Transatlantic Relations

Roundtable on Reinventing the Transatlantic Partnership
Sponsored by the National Committe on American Foreign Policy
October 27-29, 2002

• Foreword
• The Bottom Line
• National Interest Versus the Common Interest
• Managing Relations Between the West and Islam
• Conclusion
• A Note on Participants

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) is a private, nongovernmental organization dedicated to articulating American foreign policy interests from a nonpartisan perspective and within the framework of political realism. The NCAFP publishes and disseminates its policy reports and policy recommendations to a continually growing audience of foreign policymakers, specialists, and practitioners in the United States and abroad.

The October 2002 Roundtable on Reinventing the Transatlantic Partnership was the first in a proposed long-term series of meetings sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. The roundtable includes policy analysts, academics, and former government officials from both the United States and Europe.

Planning for this series of roundtables began in May 2002 when three members of the NCAFP conducted a fact-finding mission to the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), both based in Brussels. A description and summary of this mission can be found in Bernard E. Brown, Michael Curtis, and George D. Schwab, "Journey to Brussels: A Report and Policy Recommendations," American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 23, no. 5 (October 2002), 379-386. This report is now on the NCAFP Web site () and has been printed in pamphlet form. In addition to consulting with high-level officials of the European Union and NATO, the NCAFP group met with five European researchers and discussed with them a proposal to launch a series of roundtables on transatlantic relations. The entire group agreed that the project was worthwhile, and an agenda for the first roundtable was set.

It was decided that a two-day conference would deal first with the question of whether there are basic differences between American and European Union foreign policymaking and perspectives. The group agreed on the theme "The National Interest Versus the Common Interest." It was then decided that a substantive issue would be the focus of interest on the second day and that the theme would be "Managing Relations Between the West and the Islamic World." It was also agreed that one European and one American paper would be presented on each of the two days of the conference, which was held on schedule in New York, from October 27 through October 29, 2002.

Special thanks go to Professor Bernard E. Brown, the NCAFP's project director of the Roundtable on Reinventing the Transatlantic Partnership and the author of this report. Thanks also to Dr. Julian Lindley-French, senior research fellow at the European Union's Institute of Security Studies in Paris, who coordinated efforts on the European side.

The NCAFP is grateful to the European Commission and to Mutual of America Life Insurance Company for their generous support of this project.

A summary of as well as a report on the discussion at the conference follows. In order to encourage a full and free exchange of views, no individual participants (including a former high-level U.S. official who spoke informally at a luncheon) are quoted.

George D. Schwab, President
National Committee on American Foreign Policy

October 27-29, 2002

Bernard E. Brown

Each of the two transatlantic partners represents about one-fourth of the world's economy (with the European share to increase as enlargement proceeds). NATO (the United States and Canada plus 17 European nations at present) is a powerful politicomilitary alliance. The transatlantic partnership, therefore, is the central axis of democracy and the rule of law in the world. American and European participants agreed that if the United States and Europe work together, it would be easier to manage all pressing global issues today (including democratization in the former republics of the Soviet Union, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, sustainable development, the reduction of global poverty, the elimination or control of weapons of mass destruction, and so on). Conversely, if the United States and Europe drift apart and work at cross-purposes, the consequences for both sides will be negative, if not disastrous.

THE BOTTOM LINE

It became clear by the end of the first day of the conference that American and European participants were far apart in their views on the nature of the transatlantic partnership and the causes of the present crisis. Some Europeans contended that U.S. foreign policy pursues narrow and egoistic interests and emphasizes the application of military force. The European Union approach is superior, they continued, in that it is concerned with the long run and makes greater use of crisis management tools and economic aid. Some Americans denied that Europe had any meaningful common foreign policy (because of intra-European rivalries and the inability to create an autonomous executive), much less a superior policy. They stated their belief that U.S. policy is a mix of both "hard" and "soft" power, whereas Europeans tend to neglect the importance of using force when appropriate. Hence European and American conceptions of the nature of the transatlantic relationship were almost impossible to reconcile. There was also a sense that discord within the group was not artificial but mirrored disagreements in the world outside our 34th floor meeting room.

There was somewhat more agreement on the substantive issue, managing relations between the West and the Islamic world, though here too important differences emerged. Nonetheless, all participants expressed the belief that we should continue the dialogue initiated in the roundtable. Dialogue is always useful, and at least some participants stated that they emerged with a better understanding of interests on the other side, leading them to rethink or reconsider assumptions and beliefs. But the differences between the two sides are so great that there is little prospect of persuading one side to give in or of creating a consensus. There was a sense at the end of the conference that it might be worthwhile to make use of techniques in the field of conflict resolution: identify Euro-American interests in common, see what might be done together, and build confidence gradually on the basis of successful (even if at first limited) action. Exploring the possibilities of resolving Euro-American conflicts in civil society, including groups like this, may contribute to a long-term accommodation.

NATIONAL INTEREST VERSUS COMMON INTEREST

European Perspectives

1. One European analyst said that we must go to the fundamentals of transatlantic relations—the inputs rather than the outputs. All our assumptions need to be challenged. At a critical moment in the war against terrorism, we are at a crossroads between immediate reaction (the American tendency) and grand strategy (where Europeans should have a say). The goal is sustained global governance, as opposed to ad hoc coalitions. The sheer scale of the task is intimidating policymakers. The U.S. tendency is to keep policy sharply focused on military force; on the European side, the tendency is to flee from responsibilities.

We are involved in more than the search for policy, the same analyst continued. We need a strategy. In order to conduct counterterrorism, we need to create a strong politico-military alliance against an enemy that has small numbers. But this enemy could be our worst nightmare, requiring a coalition of states. We need a change of mind-set about the enemy, and the campaign. We need to rethink the balance of power, problems of governance, and the fundamental issues of transatlantic relations. The core argument is that the European Union (EU), despite its shortcomings, is changing the way that Europeans think and act. The American conception of power is quite conservative; it is not changing. The result is that we have two sets of views, two guidelines for the exercise of power and the construction of alliances. We need to strike a balance between values and power. Hans Morgenthau believed that the search for a balance of power should be part of a larger moral enterprise. There were always values behind the concept of the balance of power. These were British liberal values. The EU is a natural heir of this tradition. Ultimately Europe was reshaped in the British image. This European analyst conceded that there is no single EU position (yet), but a common European interest is emerging. U.S. and European interests have not in the past been common. U.S. interventions in 1917 and 1941 indicated a desire to make maximum gains (coming late and claiming all).

Wilsonian idealism provided the American people with a justification for a crusade in favor of democracy and morality.

The same European analyst concluded that Europeans may now claim the moral high ground, without power as yet. The EU is avoiding global responsibilities in order to achieve a more perfect legitimacy. The United States is indifferent to legitimacy and is concerned mainly with power. Europe underestimates its power, almost willfully. The United States, he claims, overstates its power. Europe demands influence without strategy; the United States the reverse. The emerging European concept of power is far more advanced than its American counterpart. At worst, the American model leads to precipitate military action, whereas the European model provides a form of appeasement. Given the differences, concluded this analyst, we have work to do. We must recognize existing differences. In order to ensure our collective security, we need an effective partnership between Europe and America that will work together to launch a global Marshall Plan. Without a clear notion of goals, the present Euro-American coalition cannot endure. The transatlantic alliance may well simply drift into irrelevance.

In response to criticism, the same analyst further explained his position. The British view of the balance of power has evolved. The United Kingdom has become increasingly concerned with morality as the justification of the balance of power. The EU is not balancing power but is transcending power by creating a rule-based system. A legitimate criticism of the EU is that it does not follow through. He wonders whether the United States and Europe have ever trusted each other. We have made the relationship work despite distrust. There are now two very different perceptions, which come down to an emphasis on power as opposed to values. He regrets that whenever Europeans criticize the United States, it is considered an expression of anti-Americanism. Why, he wonders, does agreement always have to be on American terms? Some Americans are "trashing" Europe, he contends. They refer to Europeans as Lilliputians trying to tie down Gulliver. They do not realize that European nations are powerful and valuable allies. Together we are now engaged in a new war, but he believes that the United States has the wrong defense recipe. It is spending money needlessly in order to prepare for war against a major state. But the enemy is now a terrorist network. The Europeans, because of their greater knowledge of the third world, their more skilled and flexible armed forces, and their experience in crisis management, might well be called upon to take the lead in this new war. We must change; otherwise we cannot move the transatlantic alliance forward.

2. Another European participant agreed that a contrast between national and common interests is the way to begin. Should national interests be the guiding principle on both sides of the Atlantic? And if so, can we identify common interests? We need to debate how Americans and Europeans define their interests. How different are policy processes? Europeans emphasize the process of negotiation, this analyst continued, but they tend to avoid responsibility. In the EU, the issue is public goods; there is no dichotomy between values and interests. But the United States has a tendency to go it alone. There is a narrow sense of the national interest. First the United States decides its policy; then it asks, "Who is with us? He would like to see an activist policy done multilaterally. In the view of this participant, Europe does not disagree fundamentally with the United States. But Europe is expected to support U.S. strategy without being asked for an input. This same participant also believes we need a new national security strategy. He questioned the U.S. alliance with some appalling regimes in Central and South Asia, including Pakistan. This issue should be debated collectively. We should not have to choose between Hobbes (national interest in a world of anarchy) or Kant (perpetual peace). The smart choice is Locke.

3. Another European participant asserted that we have reached a point where distrust is breaking the alliance. The United States is of course a superpower. It is neither Nazi Germany nor Stalinist Russia, he remarked. Nonetheless, it has its own interests. Europe no longer faces a massive external danger. Hence Europeans do not have to take orders from the United States. There is no longer an enemy out there. Terrorism, continued this participant, is a different kind of challenge. Are we faced with an Islamic terrorist threat? Or a larger terrorist threat, of which Islam is a part? There are many terrorist groups seeking to bring about change. The "war on terror" is comparable to the war on poverty or crime or AIDS. It is not a war in the classic sense. This analyst concluded that we must look for a community of interests between the United States and Europe. We need to negotiate a new security contract between the United States and Europe and to rethink the nature of security so that it includes the economy and civil society as well as the military. Problems arise as much from the economy and civil society as from the military domain. For example, in Iraq, after the campaign, we will have to do state building. How do we bring together a common strategy?

4. Another European participant stressed the change in attitudes toward security threats. In the past the United States exercised leadership. Europe had an interest in taking U.S. policy seriously, and the United States made compromises. What is lacking today is the idea that we absolutely must have a compromise. The United States is not as interested in having European support, and Europeans no longer feel as threatened. There is disagreement over what is threatening and what are the priorities. Everyone agrees, for example, that the world would be better off without Saddam. The disagreement is over priorities, timing, and how to proceed. It appears that the United States may discount the support of Europeans and that the Europeans will then say to the Americans,"If that is the way you feel, then go it alone." This participant also noted European resentment over American unilateralism, which is essentially a disagreement over perception and respective roles. No one expected the United States to ratify the Kyoto Treaty, but Europeans resented the way in which the Bush administration handled the problem. If the United States goes it alone, expecting Europe to follow, that would lead to bad feelings on both sides.

In response to American skepticism concerning the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), this same analyst conceded that Europeans and the EU are an easy target. They are elusive targets because the EU is changing continually. It is true that the Europeans could do better and that the EU may well remain a hybrid (communitarian in economic matters, intergovernmental in foreign and security policy). But the Convention on the Future of Europe is now debating key issues, and the gap between the communitarian and the intergovernmental can be managed by changing voting procedures. All policies are communitarian (in that the Commission proposes). Procedural changes may lead to substantive change. A range of foreign and security policies may then become more manageable in common.

5. Another European participant also defended the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. A lot has happened in the past decade in achieving a single market and a common currency. The construction of Europe is apolitical project, and problems in coordinating foreign policy are being resolved. At the moment progress is slow, but it would be unwise to discount the possibility of change. This analyst also argued that the United States emphasizes military solutions, whereas the EU emphasizes economic solutions. Somewhere down the line, we have to get the mix right.

American Perspectives

1. One American analyst stated that this transatlantic crisis may be the worst we have ever seen. Why? He summarized by making six points. (1) With the end of the cold war, both sides find they don't need each other anymore. Europeans are devoting all their energies to the construction of Europe. U.S. ambassadors have some difficulty now just making appointments to see decision makers in Europe. And the United States no longer needs European allies to fight a major power. (2) The New Transatlantic Agenda (signed in 1985 in Madrid) developed an intensive process of dialogue on a list of issues. Study groups met continually, funneling recommendation up to the ministerial level. But the machinery has not produced cooperation, which shows that machinery is no substitute for policy. We should examine this experience and see whether it can be improved.

The same American analyst continued. (3) After 9/11 the United States feels it is on the front lines and is more at risk than Europe. We have the impression that Europeans are less concerned than the United States with the threat of terrorism. (4) Israel. In his view the reason why the Israeli occupation continues is Arafat. At Camp David Arafat got everything he wanted, except for the right of return. If the terror attacks against Israel were stopped, the issue of the settlements could be negotiated. Europeans have a different perception. European television offers a one-sided portrayal in which Israelis are always brutal and Palestinians are always victims. (5) The Bush administration is more unilateral than any previous administration. The way Bush dealt with the Kyoto Treaty enraged Europeans. The United States was successful after World War II because it identified U.S. interests with those of allies and friends. But, this analyst continued, Europeans, by acting unilaterally, bear some responsibility for this state of affairs. The Europeans rejected numerous American requests at Kyoto. But as soon as the United States announced its withdrawal, the Europeans made sweeping concessions to others. Had they been willing to make the same concessions to the United States, there might have been an agreement. Similarly, regarding the International Criminal Court, the Europeans do not appreciate that the United States is in fact in a different position. It is the only power that can project military force out of area and is the ultimate enforcer of global peace. Remember that Amnesty International filed suits against the United States and NATO; frivolous and politically motivated attacks by independent prosecutors are possible. Had Europeans made a greater effort to take into account American objections, an agreement could have been reached.

Finally, for this same American analyst, (6) France is a special case. The French go out of their way to oppose and try to isolate the United States. By opposing the elimination of agricultural subsidies, the French are torpedoing the whole agricultural policy of the World Trade Organization. This is an example of European unilateralism. Another example: The United States proposed a readjustment of assessments that the UN fixed decades ago. It is ludicrous that China pays only a fraction of 1 percent of the UN budget, as do some other Asian Tigers. Instead of offering support, the French ambassador at the UN lobbied third world delegations to oppose the request. This action was hostile and pointless. The French have also been terrible about Iraq. Knowing that France was unwilling to impose sanctions, the Iraqis were able to ignore the sanctions regime. Multilateralism has not worked well at the United Nations. This analyst argued that existing Security Council resolutions already authorize the use of force against Iraq in order to restore peace and security in the area. If the United Nations multilateral system is paralyzed, concluded this American analyst, then the major international power will act.

On the other hand, this same analyst expressed grave reservations about the new U.S. national defense strategy and in particular the proclamation of the right to take preemptive action. It has long been recognized that states have the right to take preemptive action if attacks against them are being prepared. But the United States is now claiming the right of preemptive action even if there is uncertainty concerning the imminence and gravity of the attack. This could be a formula for international anarchy. This American analyst understands why Europeans fear that striking against terrorist networks might be the first example of preemptive action. The United States should stress the importance of previous UN resolutions and pay more attention to the "wise restraints" created by international law.

2. Another American analyst challenged the contrast between U.S. and European foreign policy that is widespread in Europe today which in effect identifies Americans with Mars and Europeans with Venus. Mars and Venus are code terms for, on the one hand, war, power politics, punitive sanctions, and crusades for the good and, on the other hand, patient diplomacy, the creation of a network of rules and regulations, and the management of crises through persuasion and incentives. This view has been popularized in a recent, influential essay in Policy Review (summer 2002) by Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

For this American analyst, the contrast between a unilateralist American Mars and a multilateralist European Venus is overdrawn. First, the characterization of U.S. policy as unilateral and European policy as multilateral is not an accurate description of the conferences that led to the Ottawa Convention on banning landmines, the Kyoto Treaty on greenhouse gas emissions, and the creation of the International Criminal Court. In each case there were hard negotiations between the United States and other states, and in each case American requests were rejected by a numerical majority at an international conference. In talks leading to the Ottawa Convention, one fiery NGO advocate launched the slogan, "no exceptions, no reservations, no loopholes"--though the treaty was riddled with loopholes and had been carefully crafted to favor European manufacturers of antitank mines. The treaty sponsors refused to accept a distinction between "dumb" and "smart" mines (the former create a humanitarian problem, and only the latter, which self-destruct, are used by the United States). Similarly, the European negotiators at Kyoto seemed more intent on rejecting American proposals than on negotiating an agreement with a country representing one-fourth of the world's economy. Sponsors of both treaties had a clearly stated political objective: to facilitate the transition from an international system allegedly dominated by a single superpower to one of more diffused power. The consequences of creating an International Criminal Court independent of the Security Council may be a divorce between power and responsibility leading to international chaos. Disagreements during the negotiation of international treaties cannot be reduced to the issue of unilateralism versus mulilateralism; there are real political stakes.

This American analyst emphasized the need to understand the genuine accomplishments and limitations of the European Union. The EU is a hybrid. As regards the economy, power is vested increasingly in a supranational. (or "community") level. The Commission proposes policies and implements decisions subject to approval by representatives of the member states and a parliament. But in the domain of foreign and security policy, there are 15 states (with 10 more in the wings) that remain power centers. Each of these states maintains its own armed forces and diplomatic establishment. Europeans in this domain are very much from Mars. They pursue national interests independently and within European as well as other international structures. The total number of troops under arms in the 15 member states of the EU is greater than in the United States (about 1.7 million compared to 1.5 million). Europeans, and in particular citizens of the major powers, have most certainly not abjured arms (Venus symbolism notwithstanding) or the use of coercion to back diplomacy.

For this American analyst there is one key and abiding difference between the United States and the European Union, which is at the core of the transatlantic relationship. The United States is a state, a federal state with separation of powers and checks and balances throughout but a state nonetheless. It is capable of formulating a foreign policy in defense of its national interests and of using powerful armed forces as well as economic and other tools to implement that policy. This is also true of the major powers of Europe, particularly the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The European Union is increasingly integrated as an economy, but in the realm of foreign and security policy, member states continue to call the shots. A "common'' foreign and security policy is not the same as a single policy; it reflects a clash among the national interests of its members. The American union is more complete and therefore more "rule based" than the European Union. If ever a new constitution of Europe creates an effective central government, there may be a European "national" as opposed to "common" interest. Until that happens, transatlantic relations will be characterized by the uneven and uneasy coexistence of American union national interests and European Union common interests.

The question for this same analyst is how to deal with policy divergences between the two sides. At present and in the foreseeable future, this analyst concluded, transatlantic cooperation cannot take the form of a directorate or even a partnership. But much can be acomplished through existing channels: traditional diplomacy between the United States and the power centers (that is, the key nations) in Europe and regular consultations between American policymakers and the high representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (currently Javier Solana) and his staff, which is proving to be an efficient way of conveying information and clearing up misunderstandings on both sides of the Atlantic. It would also help, the analyst added, to refrain from rhetorical overkill, end mutual recriminations, and, at the very least, do no harm.

3. Another American participant returned to the central issue of the concept of the national interest. We should proceed on the assumption (as in Hobbes) that there is no world state. Hence states are necessarily the dominant actors in the international arena. Interest is defined in terms of power; and conflict is endemic to the human condition. The primary obligation of any government is the interests of its own people. There is no automatic opposition between interests and ideals. But there is always an interrelationship between power and values and a mixture of motives. This analyst challenged the view that Britain sought to strengthen liberal democracy through a policy involving the balance of power. Central to an understanding of British policy is that the United Kingdom, in not being invaded since 1066, has been the most fortunate country in Europe. The U.S. position is quite different. A decisive shift has taken place. The United States is the only remaining superpower. Europeans resent this ascendancy and constitute an "axis of envy."

The difference between the United States and Europe today, in the view of this American participant, is that the United States is prepared to use force to defend its interests. He is more doubtful about the Europeans. He sees in Europe a tendency toward appeasement, that is, the unwarranted self-debasement of nations by the intellectual elite. The same analyst also sees American foreign policy as more complex than is usually understood by Europeans. He identifies four different strands in U.S. policy: Hamiltonian (alliance of business and politics); Jeffersonian (safeguard democracy at home, beware of allies); Jacksonian (populist defense of prosperity); and Wilsonian (moral obligation to protect democracy). The United States uses force to protect ideals as well as interests. This analyst sees no real foreign policy in Europe because there is no structure for it. He also notes the emergence of the Greens (pacifist, anti-American, and anti-Israeli) as a critical force and the problem of integrating a large Muslim population. Even though the reconciliation of France and Germany has been a success, there has been no development of a community spirit. It is not likely that such a community spirit will develop after enlargement. If there are transatlantic problems, the United States may turn away from a troublesome Europe and toward Russia and China.

4. Another American participant questioned the relevance of the concept of the balance of power today. Many Europeans are concerned that the United States is the only superpower. If the balance of power is restored, they assume that things will get better. But today the danger comes from terrorist groups, not from great powers.

5. Another American participant asked the "Passover question": Why this period of tension in transatlantic relations is different from all others? We may wonder whether the point of no return has been reached. For example, French Prime Minister Raffarin recently declared before the National Assembly that U.S. policy is "simplistic." This is hardly the language of trust. In the view of this American participant, the Europeans were humiliated in the Balkans. In Washington it appeared that the Europeans reacted by deliberately isolating the United States in international conferences. As a result, they have lost influence with the United States. Some Americans are happy with this situation because they no longer need to consult continually with the Europeans. Now we have to repair the break.

The same American participant was reminded of the old saw about the former Soviet Union: The people pretended to work, and the state pretended to pay them. In the same vein it might be said that the European Union pretends to be a full partner in security matters, and the United States pretends to consult it. The United States repays European criticism by ignoring European interests. The conflict over Iraq is creating a problem. Many Europeans believe that the United States is not coming clean and is becoming unpredictable. They see a fight between State and Defense and between the Joint Chiefs and civilians. For the first time, Europeans are frightened and concerned about bringing the United States back to the rule of law. Bush has a problem with the Europeans; he seems to be buffeted from all sides.

6. Another American participant addressed the question of anti-Americanism in Europe, which represents more than an "axis of envy." This participant agrees with some of the European participants that there are differences between the United States and Europe regarding multilateralism (Europeans are more committed than Americans) and the role of the state. Europeans really do things differently. In foreign policy the EU emphasizes legitimacy as process, which is all they can agree on. There is always a mixture of realism and idealism, this participant acknowledges. But the idealism of the Bush foreign policy reflects a brand of Straussian theory that is dangerous. The challenge of terrorism is indeed different from past challenges by states. But the United States may be forming alliances with authoritarian regimes that will lead to dangers down the road. This participant is fairly confident that Europe will be able to integrate its large Muslim population.

MANAGING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST AND ISLAM

As was mentioned in the foreword to this report, it was agreed at a preliminary meeting in Brussels in May 2002 that the agenda for the roundtable would begin with a general or theoretical theme (the national interest versus the common interest), followed by discussion of a substantive issue. After an exchange of views, it was decided to address the issue of managing relations between the West and the Islamic world.

American Perspectives

1. For one American analyst (who happens to be Muslim), the nature of the relationship between the West and the one billion people of the Muslim world (including expanding Muslim communities in Europe and the United States) has acquired a new urgency since September 11. It is necessary to clear up confusion about Islam in general and the Arab world in particular. This American analyst reviewed the basic tenets of Islam, the history of Islam, the triumph of orthodoxy after the 11th century, the (alleged) differences between mainstream Islam and fundamentalism, the militant fundamentalist agenda, and the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.

To the "silent majority" of believers, this American participant said, Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance, not of war and hatred. They nevertheless harbor admiration for people such as bin Laden, Khomeini, Saddam, and their like, as they did in the 1950s for Egypt's Nasser and Iran's Mossadegh—leaders who stood firmly against the "colonial" and "imperialist" Western powers. In fact, today's mainstream interpretations and those of militant fundamentalists do not present major differences. They deviate from one another only in implementation and tactics. Like the militants, mainstream clerics believe that being the last message of God accords "superiority" to Islam over Judaism and Christianity. Also, they believe that Islam's flag will be raised over the planet sometime in the future. They call for the observance of the sharia and for a fight to be waged against secularism. They loathe Western democracy and ways of life and oppose innovation and modernity.

The agenda of the militant fundamentalist groups is the following: (1) Expel the infidels, especially those on the soil of Saudi Arabia, where the two most sacred sites of Islam (Mecca and Medina) are located, from the House of Islam. (2) Overthrow secular leaders who befriend Western leaders, and create Muslim theocracies in their countries. (3) Remove Israel, an alien implant, from Palestine. (4) Multiply attacks and sabotage missions in the House of "Infidels." (5) Resume jihad against the West, and impose Islam throughout the planet. hi short, much of the Islamic Middle East continues to operate within parameters that are medieval and hence incompatible with the Western mind-set.

What are the causes of Islamic fundamentalism? This American analyst does not believe that widespread poverty and extreme differences between rich and poor are relevant. Khomeini's Islamic Revolution in Iran happened after Iranians emerged from poverty. People were well off; there was no unemployment; Iran was importing foreign workers. All the September 11 hijackers are from the middle classes, and bin Laden is a billionaire. Moreover, the Koran specifies that Muslims should accept their social status and should never question the poverty of some and the wealth of others because this is Allah's will. Nor can Washington's support of Israel explain the rise of radical Islam. Terror was waged as the United States was trying to build Israeli-Palestinian coexistence, not thwart it.

Cultural factors weigh more in the terrorist equation, continued this American analyst, than economic and political ones. For many centuries Muslims believed that their world was superior to the non-Muslim world. In the 19th century, when they discovered that the West had advanced well ahead of them both technologically and militarily, a feeling of humiliation became manifest. Western ideas and ways of life began to confront them in their own countries. In many cases foreign rulers imposed themselves and reduced Muslim countries to the status of colonial possessions. The feeling of humiliation reached its peak after the 1967 defeat. At that point militant fundamentalism became a force that helped Muslims restore their sense of superiority.

Can Islamic fundamentalism win? This American analyst does not believe it will or can. Militant fundamentalists have ruined the countries in which they seized power (Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan). Their terrorist activities have failed to destabilize Western societies. Militant Islamic fundamentalists cannot change the world balance of power in the near future. Unless they get hold of nuclear weapons, Islamic fundamentalists will remain a limited threat to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, they are capable of provoking havoc.

But militant terrorism may prove fatal to the Muslim world. The first wave of Islamic fundamentalism approximately eight centuries ago led to decadence, underdevelopment, and weakness. The most recent wave amounts to "a great leap backward" while the West soars ahead in its pursuit of a new scientific and technological revolution. But expanding Muslim communities in Europe and America can become a problem. Many Muslim leaders do not hide their ambition to "Islamicize" the countries in which they reside or are citizens. Fundamentalist movements have been operating freely in Europe and in America through their mosques and schools. The only way to confront such a future danger, concluded this American analyst, is to remain firm in the defense of Western values and to launch a vast educational operation designed to wrest Muslim countries from the Middle Ages and help them to live and progress in the 21st century.

In response to criticism, this same American analyst argued that the West must not show weakness. He cited several examples of Western weakness that have been exploited by fundamentalists. (1) The United Kingdom and France tried to use force in 1956 at Suez, but they were stopped by U.S. Secretary of State Dulles. As a result of their collapse, the United Kingdom and France were finished as interlocutors in the Arab world. (2) President Carter virtually boasted that the United States was powerless when confronted by Khomeini in Iran. (3) President Reagan pulled the Marines out of Lebanon. (4) President Clinton traveled to the Middle East and was deferential to Assad in Syria. (5) British Foreign Secretary Straw visited Teheran when the internal opposition was gathering its forces. The United States and Europe should project a position of strength toward the Islamic Middle East and the third world in general. This American analyst also was skeptical of the proposal for an international peace conference to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is no solution as long as we face a culture in which treaties and conventions mean nothing. After signing a peace accord with Israel, Sadat said it was a provisional step (toward the destruction of Israel). The right of return remains the key for Arabs; yet this means the destruction of Israel. We do need coordination between the United States and Europe—perhaps a permanent organ to look at the problem from the perspective of common sense.

2. Another American participant observed that the U.S. reaction to terror in the past has been weak. In response to terror attacks, the United States launched a few cruise missiles and then pulled back. Does this not mean that the United States should use decisive force to show that we are not intimidated? Should we not have a Reagan Doctrine for the Middle East? The long-term problem remains: How do we manage modernization in the Middle East?

3. For another American participant the core question in the Middle East is whether Israel's existence is legitimate. A large part of the Arab population seeks to destroy Israel and to drive Christians as well as Jews out of the Middle East. The notion of a crusade is crucial in the Arab mentality and has to be eliminated. Major responsibility for modernizing the Middle East rests with the Arabs. The United Nations recently published a report on Arab Human Development, which is a devastating document. The report devotes only a few pages to Israel; most of it deals with the internal problems of Arab society. The underlying problem is that all Arab states are authoritarian and lack creativity and a spirit of innovation. Saudi Arabia promotes the control of education by militant Islamic fundamentalists. Yet the Durban Conference did not pay the slightest attention to the problems of Arab society. It placed all blame on Israel rather than on the Arab political class. This American participant believe that ultimately the solution lies in democratization throughout the Middle East, which is the only way in which human development will progress.

4. Another American participant said that Islamic fundamentalism posed a special problem for the Israelis. In order to contain fundamentalism there is a need for secular education and democracy. It would be counterproductive to give to Islamic militants rights and freedoms they would use to destroy democracy itself. This is a general problem wherever antidemocratic movements seek to overthrow democratic political systems. Withholding rights from some groups may be justified in some contexts.

5. Another American participant observed that the transatlantic relationship is being corroded by the Middle East problem. The Europeans are not as aware as Americans of the danger of Islamic fundamentalism. At a recent conference sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, American Muslim scholars and former Muslim diplomats concluded unanimously that Arabs would never accept Israel in their midst. There is a widespread belief in the United States that Europeans would sell Israel down the river in order to appease Islamic fundamentalists. This may reflect also a rise of classic anti-Semitism in Europe. We seem to find ourselves in a situation in which Europe does not have credibility in Israel and the United States does not have credibility in the Arab world.

European Perspectives

1. One European analyst presented a broad review of security problems that face all Western countries in the Middle East, a region that ranges from Egypt to Turkey. The intrusion of the West into the Arab world has left a bitter legacy. The heavy-handed British presence in drawing boundaries (e.g., Iraq, Kuwait), controlling local governments (Egypt, Iraq), and interfering in internal affairs (Iran) has left a legacy exacerbated by subsequent U.S. actions and Israeli aggression. This legacy casts shadows on Western actions even when they are justified objectively by the circumstances. There is a major ideological battle to be waged, but it will take several generations. Many of the regimes are authoritarian; there is little outlet for even legitimate dissent. A series of panaceas, including Arab nationalism and Arab socialism, has failed. Having once been associated with success and a leading civilization, Islam now appears to be associated with failure. It has yet to go through the equivalent of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment. Educating the young to understand and accept modernity will be a longlasting task made more complicated by the fundamentalist education supported in many states by oil wealth and charitable foundations.

This same European analyst sees Zionism as a problem for the West. From an entirely understandable and even laudable reaction to conditions in 19th century Russia, Zionism, in some hands, came to be an aggressive ideology based on narrow and selfish ends pursued regardless of the rights and claims of others. The failure by Israeli governments to disown continuing aggression and unlawful actions (settlements), to address the claims of those displaced by ethnic cleansing, and to make clear that Israel does not harbor ambitions to incorporate Judea and Samaria fuels Arab fears and sense of injustice. The heavy-handed reactions to terrorism, threats over water, and the prevention of the growth of a viable Palestinian economy create massive resentment and breed further terrorism. Even if the founding of Israel had gone quietly, according to the same European analyst, there would have been problems. Some responsibility is ascribed to President Truman, who wished to compel the entry of Jews into Israel (but not the United States), and did not furnish American troops to help do the job. Much U.S. policy in the region over the last 50 years has raised grave doubts not only there but also in Europe about its wisdom and balance. The Middle East, and not solely the current contretemps over Iraq, threatens to provide one of the greatest divides between Europe and the United States. In the view of this European analyst, American policies, driven by interest groups, have provided unthinking support for Israel. The sense of American exceptionalism--the feeling that the United States has a mission to spread democracy and free market economics throughout the world and that it is not and should not be bound by the rules that apply to others--provokes adverse reactions from those who believe strongly in other ways or are convinced that U.S. policies are unfair. The Middle East has a major concentration of such people. Paradoxically, one of the complaints is that the United States does not spread democracy in dealing with some of the regimes there.

What should be done? This European analyst concludes it is in the common interests of the United States and Europe to ameliorate the problems of the Middle East and to inculcate a wider acceptance of modernity. That means fostering benign political developments, creating a more positive image of the West, and alleviating injustices that are within the power of the West to do something about. Unfortunately, the United States and Europe see different problems, would use different tools to address the problems, and so will not have the impact on the region that they should.

In principle, this same European analyst added, the United States and Europe should first try to come to joint understandings and then apply their combined weight to deal with issues. Unfortunately, that is unlikely. The Europeans lack the ability to make collective coherent policies over a wide range of issues; U.S. policies are too subject to peculiar domestic pressures to develop objectively. Therefore, a mess that in any case would be a challenge for two generations may well drag on indefinitely, threatening peace and prosperity in the region and beyond.

After some discussion this same European analyst asked what grand lessons could be drawn? There is transatlantic agreement on the need for modernization of the Arab world, but the solution is unclear. There is European-American discord over Iran (the United States boycotts Iran; Europe wishes to engage it) and Israel (in principle there should be economic leverage over both Arabs and Israelis by both the United States and the EU). It all comes down to a pressing need for U.S.-European dialogue.

2. Another European participant identified the major problems in the Middle East as (a) Iraq and what to do about its weapons of mass destruction. (b) Palestine. (c) The broader process of Arab state failure. What is to be done? We need a program of sustained, strategic reform in the Middle East. The challenge is of the order of magnitude of the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. It is not enough to destroy terrorist training camps; we need not only to kill the crocodile but also to drain the swamp.

The performance of the West in Afghanistan is not encouraging. Neither Europe nor the United States has delivered enough. Despite appearances, military intervention has not worked. In order to meet a short-term need for military bases, the United States has allied itself with repressive regimes. This policy hardly encourages needed reforms. The Bush administration, for this European participant, is shortsighted. Also, Europe has a view of the Palestine problem that is quite different from that of the United States. For Europeans the issue is occupation. Until we can negotiate a political settlement and create a two-state solution, Israel will not have security. This European participant sees no solution or possibility for a common U.S.-EU policy. One recent suggestion by Tony Blair has been ignored by the United States: to convoke an international peace conference before the end of the year. Despite his pessimism, this European participant observed that we all agree on what the deal would look like. If combined pressure could be applied on both parties (the United States on Israel, the EU on the Arabs), we could do something useful.

But developments on the ground, particularly the extension of settlements, are making things more difficult. We are stuck in an endless cycle of violence. A battle is raging for the Palestinian soul, which may be summed up as peace now or Hamas later. Mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be a good transatlantic project. But this European participant is pessimistic about the prospects.

3. Another European participant noted how hard it is to deal with Islamic fundamentalists. They can interpret even defeat as victory. Their total objective is global triumph. But there are more manageable tactical objectives, for example, gaining power in one or two countries. Can fundamentalists learn from their mistakes? A key role can be played by moderate Arab regimes. We would like these regimes to develop economically yet remain stable. But this may be a contradiction because change is unsettling. One issue for the West is whether to deal with problems singly or as a package. Dealing with problems singly is easier but may be perceived as the classic Western policy of divide and rule.

As regards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this European participant noted that Israelis and Arabs were allied and opposed to the Europeans on agricultural policy at the Barcelona Conference. Some Europeans believe that the EU should enter the area more aggressively, using as a bargaining chip the possible entry of Israel into the EU. But this same European participant believes it would be a mistake to carve out Israel politically from the Middle East. Israel should accept the idea that it is a Middle Eastern state. Otherwise it will never have security. There should be more contacts between the West and the Arab world, which would provide a sounder basis for solutions.

4. Another European participant said that we can all agree on Israel's right to exist. Europe will defend that right. But Israel's tactics are an issue. If the United Kingdom had behaved in Northern Ireland the way Israel has behaved, there would have been an explosion of public anger. Palestinians have not been treated as human beings. The United States and Europe play different roles in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Iraq, for this European participant, is a state aiming to dominate the region through weapons of mass destruction. The region is vital to all our interests. But policy is now decided through major players. The United States and Europe have different policies and should not be played off against each other. For this European participant, the next step should be a Euro-American peace conference. We should talk not of victory but of progressive stabilization and combined U.S.-EU cooperation, including peacekeeping troops. In that case, Europe would have the right to formulate policy with the United States.

CONCLUSION

There was general agreement in the roundtable that the current transatlantic crisis is perhaps the worst in the past half-century. The underlying cause according to both European and American analysts is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no longer a danger of a massive attack on the West by a hostile superpower. The danger now comes from terrorist networks and regional instability outside of Western Europe. There is less need on the part of the United States for European allies and on the part of Europeans for an American security shield.

Points of Contention

Europeans and Americans in the roundtable have drawn different if not diametrically opposed conclusions from these changed circumstances. For most European participants it is time to redefine security and renegotiate the transatlantic security contract. There is no longer a need for massive armed forces. Hence the American military buildup is irrelevant if not counterproductive. Europe is not at a disadvantage on this score. The need now is for small, mobile Rapid Reaction and Special Forces. European Special Forces are as good as (if not better than) those of the United States. On the military level, then, Europeans are the equals of Americans. As regards meeting such challenges as modernizing the Islamic mind-set, promoting human development in the third world, and managing crises, the European Union is becoming more expert than the United States. One European participant asked, "Why should not Europe lead?."

For American participants the capability of using overwhelming force is just as necessary as ever in the postcold-war world. The attacks of 9/11 were virtually invited by the weakness and vacillation of the United States in responding to previous acts of terror. One lesson of the Afghan campaign is that Special Forces are effective only when they coordinate with the massive and expert use of precision-guided munitions delivered from the air. Of critical importance are nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, B 52s operating from the United States and elsewhere, and nearby bases made available by regimes that know where their interests lie. The Europeans have a long way to go before they can create effective Rapid Reaction Forces as well as structures through which to formulate coherent foreign policies. Regarding the military sector, then, U.S. primacy within the transatlantic alliance necessarily will continue in the foreseeable future. Concerning managing crises and helping to modernize Islam in particular and the third world in general, both the United States and Europe have valuable experience and play separate roles. Modernization is a complex process that produces a range of political reactions, including the rejection of Western intrusion and a reaffirmation of traditional values. Coordination is always desirable but cannot be cast in terms of contractual obligations.

Sharp disagreement also emerged on the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some European participants expressed the belief that the central issue is the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, ethnic cleansing by the Israelis, and the harsh treatment of Palestinians.

American participants expressed the belief that the central issue is Israel's right to exist and its legitimacy. The right of return would mean the destruction of Israel. Every other issue, including the settlements, can be negotiated and indeed was negotiated at Camp David. But the Palestinians rejected the deal.

An Agenda

What can be done to repair the transatlantic breach? Both sides agreed that cooperation between the United States and Europe would make it easier to deal with all pressing international issues. A number of suggestions were made on both sides. It would be useful to apply the techniques of conflict resolution to transatlantic relations. We could try to identify interests that the United States and Europe have in common, propose actions that have a chance of succeeding, and then build on even limited accomplishments in order to create a climate of greater confidence. The areas of common action could include redesigning NATO and adapting it to new challenges and considering ways to cooperate in managing relations with the Islamic world. There could be common approaches toward facilitating contacts between the West and Islam through educational exchanges and conferences. Euro-American policies could be better coordinated to promote democracy and human development in the Arab world. It might even be possible to reduce the area of disagreement concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A critical role in exploring options is played by civil society and in particular groups like this roundtable, which brings together analysts and former government officials for far-ranging, free, and frank discussion, One European participant observed that this roundtable, consisting of core members providing continuity over a long period, is unique among the many groups studying the transatlantic relationship.

The group decided to hold the next roundtable in Geneva in May or June 2002 in order to consider possible common or parallel responses to common challenges. Among the issues that might be placed on the agenda are the campaign against terrorism and promoting human development in the Middle East.

In alphabetical order for each side, the participants are listed below.

THE UNITED STATES

• Bernard E. Brown (political science, CUNY Graduate School, and director of the NCAFP Transatlantic Relations Project)
• Herman J. Cohen (professorial lecturer, School of Advanced Studies of Johns Hopkins University, and former assistant secretary of state for African affairs)
• Michael Curtis (political science, Rutgers University, and member of the Executive Committee of the NCAFP)
• Richard N. Gardner (professor of law and international organization, Columbia Law School, and former U.S. ambassador to Italy and Spain)
• Fereydoun Hoveyda (senior fellow; member of the Executive Committee, NCAFP; and former Iranian ambassador to the UN)
• William M. Rudolf (executive vice-president, NCAFP)
• Michael Rywkin (Russian Area Studies, CCNY, and member of the NCAFP)
• Martin Schain (political science and director, Center for European Studies, New York University)
• George D. Schwab (president, NCAFP)

EUROPE

• Steven Everts (senior research fellow, Center for European Reform, London)
• William Hopkinson (associate fellow, RUSI and RIIA, London)
• Jolyon Howorth (European Studies, University of Bath, England)
• Julian Lindley-French, (senior research fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris)
• Stefano Silvestri (president, Institute for International Affairs, Rome)

OBSERVERS

• Giusseppe Ammendola (member of the Board of Advisers, NCAFP)
• Edward Goldberg (president, F. J. Elsner, N.A., Ltd., and NCAFP member)
• Steven E. Sokol (vice-president, American Council on Germany)