is rocky. The old
demons of ethnic conflict, anti-Semitism, integral nationalism,
and the continued influence of Communists may lead to the breakdown
of Russian democracy. It would be the height of irresponsibility
for Western leaders not to take necessary precautions. The West
is facing a three-pronged challenge: To encourage democratic and
progressive forces, Russia should be welcomed into the Western family;
yet an uncooperative Russia must be prevented from paralyzing the
Alliance; and a hostile Russia must be contained.
NATO should continue its present energetic efforts to engage Russia
in consultation, joint study groups and activities, and even military
exercises. Russia now contributes to the Stabilization Force in
Bosnia, accepting American rather than NATO command, which can provide
the foundation for providing assistance to Bosnia as well as logistical
support for the Russian contingent. Russia is being involved (or
is being invited to be involved) in a range of NATO and PfP programs
that serve common European interests: dealing with ecological problems
inherited from former Communist regimes; retraining officers and
soldiers; converting arms industries and military terrains to civilian
uses; and combating organized crime and terror. When the Russians
take part in concrete programs, they are less polemical and more
pragmatic. Increasing participation by Russia in PfP activities
until interrupted by the Kosovo crisis was helping to bring about
reconciliation between Russia and the rest of Europe.
Russia's decision to boycott NATO as a protest against intervention
in Kosovo is regrettable. Under the terms of the agreement on Russian
participation in the Kosovo international force, liaison will be
reestablished between the Russian military and NATO. A testing time
is ahead. The National Committee supports NATO's policy of urging
Russia to remain a valued partner in the effort to bring peace to
the Balkans.
Out of Area
An effective defense of democracy in Europe requires NATO to deal
with threats to stability from the areas that border the Alliance.
Among the immediate neighbors of NATO are Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, Croatia, Romania, and Lithuania. In order to forestall
threats to the NATO countries of Europe, NATO is compelled to adopt
a forward strategy, that is, to engage neighboring countries in
dialogue and joint activities and to be prepared to project power
out of area if necessary. In February 1995 NATO began a "dialogue"
with five Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania,
and Tunisia). Jordan became involved subsequently. Within the framework
of the PfP, NATO together with "partner" and "dialogue" countries
is exploring possibilities for cooperation in dealing with terrorism,
organized crime, and the drug trade, which are threats to the stability
of democratic institutions everywhere.
NATO intervened in Bosnia at the request of the UN Security Council,
which in turn had acted at the urging of the European Union. In
considering future operations out of area, it will be desirable
for NATO to secure UN support for diplomatic initiatives. Russia,
with some support from France, insists that NATO's military operations
must always be authorized beforehand by the UN Security Council,
which would give Russia a veto. The United States has been adamant
that Russia cannot paralyze NATO through the Permanent Joint Council
established under the NATO-Russia Founding Act and that Russia cannot
be permitted a veto through the UN back door.
A prudent approach for NATO to take in considering future operations
out of area would be to secure wide political support through any
or all appropriate international organizations: the UN Security
Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
and the Contact Group for the Balkans in addition to NATO's North
Atlantic Council and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Every operation
should be handled on a case-by-case basis; a balance must be struck
between securing a large political consensus and preventing paralysis.
The National Committee also urges that full use be made of NATO's
structures in engaging in dialogue with countries of the Middle
East and in fostering cooperation in dealing with international
terrorism.
U.S.-European Relations Within NATO
The most important issue confronting NATO is whether (and how)
to redefine relations between the United States and Europe within
and outside of NATO. Americans want Europe to shoulder a larger
part of the financial burden and to assume greater responsibility
for its own defense. Many Europeans want Europe to be the acknowledged
Alliance leader in all matters directly concerning the Continent.
The most sweeping demand for the reform of structures has been put
forward by the French, who argue for an equal partnership between
the United States and Europe within NATO.
The National Committee believes that NATO should keep in mind several
basic principles before it engages in any attempt to reform its
structures:
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The United States, as the only superpower in the Alliance,
tends to take the initiative; in fact, it has been criticized
for not doing so in certain crises.
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It is hardly necessary for Europe as a whole to be accorded
a veto over American proposals for a simple reason: Every member
of the Alliance has a veto. The Alliance operates on the basis
of consensus. In practice, members who have reservations about
particular decisions generally permit the others to proceed.
NATO has become a coalition of the willing and able. This flexibility
is an asset and has permitted the Partnership for Peace to flourish.
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Europeans already constitute about two-thirds of the personnel
at SHAPE, and by tradition the secretary general is a European.
The United States is the leading power in NATO because of its
capacity to act and the inability of Europeans to formulate
a common foreign policy, not because it dominates command structures.
In order to meet the demand of Europeans for greater responsibility,
much time and effort have been expended in creating a European Security
and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. A European chain of command
enables Europeans to use NATO's assets in carrying out their own
policies in cases in which Americans agree to step aside. The ingenious
arrangement has never been used. It is comforting for Europeans
to know that the ESDI is in place; but making use of it would require
greater unity of political purpose than is likely to emerge in the
near future.
It would be inadvisable to base decision making in NATO on an equal
partnership between the United States on one side and all European
members on the other side. First, the conflict of interests among
the Europeans would take too long to work out ii emergency situations.
A meaningful Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for Europe
will be difficult if not impossible to formulate through intergovernmental
cooperation. Second, if there were a common European position and
it conflicted with the American position, the result could be deadlock
and the eventual abandonment of NATO as an instrument of policy.
One key to NATO's success has been flexibility in decision making.
The National Committee recommends the continued development of the
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) as a way of adjusting American
and European responsibilities in changing circumstances. The CJTF
structure allows members to increase or decrease their share of
the military burden as called for in individual cases. Drawing lessons
from NATO operations in Bosnia, the intervention force in Kosovo
is to be controlled by the staff of the Rapid Reaction Force based
in Germany and under the command of a British general who reports
to the American supreme commander. The French, who do not participate
in the integrated military structure, will establish a liaison mission
at the staff of the Rapid Reaction Force, which is a sensible and
pragmatic way of securing the participation of French forces without
calling into question basic procedures.
The decision to strengthen cooperation on defense matters by the
United Kingdom and France at the December 1998 meeting between Prime
Minister Blair and President Chirac in St. Malo is a welcome development.
Europeans should assume greater responsibility for the common defense,
particularly for modernizing their armed forces, making them more
mobile by improving logistical and lift capabilities and coordinating
efforts more effectively. The integration of the Western European
Union into the structure of the European Union may facilitate that
task.
Through the CJTF structure, Europeans can assume as much responsibility
for individual operations as they wish under European command (as
in Kosovo) by making use of NATO assets under the supervision of
the supreme commander. This is an excellent solution to the problem
and may also pave the way for French reintegration into common military
structures without destroying NATO's ability to act.
RETHINKING NATO
Members of the National Committee's Study Group have come away
from their discussions with NATO officials with appreciation for
the difficulties they confront in adapting the Alliance to changing
circumstances. There are two major issues, however, that we believe
require more thought and new initiatives: NATO's role in the Balkans
and the deepening of transatlantic institutions.
Role in the Balkans
We have an interesting time ahead of us in studying the lessons
of the Kosovo crisis, said Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
after the UN Security Council approved the June 10 resolution. It
is not our intention to second-guess or criticize those who had
to make tough decisions under pressure. Instead, we wish to contribute
to the ongoing reassessment of the diplomacy of the Kosovo crisis
and rethinking NATO in light of the most important operation of
its fifty-year history.
NATO's new strategic doctrine (formally approved by the heads of
government at the Rome meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
November 1992) contains the following provision concerning ethnic
conflicts and the security interests of the Alliance (italics added):
"Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated
aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from
the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the
serious economic, social and political difficulties, including
ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by
many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions which
may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly
threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the
Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European
stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside
powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect
on the security of the Alliance."
Serbia's massive repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo did involve
outside powers, threatened European stability, spilled over into
NATO countries, and affected the security of the Alliance; hence
it clearly called for diplomatic action. As a member of the Contact
Group on Yugoslavia (along with the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Italy, and Russia), the United States participated in the Rambouillet
Conference chaired by Robin Cook (United Kingdom) and Hubert Védrine
(France). When the Serbs refused to sign the accord proposed by
the Contact Group, NATO decided, despite the opposition of the Russians,
to use force. In the specific circumstances of the Kosovo crisis,
we conclude that Serbia's defiance of the international community
constituted a threat to European stability and to the security of
the Alliance as defined in NATO's strategic doctrine.
What lessons can be learned from studying the diplomacy pursued
at Rambouillet and the means used by NATO to implement that diplomacy?
In retrospect, it is apparent that Western diplomacy and NATO's
tactics were based on setting up a false equation between Bosnia
and Kosovo. Bosnia was not a part of Serbia, whereas Kosovo was
a province of Serbia. BosniaHerzogovina had received international
recognition as a sovereign state, whereas the West accepted Yugoslav
sovereignty over Kosovo in principle. Formidable Bosnian Muslim
and Croatian armed forces were on the ground in Bosnia, whereas
the Kosovo Liberation Army was no match for the Serbian Army and
police and was not supported by the West. The allies underestimated
the attachment of the Serbs to Kosovo and its importance in Serb
historical memory. Western diplomats and NATO military leaders did
not anticipate the ferocity of the Serbian repression of ethnic
Albanians, which created a massive refugee problem; nor did they
expect the Serbs to hold out so long against air attacks.
Here are some issues and suggestions for further reflection.
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Rambouillet. The model of the Dayton Conference did
not work at Rambouillet. There was little actual negotiation;
the two sides remained apart physically while American, European
Union, and Russian negotiators shuttled back and forth. There
was no give and take and no exploration of alternatives. The
Yugoslav side was presented with a virtual ultimatum at the
end. Perhaps Serb intransigence could never have been overcome,
but greater flexibility and patience would have made a more
favorable impression on world opinion.
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The United Nations. In Bosnia the United Nations became
involved at the request of the European Union, assumed responsibility
for peacekeeping, and eventually asked for support by NATO.
In Kosovo the Western powers, especially the United States,
wanted to keep the UN out of the negotiating process in order
to avoid the hesitations and confusion that had bedeviled operations
in Bosnia. The lack of a UN mandate in Kosovo, however, turned
out to be a liability. Inasmuch as Russia was a member of the
Contact Group and supported the accord proposed at Rambouillet,
it would have been possible to seek legitimation for that diplomatic
initiative at the UN. Four of the five permanent members of
the UN Security Council are members of the Contact Group and
could have pushed for approval; it is unlikely that China would
have stood in the way. Better use could have been made of the
UN in gaining support for Western diplomatic efforts.
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NATO Tactics. NATO expected a fairly quick Yugoslav
capitulation based on the precedent in Bosnia. But in Bosnia
an air war worked because it was carried out in conjunction
with ground forces (the Croatian and Bosnian armies). In Kosovo
the Western nations with the exception of the United Kingdom
did not want to send in their own troops and did not want to
support the only other force on the ground, the Kosovo Liberation
Army. By announcing at the outset of the air war that there
would be no ground campaign, NATO strengthened the Serb resolve
to resist. In carrying out the air war, NATO was hamstrung by
the need to receive political clearance for tactical decisions
extending down to specific daily targets. Political objectives
should certainly be set only by political leaders; but the military
should then be given authority to conduct operations with some
degree of autonomy.
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The Role of Russia. The Western powers bent over backward
to give Russia a role as mediator, hoping to apply pressure
on the Serbs. The unilateral seizure of the Pristina airport
by a small detachment of Russian troops, however, raised serious
questions about the reliability of Russia as a partner. If Russia
adopts a policy of unremitting hostility to NATO, then a reassessment
of the NATO-Russia Founding Act will be unavoidable. Cooperative
behavior by the Russians should be reciprocated by the West;
hostile behavior should carry a price.
Deepening Transatlantic Institutions
The most serious problem concerning U.S.-European relations lies
outside of NATO. It is recognized on both sides of the Atlantic
that in principle a military alliance can endure only if it is part
of a community of interests. NATO will not survive unless it is
complemented by strong transatlantic institutions. Warning flags
are flying: There are bitter disputes over bananas (grown neither
by Americans nor Europeans), the dumping of steel, a ban on beef
with hormones and genetically modified plants, and subsidies for
Airbus. Europeans are discussing the creation of a European defense
industry to rival that of the United States. Economic warfare reveals
powerful impulses toward protectionism, corporatism, chauvinism,
and even xenophobia on both sides of the Atlantic. If unchecked,
antagonistic currents will cause a rift within the Western world.
Americans and Europeans cannot go on indefinitely as close military
allies and sworn economic enemies, The Transatlantic Declaration
of 1990, the new Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, and the draft plan
for a Transatlantic Economic Partnership are all steps in the right
direction, but so far the results have been disappointing.
The creation of new transatlantic institutions calls for an immense
political effort comparable to that required to reinvent NATO in
the 1990s.³ The transatlantic community is sufficiently coherent
to sustain NATO and to maintain the American commitment to the defense
of Europe for the time being. Some stregthening of transatlantic
links is taking place without political guidance through increasing
investments by each side in the economy on the other side, business
mergers, and cultural exchanges. We are muddling through. But the
deepening of transatlantic institutions ultimately will be needed
if NATO is to go forward, if the new democracies of Eastern and
Central Europe are to be integrated into the European and global
economies, and if the United States and Europe together are to remain
in the forefront of economic, scientific, and cultural development.
Only a president of the United States is capable of placing this
issue on the agenda, applying pressure at the level of heads of
government, and making it a top priority.
For half a century NATO has been a vital element of American security
and well-being. Europe (including the former members of the Warsaw
Pact and the former republics of the Soviet Union) has two to three
times the population of the United States. The domination of all
Europe by one hostile power like Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia
of the past would be a mortal threat to American interests. If Europe
were to fall prey to totalitarian regimes again or to sink into
internecine warfare, the United States inevitably would be endangered.
To make all of Europe a zone of prosperity and democratic stability
is perhaps the most important single goal of American foreign policy
today. NATO has enabled Americans and Europeans to cooperate in
preventing aggression and in creating appropriate conditions for
economic advance and social progress. Adapting the Alliance to continually
changing circumstances will continue to be a major challenge for
the countries of North America and all of Europe.
Notes
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This fascinating diplomatic episode, hardly known to the public
at large, is described in Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice,
Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, Mass.,
1995), pp. 128, 181-183, 277; Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe
Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End
of the Cold War (Boston, 1993), pp. 163, 186, 220; and James
A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York, 1995),
p. 235.
-
See Andras Simonyi, "Getting on Board the Moving Train of
NATO," NATO Review (autumn 1998): 20-23.
-
3. See Anthony Lawrence Gardner, A New Era in US.-EU Relations:
The Clinton Administration and the New Transatlantic Agenda
(Brookfield, 1997), especially pp. 113-146. Also, David C. Gompert
and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., America and Europe: A Partnership
for a New Era (New York, 1997), Christoph Bertram, Europe
in the Balance (Washington, D.C., 1995), pp. 94-100; and
Philip R. Gordon, ed., NATO's Transformation: The Changing
Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham, Md., 1997), pp.
12-137.
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